

This book's challenges do not detract from its important contribution as a reasonable source of optimism. It is helpful to be reminded that we have a global environmental agenda, work spaces, and persistent environmental institutional structures. Readers who teach or practice sustainability will be gratified to learn that they are bees who matter.

Compliant Rebels: Rebel Groups and International Law in World Politics. By Hyeran Jo. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015. 354p. \$120.00.
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— Bridget L. Coggins, *University of California, Santa Barbara*

A substantial body of work examines the conditions under which states commit to and abide by human rights and the laws of war, but we know considerably less about civil conflicts than international ones and less about rebel groups' adherence than we do governments'. Professor Hyeran Jo's book, *Compliant Rebels*, seeks to fill this gap. It asks, "Why do rebels comply with international norms and laws during civil war?" The answer to this question (together with the answer to the same question for governments) has critically important implications. It may ultimately help minimize civilian suffering in civil wars, encourage practices that more closely conform to the ideals contained in international humanitarian law (IHL), and it could help humanitarian-minded organizations and governments to more effectively allocate their scarce resources to affect change.

So, among rebels, who complies? Jo argues that a certain category of rebel organization, the "legitimacy-seeking" type, is more likely to abide by IHL than the other "legitimacy indifferent" type. Legitimacy-seeking rebels have a domestic and international constituency that supports the norms enshrined in IHL and so, for principally strategic reasons, will more likely comply with its rules. Legitimacy-seeking rebels have three characteristics in common: 1) they have an active [legal] political wing, 2) they have secessionist ambitions, and 3) they have a "human rights-conscious" foreign government benefactor (pp. 94–100). Legitimacy indifferent rebels, in contrast, "have little to no motivation to appeal to domestic and international constituencies" (p. 52). After setting out this argument, the book quantitatively examines legitimacy-seeking rebels' propensity to comply with three humanitarian laws: against the purposeful killing of civilians, against the use of child soldiers, and in favor of access to prisoners of war by the Red Cross (ICRC). Case vignettes are included alongside each large-N analysis to illustrate the mechanism connecting legitimacy-seeking motives to those rebels' compliance. The book concludes with historical and contemporary cases of rebellion and then makes recommendations for policies following from its principal findings.

Insofar as causality is concerned, this is a thorny subject. Norm compliance, a classic non-event, has bedeviled scholars for decades. So the question motivating this book is a very good one. Unfortunately, this reader remains stubbornly unconvinced that rebels' drive for legitimacy is at the root of their lawful wartime behavior.

The book's primary limit is that it lacks a theory of civil war to support its hypotheses. Five guiding assumptions about rebels are provided, (e.g.: that they fight for political ends, that compliance is costly, etc.) but the book does not provide a compelling reason why it is usually in rebels' best interest to violate humanitarian laws. Humanitarian laws exist because state leaders agreed that the outlawed practices were generally not required or desirable in war. Why is it *ceteris paribus* militarily advantageous for rebels to engage in the one-sided killing of civilians? Ought rebels be regularly, purposively killing civilians if they hope to win? What level of killing should we expect? Additionally, some of the conflicts in the project data are killing tens of thousands (Russia—Chechnya) while others are just surpassing 25 annual battle related deaths (Britain—Real IRA). Civilian killing seems much more likely in the former. In the latter, would child soldiers be desirable? Would the rebels hold prisoners? Would the ICRC request visits if no prisoners are held? In short, the nature of the conflict and scale of its violence seem important, and yet they are overlooked.

Therefore, it is unclear that rebel compliance is really "a puzzle." To illustrate, take the assumption that compliance is costly for rebels. Pages 91–92 report that 51% of rebel groups did not engage in any one-sided killing of civilians (>25 purposive killings in one year) during their wars. Indeed, where temporal data on civilian killing is presented in Appendix 3, it appears that most rebels are complying with IHL most of the time. The book concludes that these "persistent compliers" weighed the costs of not killing against the benefits of legitimacy and legitimacy concerns won-out. But when a rule is internalized, compliance is not considered in terms of the 'logic of consequence,' but via the 'logic of appropriateness.' Therefore, it is just as reasonable to conclude that, for the majority of rebels, compliance is *costless* because they do not consider slaughtering civilians to begin with. The so-called "switchover" compliers (and switchover non-compliers) seem to hold the most important evidence of the book's argument, but are not tested quantitatively.

While the book marshals an impressive array of data to support its claims, some of the modeling choices also limit the book's findings. For example, legitimacy-seeker qualification number three (above) seems as likely to be a result of the character of the organization's wartime actions as a cause (and a similar problem may arise with qualification 1). Would be sponsors with a strong IHL commitment should be more likely to offer support to

those already complying with IHL. The logic underlying the qualification is similarly unclear. If a rebel group has an external sponsor with a vibrant humanitarian law constituency, then it follows that it has an incentive to comply with IHL. But rebels without a sponsor might also *want* one, and following IHL should be more likely to get them one with an active, domestic IHL constituency. Wouldn't these groups be legitimacy-seekers too?

Further, with respect to child soldiering, the book employs the higher, more controversial age of 18 in the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) rather than the universally accepted 15, but does not explain this choice or code the alternative. In the analysis of child soldiers, secessionists are also curiously argued to be more likely to violate IHL than other types of rebels because they have domestic legitimacy. This logic suggests that secessionist child soldiers are more likely volunteers than conscripts, but does not help us to understand why children would be systematically more likely to be used in secessionist conflicts than in others. And when examining child soldiering, the analysis appears to select on a "legally allowed political wing," dropping over half of the observations from the data. These choices have important consequences for what kinds of inferences we are able to draw from the analyses and should be explained.

In sum, this book addresses an important topic with many potentially significant policy implications. It certainly delivers a provocative initial explanation for rebels' humanitarian impulses in civil war. I have questions about its analysis. Given the sensitive subject matter, the paucity of good data, and the complexities involved in examining the causal power of norms, the modeling decisions should be given special care. At the same time, as a first foray into an important, inherently difficult subject matter, it will surely be widely read and debated by scholars and practitioners with interests in advancing humanitarian law.

Drone Warfare. By John Kaag and Sarah Kreps. Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2014. 200p. \$69.95 cloth, \$19.95 paper.
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— John Williams, *Durham University*

In *Drone Warfare* John Kaag and Sarah Kreps offer an introduction to key debates about the rapid rise of armed drones in contemporary military conflicts. Accessible to non-specialists, and therefore with plenty of potential as a key teaching resource, Kaag and Kreps nevertheless demonstrate just how extensive a challenge drones represent to established thinking about the politics, law, and ethics of warfare via a sophisticated discussion of current mainstream debates. For those unfamiliar with the technology of current armed drones, the book also includes a helpful primer. Kaag and Kreps are clear that their focus

is on armed drones, so the book only addresses in passing what remains the predominant military role of drones: the provision of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance functions. Neither does it do more than touch on civilian uses of drones.

At heart, this is a call to action to recognize the challenge armed drones represent and how their accelerating deployment by the United States is driven by political and military logics that are inadequately scrutinized; rely on permissive interpretations of international and, in some instances U.S. domestic, law; and that neuter effective ethical debate. The potential consequences of U.S. practice, argue Kaag and Kreps (pp. 147–57), has potentially seriously detrimental implications as armed drones proliferate to more states and to non-state actors. These four issues: democratic scrutiny and the role of drones in U.S. politics; the role of international law in restraining the use of armed drones; the need for effective ethical debate and education about a transformatory technology; and the challenges to future regulation of globalized armed drones provide the four principal sections of the book.

Kaag and Kreps do an excellent job of setting out how armed drone use creates concerns in all four instances. For example, they highlight the low levels of Congressional and legal scrutiny that presently exist within the United States, reinforced by, and reinforcing, public opinion strongly supportive of a technology seen as killing 'terrorists' whilst reducing, even eliminating, U.S. casualties in parts of the world where deploying U.S. forces is militarily and politically difficult and dangerous. This reduces the democratic restraints imposed by a citizenry liable to bear the costs, in blood and treasure, of their leaders' military adventures, emboldening those leaders to reach for the military option (pp. 53–77). This links to an ethical concern about the extent to which the extraordinary capabilities of drones reinforces a belief in the possibility of 'surgical' strikes that thus a tendency to see political problems in such terms, irrespective of the appropriateness of that framing. When you have more and better scalpels, everything starts to look like a tumor (pp. 98–9; 117–121).

This is illustrative of Kaag and Kreps' success in sustaining linkages across the book's four main sections. A further instance is their analysis of international legal debates, which is critical of what they see as excessively permissive interpretations of key principles of self-defense and imminence by the U.S. government (pp. 82–6), links to the final section's call for U.S. self-denial and to champion multilateral controls to limit other governments in making very similar arguments in pursuit of action highly detrimental to U.S. interests and wider international order (pp. 137–43; 151–6).

Kaag and Kreps skilfully demonstrate the complexity and interconnectedness of aspects of the drone debate,