## Addendum

## The IMF As a Biased Global Insurance Mechanism: Asymmetrical Moral Hazard, Reserve Accumulation, and Financial Crises

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doi: 10.1017/S0020818318000371. Published by Cambridge University Press, 2018.

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## Reference

Lipscy, P., & H. Lee. 2019. The IMF As a Biased Global Insurance Mechanism: Asymmetrical Moral Hazard, Reserve Accumulation, and Financial Crises. *International Organization* 73 (1): 35–64.