

RESEARCH ARTICLE

Differentiated reputation effects on trust in ability and dedication: A coproducer selection context[†]

Chin-Wen Chang^{1*} and Cheng-Min Chuang²

¹Fu Jen Catholic University, New Taipei, Taiwan and ²National Taiwan University, Taipei, Taiwan

*Corresponding author. Email: 143718@mail.fju.edu.tw

(Received 19 March 2016; revised 30 August 2016; accepted 31 May 2019; first published online 8 July 2019)

Abstract

Research has demonstrated that trusting belief in one's ability is critical to coproducer selection; however, the importance of trusting belief in dedication has been ignored. This study aims to explore how reputation (i.e., word-of-mouth, certification, and recommendation) affects trusting belief in a potential coproducer's ability and dedication and examines its mediating effects in coproducing with a potential partner.

Empirical results show significant mediating effects of trusting belief in a potential coproducer's ability from certification, word-of-mouth, and recommendation, which in turn motivate coproduction, whereas certification leads to the motivation for coproduction through trusting belief in a potential coproducer's dedication. The findings refer to a unitary acceptance of ability but a divergent recognition of dedication. The focal party may regard certification as factual without personal distortion, while the recommendation is an evaluation worth considering. In considering dedication, the focal party may be unable to assess the extent of distortion from second-hand information (e.g., word-of-mouth).

Key words: trusting belief in ability; trusting belief in dedication; coproduction; signaling theory; social network perspective

Do you trust your coproducer's ability?

Do you trust your coproducer's dedication in this coproduction?

Does a partner with high ability but low dedication and a partner with both great ability and dedication mean the same thing to you?

These questions represent the focal party's concerns when selecting a coproducing partner. The rise of coproduction is derived from market uncertainty, such as heterogeneous and ambiguous tasks, infrequent and unpredictable demands, high degrees of customization, and rapidly changing customer preferences (Nightingale, Baden-Fuller, & Hopkins, 2011; Skilton, 2011). Instead of accumulating resources themselves to face market uncertainty, focal parties turn to coproduction to gain access to other parties' resources. Previous studies mainly focused on the potential partner's ability and suggested how it influences the willingness to work together (Auh, Bell, McLeod, & Shih, 2007; Chen, Tsou, & Ching, 2011; Hitt, Dacin, Levitas, Arregle, & Borza, 2000).

Assessing the ability of a potential partner is necessary; however, the 'coproduction' used in this study is not merely the equivalent of collaboration but embodies cospecialization. Cospecialization makes coproducer selection a serious process because a wrong choice endangers the focal party. Cospecialization refers to the use of one party's resource depending on how the

[†]The original version of this article was published with an incorrect author affiliation. A notice detailing this has been published and the error rectified in the online and print PDF and HTML copies.

other party's resource is utilized (Chi, 1994). Thus, cospecialization inevitably induces performance ambiguity (Alchian & Demsetz, 1972; Poppo, Zhou, & Zenger, 2008). The difficulty in dividing the contribution in coproduction forces the focal party to assess not only the potential coproducer's ability but also the extent of ability utilization (i.e., dedication). The high-dedicated coproducer exerts more ability and offers better performance than that of the low-dedicated coproducer. However, previous research has not explored the importance of dedication in the coproduction or trust-related literature. Thus, assessing and having trusting belief in the potential partner's dedication are emphasized in this study, with equal importance given to ability.

Moreover, coproduction may occur in interdisciplinary work, in which coproducers belong to heterogeneous groups, such as different industries. As the focal party does not know the coproducer before the first coproduction, the focal party relies on reputation to solve the problem of information asymmetry. Reputation involves an estimation of one's skills and other attributes necessary to the exchange (Fombrun, 1996). Previous studies also assert that positive reputation induces cooperation (Connelly, Certo, Ireland, & Reutzel, 2011; Doney & Cannon, 1997; Ganesan, 1994; Kewell, 2007; Lester, Mencl, Maranto, Bourne, & Keaveny, 2010; Money, Hillenbrand, Day, & Magnan, 2010; Wagner, Coley, & Lindemann, 2011). By assessing reputation, the focal party may gain an understanding of the underlying quality of the potential partner. However, few works have addressed the source of reputation, while the importance of the reputation effect has been highlighted.

A comprehensive definition of reputation involves various sources of reputation, and the focal party interprets the sources differently. For example, certified partners and recommended partners may suggest different kinds of bonds between the focal party and the potential partner. Certification is a form of proof provided by an impartial party (Connelly et al., 2011; Lester et al., 2010), and the bond between the certified partner and the focal party may be the trust in the third party's professionalism. However, the relationship between the recommended partner and the focal party may be emotional, such as friendship. Different kinds of bonds imply different perceptions of the information. Therefore, recognizing the source of reputation warrants our attention.

This paper focuses on the less addressed viewpoint, examining, in one study, the effect of reputation from different sources. Specifically, the study investigates the motivation to work with a potential coproducer based on the mediating effects of trust in the potential coproducer's ability and dedication, as derived from different reputational sources (i.e., certification, word-of-mouth, and recommendation). The analysis focuses on the initial coproducer selection, specifically, the period before engagement in the long-term coproducing relationship (i.e., the motivation to coproduce). The results support the view that reputation has different impacts on the focal party's trusting belief in the attributes of the potential partner.

Literature Review

Context of trust: coproduction

Coproduction is a new paradigm in the management literature, allowing participants to share resources in joint work. Participants may gain access to new resources and abilities through coproduction without having to build competency in these areas. Thus, coproduction provides not only flexibility in responding to demand uncertainty (Skilton, 2011) but also an efficient way to improve quality (Smith, 1963).

The coproduction first appeared in Kogut (1986)'s article. Kogut (1986) used coproduction to explain the self-enforcing contract of East-West trade, and the bilateral asset-specific investments were emphasized in that case. Hennart (1989) then used the term of transaction-specific investments in reference to coproduction.

Seemingly, coproduction in the sense used here is not simply a term for collaboration or team production. Although similar terms refer to coproduction, it may be best understood as a cospecialized context: the specialized cooperation with bilateral dependence. Chi (1994) followed the

term Teece (1986) used and explained that cospecialization refers to the use of one party's resource that depends on how the other party's resource is utilized sequentially. Therefore, cospecialization implies that the coproducer's work must follow the states that the focal party provides. Hence, cospecialization in coproduction makes coproduction unique to other forms of collaboration.

Cospecialization in coproduction can be thought of as two attributes from the literature: asset specificity and performance ambiguity. First, coproduction involves the essence of asset specificity, which may not necessarily occur in a team production. Asset specificity infers that the investments in this coproduction are valueless outside the relationship, and the party that leaves the relationship may suffer from the loss of this asset-specific investment (Ganesan, 1994; Kogut, 1986). Asset-specific investments are present in many forms, such as the accumulation of knowledge or the adaptation of a particular working process. As Kogut (1986) stated, the production of firm one is valueless without the product information or nonfungible capital assets provided by firm two. Thus, coproducing parties are inclined to maintain a long-term relationship to avoid potential losses (Fenwick & McMillan, 2013; Skilton, 2011).

Second, coproduction may engender performance ambiguity, which derived from bilateral dependence. Performance ambiguity refers to the difficulty in attributing the contribution of each firm to output (Alchian & Demsetz, 1972; Poppo, Zhou, & Zenger, 2008), which may be similar to the problems confronted by a team production. Specifically, Alchian and Demsetz (1972) suggested that successful exchange happens when rewards to productivity are linked effectively. That is, the productivity of each contributor can be measured and rewarded in accord with productivity. However, mutual dependence on resources prevents the focal party from being able to accurately measure and reward productivity. Coproducers thus have incentives to limit their efforts, leading to lower performance or an overcharging situation. In this case, the top priority of focal parties is to understand whether the coproducers did their best.

Moreover, poor coproducing output cannot be traced to a specific party due to the interrelated coproducing processes. Performance ambiguity in coproduction thus prevents the parties from being able to divide responsibility and thus have to solve the unexpected problem together. If the coproducers are unwilling to exert themselves to fix the problem, the irresponsible behavior may place the focal party at risk. Hence, coproducing with those characterized by high-propensity dedication may be a reasonable solution to the problems caused by performance ambiguity.

Considering the potential risk and loss, selecting a trustworthy coproducer *ex-ante* may diminish the potential failure costs (Larson, 1994). Hence, it is reasonable to assume that the focal party regards coproducer selection as essential to a desirable output and they approach it with caution.

Dimensions of trust in coproduction: ability and dedication

Trust is defined as the willingness of a party to be vulnerable to the actions of another party (Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995); it has been found to be a multidimensional construct (Butler, 1991). Thus, the trustor may have trusting belief in one aspect of the trustee but not necessarily have trusting belief in the other aspect of the trustee. For example, a competent one may be an influential mentor in the field. The ability is assured; however, it is doubtful if he is willing to deliver his knowledge to the protégé. To elaborate this argument, this study starts by introducing ability as one of the dimensions Mayer, Davis, and Schoorman (1995) identified.

Mayer, Davis, and Schoorman (1995) referred to ability as the group of skills and competencies that enable a party to have influence within some specific domain. Specifically, trusting belief in ability can be understood as the perception of the thoroughness with which the trustee approaches their jobs or the abundance of knowledge possessed by the trustee (McKnight, Choudhury, & Kacmar, 2002a). Different terms with similar meanings have also appeared in prior studies: resources (Kogut, 1986), competence (Butler & Cantrell, 1984; Levin & Cross,

2004; McKnight, Cummings, & Chervany, 1998), partner expertise (Auh et al., 2007; Chen, Tsou, & Ching, 2011), and task reliability (Sitkin & Roth, 1993).

McKnight, Cummings, and Chervany (1998) suggested that in the initial relationship, trust intention is formed by the trusting belief in ability. Mayer and Davis (1999) proved that the perception of ability leads to trust in top management. Moreover, the vital role of a trusting belief in ability is noted by McKnight, Choudhury, and Kacmar (2002a). They summarized 32 trust-related studies and found 17 articles that mentioned the trusting belief in ability. Following this argument, Kelton, Fleischmann, and Wallace (2008) addressed the importance of trusting belief in ability and argued that this belief is the basis of confidence in the ability of the trustee to fulfill the trustor's needs. Further, Kim and Han (2009) suggested that a trusting belief in ability assuages focal parties' concerns about the competence of the trustee, which facilitates continuous contact with the trustee. Song and Zahedi (2007) proved that the focal party's trusting belief in ability is positively associated with the intention to use the platform provided by the trustee. Moreover, the trusting belief in ability was proved to positively affect the willingness to purchase by assuring the focal party of the trustee's competence (McKnight, Choudhury, & Kacmar, 2002b).

In the coproduction literature, previous studies also substantiated the positive relationship between ability and the incentive to engage in coproduction (Auh et al., 2007; Chen, Tsou, & Ching, 2011). Following Chen, Tsou, and Ching (2011)'s statement that the success of coproduction is derived from the ability the coproducer brings to the partnership, this study included ability as one of the key factors. The trusting belief in ability is defined as the focal party's trusting belief in the skill and knowledge possessed by the potential coproducing partner (i.e., the coproducer) to complete the task.

Dedication is another critical factor emphasized in this study, referring to the effort that the coproducer decides to exert on tasks. The concept of dedication is complementary to the concept of ability due to its inability to describe the extent to which the coproducers use their abilities. A partner of high ability but low dedication may provide what is required by the focal party; however, a partner of great ability and dedication may possibly perform beyond the focal party's expectations. To amend the explanatory power of ability, the concept of dedication was distinguished and emphasized.

Though dedication has been less frequently addressed in the coproduction or trust-related literature, it has been inferred in the psychology and managerial fields. Yeo and Neal (2004) used a similar term, effort, to suggest that dedication is positively associated with performance. The positive relationship between effort spent and performance is also referred to in De Jong and Elfring (2010)'s work. Moreover, Graves, Ruderman, Ohlott, and Weber (2012) suggested that highly dedicated partners are prone to exhibit superior performance. Considering performance ambiguity in a coproducing context, the influence of dedication on performance, and the insufficient explanatory power of ability, the introduction of dedication to the coproduction or trust-related literature may explain the concerns of the focal party in the coproducing relationship and fill the void of existing constructs.

High dedication implies the willingness to exert effort with respect to task performance and work in a highly cooperative way. Thus, dedication may indicate strong involvement in one's work (Schaufeli, Shimazu, & Taris, 2009), demonstrating motivation to exert effort even in the face of setbacks (De Jong & Elfring, 2010) or the willingness to make specific investments (Bensaou & Anderson, 1999).

Dedication may stem from intrinsic interest, such as the feeling of responsibility to complete one's job (Graves et al., 2012), job recognition, work engagement (Schaufeli, Shimazu, & Taris, 2009), self-discipline (Van Scotter & Motowidlo, 1996), or the honor of participating. Therefore, coproducers may have an egocentric profit motive to improve the performance of a joint work because a successful coproduction may bring them more job opportunities. Or they may base their work on beliefs such as job recognition and self-fulfillment. In either case, the

primary intention is not to benefit the focal party, but it ultimately sustains or even improves the performance.

Hence, this study separates the definition of dedication from benevolence; Mayer, Davis, and Schoorman (1995) suggested that benevolence is the trait of a trustee who wants to help the trustor for reasons other than the egocentric profit motive. Dedication benefits the coproduction outcome and is welcomed by the focal party, although the reason for the dedication does not fit within the bounds of benevolence. Thus, deliberation upon performance improvement may have a higher priority for the focal party than determining the intentions of coproducers. Accordingly, the core consideration of the trusting belief in dedication is the extent of the coproducer's effort regardless of altruism or egoism.

Moreover, integrity is not emphasized in this study, although Mayer, Davis, and Schoorman (1995) mentioned it as the third dimension of trust. Following the previous literature, perceived integrity derives from the perception of the trustee's sense of justice (Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995), fairness toward others (Mayer & Davis, 1999), and their moral characteristics (Butler, 1991; Butler & Cantrell, 1984). However, the context of this research emphasizes selecting an initial coproducer, which implies that the coproducing relationship has not started yet. These definitions of integrity seem more applicable to an existing relationship, for example, discussing the employee's intention to quit or stay in the company. Further, Butler and Cantrell (1984)'s empirical study showed that ability is significantly stronger than integrity in determining trust. Butler (1991) then suggested that some trust dimensions may be more crucial than other dimensions in certain conditions. After considering the relatedness in this coproducing context and the relative importance of ability and integrity, the aspect of integrity is thus not emphasized in this study.

In sum, performance constitutes the ability that each party brings to this relationship (Chen, Tsou, & Ching, 2011) and how it is used. Since the indigenous essence of coproduction implies the uncountable share of the contribution from each party, it is reasonable to concentrate on the dimension of ability and an added dimension, dedication, when discussing coproducer selection.

Process of trust: signaling-based trust and trust transference

The focus of this study is investigating coproducer selection for first-time selectors who have had no previous interaction with the coproducer; therefore, the literature on initial trust is the key to our discussion.

McKnight, Cummings, and Chervany (1998) theorized that initial trust is affected by three factors – personal-based trust, institution-based trust, and cognitive-based trust. Personal-based trust is the propensity of trustors to trust others, which is developed during their early life experience. Institution-based trust describes trust as reflecting the security the trustors feel about a situation because of formal rules and procedures defined by a legal structure (Zucker, 1986). Cognitive-based trust is grounded in the trustors' initial perceptions or received cognitive cues (Meyerson, Weick, & Kramer, 1995). These processes of trust have shown their influence in the existing literature and infer the active role of the trustor in the trustor–trustee relationship. It seems that the trustees wait passively for trustors to trust them and are unable to influence circumstances.

However, when the relationship has not started, and the information between the focal party (i.e., trustor) and the coproducer (i.e., trustee) is asymmetrical, the coproducer may want to win the trust spontaneously. Considering the active role of the coproducer, the foundation of signaling behavior lies in the unequal possession of information between two parties, and signaling theory has been used to explain decision-making in many studies (Connelly et al., 2011; Hopp & Lukas, 2014; Lester et al., 2010; Spence, 1973; Wagner, Coley, & Lindemann, 2011); this study thus intends to connect signaling theory with the process of trust.

Spence (1973) used 'buying a lottery ticket' to describe a situation where the focal party does not know the partner's capability until the partner is hired. To solve the problem of information

asymmetry, Spence (1973) suggested that the existence of signals and defined signals is observable and alterable. The signal receivers (i.e., the trustors or the focal party in this study) can receive the signal, and the signalers (i.e., the trustees or the potential partner in this study) can show their quality by sending signals with a cost. Moreover, the signaling cost is assumed to be negatively correlated to productivity in the discrimination of good ones from bad ones. That is, the low-quality ones have a higher cost of signaling quality. The negative correlation between signaling cost and productivity leaves only the low-quality ones, which infers that signaling behavior can only be achieved by the good ones. On the one hand, high-quality parties use signaling to show underlying quality and to separate themselves from low-quality parties. On the other hand, the less informed party obtains the information they do not know by interpreting the signal.

Using trust terminology, a trustee may actively attract the trustor's attention through signaling. Signaling preparation infers not only the determination of the trustees to win the other party's trust but also confidence in their underlying qualities. As the less informed party, the trustors understand that the cost of signaling is negatively related to the underlying qualities. Low-quality ones are unable to signal; thus, trustors may have a positive opinion or feeling about the qualities emphasized by the trustee after the signal is sent. Moreover, costly signaling guarantees the underlying quality of the trustee and instills further trust in the trustee. In the end, signaling-based trust is produced through the interpretation of signals.

Furthermore, the transference of trust is also discussed in this paper, as the focus of this study is a new coproduction between newly established partners. Doney, Cannon, and Mullen (1998) suggested that trust may develop from a known entity to an unknown one. They reasoned that the trustor (i.e., the focal party) might base its outlook on 'proof sources' that transfer trust to the trustee, even if the trustor has little or no direct experience with the trustee. Moreover, trust may transfer from different kinds of sources. A prior study argues that transfer may be made from an industry association to an individual (Milliman & Fugate, 1988). In such situations, trust transference rests on the assumption that institutions act as trustworthy proof sources. To illustrate, the industry association reflects the actions of the people involved. Thus, beliefs about the institutions help to form beliefs about the people who are involved in the institutions. That is, if the focal party trusts the institution (i.e., the reputational information provider) to have strict examining standards or procedures, the trusting belief in the professionalism of the institution will transfer to the trust in the potential partner's professionalism.

Other studies focus on individuals (i.e., known targets) who serve as the source of trust transfer to unknown targets as represented by social networks (Doney, Cannon, & Mullen, 1998). A social network is constructed of nodes (actors) and paths (relationships), in which paths link pairs of nodes and then string together a network. A social network may be formed from a group of people with similar attributes (e.g., personal values, interests, or occupations). Within the social network, network members share opinions about objects and sources of information they interact with (Zucker, 1983). Although each member has very limited information, the linkage allows actors to connect with others or exchange resources (e.g., information and affect) (Tichy, Tushman, & Fombrun, 1979). Based on the assumption of trust transference, the bestowment of trust on a trustee rests on the trustworthiness of individuals closely associated with the trustee (Stewart, 2003). Thus, not only the information will transfer in the network but also trust. The focal party may make decisions by collecting and combining information from other members within a social network. The interactions between network members trigger an aligned network of trust in the end.

Hypotheses development

The focus of this study is to examine partner selection for newly begun coproductions that tend not to have established partners. However, there are plenty of potential candidates that have never

worked together, and it is impossible to review all the candidates. Thus, focal parties may simplify the selection process by making decisions based on reputation.

Reputation is 'a representation of a company's past action and prospects that describe the firms' overall appeal to all of its key constituents when compared with other leading reveals' (Fombrun, 1996). The favorability of reputation has been proven to affect the focal party's trusting belief in a potential partner (Doney & Cannon, 1997; Ganesan, 1994; McKnight, Cummings, & Chervany, 1998; Wagner, Coley, & Lindemann, 2011). Although published studies have discussed the reputation effect, how the reputation was assessed has not been discussed. Considering the potential influence of reputation sources, this study divides reputation into three categories: certification, word-of-mouth, and recommendation. Figure 1 illustrates the conceptual model with hypotheses regarding the relationships between reputation sources, trusting belief, and motivation to coproduce with a potential partner.

Certification

Certification from a well-known nonstakeholder has been discussed as a strong signal of high quality (Connelly et al., 2011; Lester et al., 2010; Spence, 1973). Certification pre-examines the candidate's required capability; therefore, the potential partner may through professional credentials serve as a clear signal of role preparedness (Lester et al., 2010; Spence, 1973). Moreover, passing the certification gives the focal parties greater confidence in potential partners' skills or knowledge in a professional standard. Hence, the one path of trust production is signaling-based trust. As Kim (2008) suggested, one develops trust when others impress that person with their professional training and experience; it is reasonable to indicate that the signaling from certification produces trusting beliefs in their ability.

The other path of trust production is trust transference. The focal parties may trust the certification provider due to professionalism or perceived information reliability. The focal party does not need to test the potential partner's ability because professional associations and credentialing agencies provide guarantees through certification (i.e., acceptance in their professional community). Hence, the trusting belief in ability will transfer from the trusted professional third party to the potential certified partner.

As Fishbein and Ajzen (1975) suggested, the belief directly affects the intention, and McKnight, Cummings, and Chervany (1998) linked trusting belief to trusting intention; this study suggests trusting beliefs in ability derived from signaling and transference will lead to the motivation to coproduce with the candidate.

Therefore,

Hypothesis 1: *Third-party certification leads to the motivation to coproduce with a potential partner through its effect on trusting beliefs in ability.*

Coproduction is known as interrelated usage of resources; therefore, coproduction requires participating parties to solve problems together. For instance, when the output does not comply with the customer's need, it requires high dedication for modifications. If the coproducer refuses to make the modifications, the focal party may be unable to shirk the responsibility and inevitably receives a negative evaluation from the customer. Accordingly, the focal party may want to distinguish highly dedicated candidates from those trying to shirk.

Thus, the trusting belief in dedication is mainly produced from signaling-based trust. Connelly et al. (2011) noted that the process of obtaining a certification (e.g., ISO 9000) is time consuming. Supporting this notion, this study suggests certification may also signal a guarantee of high dedication. Requiring certification costs time and money; therefore, only those who take their job seriously may regard acquiring certification as important. On the one hand, potential partners show the determination that they want to be set apart from other candidates in the market by taking




Figure 1. Conceptual model and theoretical reasoning

the certification examination. On the other hand, passing the certification becomes an important signal to focal parties regarding the candidate’s value and respect for this job.

In sum, the certified potential partner signals as a high-dedicated candidate and implies more willingness to complete the job. Based on the signaling statement, hypothesis 2 is thus derived.

Hypothesis 2: *Third-party certification leads to the motivation to coproduce with a potential partner through its effect on trusting beliefs in dedication.*

Word-of-mouth

Word-of-mouth is the perceptual representation of a party’s past actions that describes its overall appeal to its key constituents and is central to human decision-making (Kewell, 2007). Wagner, Coley, and Lindemann (2011) suggested that the received signal regarding a potential partner’s word-of-mouth at the very beginning of the selection process positively influences the focal party’s willingness to collaborate in future. The academic literature also confirms that positive word-of-mouth about a potential partner at the start of a project is, thereby, linked directly to trust (Doney & Cannon, 1997; Ganesan, 1994; McKnight, Cummings, & Chervany, 1998; Money et al., 2010; Wagner, Coley, & Lindemann, 2011).

The main process of trust from word-of-mouth here is signaling-based trust. Word-of-mouth is regarded as a signal because it requires time and effort to build up. Moreover, word-of-mouth signals adequate ability and dedication to delivering products or services that meet the promised terms. Although word-of-mouth builds over a long period of time, it ruins quickly. Thus, maintaining word-of-mouth signals recognition by and dedication to one’s job. Compared to the high-dedicated candidates, the low-dedicated candidates evaluate the costs and benefits of signaling and are unwilling to sustain the payment in the long term. Following the signaling argument, word-of-mouth may segregate low-quality candidates, leaving potential partners with adequate ability and dedication in the review process, which leads to the motivation for coproduction. Therefore,

Hypothesis 3: *Word-of-mouth leads to the motivation to coproduce with a potential partner through its effect on trusting belief in ability.*

Hypothesis 4: *Word-of-mouth leads to the motivation to coproduce with a potential partner through its effect on trusting belief in dedication.*

Recommendation

To distinguish the concept of recommendation from word-of-mouth in this study, the term recommendation is defined as a reference or suggestion from friends, colleagues, and acquaintances. Thus, the influence of newspapers and printed advertisements is not included in this category. Brown and Reingen (1987) used a similar term, referral behavior, to describe how recommendations travel around a network through the linkages between network members.

Hence, the process of trust from recommendation here is the trust transference in a social network. A typical example of trust transference in a network is a focal party that trusts someone who is recommended by respected colleagues. From the perspective of the focal parties, they choose the trustworthy reputation source when information is not easy to verify. If the trustee is perceived to be related to the trusted source, trust is then transferred to another unknown trustee (Doney & Cannon, 1997; Doney, Cannon, & Mullen, 1998; Kim, 2008; Lim, Sia, Lee, & Benbasat, 2006; Stewart, 2003). Accordingly, the process of transference can be used to predict a positive relationship between a recommendation from a close entity and trust in the recommended candidate.

Social network members tend to share common goals and values (Zucker, 1983); therefore, members within the same network may understand the practical requirements of a coproducing relationship. The focal party may believe that the potential partner had adequate ability to accomplish the task, given they are recommended from a reliable network member. Therefore,

Hypothesis 5: *Third-party recommendations lead to the motivation to coproduce with a potential partner through its effect on trusting beliefs in ability.*

In addition to similar values and goals, social network members hold common beliefs about appropriate behavior in a coproducing relationship. Members within the same network are assumed to provide information in line with the focal party's needs and preferences. The focal party regards the social network member as a reliable third party who understands the practical requirements of the relationship. Therefore, the trusting belief in the social network member will transfer to the recommended potential partner's dedication. The trusting belief in the dedication of the recommended potential partner then further enhances the motivation to participate in coproduction. Therefore,

Hypothesis 6: *Third-party recommendations lead to the motivation to coproduce with a potential partner through its effect on trusting beliefs in dedication.*

Methods

Sample and data

We chose dental prosthesis fabrication as the empirical setting for two reasons. First, this is a typical coproduction scenario (Davenport, Basker, Heath, Ralph, Glantz, & Hammond, 2000), starting with the dentist impressing a patient's oral cavity onto a mold, while the dental technician completes the denture according to the model. However, the success of the output relies on an accurate impression (Lynch & Allen, 2005; Radhi, Lynch, & Hannigan, 2007; Smith, 1963), and the dentist's particular habits (i.e., the gesture of an impression) may lead to inaccuracies. The dental technician may need to use their knowledge and understanding about the dentist to correct minor inaccuracies (Haj-Ali, Al Quran, & Adel, 2012; Radhi, Lynch, & Hannigan, 2007). Understanding a particular partner takes time and effort to accumulate specific knowledge,

which is regarded as an asset-specific investment. Second, the dentist has a responsibility to the public and the profession in safeguarding quality (Henderson, 1966), even though dental prosthesis fabrication is a joint process. The responsibility, asset-specific investment, and performance ambiguity problem make partner selection crucial for the dentist.

We conducted qualitative and quantitative analyses to gain a deeper understanding of how reputation works within coproducing behavior. In the first qualitative stage, a semistructured interview was conducted with two experienced dentists and two coproducers. They were asked to describe the working process and the interactions with their coproducers. In the second qualitative stage, four dentists and two researchers specializing in interorganization relationships helped us correct our conceptual model for further empirical testing. They were also asked to identify any ambiguities or misunderstandings in the questionnaire. Based on their feedback, some minor changes of wording were made to help the respondent understand the academic terms in their language. For instance, it may be difficult for the respondent to understand the academic term ‘coproducer,’ that is, the partner in the coproducing relationship. Thus, instead of providing a long description, replacing the term ‘coproducer’ with the term ‘partner’ may be easier for respondents to answer.

In the quantitative stage, we excluded public-owned clinics because the selection of dental technicians from such clinics is restricted by law. However, the flexibility to select a coproducer freely was particularly crucial in this research context. Thus, only self-owned clinics were included in the sample. Moreover, to ensure respondents had an adequate ability to make selections, only the dentists in charge were chosen. That is, when more than one dentist was working in the same dental clinic, only the one in charge received our questionnaire.

To minimize selection bias and to be more representative, the sample was systematically selected from registered self-owned dental clinics in Taiwan. A total of 1,000 questionnaires were sent out; 13 (1.3%) were undeliverable because of incorrect addresses. Of the remaining 987 delivered questionnaires, 109 completed ones were received. This response rate is considered to be acceptable in Taiwan, where the average response rate for similar survey studies is around 10% (Harzing, 2000). The majority of respondents were male (95%) with an average tenure in the dental industry of 25.92 years ($SD = 8.10$). According to the statistics, the respondents had worked with their current technicians for an average of 15 years ($SD = 8.57$). They reported that, including themselves, an average of 1.72 dentists ($SD = 1.68$) served in their dental clinics, which may imply the respondent’s ability to make decisions without interference from others. Interestingly, they had worked with an average of 2.09 technicians ($SD = 2.12$) over their service years. To be more specific, in a dentist’s 26 years of experience, only three dental technicians (including the current one) had coproduced with them. This partially supports our assertion in the research context that initial coproducer selection is important, and asset-specific investment means that a dentist rarely replaces their coproducer.

To ensure the analyses were not biased by nonresponses and that the sample was representative of the industry, early and late respondents were compared using an independent samples *t*-test. The results indicated no significant differences between the attributes of two response groups, including firm size ($p = .74$; $t = 0.33$) and years with current coproducer ($p = .71$; $t = 0.37$). In addition to procedural controls, such as anonymous submission, a short questionnaire, and minimization of the ambiguity of the measurement items, Harman’s single-factor test was performed to check for common method bias. The result shows the first factor accounted for <50% of the total variance, which suggests that common method bias is an unlikely concern in the data.

Measures

We adapted our measures from previous studies based on the relevant literature and the interview results. Some modifications were necessary to accommodate the research context, and the respondents were asked to answer questions based on their selection experiences, rating on a 5-point

Likert scale. All multi-item constructs showed good discriminant validity based on factor analysis, using scree plots of eigenvalues, and all expected factor loadings are above 0.50. With all Cronbach's α above 0.70, constructs exhibit good convergent validity as well. Multi-item variables were based on an unweighted average of relevant items.

For the source of reputation, certification was assessed by the respondent's perception of the certification the potential partner possessed. The first two items were adapted from Lim et al. (2006) for the linkage with the certification, and the last two items were based on the interview result and the concept from the signaling literature (Connelly et al., 2011; Lester et al., 2010). Word-of-mouth was gauged by the extent to which the respondent knew about the potential partner, and four items were from Pirson and Malhotra (2011) and Ganesan (1994). Recommendation measured the perception of the potential partner's recommendation by a social network member, and three items were adapted from Lim et al. (2006).

Consistent with previous studies (Auh et al., 2007; Mayer and Davis, 1999), trust in ability was measured by the extent of the trusting belief in the potential partner's ability after receiving reputational information, and six items were used. As no prior studies have examined trusting belief in dedication, we select items most related to the interview results. Six items were selected from Bensaou and Anderson (1999) and De Jong and Elfring (2010): two items related to the concept of dedication, two items associated with the coproducer's attitude toward the coproduction, and two items related to the degree of specific investment in the coproduction. The motivation for coproduction was measured by asking the respondent the extent to which they considered cooperating with the candidate (Doney & Cannon, 1997; Lim et al., 2006).

Two business attributes, such as tenure and firm size, were included as control variables to ensure their effects did not confound the measures of the proposed relationships. The more experienced a focal party is, the more thoughts it has regarding coproducer selection. Accordingly, tenure was used as a control variable owing to its reflection of the focal party's accumulated experience. Consistent with prior studies (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1990; Zenger & Lawrence, 1989), tenure was measured by the number of years the respondent had served in the industry. Regarding the measurement of firm size, the literature suggests that larger firms may have more resources and bargaining power (Jarvenpaa, Tractinsky, & Vitale, 2000), which could potentially influence the logic of decision-making. Thus, firm size was included and determined by the number of dentists serving in the same clinic.

Results

Table 1 shows the means, standard deviations, internal reliability, correlations, and the significant bivariate relationships between our independent and dependent variables. The positive correlation between three sources of reputation (word-of-mouth, certification, and recommendation) and the motivation for coproduction confirms the face validity that reputation is essential in the coproducing context.

We tested our hypotheses using the Hayes (2013) PROCESS macro, which provided the coefficients from ordinary least squares (OLS) analysis and an inferential test. The former helped us to follow Baron and Kenny (1986) criteria, and the latter was used to reduce the probability that type II error occurs when mediation is unable to be claimed once the parameters fail to meet the criteria (Preacher and Hayes, 2004). We also followed the suggestion of Hayes (2013) to report the coefficients in unstandardized form.

As predicted by Hypothesis 1 and 2, Table 2 shows certification had a positive effect ($c = 0.39$; Equation [1]) on the motivation to coproduce with the potential partner. The focal party had trusting belief in a certified potential partner's ability ($a = 0.23$; Equation [10]), and trust in their ability increases the motivation to coproduce with them ($b = 0.51$; Equation [2]). A bias-corrected bootstrap 95% confidence interval for the indirect effect ($ab = 0.11$), based on 10,000 bootstrap samples, was entirely above zero (0.030–0.288). This result supports

Table 1. Descriptive statistics for study variables^a

Variables	Means	SD	1	2	3	4	5	6
1 Certification	3.49	0.67	(0.72)					
2 Word-of-mouth	3.51	0.72	0.73**	(0.71)				
3 Recommendation	4.08	0.54	0.37**	0.19	(0.90)			
4 Trusting belief in ability	4.13	0.42	0.36**	0.21*	0.93**	(0.83)		
5 Trusting belief in dedication	4.20	0.49	0.36**	0.26**	0.80**	0.85**	(0.88)	
6 Motivation to coproduce	4.02	0.73	0.45**	0.40**	0.42**	0.41**	0.47**	--

^aInternal reliabilities are presented along the diagonal in parentheses. Two-tailed tests; * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$.

Hypothesis 1; certification indirectly influenced the motivation for coproduction with the potential partner through its effect on trust in the potential partner's ability. As for Hypothesis 2, the significant statistic result (see Equation [13]) shows the focal party also had trusting belief in a certified potential partner's dedication ($a = 0.20$), and trust in their dedication increases the motivation to coproduce with them ($b = 0.38$; Equation [3]). Moreover, based on 10,000 bootstrap samples, the bias-corrected bootstrap 95% confidence interval for the indirect effect ($ab = 0.07$) was entirely above zero (0.009–0.241). Hypothesis 2 also passed the two tests for mediation; certification indirectly influenced the motivation for coproduction with the potential partner through its effect on trust in the potential partner's dedication. The result suggested the linkage between signaling and trust, in which certification was signaling well as a candidate's capacity to create a level of trusting belief in their ability and dedication.

As predicted by Hypothesis 3 and 4, word-of-mouth had a positive effect ($c = 0.35$; Equation [4]) on the motivation to coproduce with the potential partner. The focal party had trusting belief in a positive word-of-mouth potential partner's ability ($a = 0.13$; Equation [11]), and trust in their ability increases the motivation to coproduce with them ($b = 0.67$; Equation [5]). A bias-corrected bootstrap 95% confidence interval for the indirect effect ($ab = 0.09$), based on 10,000 bootstrap samples, was entirely above zero (0.007–0.226). These results support Hypothesis 3; word-of-mouth leads to the motivation to coproduce with a potential partner through its effect on trusting beliefs about their ability. The insignificant effect (see Equation [14]) suggests that the focal party did not have trusting belief in the dedication ($a = 0.11$), although the effect of trust in their dedication to the coproducing motivation ($b = 0.51$; Equation [6]) is significant. The 10,000 bootstrap samples with a bias-corrected method also showed the 95% confidence interval for the indirect effect ($ab = 0.06$) contains zero (–0.002 to 0.179). There is no evidence to support Hypothesis 4; although word-of-mouth may be a good signal to represent the candidate's ability, the statistical result is unable to state that positive word-of-mouth leads to the motivation to coproduce with a potential partner through its effect on trusting beliefs about their dedication.

With respect to Hypothesis 5 and 6, recommendation directly influences motivation for coproduction with the potential partner ($c = 0.44$; Equation [7]). The focal party had trusting belief in a recommended potential partner's ability ($a = 0.80$; Equation [12]) and dedication ($a = 0.67$; Equation [15]); trust in their ability therefore increased motivation to coproduce with them ($b = 1.45$; Equation [8]); while trust in their dedication did not increase motivation for coproduction ($b = 0.37$; Equation [9]). The indirect effect with a bias-corrected bootstrap 95% confidence interval for Hypothesis 5 ($ab = 1.17$) based on 10,000 bootstrap samples was entirely above zero (0.453–1.942). Thus, Hypothesis 5 is supported. However, the 10,000 bootstrap samples with a bias-corrected method for Hypothesis 6 showed the 95% confidence interval for the indirect effect ($ab = 0.25$) contains zero (–0.101 to 0.689). There is no sufficient evidence to support Hypothesis 6. In sum, recommendation increases motivation to engage in

Table 2. OLS regression results^a

Variable	Motivation to coproduce								
	Equation (1)	Equation (2)	Equation (3)	Equation (4)	Equation (5)	Equation (6)	Equation (7)	Equation (8)	Equation (9)
Tenure	0.00(0.01)	0.00(0.01)	0.00(0.01)	0.00(0.01)	0.00(0.01)	0.00(0.01)	0.00(0.01)	0.00(0.01)	0.00(0.01)
Firm size	0.01(0.04)	0.02(0.04)	0.02(0.04)	0.02(0.04)	0.03(0.04)	0.03(0.04)	0.04(0.04)	0.04(0.01)	0.04(0.04)
Certification	0.39***(0.09)	0.28**(0.09)	0.32**(0.09)						
Word-of-mouth				0.35***(0.10)	0.27**(0.09)	0.30**(0.10)			
Recommendation							0.44**(0.13)	-0.72*(0.34)	0.19(0.20)
Trusting belief in ability		0.51**(0.16)			0.67***(0.16)			1.45***(0.39)	
Trusting belief in dedication			0.38*(0.15)			0.51**(0.15)			0.37(0.22)
R ² =	0.16	0.25	0.21	0.12	0.26	0.21	0.11	0.21	0.13
Variable	Trusting belief in ability			Trusting belief in dedication					
	Equation (10)	Equation (11)	Equation (12)	Equation (13)	Equation (14)	Equation (15)			
Tenure	0.00(0.01)	0.00(0.01)	0.00(0.01)	0.00(0.01)	0.00(0.01)	0.00(0.01)			
Firm size	-0.02(0.03)	-0.01(0.02)	0.01(0.24)	-0.03(0.03)	-0.02(0.03)	0.00(0.02)			
Certification	0.23***(0.06)			0.20**(0.06)					
Word-of-mouth		0.13*(0.06)			0.11(0.06)				
Recommendation			0.80***(0.03)			0.67***(0.06)			
R ² =	0.14	0.05	0.86	0.11	0.05	0.57			

^aUnstandardized coefficients shown with standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$.

coproduction with the potential partner through a level of trusting belief in ability but not in dedication.

Discussion and Conclusion

This paper attempts to show the importance of ability and dedication in a coproducing context by examining how reputation works in the search for a coproducing partner. The findings are consistent with the hypotheses that certification, word-of-mouth, and recommendation are, in turn, positively related to trust in a potential partner's ability. The trusting belief in ability mediates all the relationship between three reputation sources and motivation for coproduction. However, only the certification links to motivation to coproduce with the potential partner through trust in dedication. These empirical results suggest different sources of reputation influence the focal party's selection choice variously.

First, it is worth noting that focal parties address one's attributes separately, and the inconsistent result of trusting belief in ability dedication from word-of-mouth is one example. In the word-of-mouth case, trusting belief in ability mediates the relationship between word-of-mouth and the motivation to coproduce. However, trusting belief in dedication was unable to claim a mediating effect between word-of-mouth and the motivation to coproduce. The segmentation between trust in the ability and dedication is reasonable since the focal party expects to obtain required resources through coproduction and to utilize these completely. Assessing the ability of the coproducer is equally important as evaluating the possibility to utilize this ability fully. Certain types of reputational information (e.g., word-of-mouth) may be unable to provide sufficient information for the focal party to assess the two objects simultaneously.

Second, a unitary acceptance of ability and a divergent acceptance of dedication may be attributed to the inconsistent results of recommendation. The significant mediating effect of trust in ability supports the fact that recommendation represents sufficient ability to meet an accepted requirement. However, the respondents showed that their trusting belief in one's dedication did not significantly mediate the relationship between recommendation and motivation to coproduce. The result may derive from different levels of acceptance in defining adequate dedication; that is, two parties may have different evaluations of one coproducer's dedication. Focal parties may have a trusting belief in the dedication of a recommended coproducer; however, focal parties turn to their assessment when deciding whether to coproduce with this recommended coproducer. Namely, from their social experience, focal parties realized the recommendation may be distorted by individual differences. Although recommenders believe they provide the recommendation that suits the focal party's need, the focal party may slightly adjust the evaluation, which influences the mediating effect of trust in dedication.

Implications

This study makes several key contributions and implications. First, we mainly distinguish dedication from ability. Previous studies focus on assessing the ability of the partner (Auh et al., 2007; Chen, Tsou, & Ching, 2011; Connelly et al., 2011; Hitt et al., 2000); however, dedication is a major factor worth noting in coproduction. The essence of coproduction is resource obtainment and performance ambiguity; the former implies the importance of ability, and the latter addresses the importance of dedication. Thus, a coproducer with both ability and dedication and one with ability but little dedication may be regarded as two types of potential partner. In addition to showing the ability, empirical practitioners may need to present their dedication to the work to gain more coproducing opportunities.

Second, we suggest that distinctions between reputation sources are salient. Previous studies include all reputational information under one category: reputation (Doney & Cannon, 1997; Fombrun, 1996; Ganesan, 1994; Wagner, Coley, & Lindemann, 2011); however, the focal party

may obtain information from different channels and therefore respond differently. For example, certification from a professional institution may be regarded as factual, without personal distortion. Recommendations from a known friend may represent an assessment of a similar view worth considering. Moreover, first-hand and second-hand information have different meanings for the information receiver. For example, word-of-mouth may be regarded as second-hand information. The focal party may obtain word-of-mouth from a secondary source and is unable to trace the original information source. Regarding attributes that can converge to generally accepted criteria (e.g., ability), the focal party may be able to judge whether individual preferences distort word-of-mouth. However, for an attribute that is unable to quantify (e.g., dedication), it is hard for the focal party to assess the extent of distortion in word-of-mouth. The essence of reputation suggests the differences between reputation sources may induce different reactions; therefore, empirical practitioners may need to gather reputation from various channels, thereby selecting partners in a more comprehensive way. Empirical practitioners may also try to establish their reputation in different channels – and may, therefore, receive more job opportunities.

Third, we extend the application of signaling theory by linking it to the trust-related literature. Spence (1973) suggested that actors will respond to the signaler (e.g., hire them) after receiving the signal. This logic is originally derived from an economic perspective; however, little is addressed regarding individual differences. Combining signaling theory with trust-related concepts allows researchers to explain why particular signals may be more appealing to the receiver, thereby inducing future actions.

Fourth, we differentiate this study by treating the selection process in detail. Li, Eden, Hitt, and Ireland (2008) assume that partner selection is derived from exchange attributes; however, the selecting process is more complicated in reality. Selection is regarded as a way to protect the focal party from being vulnerable in the relationship; therefore, the focal party may start by gathering information and forming beliefs regarding their intention to work with a partner. Theoretical developers may benefit from finding out how decisions change as priorities vary in different selection processes; empirical practitioners may attract focal parties by meeting their expectations.

Last but not least, empirical practitioners who benefit from this study are not limited to this research context; any coproducing context is applicable. The context may be the selection of leading roles in a stage play, the member of an orchestra, or any context involving performance ambiguity. Empirical practitioners may find direction regarding what to consider and how to reduce problems *ex-ante* from this study.

Limitations and directions for future research

Notwithstanding the aforementioned implications, our study has limitations. First, we were unable to examine the strength of, or compare, reputation sources in the current study; this remains for future studies. Second, the setting of our research context may provide a partial explanation for the small sample size; it focused on dental prosthesis fabrication and excluded tooth implants. These two treatments serve as different research contexts, and we were unable to ascertain those clinics specializing in tooth implants from the brochure before sending the questionnaires. Accordingly, specialized clinics may be unable to answer our questionnaire. Moreover, the sensitivity of potential respondents' concerns on revealing the quantity of dental prosthesis fabrication may have created an unwillingness to reply. Although not a perfectly large sample, this study reveals the practice of coproduction. Third, we sent questionnaires only to the focal party – the dentists. This study thus simply represents the focal party's perspective. Significant work remains to be done from the perspectives of coproducers. By comprehending the perspectives of both sides, we may have a better understanding of coproduction.

Future research may further examine the role of third parties, which deserves more attention. The third party in this study is a nonstakeholder in the coproducing relationship, which ensures information authenticity; therefore, it may be interesting to see future researchers examine the

context in which the third party is a stakeholder. Moreover, future research may further examine the relationship between the motivation to coproduce with the potential partner and the actual coproducing behavior. In the relationship, it may be an interesting topic to include factors such as affective and calculative commitment (Nyhan, 1999). Finally, future research may examine this framework in a context without bilateral dependence and specificity or a craft-based research context, which may be another interesting issue worthy of attention.

References

- Alchian, A. A., & Demsetz, H. (1972). Production, information costs, and economic organization. *The American Economic Review*, 62(5), 777–795. doi:10.2307/1815199
- Auh, S., Bell, S. J., McLeod, C. S., & Shih, E. (2007). Co-production and customer loyalty in financial services. *Journal of Retailing*, 83(3), 359–370. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jretai.2007.03.001
- Baron, R. M., & Kenny, D. A. (1986). The moderator–mediator variable distinction in social psychological research: Conceptual, strategic, and statistical considerations. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 51(6), 1173–1182.
- Bensaou, M., & Anderson, E. (1999). Buyer-supplier relations in industrial markets: When do buyers risk making idiosyncratic investments? *Organization Science*, 10(4), 460–481. doi:10.2307/2640366
- Brown, J. J., & Reingen, P. H. (1987). Social ties and word-of-mouth referral behavior. *Journal of Consumer Research*, 14(3), 350–362. doi:10.2307/2489496
- Butler, J. K. (1991). Toward understanding and measuring conditions of trust: Evolution of a conditions of trust inventory. *Journal of Management*, 17(3), 643–663. doi:https://doi.org/10.1177/014920639101700307
- Butler, J. K., & Cantrell, R. S. (1984). A behavioral decision theory approach to modeling dyadic trust in superiors and subordinates. *Psychological Reports*, 55(1), 19–28. doi:https://doi.org/10.2466/pr0.1984.55.1.19
- Chen, J.-S., Tsou, H.-T., & Ching, R. K. (2011). Co-production and its effects on service innovation. *Industrial Marketing Management*, 40(8), 1331–1346.
- Chi, T. (1994). Trading in strategic resources: Necessary conditions, transaction cost problems, and choice of exchange structure. *Strategic Management Journal*, 15(4), 271–290.
- Connelly, B. L., Certo, S. T., Ireland, R. D., & Reutzel, C. R. (2011). Signaling theory: A review and assessment. *Journal of Management*, 37(1), 39–67. doi:10.1177/0149206310388419
- Davenport, J. C., Basker, R. M., Heath, J. R., Ralph, J. P., Glantz, O., & Hammond, P. (2000). Prosthetics: Communication between the dentist and the dental technician. *British Dental Journal*, 189(9), 471–474.
- De Jong, B. A., & Elfring, T. O. M. (2010). How does trust affect the performance of ongoing team? The mediating role of reflexivity, monitoring, and effort. *Academy of Management Journal*, 53(3), 535–549. doi:10.5465/AMJ.2010.51468649
- Doney, P. M., & Cannon, J. P. (1997). An examination of the nature of trust in buyer-seller relationships. *Journal of Marketing*, 61(2), 35–51.
- Doney, P. M., Cannon, J. P., & Mullen, M. R. (1998). Understanding the influence of national culture on the development of trust. *The Academy of Management Review*, 23(3), 601–620. doi:10.2307/259297
- Fenwick, J., & McMillan, J. (2013). Management development and co-production: Myths and realities. *Journal of Management Development*, 32(9), 971–983. doi:10.1108/JMD-07-2012-0083
- Finkelstein, S., & Hambrick, D. C. (1990). Top-management-team tenure and organizational outcomes: The moderating role of managerial discretion. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 35(3), 484–503. doi:10.2307/2393314
- Fishbein, M., & Ajzen, I. (1975). *Belief, attitude, intention and behavior: An introduction to theory and research*. Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley.
- Fombrun, C. J. (1996). *Reputation: realizing value from the corporate image*. Boston: Harvard Business School Press.
- Ganesan, S. (1994). Determinants of long-term orientation in buyer-seller relationships. *Journal of Marketing*, 58(2), 1–19.
- Graves, L. M., Ruderman, M. N., Ohlott, P. J., & Weber, T. J. (2012). Driven to work and enjoyment of work: Effects on managers' outcomes. *Journal of Management*, 38(5), 1655–1680. doi:10.1177/0149206310363612
- Haj-Ali, R., Al Quran, F., & Adel, O. (2012). Dental laboratory communication regarding removable dental prosthesis design in the UAE. *Journal of Prosthodontics*, 21(5), 425–428. doi:10.1111/j.1532-849X.2011.00842.x
- Harzing, A.-W. (2000). Cross-national industrial mail surveys: Why do response rates differ between countries? *Industrial Marketing Management*, 29(3), 243–254.
- Hayes, A. F. (2013). *Introduction to mediation, moderation, and conditional process analysis: A regression-based approach*. New York, NY: The Guilford Press.
- Henderson, D. (1966). Writing work authorizations for removable partial dentures. *Journal of Prosthetic Dentistry*, 16(4), 696–707. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0022-3913(66)90148-X
- Hennart, J.-F. (1989). The transaction-cost rationale for countertrade. *Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization*, 5(1), 127–153.

- Hitt, M. A., Dacin, M. T., Levitas, E., Arregle, J.-L., & Borza, A. (2000). Partner selection in emerging and developed market contexts: Resource-based and organizational learning perspectives. *Academy of Management Journal*, 43(3), 449–467.
- Hopp, C., & Lukas, C. (2014). A signaling perspective on partner selection in venture capital syndicates. *Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice*, 38(3), 635–670. doi:10.1111/etap.12023
- Jarvenpaa, S. L., Tractinsky, N., & Vitale, M. (2000). Consumer trust in an internet store. *Information Technology and Management*, 1(2), 45–71.
- Kelton, K., Fleischmann, K. R., & Wallace, W. A. (2008). Trust in digital information. *Journal of the American Society for Information Science and Technology*, 59(3), 363–374. doi:10.1002/asi.20722
- Kewell, B. (2007). Linking risk and reputation: A research agenda and methodological analysis. *Risk Management*, 9(4), 238–254.
- Kim, B., & Han, I. (2009). The role of trust belief and its antecedents in a community-driven knowledge environment. *Journal of the American Society for Information Science and Technology*, 60(5), 1012–1026. doi:10.1002/asi.21041
- Kim, D. J. (2008). Self-perception-based versus transference-based trust determinants in computer-mediated transactions: A cross-cultural comparison study. *Journal of Management Information Systems*, 24(4), 13–45.
- Kogut, B. (1986). On designing contracts to guarantee enforceability: Theory and evidence from East-West trade. *Journal of International Business Studies*, 17(1), 47–61.
- Larson, P. D. (1994). Buyer-supplier co-operation, product quality and total costs. *International Journal of Physical Distribution & Logistics Management*, 24(6), 4–10.
- Lester, S. W., Mencl, J., Maranto, C., Bourne, K. A., & Keaveny, T. (2010). The impact of passing the professional in human resources exam on early career success for undergraduates entering the human resource field. *International Journal of Selection and Assessment*, 18(3), 282–290.
- Levin, D. Z., & Cross, R. (2004). The strength of weak ties you can trust: The mediating role of trust in effective knowledge transfer. *Management Science*, 50(11), 1477–1490.
- Li, D., Eden, L., Hitt, M. A., & Ireland, R. D. (2008). Friends, acquaintances, or strangers? Partner selection in R&D alliances. *Academy of Management Journal*, 51(2), 315–334.
- Lim, K. H., Sia, C. L., Lee, M. K., & Benbasat, I. (2006). Do I trust you online, and if so, will I buy? An empirical study of two trust-building strategies. *Journal of Management Information Systems*, 23(2), 233–266.
- Lynch, D., & Allen, P. F. (2005). Quality of written prescriptions and master impressions for fixed and removable prosthodontics: A comparative study. *British Dental Journal*, 198(1), 17–20.
- Mayer, R. C., & Davis, J. H. (1999). The effect of the performance appraisal system on trust for management: A field quasi-experiment. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 84(1), 123.
- Mayer, R. C., Davis, J. H., & Schoorman, F. D. (1995). An integrative model of organizational trust. *Academy of Management Review*, 20(3), 709–734. doi:10.5465/amr.1995.9508080335
- McKnight, D. H., Choudhury, V., & Kacmar, C. (2002a). Developing and validating trust measures for e-commerce: An integrative typology. *Information Systems Research*, 13(3), 334–359.
- McKnight, D. H., Choudhury, V., & Kacmar, C. (2002b). The impact of initial consumer trust on intentions to transact with a web site: A trust building model. *The Journal of Strategic Information Systems*, 11(3–4), 297–323.
- McKnight, D. H., Cummings, L. L., & Chervany, N. L. (1998). Initial trust formation in new organizational relationships. *Academy of Management Review*, 23(3), 473–490.
- Meyerson, D., Weick, K. E., & Kramer, R. M. (1995). Swift trust and temporary groups. In R. M. Kramer & T. R. Tyler (Eds.), *Trust in organizations: Frontiers of theory and research* (pp. 166–195). Thousand Oak, CA: SAGE Publications, Inc.
- Milliman, R. E., & Fugate, D. L. (1988). Using trust-transference as a persuasion technique: An empirical field investigation. *Journal of Personal Selling and Sales Management*, 8(2), 1–7.
- Money, K., Hillenbrand, C., Day, M., & Magnan, G. M. (2010). Exploring reputation of B2B partnerships: Extending the study of reputation from the perception of single firms to the perception of inter-firm partnerships. *Industrial Marketing Management*, 39(5), 761–768.
- Nightingale, P., Baden-Fuller, C., & Hopkins, M. M. (2011). Projects, project capabilities and project organizations. *Advances in Strategic Management*, 28, 215–234. doi:10.1108/S0742-3322(2011)0000028012
- Nyhan, R. C. (1999). Increasing affective organizational commitment in public organizations: The Key role of interpersonal trust. *Review of Public Personnel Administration*, 19(3), 58–70. doi:10.1177/0734371X9901900305
- Pirson, M., & Malhotra, D. (2011). Foundations of organizational trust: What matters to different stakeholders? *Organization Science*, 22(4), 1087–1104.
- Poppo, L., Zhou, K. Z., & Zenger, T. R. (2008). Examining the conditional limits of relational governance: Specialized assets, performance ambiguity, and long-standing ties. *Journal of Management Studies*, 45(7), 1195–1216. doi:10.1111/j.1467-6486.2008.00779.x
- Preacher, K. J., & Hayes, A. F. (2004). SPSS and SAS procedures for estimating indirect effects in simple mediation models. *Behavior Research Methods, Instruments, and Computers*, 36(4), 717–731. doi:10.3758/BF03206553

- Radhi, A., Lynch, C. D., & Hannigan, A. (2007). Quality of written communication and master impressions for fabrication of removable partial prostheses in the Kingdom of Bahrain. *Journal of Oral Rehabilitation*, 34(2), 153–157. doi:10.1111/j.1365-2842.2006.01685.x
- Schaufeli, W. B., Shimazu, A., & Taris, T. W. (2009). Being driven to work excessively hard: The evaluation of a two-factor measure of workaholism in the Netherlands and Japan. *Cross-Cultural Research*, 43(4), 320–348.
- Sitkin, S. B., & Roth, N. L. (1993). Explaining the limited effectiveness of legalistic ‘remedies’ for trust/distrust. *Organization Science*, 4(3), 367–392. doi:10.1287/orsc.4.3.367
- Skilton, P. F. (2011). Varieties of cooperative strategy in project based organizing: The case of international motion picture co-production. *Advances in Strategic Management*, 28, 27–59. doi:10.1108/S0742-3322(2011)0000028006
- Smith, G. P. (1963). The responsibility of the dentist toward laboratory procedures in fixed and removable partial denture prosthesis. *The Journal of Prosthetic Dentistry*, 13(2), 295–301. doi:[http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0022-3913\(63\)90174-4](http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0022-3913(63)90174-4)
- Song, J., & Zahedi, F. M. (2007). Trust in health intermediaries. *Decision Support Systems*, 43(2), 390–407. doi:<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.dss.2006.11.011>
- Spence, M. (1973). Job market signaling. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 87(3), 355–374. doi:10.2307/1882010
- Stewart, K. J. (2003). Trust transfer on the World Wide Web. *Organization Science*, 14(1), 5–15.
- Teece, D. J. (1986). Profiting from technological innovation: Implications for integration, collaboration, licensing and public policy. *Research Policy*, 15(6), 285–305.
- Tichy, N. M., Tushman, M. L., & Fombrun, C. (1979). Social network analysis for organizations. *Academy of Management Review*, 4(4), 507–519. doi:10.5465/AMR.1979.4498309
- Van Scotter, J. R., & Motowidlo, S. J. (1996). Interpersonal facilitation and job dedication as separate facets of contextual performance. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 81(5), 525–531.
- Wagner, S. M., Coley, L. S., & Lindemann, E. (2011). Effect of suppliers’ reputation on the future of buyer-supplier relationships: The mediating roles of outcome fairness and trust. *Journal of Supply Chain Management*, 47(2), 29–48.
- Yeo, G. B., & Neal, A. (2004). A multilevel analysis of effort, practice, and performance: Effects; of ability, conscientiousness, and goal orientation. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 89(2), 231–247.
- Zenger, T. R., & Lawrence, B. S. (1989). Organizational demography: The differential effects of age and tenure distributions on technical communication. *Academy of Management Journal*, 32(2), 353–376. doi:10.2307/256366
- Zucker, L. G. (1983). Organizations as institutions. In S. Bacharach (Ed.), *Research in the sociology of organizations* (Vol. 2, pp. 1–47). Greenwich, CN: JAI Press.
- Zucker, L. G. (1986). Production of trust: Institutional sources of economic structure, 1840–1920. *Research in Organizational Behavior*, 8(1), 53–111.