

demonstrations to shore up enthusiasm for state policies, crowd out potential protests, or simply demonstrate their ability to raise a crowd. They can also organize, or turn a blind eye to, mobs that violently suppress opponents of the regime, thereby establishing for the offending authorities some measure of plausible deniability. And, of course, ambitious actors within the state apparatus can also use such movements to undermine their rivals.

The chapters also identify diverse technologies that state agents may deploy to encourage and shape such collective action. Although the traditional technologies that elites have used to mobilize the citizenry, such as patronage and various “administrative resources,” are still on the table, they may be less necessary and less useful in an age of information technology and social media. In such cases “symbolic” resources may become more important. For example, Mark Beissinger’s analysis of broad surveys of Ukrainians during the 2004 Orange Revolutions suggests that, although patronage played a part in mobilizing counterrevolutionary crowds, appeals to Russian ethnic identity and fear of Yushchenko’s platform of Ukrainian nationalism also played an important role. In some cases, moreover, it may be enough for the authorities to signal, with a wink and a nudge, that illegal actions directed against opponents to the regime will not be subject to any investigations.

Technologies may also diffuse across boundaries. Julie Hemment finds that the Russian youth organization Nashi shifted after 2008 from a repertoire emphasizing confrontation against opponents to the regime to one that mimicked the project technologies encouraged by Western development agencies in their efforts to build civil society in Russia. These technologies sought to draw young people in with the promise of fostering professional habits that would serve them well in a modern society. This technology also seems relevant to the Chinese youth organization’s efforts to mobilize, coordinate, and channel young people’s impulses for volunteer service in that country.

One of the great strengths of the volume is its treatment of the state itself. Whereas many works in contentious studies draw a thick line dividing state and society, and too often undertheorize the state as a more or less unitary actor, the framework proposed in this volume purposefully and explicitly blurs and breaks the line between the two. First, it recognizes that the regime has many levers to use to bring citizens to their aid and that such levers, used by different parts of the state for different purposes, may work at cross-purposes with each other or even backfire. Second, it asks to what extent state agents can control the forces unleashed by their encouragement—think of the Chinese leadership’s use of nationalist demonstrations or of moderate US Republicans’ embrace of the Tea Party in 2010. Third, it explores occasions when it is difficult to distinguish between state and society: How do we characterize the policemen, prosecutors, and judges who ignored and

even participated in terrorist acts against civil rights activists in Mississippi during the 1960s?

The various authors would be the first to admit that the framework needs further refinement. The introductory chapter notes the need for more research of such movements in more liberal contexts (segregationist Mississippi does not count), and I would like to see more discussion—there is some—of how different technologies travel across national boundaries. In addition, the umbrella concept of state-mobilized movements could be defined more narrowly: To what extent and under what conditions is it useful to compare coordinating volunteers for public service with organizing workers to break students’ heads?

Most significantly, as the introduction again acknowledges, the methods in this volume—except for Hemment’s ethnographic work and, to a lesser extent, the survey analyses by Mark Beissinger—do not offer enough insight into why individuals agree to join such movements. If symbolic resources really are becoming more important, then researchers must think more deeply about how they operate. For example, without such analyses, it seems difficult to explain how an openly adulterous, manifestly corrupt president could persuade so many self-identified patriotic and Christian white Americans over the age of 40 that it was appropriate to violently attack the US Capitol.

After Repression: How Polarization Derails Democratic Transition. By Elizabeth Nugent. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2020. 256p. \$95.00 cloth.

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Elizabeth Nugent’s *After Repression* makes a scholarly contribution on three levels. First, it offers a solid and interesting explanation for the outcomes of polarization and democratization in transition periods following the collapse of an authoritarian regime. Second, by exploring this explanation in the context of two recent cases, Tunisia and Egypt, it offers a coherent account of those complex experiences; these two cases are likely to loom large in subsequent scholarship on uprisings and regime change. Third, and likely most significantly, the book offers a novel account of how repressive tools are built and of the effects of using them, anchoring the former in history and the latter in social psychology. The first contribution requires some simplifying assumptions that greatly add in clarity and accessibility, but they may go too far for those interested in these particular cases. The second contribution is notable for its ability to bring a level of retrospective coherence to confused situations, although again it tends to favor clarity over verisimilitude. The third contribution is the subtlest and deepest and is likely to be most helpful and indeed influential over the long term.

Nugent's general argument is that when authoritarian regimes use indiscriminate repression against opposition, they provide mechanisms and conditions for those opposition elements to find some common ground and that, after such regimes fall, such common ground makes polarization less likely and facilitates agreements that enable the construction of democratic systems. By contrast, when such regimes treat different opposition groups differently, they sow the seeds for polarization in any transitional situation and such polarization inhibits democratic outcomes.

This general argument is explored in the Tunisian and Egyptian cases. The argument is very clearly stated, and the cases are squarely situated within broader scholarly discussions about democratization and transition. This clarity sometimes leads to framing claims in terms that are quite strong—for example, downplaying the role of the military and suggesting a fairly high level of determinism—that are not likely to be fully persuasive for an audience deeply familiar with the two cases.

To be sure, Nugent generally favors modest terms for her causal argument, using words like “shape,” “affect,” and “condition” far more often than “create,” “define,” or “determine”—although the latter are used on occasion. Such careful word choice is to the author's credit. The argument on path dependency for patterns of repression comes closest to a historical determinism; the other parts of the causal chain are framed a bit less ambitiously but are still persuasively argued. With a phrasing that is generally probabilistic rather than deterministic, the framework of the book is better at supplementing other explanations than at replacing or disproving them. Factors often cited for preventing democratization or aggravating polarization, such as the role of the military, are dealt with a bit too quickly; some other factors—electoral outcomes resulting in a split assembly in Tunisia but a strong Islamist majority in Egypt—are not discussed.

The second contribution of the book is on an empirical level. The pace of events in both countries was dizzying; the number of highly engaged actors and analysts (and actor-analysts) was large, and indeed, the stakes were high enough to leave much of the narrative terrain contentious. Assembling a coherent analysis of the political tumult in both countries—and doing so in a manner that is judicious, well informed, and liable to be legible to a disciplinary audience with a specific vocabulary (about regimes and transitions, most specifically)—is not an easy task.

This clarity will aid understanding for comparativists. However, those whose interests are more specific to the two empirical cases than the cross-national study of regime change may find that the framework does not always fit. The contrast in outcomes between Tunisia and Egypt did indeed appear stark from the perspective of the half-decade after the 2011 uprisings (when the research was conducted). It is less clear now—and may

continue to be uncertain in the future—whether demarcating that period as a clear “transition” with an authoritarian outcome in Egypt and a democratic one in Tunisia will be the most useful lens for understanding regime change.

But the final and most profound contribution made by the book is its innovative approaches to two subjects that play supporting roles in the argument but nevertheless help us to think about some critical areas a bit differently than is usually done. First, Nugent precedes the full explication of her argument with an exploration of *why* regimes differ in their repressive strategies, and in doing so, her approach comes close to undermining the phrase “repressive strategies” itself. She argues that state formation—and, in these two cases, critical institutional developments in the period of foreign control—forges patterns that later regimes find themselves forced to use. In that sense, repression is more a function of the tools available than a phenomenon that follows from any strategic logic on the part of the regime. This is a welcome departure from the functionalism that has crept into so much of the scholarship on authoritarianism, though again the clarity of the presentation sometimes seems to make the argument a bit too stark and deterministic, as if choices made within a colonial period are made for all time.

Second, the book offers an account of the effects of repression that takes individual experiences very seriously. Torture, incarceration, and exile can have profound effects. The impact that interests Nugent the most is the way such repressive tools can enhance empathy among ideologically diverse victims who share common experiences (and even common prison cells). She establishes the plausibility of this account with a survey experiment but persuasively traces its relevance and significance through interviews with activists in the two cases.

In sum, close readers of *After Repression* will be rewarded by sophisticated insights that are underplayed when the general argument is laid out but are richly developed within several chapters. Those seeking to understand political trajectories in Egypt and Tunisia in the 2010s will find a clear, plausible, and sensible account. Those who wish to probe a bit deeper will get richer rewards for how to think about repression's history and its effects.

The Black and White Rainbow: Reconciliation, Opposition, and Nation-Building in Democratic South Africa.

By Carolyn E. Holmes. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2020. 264p. \$75.00 cloth, \$29.95 paper.

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In this richly detailed study, Carolyn E. Holmes explores the challenges that postconflict societies face when navigating the at-times conflicting imperatives of nation-building and institutionalizing democratic competition.