

The Anti-Algiers

In December 1960, the same month that the United Nations General Assembly declared national self-determination an international norm, Reverend Michael Scott and Jayaprakash Narayan (JP) met for a conference at Gandhigram Ashram in Madras State (now Tamil Nadu), India. Although Scott and JP did not agree on certain issues – such as the demands of Nagaland nationalist claimants within India – they both supported anticolonial nationalism across much of the decolonizing world and were committed proponents of non-violent political action. The Gandhigram Ashram conference was hosted by War Resister's International, the flagship organization of the international peace movement, of which JP and Scott were key members.

The legacy of Mahatma Gandhi and Indian national liberation had brought the international peace movement to India: India as a model for peaceful national liberation, India with its political philosophy of “peaceful coexistence,”¹ and India as a postcolonial state with its own violent divisions served as a source of inspiration, credibility, and contestation for global pacifists. Gandhigram was War Resisters' International's first conference in the decolonizing world – emphasizing that the international peace movement was turning its attention to the challenges of war and peace in those regions. The conference agenda focused on the Algerian war of independence from France; the Sub-Saharan African region of

¹ M. C. Chagla letter to Jawaharlal Nehru, July 7, 1960: “India represents the credo of nationalism and has given to the world the philosophy of peaceful co-existence.” Correspondence File 705, Jawaharlal Nehru Papers post-1947, Nehru Memorial Museum and Library (hereafter, “Nehru Papers”).

Katanga's secession from newly independent Congo-Leopoldville; and the gathering confrontations facing the Indian government both on the Sino-Indian borders and over Goa, a Portuguese-held territory on India's western coast. A year later, in 1961, India annexed Goa, ending European empire on the South Asian subcontinent.² The following year, in 1962, India and China went to war over their contested Himalayan borderlands. Wars of decolonization loomed on the horizon for the global pacifist movement.

JP spoke at the Gandhigram conference, closing his address with a call for a new organization – the World Peace Brigade – to intervene in modes that the United Nations as a bureaucratic, state-centric institution could not. To carry out this scheme, he envisioned the brigade as an international civil society organization that would send peace activists to intervene nonviolently in confrontations between states, empires, and nationalist movements. He stated, “It would have been interesting to watch the action of an unarmed force in the Congo. The situation in that unfortunate land would have been quite different and the UN might have succeeded by now in its mission of peace.”³ JP pushed his audience to shift from *pacifism* as an abstention from violence, to *nonviolent confrontation* that actively sought to challenge the use of force. He asked his audience to consider violence in the decolonizing world as ground zero for the international peace movement and to see discrete violent flashpoints inside and outside India as part of a global pattern.

But just as freedom was never won free of struggle, the pursuit of peace could not be peaceful – a dichotomy captured in the term “peace brigade.” The effectiveness of Gandhian nonviolent mobilization, eventually called a peace army, or *Shanti Sena*, had relied on the threat of violence;⁴

² The Indian Union territory of Puducherry had been bureaucratically united with India since 1954, but the international-legal handoff between France and India occurred in 1963. The colonial, postcolonial, and neocolonial dimensions of these entanglements are described in Jessica Namakkhal, *Unsettling Utopia: The Making and Unmaking of French India* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2021).

³ J. P. Narayan, Keynote address from Gandhigram Conference, December 1960, Devi Prasad Papers, International Institute of Social History, Amsterdam (hereafter, “Devi Prasad Papers”).

⁴ Gandhi allegedly coined the specific term *Shanti Sena*, or “peace army,” near the end of his life, as he was trying to rally a voluntary peacekeeping force to halt communal violence in Northern India; on the relationship between Gandhian nonviolence and the threat of violence, see Judith Brown, “Nonviolence on Trial,” in *Gandhi: Prisoner of Hope* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1991), 314–95; Faisal Devji, *The Impossible Indian: Gandhi and the Temptation of Violence* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012), 165.

Martin Luther King's calls for nonviolent protest to end racial inequality in the United States worked in part because of the juxtaposition provided by Malcolm X's insistence on achieving that goal "by any means necessary"; and the World Peace Brigade that JP called for sought to create a peace force in order to force peace. The concept of a nonviolent force had its roots in Gandhi's early-twentieth-century activism in South Africa, also the point of origin for connections between Indian national liberation, anticolonial struggle in Southern Africa, and the tactic of using nonviolent civil disobedience to generate international attention.⁵ The seemingly nonviolent character of the mainstream Indian independence movement became a site of (and an ideal for) transnational advocacy.⁶

THE WORLD PEACE BRIGADE

In January 1962, a year after the Gandhigram conference ended – a year that saw intense planning by the American Quaker Arlo Tatum, seconded from War Resisters' International – the World Peace Brigade was officially launched. Modeled on Gandhi's peace army and composed of people from various liberation, disarmament, human rights, and civil rights groups across the world, the Brigade was founded as an organization that would support anticolonial struggles through nonviolent means. Its planners chose a Quaker high school in sleepy, provincial Brummana, Lebanon, for the organization's founding conference, because of its proximity to the Israel–Palestine dispute, and because Israelis could be permitted entry.

⁵ On Gandhi in South Africa: Isabel Hofmeyr, *Gandhi's Printing Press: Experiments in Slow Reading* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2013); Ramachandra Guha, *Gandhi before India* (New York: Random House, 2014); Ashwin Desai and Goolam Vahed, *The South African Gandhi: Stretcher-Bearer of Empire* (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2016).

⁶ On the Indian independence movement as a site for transnational advocacy, see Muhammad Ali Raza, Franziska Roy, and Benjamin Zachariah, eds., *The Internationalist Moment: South Asia, Worlds, and World Views, 1917–1939* (New Delhi: Sage, 2016); Michele Louro, *Comrades against Imperialism: Nehru, India, and Interwar Internationalism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018); Sandipto Dasgupta, "Gandhi's Failure: Anticolonial Movements and Postcolonial Futures," *Perspectives on Politics* 15, no. 3 (2017): 647–62; Rikhil Bhavnani and Saumitra Jha, "Gandhi's Gift: Lessons for Peaceful Reform from India's Struggle for Democracy," *Economics of Peace and Security Journal* 9, no. 1 (2014): 80–92; Azar Ahanchi, "Reflections of the Indian Independence Movement in the Iranian Press," *Iranian Studies* 42, no. 3 (2009): 423–43.

Conference attendees structured the Brigade to have three regional councils, or headquarters: in North America (New York), Europe (London, at the War Resisters' International office), and Asia (Rajghat, Varanasi, India); symptomatic of some of the organization's eventual challenges, there was no African regional council. Each regional council had a different religious slant: Hindu/Sarvodaya (Asia), Anglican (Europe), and American Friends/Quaker (North America). The Brigade's central council included a chairperson from each region as well as individual Quakers, Sarvodaya workers, pacifists, and US civil rights and anti-nuclear weapons activists.⁷ The organization combined Americans, Britons, and Indians, some of whom worked on a host of sometimes religiously oriented pacifist causes, and some of whom had been involved in the Indian independence struggle either directly – as nationalist claimants – or as international advocates. JP Narayan, Reverend Michael Scott, and A. J. Muste (a US clergyman active in the peace, labor, and civil rights movements) formed the Brigade's leadership; listed as advisors on the organization's letterhead were Martin Luther King; Kenneth Kaunda, leader of the United National Independence Party (UNIP) of Northern Rhodesia and the first president of an independent Zambia; Julius Nyerere, prime minister of Tanganyika and later president of Tanzania, its successor state; and Eleanor Roosevelt.

The World Peace Brigade's Asia office shared its leadership and mailing address with the Indian Sarvodaya movement. A concept that Gandhi developed, *sarvodaya* ("universal uplift" or "well-being of all") celebrated manual labor, the voluntary equal distribution of wealth, and small-scale self-sufficient communities.⁸ After Indian independence (1947)

⁷ Albert Bigelow (a Quaker, former member of the US Navy, later an anti-nuclear weapons activist), Siddharaj Dhadra (an Indian lawyer who resigned from the Congress Party in 1957, entering informal politics as one of JP's lieutenants in the Sarvodaya movement), Stuart Morris (a prominent member of the British pacifist Peace Pledge Union, imprisoned during the Second World War for corresponding with the Indian independence movement), G. Ramachandran (who sat on the Gandhi Memorial Foundation), Bayard Rustin and Bill Sutherland (US civil rights activists), as well as Devi Prasad (who eventually became head of War Resisters' International). Elements of this community (including Scott and Sutherland) had formed the Sahara Protest Team, organizing a march from Ghana to protest French nuclear testing in the Sahara desert in 1959, see Robert Skinner, "Bombs and Border Crossings: Peace Activist Networks and the Post-colonial State in Africa, 1959–1962," *Journal of Contemporary History* 50, no. 3 (July 2015): 418–38.

⁸ Gandhi allegedly came up with the idea of *sarvodaya* in 1903 while reading John Ruskin's series of essays *Unto the Last* (1862) on an overnight train from Durban; M. K. Gandhi, *Autobiography: Story of My Experiences with Truth* (Washington, DC: Public Affairs

and Gandhi's death (1948), the idea of *sarvodaya* transformed into the Sarvodaya movement, which aimed to rectify social, economic, and political injustices within India – an Indian civil rights movement that remained outside of government or electoral politics and espoused nonviolence and volunteerism as an operating method and a source of legitimacy. JP Narayan was one of its main leaders.⁹ The Brigade was conceived as an internationally scaled Sarvodaya movement, growing out of the transnational connections between activists in the United States, Britain, and elsewhere who had supported Gandhi.¹⁰ While many of the pre-1947 solidarities between the Indian nationalists who became the governing elite of independent India and their US and European colleagues had eroded by the 1950s and early 1960s, peace activists' affinities with Indians outside government in the Sarvodaya movement remained.¹¹

The Brigade stressed the importance of the individual in service of “peace action.” As Albert Bigelow, an antinuclear activist wrote in his thoughts on the Brigade's founding conference, “Men can be human, responsible, autonomous . . . [in places] precisely at the point of tension of war.”¹² As individuals, Brigade members would provide “pilot examples” and bear “prophetic witness” to the unrest of decolonization.¹³ The Brigade would define, support, and train up the “right” kind of anticolonial nationalist leadership to shift nationalism into the correct political form (democratic self-rule, with no nationalization of industry or expulsion of settler-colonial or diaspora communities)

Press, 1948), 265. In 1908, Gandhi published a translation of Ruskin in Gujarati titled *Sarvodaya*. On the economic aspects of the Sarvodaya movement, see Narayan Desai, *Gramdan: The Land Revolution Movement in India* (London: War Resisters' International, 1969).

⁹ The other being Vinobha Bhave, the Indian social reformer.

¹⁰ Harald Fischer-Tiné, “Indian Nationalism and the ‘World Forces’: Transnational and Diasporic Dimensions of the Indian Freedom Movement on the Eve of the First World War,” *Journal of Global History* 2, no. 3 (2007): 325–44.

¹¹ Nico Slate, “From Colored Cosmopolitanism to Human Rights: A Historical Overview of the Transnational Black Freedom Struggle,” *Journal of Civil and Human Rights* 1, no. 1 (2015): 3–24.

¹² Albert Bigelow, “Some Reflections on the Lebanon Conference to Establish the World Peace Brigade,” 1961. World Peace Brigade North American Regional Council [NARC] Papers, Box 2, Wisconsin Historical Society, Madison, WI (hereafter, “WPB NARC Papers”).

¹³ Bigelow, “Some Reflections.”

through nonviolent methods. It vouched for the peaceful yet legitimately nationalist credentials of its chosen protégés in the international media and at the United Nations.

Members of the World Peace Brigade, and the overlapping circles of anticolonial nationalist and pacifist activism in which its participants were embedded, formed a transnational advocacy network.¹⁴ These networks, motivated by shared values, were loosely organized spheres of nongovernmental activism that crossed national borders. Anticolonialists have often operated transnationally, both before and after the Second World War.¹⁵ Such networks have allowed them access to spheres of influence that remained closed to them within their colonized country. Understandings of these anticolonial transnational networks generally focus on solidarities between colonized and formerly colonized or otherwise disenfranchised peoples; these are often termed “South–South” connections.¹⁶

However, the Brigade and the wider community of activism in which it operated differed from many of these networks in two key ways: First, its membership predominantly came from a departing imperial colonizer (Britain), rising indirect empire (the United States), and new postcolonial state (India), *not* from active anticolonial nationalist movements. Second, while Indians, along with some African American civil rights activists,

¹⁴ The term “transnational advocacy network” was coined by Margaret Keck and Katherine Sikkink, *Activists beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998).

¹⁵ Regarding the British imperial sphere, see Priyamvada Gopal, *Insurgent Empire: Anticolonial Resistance and British Dissent* (London: Verso, 2019) and Antoinette Burton, *The Trouble with Empire: Challenges to Modern British Imperialism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015). For a global cross-section, see Erez Manela and Heather Streets-Salter, eds., *The Anticolonial Transnational: Networks, Connections, and Movements in the Making of the Postcolonial World* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2023).

¹⁶ A sampling of this rich literature includes Carolien Stolte and Su Lin Lewis, eds., *The Lives of Cold War Afro-Asianism* (Leiden: Leiden University Press, 2022); Jeffrey Byrne, *Mecca of Revolution: Algeria, Decolonization and the Third World Order* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016); Jonathan Derrick, *Africa’s “Agitators”: Militant Anticolonialism in Africa and the West, 1918–1938* (London: Hurst, 2008); Leslie James, *George Padmore and Decolonization from Below: Pan-Africanism, the Cold War, and the End of Empire* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015); Brent Hayes Edwards, *The Practice of Diaspora: Literature, Translation and the Rise of Black Internationalism* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003); Maia Ramnath, *Haj to Utopia: How the Ghadar Movement Charted Global Radicalism and Attempted to Overthrow the British Empire* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011); Seema Sohi, *Echoes of Mutiny: Race, Surveillance, and Indian Anticolonialism in North America* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014).

played crucial roles in terms of leadership, membership, and inspiration, the Brigade and its network drew much of their finances as well as significant portions of their leadership and membership from white allies – to use ahistorical language. Advocates from the Brigade community derived their prestige and influence from the various movements to which they belonged, as well as their degree of proximity to spheres of political power that lay within (or were allied with) the United States during the Cold War.

In this way, the Brigade was a First World construction – built upon the geopolitical framework after the Second World War that divided the world into those who supported or were backed by the United States, those who supported or were backed by the Second World of the Soviet Union and its satellite states, and those in the postcolonial or decolonizing “Third World.”¹⁷ Alongside its First World orientation, the Brigade set out to find ways to address violence in the decolonizing Third World. The analytical disconnect between its First World alignment and its Third World mission undermined the Brigade’s neutral peace politics, which presented an alternative to the prospect of (what it perceived to be) uncontrolled, violent, and potentially communist-supported national liberation.

LEADERSHIP: MUSTE, NARAYAN, SCOTT

The structure of the World Peace Brigade prioritized the individual advocate – particularly the charismatic individual of moral stature – as the solution to international problems of war, violence, disenfranchisement, and dependency. When pondering Katanga’s secession from Congo-Leopoldville in Sub-Saharan Africa, JP’s wife and colleague, Asha Devi, queried what she herself could do if she were parachuted into the midst of the Congo Crisis.¹⁸ Devi proposed that a nationally unaffiliated person of Gandhian training and discipline, dropped into a conflict zone, might succeed in negotiating between opposing parties in a situation that stymied official diplomacy.

The Brigade was a collection of individuals who shared this belief. Its three chairmen (Figure 3.1) – A. J. Muste (1885–1967); J. P. Narayan

¹⁷ This framework was first described by Alfred Sauvy, “Trois mondes, une planète,” *L’Observateur* 14, no. 118 (August 14, 1952): 14. In the subsequent decades, the hierarchy imbedded in notions of a First, Second, and Third World have made them contested political terms. Here, they are used in their contemporary context, rather than the meanings the terms took on over time.

¹⁸ Asha Devi Aryanayakam, “Notes on Talks with Vinoba on World Peace and the World Peace Brigade,” February 1, 1961, File 46, Devi Prasad Papers.




FIGURE 3.1 (a) A. J. Muste, 1965; (b) Jayaprakash Narayan, 1975; (c) Michael Scott (center) with Bertrand Russell, 1961. Getty Images

(1902–1979); and Michael Scott (1907–1983) – were founders, board members, and supporters of multiple activist organizations and possessed moral clout among their colleagues and followers. They stood at the center of the international peace movement, espoused nonviolent interventionism, and were activists for causes specific to the country in which they held citizenship. In addition, they had leadership roles in faith communities that were nationally oriented but had international followings.

Abraham Johannes Muste chaired the Brigade's North American Regional Council. Muste was an ordained Protestant minister and had worked for organized labor in the United States throughout the 1930s. In 1940, he became a leader of US Christian pacifism, heading the Fellowship for Reconciliation and the Institute for the Rights of Man, among other Quaker-oriented organizations.¹⁹ He was active in the US civil rights movement and mentored the African American civil rights leader Bayard Rustin (also a Quaker) and pan-Africanist Bill Sutherland, who both joined the World Peace Brigade.²⁰ Muste was a brilliant administrator and accomplished fundraiser, able to shift between roles as organizational figurehead and *éminence grise*. He skillfully moderated the internecine conflicts endemic to voluntary associations run on shoestring budgets, and he tapped US philanthropists to fund his

¹⁹ Nat Hentoff, *Peace Agitator: The Story of A. J. Muste* (New York: Macmillan, 1963); Leah Danielson, *American Gandhi: A. J. Muste and the History of Radicalism in the Twentieth Century* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2014). A. J. Muste's personal papers are held by the Swarthmore College Peace Collection and are available on microfilm.

²⁰ Jo Ann Robinson, *Abraham Went Out: A Biography of A. J. Muste* (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 1998), 118.

enterprises. He died in 1967, a few months after his visit to and deportation from South Vietnam (and his meeting with North Vietnamese leaders in Hanoi) in protest of the United States' war against that country.

Muste, along with George Houser (also a Protestant minister) of the American Committee on Africa, an anti-apartheid advocacy organization, was one of the few on the antiwar American left who could get along well both with elements of the US Democratic Party establishment – often donors to their organizations – and with the growing, more radical New Left. Such activists were quiet diplomats who did not mind ceding prime billing to let the claimants they supported take center stage. They belonged to a tradition of Protestant activism known and perceived as safe by more establishment types,²¹ and they were willing to suffer physical and financial discomfort in pursuit of their goals. For example, Houser and colleagues would travel across the United States by car, at times sleeping in it overnight, singing hymns during the day and road-tripping from donor meetings to college campus speeches.²²

In the late 1950s, Jayaprakash Narayan (JP), chair of the Brigade's Asian Regional Council, had such a substantial international profile that many in the US Department of State assumed that he would be Nehru's successor as Indian prime minister, a belief based more on JP's prestige abroad than on political dynamics within India.²³ JP was deeply invested in Indian domestic development, the Sarvodaya movement, and the Bhoodan movement for voluntary land reform.²⁴ He lent his prestige to certain nationalists (particularly Tanganyika/Tanzania's Julius Nyerere, Northern Rhodesia/Zambia's Kenneth Kaunda, and Kenya's Jomo Kenyatta) and attempted to tap into South Asian diaspora communities in Southern and Eastern Africa for logistical and popular support.²⁵

²¹ Udi Greenberg, "The Rise of the Global South and the Protestant Peace with Socialism," *Contemporary European History* 29, no. 2 (2020): 202–19.

²² Jennifer Davis, eulogy, November 6, 2015, George Houser Memorial Service, Union Theological Seminary, New York City. Davis was executive director of the American Committee on Africa, 1981–2001.

²³ General Records of the US Department of State, 1955–1959. Series 791.5/7-356 to 791.00/11-3056 contains innumerable allusions to JP as the most likely successor to Nehru as Indian prime minister. JP's extensive collection of personal papers are at the Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, New Delhi.

²⁴ Suresh Ramabhai (Suresh Ram), *Vinoba and His Mission: Being an Account of the Rise and Growth of the Bhoodan Yajna Movement*, foreword by S. Radhakrishnan, introduction by J. P. Narayan (Sevagram: Akhil Bharat Sarva Seva Sangh, 1954). Suresh Ram was heavily involved in the World Peace Brigade.

²⁵ Bill Sutherland to Michael Scott, January 26, 1963, on JP's contacts in Nairobi, Box 2, WPB NARC Papers.

As the figurehead for the student-led “JP movement,” he emerged as an opponent of Indian prime minister Indira Gandhi when she suspended civil liberties and cancelled elections during the Indian Emergency (1975–1977).²⁶ JP had a track record of ambiguous support for the political grievances of Kashmir, Tibet, and Nagaland.²⁷ He expressed this ambiguity by deliberately avoiding giving direct answers to binary political questions; he had the gift – at times a curse – of straddling opposing positions. Sometimes this made him an ideally placed negotiator while, at other times, he was in danger of alienating his own side.

The chair of the Brigade’s European Regional Council, Michael Scott, an Anglican clergyman, first came to India in the 1930s as an undercover courier for the Communist Party, on the staff of the Bishop of Bombay. His overarching concern for political justice had bridged his theology and communist sympathies. After the Second World War he grew disillusioned with Stalinism and took a posting to Johannesburg, giving himself the first-hand experience he used when he testified on behalf of India at the UN’s Fourth Committee on Colonialism hearings on South Africa’s restrictive 1946 Asiatic Land Tenure and Representation Act, which limited where South Asians could own property in South Africa. By 1960, Scott was a veteran UN petitioner, speaking nearly annually on behalf of the rights of the Herero people of South West Africa at the UN Committee on South West Africa, sometimes with the logistical support of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), an African American civil rights organization.²⁸

Scott was deeply concerned with the fates of minority peoples within new postcolonial states and tacked some unofficial diplomacy onto his visit to the War Resisters’ International Gandhigram conference, held in India in December 1960–January 1961. Passing through Delhi right before and after the conference, Scott talked with Prime Minister Nehru about national independence for the Naga people in India’s Northeast, and the future of their exiled leader, Angami Zapu Phizo, who was at that time ensconced at Scott’s London-based advocacy organization, the

²⁶ Gyan Prakash, *Emergency Chronicles: Indira Gandhi and Democracy’s Turning Point* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2019), 307–16, details JP’s political thought while he was incarcerated during the Emergency.

²⁷ Lydia Walker, “Jayaprakash Narayan and the Politics of Reconciliation for the Postcolonial State and Its Imperial Fragments,” *Indian Economic and Social History Review* 56, no. 2 (2019): 147–69.

²⁸ Carol Anderson, *Bourgeois Radicals: The NAACP and the Struggle for Colonial Liberation, 1941–1960* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 69–132.

Africa Bureau. The International Friends (Quaker) Centre in North Delhi had agreed to serve as a neutral, private ground for Scott and Nehru's conversation since Scott had told Indian Quakers that "he was not sponsoring Phizo's claim, . . . only his right for a chance to talk with his own people" and return to India.²⁹ Most importantly, Nehru's own government was not privy to the content or occurrence of these secret meetings until Nehru himself chose to divulge them in a January 1961 press conference.³⁰

The fact that Scott, a non-Indian and private British citizen, could hold secret negotiations with the prime minister of India on a thorny diplomatic matter involving the latter's country indicates that Scott – along with certain other leaders of the international peace movement – was held in great respect by and had sway with particular top government officials. These off-the-record, unofficial meetings also showed how international civil society spaces such as the Friends Center facilitated unofficial diplomacy and highlighted the involvement of the Friends Service Committee. Many Quakers had been active participants and advocates for the Indian independence movement; in the 1960s, some turned to the US civil rights movement and to the unfinished business of decolonization, such as the place of minority peoples within newly independent nation-states.

The lives and work of Muste, JP, and Scott typify how a well-placed, well-connected individual could act as an iconic figure metonymic of a larger cause, as a link between different realms of politics, and as a gatekeeper on behalf of those who lacked the ability or access to represent themselves in circles of power. Each stood at the center of liberal, anticommunist civil society activism within his own country, and each was often more practical, even more expedient, than his ideological goals might imply. They were moralists who functioned with more finesse and ability as individuals than they did within the organization they

²⁹ Arjun Das, Quaker International Centre, Delhi, Gandhigram Conference report, January 8, 1961. American Friends Service Commission Archives, Philadelphia, PA (hereafter, "AFSC Papers").

³⁰ Transcript of Press Conference Held by Prime Minister at Vigya Bhavan on January 18, 1961, File 713, Part 1, Nehru Papers. Scott assured Nehru that he did not support Naga independence, and broached the topic of some form of international civil society commission to broker a deal between Naga nationalists and the Indian government. According to Scott, Nehru seemed open, interested, and noncommittal; see, Das, "Report on the Gandhigram Conference"; Michael Scott to Rev. Layton P. Zimmer, January 25, 1961, Box 31, GMS Papers. According to Nehru, Scott was well meaning but misguided: Nehru to General SM Shrinagesh, Governor of Assam, January 24, 1961, File 713, Part 3, Nehru Papers.

cofounded, the World Peace Brigade. They operated within the interstices, the unregulated spaces, of the United Nations as both a set of bureaucracies and as a system of international order, because they saw the institution as inadequately addressing the process of decolonization. However, when the Brigade was established as an organization, its weaknesses were revealed: lack of money, staffed by volunteers with day jobs, and led by unofficial politicians with many and varied – and at times conflicting – ideological commitments.

THE AFRICA FREEDOM ACTION PROJECT

February 1962 to February 1963 saw intense activity by Brigade members. They conducted seminars in civil disobedience in Dar es Salaam and testified to the UN Special Committee of 17 on Decolonization concerning Katanga's secession from the former Belgian Congo, which they viewed as an illegitimate, neoimperial, rather than national, claim because of Katanga's direct links to Western multinational mining interests. Brigade members were also some of the few non-Africans to attend conferences sponsored by the Pan-African Freedom Movement of Eastern, Central, and Southern Africa (PAFMEC[S]A) and to consult with African nationalist leaders there. In addition to these activities, one of their most significant undertakings was their launch of the African Action Freedom Project in East Africa. This project included a planned march from Tanganyika to Northern Rhodesia, with Northern Rhodesian/Zambian nationalist leader Kenneth Kaunda, to help generate international attention and support for the Zambian independence movement.³¹

In the early 1960s, the Indian Ocean port of Dar es Salaam, Tanganyika, was an obvious point of entry for a host of international actors who sought to work with the forces of national liberation.³² It had been a hub for global exchange and connection since the nineteenth century.³³ Tanganyika had a newly independent government led by Prime Minister Julius Nyerere – a charismatic leader, anticolonialist,

³¹ The specific start-and-end locations of the planned march remained unspecified.

³² George Roberts, *Revolutionary State-Making in Dar Es Salaam: African Liberation and the Global Cold War, 1961–1974* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021).

³³ James R. Brennan and Andrew Burton, "Emerging Metropolis: A History of Dar es Salaam, 1862–2000," in *Dar es Salaam: Histories from an Emerging Metropolis*, ed. Burton Brennan and Yusuf Lawi (Dar es Salaam: Mkuki na Nyota Publishers, 2007), 13–75.

and political thinker with a growing African and international profile.³⁴ The city itself had an increasingly vibrant university and cultural sensibility.³⁵ It also had relative geographic propinquity to the landlocked “decolonization hot spots” of Katanga and the Rhodesias. A variety of intelligence agencies operating in the city competed with each other to recruit informants among nationalist movements, university students, and the general population.³⁶

All these characteristics made Dar es Salaam an ideal site for the World Peace Brigade’s work of transforming anticolonial nationalist movements into peaceful, anticommunist, postcolonial states – and of building an international civil society nonviolent militia: a civitia.³⁷ In early 1962, the Brigade launched the Africa Freedom Action Project with the aim of aiding the breakup of the white-ruled Central African Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland (present-day Zambia, Zimbabwe, and Malawi). At first, Michael Scott was the primary project leader. After he left Dar es Salaam in summer 1962, Bill Sutherland assumed leadership of the project.

Dar es Salaam figured as the project’s headquarters for supporting and training anticolonial nationalists in nonviolent civil disobedience of the type used by Gandhi and the US civil rights movement. Project participants aimed to make the city what they termed the “anti-Algiers,” alluding to the city’s Arabic name (“Abode of Peace”) and contrasting the Brigade’s training of anticolonial nationalists in Gandhian civil disobedience to the violence of Algerian decolonization and the new Algerian government’s military training for other national liberation movements.³⁸ Project members saw themselves as “nonviolent technicians” who would organize and teach Africans “how to be effective” on a mass march.³⁹

³⁴ Issa Shivji, Saida Yahya-Othman, and Ng’wanza Kamata, *Julius Nyerere: Development as Rebellion*, vols. 1–3 (Dar es Salaam: Mkuki na Nyota Publishers, 2020). Many thanks to Issa Shivji for outlining this collaborative biographical project and its source base during my 2016 research trip to Dar es Salaam.

³⁵ Emily Callaci, *Street Archives and City Life: Popular Intellectuals in Postcolonial Tanzania* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2017).

³⁶ James R. Brennan, “The Secret Lives of Dennis Phombeah: Decolonization, the Cold War, and African Political Intelligence, 1953–1974,” *International History Review* 43, no. 1 (2021): 153–69.

³⁷ “Civitas” is the descriptive term for the World Peace Brigade used by A. J. Muste; see, Bigelow, “Some Reflections.”

³⁸ A. J. Muste letter to North American Regional Council Members, July 30, 1963, Box 2, NARC Papers.

³⁹ Bill Sutherland and Matt Meyers, *Guns and Gandhi in Africa: Pan African Insights on Nonviolence, Armed Struggle and Liberation in Africa* (Trenton, NJ and Asmara, Eritrea: Africa World Press, 2000), 63.

They led training programs and held rallies – featuring themselves and regional nationalist leaders – of around five thousand people in Dar es Salaam and of almost ten thousand at Mbeya, in southwest Tanganyika.

Absent from the Brigade's planning was its ideological competition – the many African anticolonial nationalist guerrilla camps that stood on the outskirts of the city.⁴⁰ The leadership of Namibian, Mozambican, Zambian, Zimbabwean, and South African anticolonial nationalists, either based in or repeatedly passing through Dar es Salaam, sought succor and support from a range of individuals attached to governments, corporations, and nongovernmental organizations, including members of the World Peace Brigade.⁴¹ These nationalists had an assortment of advocates from whom to draw backing, as well as actual paramilitary training camps on the doorstep of Dar es Salaam. The “Algerian model” encircled the anti-Algiers.

One of the few African leaders who actively engaged with the Africa Freedom Action Project was the Northern Rhodesian/Zambian nationalist Kenneth Kaunda. In early February 1962, Kaunda met Bayard Rustin, Bill Sutherland, and Michael Scott in Addis Ababa at the Fourth PAFMEC(S)A Conference.⁴² There, the Brigade members pitched the Freedom Action Project to Kaunda as a nonviolent civil-disobedience campaign in support of Zambian independence; as its first endeavor, the project planned a march from Mbeya (near the Tanganyika–Northern Rhodesia border) into Northern Rhodesia. This march would spearhead a six-month general strike that Kaunda planned to launch against the British colonial state that governed Northern Rhodesia. The threatened strike and march were tools to pressure British colonial authorities, hastening their withdrawal by making them

⁴⁰ Christian Williams, *National Liberation in Postcolonial Southern Africa: A Historical Ethnography of SWAPO's Exile Camps* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 65–93; Michael Panzer, “Building a Revolutionary Constituency: Mozambican Refugees and the Development of the FRELIMO Proto-State, 1964–1968,” *Social Dynamics* 39, no. 1 (2013): 5–23; George Roberts, “The Assassination of Eduardo Mondlane: FRELIMO, Tanzania, and the Politics of Exile in Dar es Salaam,” *Cold War History* 17, no. 1 (2017): 1–19.

⁴¹ Andrew Ivaska, “Liberation in Transit: Eduardo Mondlane and Che Guevara in Dar es Salaam,” in *The Routledge Handbook of the Global Sixties*, ed. Chen Jian, Martin Klimke, Masha Kirasirova, Mary Nolan, Marilyn Young, and Joanna Waley-Cohen (London: Routledge, 2018); Philip Muehlenbeck and Nathalie Telepneva, eds., *Warsaw Pact Intervention in the “Third World”: Aid and Influence in the Cold War* (London: IB Tauris, 2018).

⁴² Andy DeRoche, “Dreams and Disappointments: Kenneth Kaunda and the United States, 1960–1964,” *Safundi: The Journal of South African and American Studies* 6, no. 4 (2008): 375.

view Zambian independence more favorably compared to the rising costs of governing. Kaunda supported the Brigade's scheme, announcing that the proposed march would be equipped with bibles, not guns – thus linking the endeavor to the faith-based peace politics of the Brigade community rather than to the revolutionary nationalism of other liberation movements.⁴³

An April 1962 profile of Kaunda in the *New York Times* emphasized his commitment to multiracialism and “his record for keeping hot-headed supporters under control.”⁴⁴ The US “paper of record” described Kaunda as a “son of a missionary” and a “disciple of Gandhi,” who neither drank nor smoked and who emulated Abraham Lincoln. The *Times* portrayed the Northern Rhodesian leader as the “right” kind of anticolonial nationalist, who channeled the fervor of his “hot-headed” supporters through personal discipline and a sensibility aligned with that of the Gandhian World Peace Brigade. Kaunda had traveled to the United States twice in the previous two years, as the guest of George Houser's American Committee on Africa (a member of the Brigade community), where he made a positive impression on John F. Kennedy and garnered the endorsement of *Life* magazine as “a patriotic practitioner of democracy” and a “soft-spoken believer in non-violence.”⁴⁵ There was a history of multiracial, self-proclaimed “liberal” organizing in colonial Northern Rhodesia that Kaunda may not have directly espoused but from which he benefited as he positioned himself as the internationally recognized, safely religious, peaceful, and anticommunist leader of an independent Zambia.⁴⁶

⁴³ DeRoche, “Dreams and Disappointments,” 375. According to A. J. Muste, “Kaunda, on Principle, and Nyerere, on Personality” supported the project, which was primarily staffed by Suresh Ram, Rustin, Scott, and Sutherland; see, Sutherland and Meyers, *Guns and Gandhi in Africa*, 63.

⁴⁴ “A Disciple of Gandhi: Kenneth Kaunda,” *New York Times*, April 18, 1962.

⁴⁵ DeRoche, “Dreams and Disappointments,” 371. While Kaunda was successful in his international performance, he had a more complicated relationship with the liberalism espoused by the Brigade community: as early as autumn 1963, a year before he assumed power as the first president of Zambia, Kaunda signaled his interest in dissolving rival political parties, so that soon-to-be independent Zambia would be a one-party state; see, Bizeck Jube Phiri, “The Capricorn Africa Society Revisited: The Impact of Liberalism in Zambia's Colonial History, 1949–1963,” *International Journal of African Historical Studies* 24, no. 1 (1991): 82. Under Kaunda, Zambia became a one-party state in 1972.

⁴⁶ On multiracialism and political organizing in the run-up to Zambian independence, see Jan-Bart Gewald, Marja Hinfelaar, and Giacomo Macola, eds., *Living the End of Empire: Politics and Society in Late Colonial Zambia* (Leiden: Brill, 2011).

As the British-colonial Central African Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland unraveled into white supremacist and Black majority-ruled states against the background of racial and Cold War politics, Kenneth Kaunda was attempting to navigate that complicated political terrain.⁴⁷ The future of the Rhodesias, whether as white-ruled British dominions or as independent postcolonial states or as something in between, was seemingly up for grabs in the early 1960s.⁴⁸ White-settler colonials could rely on personal connections within the British government to make their case for an Australia in the Southern African Copperbelt. Black African leaders, on the other hand, lacking these direct connections, had to demonstrate from afar their regional popularity and their ability to manage their constituents.⁴⁹ In his push for Zambian independence, Kaunda had to show the British two things: that the anticolonial movement was of sufficient strength for London to take it seriously, and that he could speak for and manage Northern Rhodesian anticolonial nationalism. Kaunda needed to present anticolonial nationalism as dangerous – but not too dangerous.

In early 1962, before Zambian independence, it was therefore opportune – in terms of both Kaunda's goals and peace advocacy – for the Brigade to help Kaunda with this balancing act by grabbing local and international headlines through its planned march into Northern Rhodesia, designed to increase the “right” kind of pressure on the British: nonviolent, anticomunist, seemingly democratic-participatory.⁵⁰ Kaunda's pre-independence authority rested on his skillful

⁴⁷ On the evolution of South African diplomacy regarding the decolonization of the Central African Federation: Jamie Miller, *An African Volk: The Apartheid Regime and Its Struggle for Survival* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016); Julia Tischler, *Light and Power for the Multi-racial Nation: The Kariba Dam in the Central African Federation* (London: Palgrave, 2013). Over time, South Africa gradually distanced itself from Southern Rhodesia after its Unilateral Declaration of Independence (1965), and came to favor anticomunist, weaker Black regimes such as Malawi's. This evolution put more pressure on Kaunda's Zambia, leading him to crack down on the Southern African liberation movements; Paul Trehwela, “The Kissinger/Vorster/Kaunda Détente: Genesis of the SWAPO ‘Spy Drama,’ Part I,” *Searchlight South Africa* 2, no. 1 (1990): 69–86; and Trehwela, “The Kissinger/Vorster/Kaunda Détente: The Genesis of the SWAPO ‘Spy Drama,’ Part II,” *Searchlight South Africa* 2, no. 2 (1991): 42–58.

⁴⁸ Luise White, *Unpopular Sovereignty: Rhodesian Independence and African Decolonization* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015), captures this contingency.

⁴⁹ Miles Larmer, *Rethinking African Politics: A History of Opposition in Zambia* (London: Ashgate, 2011), 32.

⁵⁰ “Michael Scott Is Far Too Busy in Dar,” *Sunday News* (Tanganika), May 6, 1962, University of Dar es Salaam East Africana Collections, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. Also,

embodiment of the “correct” form of anticolonial nationalism as a “principled non-violent Christian leader” with legitimate anticolonial nationalist credentials: a leader whom Western governments and multinational mining corporations could consider “reasonable” and safe for foreign investment.⁵¹

By autumn of that year, however, Kaunda no longer needed the support of the Brigade: the Northern Rhodesian election allowed his United National Independence Party (UNIP) to form a coalition government and enter formal politics. The election empowered Northern Rhodesian nationalists and undermined the purpose of the Africa Freedom Action Project’s work in that region. As Kaunda became the presumptive leader of a likely independent Zambia, his need for the Brigade evaporated. He had used the agitation over its planned peace march as leverage while constitutional proposals for Northern Rhodesia were debated in London. However, when Britain began to negotiate with him seriously about a political transition toward an independent state, he could prioritize his much-needed connections with investors – mining companies and development organizations – over those with peace activists. At the last minute, he pulled the plug on the proposed march (and the strike) as a gesture of good faith to London.⁵²

Members of the World Peace Brigade had functioned as important gatekeepers for Kaunda, setting up meetings for him with government officials and investors, who often sat on the board of development or advocacy organizations, or both.⁵³ The gatekeeper’s job was to open metaphorical gates and forward a nationalist claim on to the next, more powerful advocate. Brigade members’ effectiveness in making these connections for Kaunda played a role in Kaunda’s successful bid for national leadership and Zambian independence. Yet that same success caused Kaunda to withdrawal from the Africa Freedom Action Project, thereby undermining the Brigade’s work in East Africa.

“Rhodesia Tensions Rise,” *New York Times*, May 5, 1962; “Marchers Wait for the ‘Signal,’” *Observer*, March 4, 1962.

⁵¹ Larmer, *Rethinking African Politics*, 51.

⁵² In a hasty, barbed note to Scott in the spring of 1963, A. J. Muste expressed his “continued regret that conditions . . . made it impossible for [Scott] to remain in Africa last year.” Muste said that he “recognize[d] that the situation might not have provided any opening for” the Brigade; “[o]n the other hand,” he wrote, “it might have”; see A. J. Muste note to Michael Scott, May 24, 1963, Box 1, WPB NARC Papers.

⁵³ This process is described more fully in Chapter 4, “The Spectre of Katanga.”

Despite its original utility for Kaunda, the Brigade's Africa Freedom Action Project in Dar es Salaam was not able to find another African nationalist leader interested in its services. Losing momentum, the project shut down after a year (in 1963), as its leadership's focus shifted toward other endeavors. Without a concrete aim after Kaunda lost interest, in September 1962 Bill Sutherland, de facto project leader after Scott left in summer 1962, fantasized about a march to South West Africa – either a land march from Tanganyika or a “sea movement” from Congo-Leopoldville – that would generate international attention for both anticolonial nationalist liberation in Southern Africa and the Africa Freedom Action Project.⁵⁴ But just four months later, at the start of the new year, a worn-out Sutherland dropped Scott a note one night: “Since the generator is not working at the moment and water is not being pumped properly from the well, [I am] getting the hell out of here. I may continue writing letters in some bar; although I’m somewhat on the wagon.”⁵⁵

“LIBERALIST” INTERNATIONALISM AND ITS WEAKNESSES

Shortly afterward, in February 1963, the Brigade – mired in internal ideological disagreement, lacking nationalist backing, and losing money – closed the Africa Freedom Action Project. Bill Sutherland wrote to A. J. Muste about its demise:

It is our failure to come up with a dramatic and imaginative program for South Rhodesia, South West Africa, Mozambique or any other place which excludes us. If a tried and able group of Afro-Americans from the Birmingham scene could be brought over here with strategists like Bayard [Rustin] . . . I’m sure the Southern Africans, Eduardo Mondlane of Mozambique – even [South West African People’s Organization leader Sam] Nujoma would listen. It’s just that terrorism and guerrilla warfare are the only methods which appear relevant to the Southern African scene that Julius [Nyerere] falls into step with [Algerian president Ahmed] Ben Bella.”⁵⁶

Sutherland highlighted the failure of the Brigade’s twin aims: internationalizing the US civil rights movement and making Dar es Salaam a center for nonviolent anticolonial struggle – the metaphorical anti-Algiers. The

⁵⁴ Bill Sutherland to A. J. Muste, Bayard Rustin, and Michael Scott, September 16, 1962, Box 1, WPB NARC.

⁵⁵ Bill Sutherland letter to Michael Scott, January 26, 1963, Box 1, WPB NARC; Sutherland alluded to his alcoholism, which became a liability to the project.

⁵⁶ Bill Sutherland letter to A. J. Muste, May 31, 1963, Box 1, WPB NARC Papers.

inadequate number of US civil rights activists was his first explanation for the collapse of the anti-Algiers. His second was “that terrorism and guerrilla warfare [were] the only methods which appear relevant” to anticolonial nationalist movements.

Muste’s own epitaph for the project blamed its shortcomings in part on Brigade leadership, at the level of the individual – specifically, Scott’s abandonment and Sutherland’s drinking. He also felt, as he wrote in a letter (likely in 1963), that the demise of the project was part of the growing pains for a new type of politics: “Ventures of this kind are necessarily experimental in nature.”⁵⁷ Muste alluded to the Brigade’s aim to “bear prophetic witness” to political change rather than engineer that change itself. This aim encapsulated the conundrum of advocacy, which could disempower – or even supplant – its cause if advocacy ended up exceeding the strength and influence of the cause on whose behalf it worked.

A 1962 article by Barbara Deming in Muste’s *Liberation* magazine, written before the Africa Freedom Action Project dissolved, gave the most thorough account of the Brigade’s aims while simultaneously indicating the deeper flaws in the organization.⁵⁸ A prominent feminist, pacifist, attendee at the Brigade’s founding conference, and close colleague of the Brigade community, Deming was an excellent writer and theorist of nonviolent sociopolitical change. Her tagline for the Brigade was “to revolutionize the concept of revolution.” She captured the tension at the heart of the Brigade’s attempt to be an international “people’s movement” whose membership did not belong to the peoples it sought to liberate. She opened her piece with the image of a cluster of Brigade members (Americans, Indians, and Europeans) “bent over a map weighing the possibilities of a trek by an international team into some part of Black Africa to set up a non-violent training center there, and to assist the African leaders in their struggle for self-determination.”⁵⁹ The imperial echoes of Deming’s words are hard to ignore: non-Africans pouring over a map of “some part of Black Africa,” planning their expedition. She closed with a caveat: “Before the African project could be definite, there had of course to be consultations with independence

⁵⁷ Muste letter to Suresh Ram, undated, probably fall 1963, Box 1, WPB NARC Papers.

⁵⁸ Barbara Deming, “International Peace Brigade,” *Liberation* (Summer 1962), Swarthmore Library Peace Collection, Swarthmore College, Swarthmore, Pennsylvania.

⁵⁹ Deming, “International Peace Brigade.”

leaders there.”⁶⁰ Revealingly, as noted earlier, the World Peace Brigade had no regional council for the African continent or African leadership.

In 1960, two years before the Brigade launched the Africa Freedom Action Project, George Loft, the American Friends Service Committee representative in Salisbury, Rhodesia, met with the governor of Northern Rhodesia to discuss a project on the “Christian approach to the issues the Federation will face in 1960.”⁶¹ Loft pleaded for the organized participation of anticolonial nationalist leaders “such as Kenneth Kaunda.” “We tend to forget,” he argued, “that most of our African leadership has come through some phase of Christian mission work; it would be well for them to be reminded of their Christian heritage and responsibilities; it would be equally desirable to remind the European community at large that the African leaders have such a heritage.”⁶²

Loft’s successor, Lyle Tatum, who took up his post as the Friends Service Committee’s Salisbury, Rhodesia, representative later in 1960, was the brother of the founding secretary of the World Peace Brigade, Arlo Tatum. Lyle decided to pursue a faster and more personal integrationist policy than had Loft, and invited Black Africans into his rented home in a white-only Salisbury neighborhood. Facing eviction for having done so, Lyle Tatum circulated a poll among his neighbors in October, seeking textual evidence of their views on the matter.⁶³ Some respondents said that they had no objection as long as gatherings were personal rather than political and guests “behave themselves in a civilized and orderly manner.” Others emphasized how long they had been in Rhodesia: “27 years,” an “old Rhodesian,” “three generations in Rhodesia,” and said that multiracialism was doomed to failure – look at Congo – and that Lyle Tatum should turn his attention to the American South.⁶⁴

⁶⁰ Deming, “International Peace Brigade.”

⁶¹ After his stint in Rhodesia, Loft served as the director of the Quaker program at the UN (1961–1963) and the vice-president of the African-American Institute (1963–1966).

⁶² George Loft letter to Sir Evelyn Horn, January 2, 1960, International Service Division, 1960. Latin America Program, Africa Program Box, File 62968, AFSC Papers. “The Federation” was the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland (1953–1963), which was made up of what are currently Zimbabwe, Zambia, and Malawi.

⁶³ Poll options included sympathy for the Tatum family’s “multi-racialist” point of view; no sympathy, but respect for their right to entertain whomever they liked in their own home; and no sympathy as well as a request for the Tatums to move.

⁶⁴ Tatum poll info, October 1960, File 62968, AFSC Papers. Lucie White shows that expressions of generational connection to Rhodesia made by white settlers were more imaginary than real. White, *Unpopular Sovereignty*, 4: “Of the seven hundred original pioneers who arrived in 1890, only fifteen lived in the country in 1924.” “There were

The Tatum family shifted houses and organized a series of community development projects, building homes, schools, and gardens with a staff of multiracial volunteers.

Reading through the responses made Lyle more sympathetic to the point of view of his segregationist neighbors. In a July 1962 letter to Muste and Sutherland (responding to one that Muste had written to Lyle in April), Lyle criticized the Brigade's closeness with Kaunda's UNIP party, arguing that it corrupted the Brigade's attempt to craft a reputation for itself as an honest broker for the region's conflicts. In particular, he denounced JP's, Sutherland's, and Scott's testimony before the UN:

There was nothing in the World Peace Brigade's testimony which was anything like evidence under US law. Most of it was hearsay, and the information . . . was not original and could have been submitted by UNIP . . . I feel there is a heady wine of high places about [the] World Peace Brigade that needs watching – UN testimony, prime ministers as friends and patrons, etc. It is easy to get led down the primrose path of this heady wine. The World Peace Brigade is not and cannot be number one with any of these people, even Kaunda.⁶⁵

Beyond the issue of whether the Brigade, as organized, should advocate for multiracial societies in specific African territories, Lyle's disapproval addressed issues inherent in an international organization taking defined nationalist stances. At what point would it cease to be an independent agent? What loyalty would nationalist elites have toward a collection of underfunded idealists once they had access to development assistance and the foreign policy representatives of actual countries? For instance, although Julius Nyerere had invited the Brigade to Dar es Salaam, he had more interest in signing agreements with existent governments than with Sutherland and Muste. Further, Lyle warned, "even Kaunda" – at that time, in the early 1960s, still fighting for Zambia's recognition – would lose interest at some point in working with the Brigade. The Brigade was useful to the leader of a nationalist movement who lacked official recognition but not so much to a president or prime minister of an actual state.

Continuing in the same letter with his denunciations of the Brigade's activities, Lyle suggested the elimination of the words "settler," "native," and "imperialism" from Brigade literature, as they "immediately stamp

almost equal numbers of white immigrants and white emigrants for most of the early 1960s."

⁶⁵ Lyle Tatum letter to A. J. Muste and Bill Sutherland, July 19, 1962, Box 3, WPB NARC Papers.

the political orientation of the material, foreclose readership outside of the pro-nationalist groups, and antagonize those with whom we seek reconciliation.”⁶⁶ Lyle’s discomfort with terminology that highlighted racial political hierarchies and preference for words like “partnership” marked a turn from antiracism, as Muste wrote in his stinging April 1962 letter to Lyle: “Issues are often controversial precisely because they matter, they confront people with decisions they do not want to make. ‘Partnership’ became a bad word *because* it was used for what amounted to phony partnership.”⁶⁷

Lyle’s attempt to view his white Rhodesian neighbors as legitimately African was part of a broader conversation at the time about whether European settlers in Southern Africa were African or European.⁶⁸ This conversation paralleled that of France around Algerian independence and the place of the *pied noir* – the white-settler population, often of Italian and Spanish descent, who were “repatriated” to France following Algerian independence.⁶⁹ It also resonated with the question of Indian diaspora communities in South and East Africa and their political relationships with independent India and Pakistan, former European metropole, and their new postcolonial African government.⁷⁰ Where and how these groups fit within postcolonial states shifted with time and political context. However, in the run-up to independence, demonstrating “multi-racialism” – inclusion of Asian and white-settler populations in a prospectively democratically (i.e., Black African majority) ruled postcolonial state – was necessary in order for an anticolonial nationalist leader to demonstrate his legitimate credentials to an international audience (and Western financial elites), as Kaunda himself knew well.

After his argument with Lyle Tatum over the Brigade’s support of Kaunda, Muste had another ideological disagreement on the Northern Rhodesia question, this time with Robert S. Steinbock, an American Quaker businessman who donated money to the American Friends Service Committee (which helped fund the Brigade) and who objected

⁶⁶ Tatum letter to Muste and Sutherland, July 19, 1962.

⁶⁷ A. J. Muste letter to Lyle Tatum, April 18, 1962, Box 3, WPB NARC Papers. Emphasis in original.

⁶⁸ White chooses not to use the term “settler colonialism” in part to sidestep this conversation: *Unpopular Sovereignty*, 25.

⁶⁹ Todd Shepard, *The Invention of Decolonization: The Algerian War and the Remaking of France* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2008).

⁷⁰ Sana Aiyar, *Indians in Kenya: The Politics of Diaspora* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2015).

to the “direct and implicit political nature of the World Peace Brigade.”⁷¹ Steinbock thought that the Brigade acted in “coordinate relationship with several political organizations professing and practicing extremist policies in Africa.” He drew an analogy between the Brigade’s planned march to Northern Rhodesia and US anti-immigrant fears:

AJ Muste appealed on humanitarian grounds to pacifists to support a nonviolent march from Tanganyika to help the (according to him) oppressed masses in Rhodesia. I wonder what Friends would say if, say 10,000 Mexicans were banded together and led by AJ Muste in support of some political movement in this country.

Another division within the Brigade community grew between those who believed pacifist principles should come before questions of political justice and those who did not, such as Muste and Scott. This division became a deep problem for the Brigade during its second major Third World endeavor, a planned march from New Delhi to Peking to draw international attention to the continued tensions on the contested Sino-Indian border following the 1962 war between India and China.

As these divisions indicated – between those who were pure pacifists and those who were not, between those who thought reconciliation with members of white supremacist regimes might be possible and those who did not – the World Peace Brigade did not have unified positions. It was an amalgamation – a set of alliances of shared interests and affinities – rather than an integrated movement, making it difficult to characterize its politics under a single label. The Brigade also drew upon supporters who belonged to circles sympathetic to its aims but did not participate in its endeavors. Its members and sympathizers were liberal, anticommunist supporters of both anticolonial nationalism and peaceful regime-change. They drew inspiration from and were part of the political community that inspired John F. Kennedy’s Peace Corps, a project that overlapped in time and theme with the Brigade’s creation. Brigade members saw themselves as unarmed peacekeepers who could be seconded to the United Nations as a peace force in much the same way that countries rented out members of their own military to the UN as armed peacekeepers.⁷² The

⁷¹ Robert S. Steinbock, letter to the editor, *Friends Journal*, December 1, 1962. All quotes from Steinbock in this chapter are from this source.

⁷² Arlo to Lyle Tatum, April 7, 1961: “We are in hopes that the Brigade could offer its unarmed service in the areas of tension and conflict to the UN . . . It would give the UN a choice of sending armed or unarmed persons into a particular area and I scarcely see how it could be less successful in the Congo than sending in armed men with instructions not to use their weapons.” File 45B, Devi Prasad Papers.

UN, especially its Fourth Committee on Colonialism, which handled decolonization questions, shaped Brigade activism. Members of the Brigade served as character witnesses, testifying regularly in front of its subcommittees in support of particular anticolonial nationalists.

UN civil servants were often friends and ideological sympathizers of Brigade members and occupied a similar position on the ideological spectrum: proponents of peaceful, anticommunist (i.e., opposed to the nationalization of industry) national liberation, in the shape of an independent postcolonial state. The UN's decolonization dilemma, exemplified by its peacekeeping difficulties in Congo, set the scene for the contentious ideological landscape confronting the Brigade. In his play *Murderous Angles*, Conor Cruise O'Brien, former UN special advisor to the secessionist Congolese province of Katanga as well as a friend of the Brigade community, defined "liberalists" (embodied by UN secretary general Dag Hammarskjöld) and "liberationists" (embodied by Congolese nationalist leader Patrice Lumumba) as ideological competitors on a mutually deadly collision course.⁷³ Liberalists prioritized peace and political stability over the overthrow of unjust regimes; liberationists, the opposite.

The World Peace Brigade and its overlapping circles of supporters espoused this liberalist perspective. Though some had been sympathetic to communism before Stalin and the Second World War and were labeled "communist" by their political opponents, they were no longer aligned with the political ideology. At times, the old "communist" label created difficulties for Brigade members and affiliated organizations: for instance, on account of his Communist Party past, for decades Scott's US visa for petitioning the UN specified that he could only be present in the US within a fifty-block radius of the UN building in Turtle Bay.⁷⁴ In addition, because of his "unstable" communist past, South Africa claimed that Scott was an unreliable advocate and should not be granted hearings at the UN.⁷⁵ Furthermore, the Brigade's American parent organizations had to repeatedly testify to their anticommunist bonafides at the US Congress's Un-American Activities Committee as they included members

⁷³ Conor Cruise O'Brien, *Murderous Angles: A Political Tragedy and Comedy in Black and White* (New York: Little, Brown, 1968).

⁷⁴ J. Wayne Fredericks, US Department of State to Colin Legum, July 7, 1967. "Visas for Rev. Scott can never be considered entirely routine." Box 5, GMS Papers.

⁷⁵ "13e Sessie van die V.V.O.: Suidwes-Afrika Aangeleenthede," November 8, 1958. Annexure V. AS Series (SWAS) 373 File AS.50/2/3/2 (v. 2), National Archives of Namibia.

who had once joined the Communist Party.⁷⁶ Yet, in spite of these allegations against the Brigade, the reality stood that its community was and remained anticommunist.

Alongside UN peacekeeping in Congo, the foreign policy of John F. Kennedy – as US senator, presidential candidate, president-elect, and eventually president – influenced the Brigade community. At first, Kennedy provided it with inspiration and potential avenues of access to political decision-making. Before becoming president, Kennedy served as the chairman of the newly created US Senate Subcommittee on African Affairs. Since the US Department of State lacked an Africa office until 1958, the subcommittee sourced its own information network. Kennedy solicited memos, speech drafts, and introductions to anticolonial nationalist leaders from a range of interested individuals and civil society organizations who were experts (e.g., elements of the Brigade community) on topics related to decolonization and Africa.⁷⁷ As a “president-in-waiting,” Kennedy made use of the transnational civil society connections that underpinned the Brigade; later on, as president with his own Department of State that now had an established Africa office and with increased needs for sensitivity and secrecy, the Kennedy team dissolved many of these civil society ties.⁷⁸

Chronicling this shift in late 1961, Winifred Courtney wrote an article on President Kennedy’s first year in office, in *Africa South in Exile*, an anticolonial nationalist advocacy magazine. Courtney, an American Quaker, was the UN observer for a number of religious left-oriented advocacy organizations: George Houser’s American Committee on Africa, Muste’s Fellowship of Reconciliation, and the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom. She reported on UN activities to her organizations, which, in turn, circulated these reports in their publications and newsletters. She was a friend of nationalist leaders Mburumba Kerina (Namibia) and Tom Mboya (Kenya); she and her family in Westchester, New York, often hosted Scott on his visits to New York City to testify at the United Nations on behalf of Namibian

⁷⁶ For example, Fellowship of Reconciliation, American Committee on Africa, and the Friends Service Committee all had to testify in 1968. *Hearings, Reports and Prints of the House Committee on Un-American Activities* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1968).

⁷⁷ Winifred Armstrong interview with author, June 21, 2015.

⁷⁸ Lydia Walker, “The Unexpected Anticolonialist: Winifred Armstrong, American Empire, and African Decolonization,” in Manela and Streets-Salter, *The Anticolonial Transnational*, 199–218.

nationalists (after he was allowed outside of his fifty-block radius); and she edited some of Scott's speeches. In her article "Kennedy's New Frontier," Courtney highlighted the crucial difference between Kennedy as a senator versus as a president:

During the dying days of the Eisenhower Administration, John F. Kennedy seemed to understand world revolution [i.e. decolonization] remarkably well. He recognized that in the eyes of emerging peoples, the US has been all too often the defender of colonial and dictatorial oppression rather than the great bastion of freedom it fancies itself to be. This he emphasized in his Senate speech on American policy over Algeria a few years ago, which angered the French. His experience as Chairman of the Senate's Africa Subcommittee had given him sympathetic insight into the problems of the whole continent. But the gap between opposition criticism and day-to-day practice in office is invariably wide.⁷⁹

According to Courtney, Kennedy, as president, became the prisoner "of his own ability – which after all got him elected – to ride two horses at once: The Cold War and World Development under World Law," meaning the channeling of anticolonial nationalist movements into peaceful, anticommunist postcolonial states.⁸⁰ Courtney considered the Cold War as antithetical to this "liberalist" decolonization project: Kennedy's flaw was that he saw the Cold War and decolonization "as a circus team, rather than as the mutually antagonistic forces that they are, bound to dump him catastrophically in the end."⁸¹

However, contra to Courtney's distinction, the channeling of decolonization into peaceful, liberalist (noncommunist) states *was* Cold War politics. The Brigade's conception of Dar es Salaam as the anti-Algiers aligned ideologically and analytically with the First World even though it criticized divisive United States–Soviet Union international relations. Within this First World political context, the Brigade stood at the intersection of a slew of international civil society organizations – including Quakers – that advocated for nonviolent, anticommunist political justice. But mobilizing financial provision for such advocacy required ingenuity. Funding for international civil society endeavors like the World Peace Brigade came from a patchwork of state, corporate, and foundation sources facilitated by personal connections. In India, JP asked Nehru for money, and the Mahatma Gandhi National Memorial Trust in India also

⁷⁹ Winifred Courtney, "Kennedy's New Frontier," *Africa South in Exile* 6, no. 1 (1961): 104.

⁸⁰ Courtney, "Kennedy's New Frontier," 105.

⁸¹ Courtney, "Kennedy's New Frontier," 105.

funded Brigade work.⁸² Individual members paid for their own travel, sometimes through personal fundraising, sometimes through the budgets of their own affiliated organizations.

Brigade members' parent organizations – such as the Africa Bureau, Fellowship of Reconciliation, Minority Rights Group, War Resisters' International, Friends Service Committee, among others – were often indirect recipients of CIA money intended to promote global anticommunism.⁸³ For instance, Scott's Africa Bureau received financial support from the Fairfield Foundation, and JP headed the Indian branch of the Congress for Cultural Freedom – two of the largest CIA-funded anticommunist advocacy organizations.⁸⁴ Despite this CIA support for the Brigade, vehement anticommunists within the US government and of course in Southern African settler governments denounced Brigade members as socialists, leftists, and even communists.⁸⁵ In addition, many Brigade members did not know the original source of their funding, nor did that financial support shift their goals or methods. As stated by the *Times of India*, if “the CIA believes that it is achieving something more than goodwill by its liberal donations, that is obviously the concern of the American tax-payer and not those of whom innocently benefit from the transaction.”⁸⁶

⁸² Arlo Tatum to Stephen Cary, June 29, 1961, File 45 B, Devi Prasad Papers.

⁸³ Allegations unearthed in Sol Stern, “NSA and CIA,” *Ramparts Magazine*, March 1967, 29–39, and subject to a US Congressional inquiry that year. Tity de Vries, “The 1967 Central Intelligence Agency Scandal: Catalyst in a Transforming Relationship between State and People,” *Journal of American History* 98, no. 4 (2012): 1075–92.

⁸⁴ The literature on the Congress for Cultural Freedom and the Cold War is broad and growing. Sarah Miller Harris, *The CIA and the Congress for Cultural Freedom in the Early Cold War: The Limits of Making Common Cause* (London: Routledge, 2016); Patrick Iber, *Neither Peace nor Freedom: The Cultural Cold War in Latin America* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2015); Frances Stonor Saunders, *The Cultural Cold War: The CIA and the World of Arts and Letters* (New York: The New Press, 2013 [1999]). On the relationship between transnational socialist, noncommunist networks and the Cold War, see Su Lin Lewis, “‘We Are Not Copyists’: Socialist Networks and Non-alignment from Below in A. Philip Randolph’s Asian Journey,” *Journal of Social History* 53, no. 2 (2019): 402–28.

⁸⁵ For an example of such criticism of Rustin, Sutherland, and Scott, see State Department Decimal Files, 745c.00/2-2362, Deputy Director for Eastern and Southern African Affairs William Wight to Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Henry Tasca, February 23, 1962, quoted in DeRoche, “Dreams and Disappointments,” 375. By the early 1960s, most members of the World Peace Brigade were prohibited from entering both South Africa and Southern Rhodesia.

⁸⁶ *Times of India*, April 30 1967.

Still, financial connections and aid demonstrated aspects of ideological alignment – at least that elements within the CIA perceived the utility of Brigade members' work toward supporting First World interests during decolonization. The Brigade's anti-Algiers was a Cold War project, positioning Gandhian peaceworkers in Dar es Salaam as the political alternative to Ahmed Ben Bella's National Liberation Front in Algeria, which did more than train anticolonial nationalists in guerrilla warfare. In 1963, with Ben Bella as president, Algeria nationalized a portion of its industry, its banking, and its media, and eliminated French land ownership.⁸⁷

CONCLUSION

Beginning in the 1920s, notions of a “dark” or “colored world” – W. E. B. Du Bois's “color line” – had provided a sense of solidarity between African Americans and peoples in the colonial world engaged in nationalist struggles.⁸⁸ There was a strong affective relationship between 1950s–1960s anticolonial nationalism and US civil rights, though one focused on national independence *from* external/imperial rule, and the other, on political equality *within* the preexisting state.⁸⁹ The World Peace Brigade's anticolonial nationalist advocacy mission also grew out of past Western advocacy for Indian independence.⁹⁰ This transnational network stretched beyond the white Anglosphere: from the Indian independence movement through the 1960s, African American and Indian activists exchanged ideas and tactics in their struggles for democratic participation.⁹¹ The World Peace Brigade was also a product of this “colored cosmopolitanism.”⁹²

⁸⁷ Jeffrey James Byrne, “Our Own Special Brand of Socialism: Algeria and the Contest of Modernities in the 1960s,” *Diplomatic History* 33, no. 3 (2009): 433.

⁸⁸ Adom Getachew, *Worldmaking after Empire: The Rise and Fall of Self-Determination* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2019); Carol Anderson, *Eyes Off the Prize: The United Nations and the African American Struggle for Human Rights, 1944–1955* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).

⁸⁹ John Munro, *The Anticolonial Front: The African American Freedom Struggle and Global Decolonisation, 1945–1960* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017).

⁹⁰ Ramachandra Guha, *Rebels against the Raj: Western Fighters for India's Freedom* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2022). The activities of such figures as C. F. Andrews, Annie Besant, Samuel Stokes, and Marjorie Sykes exemplify this history.

⁹¹ Nico Slate, *Colored Cosmopolitanism: The Shared Struggle for Freedom in India and the United States* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011).

⁹² Slate, *Colored Cosmopolitanism*.

In addition, the organization relied upon Third World elite politicians and the personal invitations of such national and nationalist leaders as Julius Nyerere and Kenneth Kaunda to launch its projects. Dependence on personal prestige and elite invitations did not negate the democratic, political justice-oriented aims of the Brigade. Nevertheless, it emphasized that connections between Martin Luther King (whose involvement was limited to his presence on Brigade letterhead), Jayaprakash Narayan, and Kenneth Kaunda were elite solidarities that did not necessarily reach the grassroots of anticolonial national liberation movements in East Africa.

Once in office, most leaders of postcolonial states shifted from global antiracism and anti-imperialism to state-promoting and state-protecting visions of their own country's position in an international order made up of states. For instance, Indian political leaders were often imperfect guardians of the rights and liberties of minority peoples within their own borders. Independent India's limited concern for civil rights within India (and its desire for US government development aid) decreased its interest in publicizing civil rights abuses in the United States.⁹³ As exemplified by the career of Kenneth Kaunda, when nationalist leaders became national leaders, transnational civil society ties became subsidiary to formal, state-to-state relations; such ties lost much of their impact because leaders of governments no longer needed them. Conversely, for nationalist claims *within* postcolonial nations, those transnational civil society connections *were* their diplomatic relations.

The World Peace Brigade proposed the possibility of nonviolent, anticommunist, majority-ruled postcolonial states. The organization supported peaceful regime change rather than radical nationalist liberation. It also prioritized the individual as the vessel of political change because this focus allowed the Brigade to remain outside of state-centric international relations, positioning it to be an honest broker between opposing sides, and reinforcing the importance of the individuals who made up the organization. Yet its prioritizing of individual solutions to structural international problems let the political "structure" – the order of nation-states that made up the international political system – off the hook. In a cynical reading, it also focused the spotlight on the personal moral stature of Brigade members rather than on the causes they espoused. As a result, the Brigade did not integrate itself into the fabric of the societies on whose behalf it sought to advocate and was at the

⁹³ Slate, *Colored Cosmopolitanism*, 202–42.

mercy of the attention span and frailty of those individuals who composed the organization and of those, such as Kaunda and Nyerere, who had invited them in the first place.

The Brigade was one element in a brew of state and non-state actors – including mining companies and development organizations – that tried to mold anticolonial nationalism into the “correct” political (state-like) shape. While some of these actors had points of access to Northern Rhodesia/Zambia’s Kenneth Kaunda and other nationalists through colonial officials and particular domestic constituencies (such as trade unions),⁹⁴ individual Brigade members themselves were also links to those officials and constituencies. Before a nation gained its independence, transnational advocacy networks (such as the Brigade community) amplified nationalist claimants, positioning them as states-in-waiting. Although advocates could not provide the technical expertise or financial means required for economic planning or other core functions of newly independent states who wished to fulfill domestic expectations for rapid social and economic progress, they could – and did – connect anticolonial nationalists to those who were able to mobilize foreign capital for state-building purposes in the fluid and rapidly changing political terrain of global decolonization. The catch was that once nationalists gained genuine political power, they no longer needed Brigade intervention.

In 1963, the Brigade closed down its Africa Freedom Action Project in Dar es Salaam. Not only did Kenneth Kaunda no longer rely on the project for help in Zambia’s nationalist effort, but, in addition, the project’s notion of Dar es Salaam as the anti-Algiers was increasingly challenged. Over time, Dar es Salaam became one of the strongest locations not just for military training (already occurring in the early 1960s) but also of African socialist thought, from Julius Nyerere’s *Ujamaa* writings to the African diaspora and Western socialists at the University of Dar es Salaam.⁹⁵ As early as 1963 – just a year after the project began – members of the Brigade were well aware that “Julius” was falling “into

⁹⁴ Carolien Stolte, “Introduction: Trade Union Networks and the Politics of Expertise in an Age of Afro-Asian Solidarity,” *Journal of Social History* 53, no. 2 (2019): 331–47.

⁹⁵ Julius Nyerere, *Ujamaa-Essays on Socialism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971); Emma Hunter, *Political Thought and the Public Sphere in Tanzania: Freedom, Democracy and Citizenship in the Era of Decolonization* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 219–24. Walter Rodney, Terence Ranger, John Saul, among others, congregated at the University of Dar es Salaam, and Bill Sutherland stayed in the city after the Brigade left, joining this liberationist intelligencia.

step with Ben Bella.”⁹⁶ Increasingly across the subsequent decade, Nyerere shifted to the left, became entangled with China, and the city took on a liberationist ideological slant.⁹⁷ The African Americans who came to Dar es Salaam in the 1970s were Black Panthers, not pacifist members of the mainstream US civil rights movement.⁹⁸

In this way, the Brigade’s effort to build an anti-Algiers project in Dar es Salaam dissolved. However, the Africa Freedom Action Project was the *Africa* – not the Northern Rhodesia – Freedom Action Project; members of the Brigade community were involved in a host of decolonizing questions in Sub-Saharan Africa. While they supported anticolonial nationalism in some places, such as the white-settler states of South Africa, South West Africa/Namibia, and Southern Rhodesia, in another instance – that of Katanga – they worked to undermine an incipient nationalist claim.

⁹⁶ Sutherland to Muste, May 31, 1963, Box 1, WPB NARC Papers.

⁹⁷ Thomas Molony, *Nyerere: The Early Years* (London: James Currey, 2014).

⁹⁸ Seth Markle, *A Motorcycle on Hell Run: Tanzania, Black Power, and the Uncertain Future of Pan-Africanism, 1964–1974* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2017).