democracy. Both Whitehead and Emilio Lamo de Espinosa emphasize that democratic legitimacy depends on citizens trusting government. In Lamo de Espinosa's careful terminology, one problem arises because voters react to perceptions of government *corruption* (that is, an elected official providing a favor to a contributor, and thus both parties cheating the citizenry at large) by conceptualizing *fraud* (a citizen cheating the state, as through tax evasion) as morally acceptable. He also raises the intriguing question of why political corruption exists. Is it a case of incomplete modernization, "a sort of ethical transition following political and economic transitions" (pp. 31 ff.), or instead a question of economic incentives created by particular institutional designs, such as the 1990s decisions in many countries of both Europe and Latin America to privatize large portions of the state without adequate regulatory oversight (pp. 39–42)?

Contributors often do seek favors. Kevin Casas-Zamora's description of "friendliness" in Uruguay (pp. 220–24) offers pithy examples of the "delicate" quid pro quo between politicians and contributors. And what if party activists employ otherwise legitimate funds to "reward" potential voters ("vote-buying"), as in several of the Latin American cases discussed? An even more pernicious practice, though not one much discussed in the volume, is use of party funds to purchase the votes of wavering members of a multiparty legislative coalition, as recently occurred in Brazil's *mensalão* (monthly stipend) scandal, in which the ruling Workers Party (PT) distributed allowances to friendly federal deputies from other parties.

Third, does public financing of campaigns and parties constitute an important piece of the solution to unequal access for the wealthy? Parties of the Left, whose natural partisans are poorer, tend to believe so—but sadly, several European leftist parties have been among those recently accused of corruption. Pujas and Rhodes (pp. 70 and passim) in their chapter on Western Europe suggest that the problem is not public financing per se, but rather a combination of opportunity (inadequate checks and balances) and heightened incentives to incumbents due to increased partisan political competition (see also Pilar del Castillo on Spain). Another question is whether public financing tends to institutionalize spoils distribution while keeping new ideas and parties permanently shut out—a concern running particularly through the South American chapters. The countries profiled here, excepting Britain, all have substantial public financing of politics, though the Latin Americans are moving toward greater use of public financing, while the Europeans are inching back toward greater use of private funds. The other institutional option is the Anglo-American system of caps on private contributions from individuals and firms, often accompanied by prohibitions on certain donations, for example, from foreigners or state-owned enterprises. It is interesting to note that the United States is among the increasing number of countries that prohibit political contributions from noncitizens—although the U.S. National Endowment for Democracy proudly finances partisan campaigns abroad.

In a refreshing admission, the contributors openly acknowledge the volume's most notable flaws, which are the lack of a tight comparative framework and similar data across cases. Eduardo Posado-Carbo's introduction laments the dearth of good cross-national data, even for the advanced industrial democracies. Like Michael Pinto-Duschinsky, I cannot resist repeating Elizabeth Drew's informant's quip that the less-than-perfect disclosure rules in the United States lead to "over-regulating the penguins on the tip of the iceberg" (p. 67). Pinto-Duschinsky also recalls that until recently political finance was not thought a respectable subject for scholarly study (p. 56). A quick Web search did lead this reviewer to relevant cross-national data on "Governance and Corruption" at the World Bank (www.worldbank.org) and a series of country papers on comparative political financing at the National Institute for Democracy (www.accessdemocracy.org), and so perhaps the topic finally is catching on. One hopes so.

Unarmed Insurrections: People Power Movements in Nondemocracies. By Kurt Schock. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2005. $67.50 cloth, $22.50 paper.

Citizen Power, Politics, and the Asian Miracle: Reassessing the Dynamics. By O. Fiona Yap. Boulder, CO: Lynne Reiner, 2005. $49.95.
DOI: 10.1017/S1537592707071265

— Teresa Wright, *California State University at Long Beach*

These works exemplify the kind of broadly comparative study that many political scientists call for, yet few actually undertake. Kurt Schock studies six different popular movements against authoritarian rule, and O. Fiona Yap analyzes the interaction between citizens and government in four Asian newly industrialized countries (NICs). Together, they illuminate the dynamics of state-society relations in illiberal political contexts.

Most importantly, Schock and Yap both demonstrate that citizens in nondemocracies are not impotent, but rather have the ability to elicit favorable government responses through noninstitutional means. They both argue that, even in the most authoritarian of settings, government is not truly autonomous, but rather derives its power from sources within society. Thus, the citizenry always retains some power to influence the government. Both Schock and Yap provide concrete examples that illustrate how citizens in nondemocracies may use this power to successfully challenge existing policies. For both, a key strategy is the withdrawal of the economic resources upon which the ruling regime relies. Crucial in this regard is the power of labor, which tends to be an especially important resource in developing states. Consequently, by engaging in strikes (or otherwise withdrawing their labor), common people can exert great power over illiberal regimes.

These books contribute to a growing literature that challenges earlier assumptions of a state-society dichotomy in nondemocracies (see, for example, Maryjane Osa and Cristina Cordureanu-Huci, "Running Uphill: Political Opportunity in Non-democracies," *Comparative Sociology* 2:4 (2003):605–629; Peter Hayes Gries and Stanley Rosen, eds., *State and Society in 21st-century China* (NY: Routledge, 2004); Vince Boudreau, *Resisting Dictatorship: Repression and Protest in Southeast Asia* (NY: Cambridge University Press, 2004); and Kevin O'Brien and Lianjiang Li, *Rightful Resistance in Rural China* (NY: Cambridge Univeresity Press, 2006)). By taking apart what once were treated as monolithic and impenetrable states, these studies uncover intragovernmental conflict and inconsistencies, and the openings to citizen influence that result. At the same time, they reveal the ways in which supposedly "passive" and "controlled" citizens actually exploit these openings to their own benefit.

Yap portrays her work as a rebuttal to the Asian development model, which assumes that citizens of the Asian NICs cooperate with the state because "autonomous and unaccountable governments command them to do so" (p. 1). In reality, Yap argues, these citizens do not always cooperate. Using both statistical analysis and focused narrative comparisons, Yap demonstrates that they lend their economic cooperation only when one of two conditions holds: 1) economic performance is strong, and the government does not alter its policies; or 2) economic performance is weak, and the government offers a "credible apology" to the citizenry. Otherwise, citizens will withdraw their cooperation, by increasing strike activity and decreasing private production investment. When citizens withdraw their economic cooperation, Yap argues, the government is pressed to alter its policies. Given this, she concludes that "there are observable bargaining mechanisms between citizens and governments in the less democratic Asian NICs, even in the absence of competitive elections" (p. 14).

A credible apology is characterized by both "punishment of government and monitoring of government" (p. 9). The former includes the dismissal of officials, the elimination of a government agency, and/or reparations to those affected by the poor economy. The latter involves an increase in governmental transparency or the inclusion of new actors in the policy process (p. 10). Economic performance is gauged by 1) annual growth in real per capita GDP and 2) the unemployment rate, relative to the nonaccelerating inflation rate of unemployment.

Through statistical analysis, Yap compares labor quiescence and production investment in cases where authoritarian governments in Taiwan, South Korea, Malaysia, and Singapore did or did not offer credible apologies for poor economic performance. The data demonstrate that credible apologies are accompanied by increased investment, and the lack of such apologies correlates with a decline in investment. Regarding labor quiescence, Yap's data show that in Malaysia and Singapore, credible apologies do correlate with decreased strike activity (and vice versa). However, the results for South Korea are not statistically significant, and for Taiwan no evaluation is made due to the lack of available strike data.

Yap also undertakes a series of narrative comparisons. She includes a variety of cases from each country's pre- and post-liberalization periods, looking at nearly every possible combination of poor versus strong economic performance, credible government apology verus no credible apology, and citizens' economic cooperation versus lack of cooperation. Yap's examples generally support her argument. This is most clearly so in cases where the economy was strong and the government made no policy changes (pp. 133–41). Under other scenarios, some questions can be raised. For example, in 1968–69 and 1972–73, Yap characterizes Singapore's economic performance as poor. She then shows that, as predicted, the government's credible apologies in 1968–69 led citizens to increase their economic cooperation, but the government's failure to apologize in 1972–73 led citizens to withdraw. However, as Yap notes herself, both periods were times of high real growth in per capita GDP and declining unemployment in Singapore (pp. 100, 102, 129). Given this, it seems more accurate to code these periods as times of strong economic performance. If so, then these two cases directly contradict Yap's argument.

The text also suffers from some stylistic limits. It is extremely repetitive, with long passages repeated almost verbatim at multiple points (eg., pp. 3–7 and 150–51). In addition, Chapter 2 probably could be omitted. Further, the reader must struggle to keep straight the 16 detailed comparisons that appear in Chapters 4 and 5.

A bigger question is whether or not citizens and government officials *consciously* act in *response to* one another's actual or anticipated actions. Throughout the text, Yap characterizes state-society relations as "bargaining," with citizens making "demands," and government responding (or vice versa). She also utilizes causal language; for example, "the government's credible apologies . . . *led to* an actual increase in production investment" (p. 73, my italics). Yet in no place does Yap's data show that such causal linkages and conscious responsive behaviors are present. Her evidence clearly shows correlations between citizen and government actions, but she has no way of demonstrating what comes first—government action or inaction or citizen cooperation or withdrawal.

Relatedly, a few of Yap's more specific claims lack adequate support. For example, Yap states, "[government] punishing without monitoring does not suffice to demonstrate government credibility; likewise, monitoring alone is not sufficient" (p. 10, see also p. 149). Yet, she later declares that government punishment and monitoring almost always appear together, making it virtually impossible to test her proposition (p. 67). Similarly, in several places Yap states that, according to her statistical tests, if a government engages in self-punishment and monitoring when the economy is strong, citizens will withdraw their economic resources (pp. 14, 76, 148). Yet in the book's penultimate paragraph, Yap claims that governments never actually do this (p. 152).

Nevertheless, the book makes an important point that is worthy of consideration: Even authoritarian governments engage in self-criticism and policy change, and citizens can and do act in ways that pressure the government to do so.

Schock reaches a similar conclusion, while also making a substantial contribution to the literature on contentious politics. Importantly, Schock is one of the first to explicitly, analytically, and comparatively examine when and why nonviolent action succeeds or fails. He finds that—when employed in a particular fashion—nonviolent collective action is the most effective method that citizens can use to successfully challenge contemporary nondemocratic regimes (p. 41). For nonviolent action attacks the modern state at its "social roots" rather than at the "pinnacle of the state or its military/security apparatus." Thus, instead of "challenging the state on its own terms . . . nonviolent actions challenge the state using methods that operate to [the citizenry's] advantage" (p. 38). Further, nonviolent action is available to everyone—including the most vulnerable and weak. Accordingly, it holds the most promise for widespread public participation (p. 40).

Schock's argument derives from a comparison of four cases of successful nonviolent collective action (South Africa, 1983–90; the Philippines, 1983–86; Nepal, 1990; Thailand, 1991–92) with two cases of failed nonviolence (Burma, 1988; China, 1989). He finds that each of the successful cases displayed three common features. First, movement organization was decentralized and network-oriented rather than hierarchical. Second, successful movements utilized a diversity of nonviolent tactics and were able to innovate when one method failed. In particular, they shifted from "methods of concentration" (e.g., sit-ins) to "methods of dispersion" (e.g., strikes). They also utilized all three types of nonviolent action (protest [or persuasion], noncooperation, and nonviolent intervention). These two features gave regime challengers resilience in the face of repression, enabling them to exhibit the third essential feature of successful movements—the ability to target the groups upon which the state depends (pp. 50–53). Together, these three features give a nonviolent movement the necessary leverage to compel at least some regime elites to embrace reform (pp. 68, 143).

Schock's work is impressive, leaving room for only a few minor suggestions. First, the work would be strengthened by a more explicit clarification of the relative importance of the three common features of successful nonviolent action. Second, the book could further address the iterative effect of repeated liberalization and restriction on movement organization and success (cf. Paul Almeida, "Opportunity Organizations and Threat-Induced Contention: Protest Waves in Authoritarian Settings," [2003]). Third, the role of information flows could be better integrated into Schock's overall framework.

That said, the merits of Schock's work are manifold and substantial. To begin, the book is of immense practical value, serving as a virtual handbook for dissidents in illiberal regimes. Of more scholarly import, Schock brilliantly blends the literature on nonviolent action with the political process approach to contentious politics. Whereas students of nonviolent action focus on movement trajectories and emphasize human agency, the political process approach emphasizes movement origins and political structures (p. xiv). By bringing together these approaches, Schock shows how challengers can change the political opportunity structure to their benefit, even in the face of brutal repression. As such, he brings important new insights into the study of social movements in nondemocracies. At the same time, he takes us a long way in resolving the age-old question of the relationship between structure and agency.

Faith in Moderation: Islamist Parties in Jordan and Yemen.

By Jillian Schwedler. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006. 252p. $80.00.

DOI: 10.1017/S1537592707071277

— Russell E. Lucas, *Florida International University*

Many attribute the failure of democratization in the Islamic world to the existence of antidemocratic Islamist movements. Why should democratization move forward when the main beneficiaries would allow for "one person, one vote, one time"? Jillian Schwedler in *Faith in Moderation* refutes this common argument head-on. Schwedler, however, is not merely content in presenting two Islamist parties as "moderate" to show how Islam is not monolithic. She has a more analytical project in which she urges us to unpack many of our assumptions about regime transitions in the Middle East and in general. Her argument targets the linkage between the inclusion of Islamist opposition groups in politics and the effects of their participation in moderating their ideology and behavior. Her treatment of this topic, based in social movement theory, deserves our attention.

Schwedler contributes to an ongoing critique of "transitology" through her structured comparison of two Islamist political parties—the Islamic Action Front (IAF) in Jordan and the Islah (reform) party in Yemen. She argues that the dominant institutional approach to the "stalled" transitions in the two Arab countries fails to explain a key tenet of transitology: The inclusion of nondemocratic opposition parties in the political process will promote the moderation of those parties and thus prompt