point in the Cold War, does not show up in the text at all. Political parties divide between Communist and anti-Communist, rather than Republican or Democrat. Hence, the ready means by which the Democrats exploited Sputnik to win the 1958 congressional elections does not much matter to the author, since both parties lived in Cold War America and agreed on most things. This intellectually agile literary approach appears to best advantage in the book's very skilful readings of Cold War novels, such as Nevil Shute's *On the Beach* (1957) and Eugene Burdick and William Lederer's *The Ugly American* (1958). *On the Beach* tells the story of a world-destroying nuclear catastrophe from the standpoint of people in Australia who are waiting for the fallout to reach them. Such fiction helped to establish "the unity of the world." Végső adroitly contrasts nuclear holocaust fiction with spy novels of the Ian Fleming variety, which "introduced the idea that in order to protect [the necessary world unity] the world of democracy has to be constitutively split between the normal world of publicity and the clandestine world of sovereign violence" (p. 170). Nicely put.

At times, the author takes the analysis beyond the limits of the reader's patience (or at least the patience of this non-English-major reader). Do Végső's four figures "haunt the modern imagination because they are historically contingent figures produced by a set of constitutive exclusions" (p. 202)? I leave that question to others but recommend *The Naked Communist* to anyone who wants to gain an understanding of American anticommunist politics and literature of the 1950s.

American Allies in Times of War: The Great Asymmetry. By Stéfanie von Hlatky. New York: Oxford University Press, 2013. 208p. $85.00.
doi:10.1017/S1537592714002060

— James Goldgeier, *American University*

When France and Germany sided with Russia against the Iraq War, it was a reminder that America's allies do not always stand by the world's preeminent military power. In this thoughtful analysis of the behavior of American allies during times of war, Stéfanie von Hlatky describes the varying behavior of Canada, the United Kingdom, and Australia in response to the American-led efforts in Afghanistan and later Iraq after the attacks of September 11, 2001.

Von Hlatky provides three compelling case studies. As we know, the UK went all in on Iraq, taking the wind out of Prime Minister Tony Blair's sails at home when the war turned into a foreign policy disaster. The author has difficulty explaining the British behavior within her framework, ultimately settling on the prime minister's ability to circumvent the usual foreign policy process. She provides some interesting detail on Blair's need in the fall of 2002 for United Nations Security Council authorization to take action against Iraq, which in turn played a significant role in U.S. President George W. Bush's calculations.

Canada meanwhile opted out of Iraq. The author writes, "As long as Canada is not seen as a security liability to the United States, it can get away with a lot in Washington" (p. 15). Canada took on a major role in Afghanistan, leaving it less capable of providing troops to Iraq but also giving it more leeway. Compared to Australia, which strategically considers what it wants from the United States in exchange for support, "[w]hat is striking about the Canada-US security relationship is how each issue is managed separately. There is no overarching approach to manage the bilateral relationship" (p. 92).

In her interview with John McCallum, who served as Canadian defense minister at the time, von Hlatky learned that the United States did not make a formal request for a Canadian commitment to the Iraq War. McCallum's chief of staff, Eugene Lang, noted that the lack of such a request "caught us off guard" (p. 104). Domestically, however, the situation was perfect for the government in Ottawa: it could step up its support of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan and avoid sending troops to Iraq.

Australian Prime Minister John Howard, meanwhile, strongly supported the United States in both the war in Afghanistan and in the run-up to the Iraq War. In return, von Hlatky writes, Howard was able "to push for items that were high on the Australian agenda, such as the [free trade agreement], the threat of North Korea, and the reinforcement of Australia-US security ties" (p. 135).

While the author provides three excellent empirical chapters, the theoretical contribution is more limited. As with many books that started as dissertations, she cannot shake the impulse to lead us through the pro-forma limitations of realism, liberalism, and constructivism in guiding our understanding of particular foreign policy decisions. It would be wonderful if dissertation committees encouraged students for whom this exercise is not necessary to avoid it, but if they do require such a review, then university presses should insist that unless it is relevant to the argument, authors must move on to what is important for their own work. We will know that the foreign policy field has really matured when young scholars writing about decision making skip the pro forma discussion of macro-level theories and straightaway get down to the business of producing insights about individual and group behavior in the face of difficult political and policy choices.

In this case, her goal is to demonstrate that high government cohesion and strong military capabilities will lead a state to make major military contributions, whereas low government cohesion and weak military capabilities will not. However, as noted, the UK response to the Iraq War did not fit the argument, as von Hlatky's model expected a more limited contribution given the domestic

politics of the time; she explains this finding by citing Blair's circumvention of the normal policymaking process.

The virtue of the work lies in deepening our understanding of these three American allies and their responses to the U.S. decisions to go to war in Afghanistan and Iraq. Von Hlatky also highlights certain historical lessons, such as those learned by Australia after its support for the U.S. war in Vietnam.

Although the case studies were chosen carefully, it is curious that in her concluding chapter, von Hlatky did not, at least briefly, address other cases, such as the French and German decisions to oppose the Iraq War, the constraints on German and Italian operations in Afghanistan, and the German abstention in the UN vote on Libya. There certainly has been a wide variety of alliance behavior within NATO over the past 15 years. Some new members like Poland have sought to prove how important an ally they can be to the United States, an impulse that is perhaps even more true for aspiring alliance members like Georgia. In addition, Australia is not the only American ally outside of NATO to face key decisions on Afghanistan and Iraq: South Korea and Japan, for example, faced both domestic and capabilities constraints and participated at different levels and in different ways.

Von Hlatky's dissection of the politics and strategic approaches of three key American allies paves the way for future research in comparative foreign policy concerning these types of states and their relationship to the United States. By going beyond a simple domestic politics argument and showing us the importance of different types of strategic calculations, the author provides valuable insights for comparing the foreign policies of medium powers in their interactions with their dominant ally. Expanding the scope to a broader range of allies would allow us to consider a greater number of options that states have to make contributions to war efforts, particularly when their military capabilities are limited.

The Sovereign Citizen: Denaturalization and the Origins of the American Republic. By Patrick Weil. Philadelphia: The University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013. 296p. 34.95.
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— J. M. Opal, *McGill University*

Between 1906 and 1967, the United States government denaturalized some 22,000 people, revoking the citizenship claims they had obtained and removing them from the protections of American nationhood. A substantial number of natural-born Americans also lost their "Americanness," at least in the eyes of the national state. In this respect, the United States behaved much like other Western democracies during the twentieth century, though not approaching the Soviet Union, which cast more than 1.5 million people into statelessness.

Citizenship under threat of revocation was "conditional," Patrick Weil notes, hardly the building block of a liberal and democratic social contract (p. 4). And yet that was the nature of American citizenship until the later decades of the 1900s. Worse still, the majority of the denaturalized had something less than their proverbial day in court. Denaturalization was a matter of "equity" or of "ex parte" jurisdiction overseen by individual judges without juries. By the 1920s, most of the work happened within the walls of the Division of Naturalization: a faceless bureaucracy of the kind that continues to inspire antigovernment fantasies. And then, over about a ten-year period at the height of the Cold War, a tenuous majority of Supreme Court justices ended the government's authority to terminate citizenship. "The numbers speak for themselves," Weil notes; since 1968, fewer than 150 people have been denaturalized (p. 179). For the author, this amounts to nothing less than "a revolution in the definition of American citizenship" (p. 9), the installation of the citizen's "sovereignty" at the expense of the state to whom he or she grants conditional legitimacy.

Weil recounts this transformation through close and careful examination of government files and memos and of the records of various federal courts. Working chronologically from the Naturalization Act of 1906 to the decisive *Schneiderman* and *Afroyim* cases from the late 1960s, he offers a trove of individual stories framed in a careful accounting of denaturalization through the decades. We read about scores of obscure people who obtained U.S. citizenship—as a result of the Civil War and Fourteenth Amendment—only to see it suspended or destroyed. They included American-born women who married and lived with foreign nationals abroad; immigrants who had once been welcomed by city machines but who now lost their citizenship if they returned home; and various communists, anarchists, and fascists whom the government deemed to have taken their oaths with "mental reservation." Weaving their stories into that of the institutions that decided their fates, Weil also offers a fresh look at some familiar figures: Theodore Roosevelt, who blanched at the idea of recent immigrants gaining citizenship too easily; Felix Frankfurter, who thought that the courts should defer to the government's interest in guarding national security; and Earl Warren, who was fundamentally appalled by denaturalization and eventually found the juridical tools with which to kill it.

"Changes in America's management of naturalization and denaturalization reflect larger structural phenomena," Weil argues, "but these changes were not the inevitable product of broader forces" (pp. 9–10). Indeed, his approach is very much the "zoom-in" variety. He keeps our noses close to the most relevant sources, only occasionally pointing out the larger sweep of history rushing by. For those of us inured to overcautious argumentation, this approach is refreshing in its clarity and certainty. The author *explains* change over time.