

swadeshi movement in colonial India. The book's conclusion traces the postwar legacies of neomercantilism, highlighting their formative imprint on the Bretton Woods architecture and the Non-Aligned Movement, before ending on the postneoliberal drift to neomercantilism.

A study that traverses multiple centuries, regions, and intellectual traditions is no doubt ambitious, and Helleiner readily anticipates some skepticism on this account. To this reviewer, the book's historical research sufficiently girds its argumentative arch, though regional specialists might have their disagreements with Helleiner's rendering of particular texts and traditions. Of greater interest to a broader audience would be the conceptual and methodological threads that stitch together the historical analysis.

One such thread is the imperial political ontology of neomercantilism. Helleiner's story is set in a world of imperial and subimperial polities, one where hierarchy and not anarchy is the ordering principle. One is struck by the extent to which the historical figures examined in the book readily assume that they inhabit a world of empires rather than nation-states (which ironically puts them ahead of mainstream IR theory that still operates on premises of methodological nationalism). They conduct their debates over free trade, protectionism, and interventionism in the language of "colony," "dependency," and "tributary," terms replete with the odium of economic subordination as much as political subjugation. In these debates, one finds the term "civilization" assuming a definitive political economic content, one predicated on industrialization, economic diversification, and competitiveness. Against this backdrop, neomercantilism manifests variously in a defensive strategy of avoiding peripheralization or an offensive strategy of economically dominating other polities. If it is admitted that the contemporary world order has not shed its "imperial constitution" after formal decolonization, the implications of the analysis for the present moment become more salient.

The same thread also implicates questions of historical method. Helleiner's rendering of global neomercantilism generates palpable resonances across disparate regions, periods, and ideological traditions. Exemplary in this regard are Zheng Guanying's observations on a global "commercial warfare" embroiling China, and Fukuzawa Yukichi's tasking of Japanese merchants with the duty to "wage the war of trade." It is difficult to overlook the parallels with the early modern European view of commerce as war by other means, except that Zheng and Fukuzawa draw their inspiration not from Josiah Child or Jean-Baptiste Colbert but from a Chinese mercantilist tradition dating back to the third century BCE. Helleiner offers a contextual explanation of such resemblances, averring that neomercantilist ideas are prone to crop up under conditions of heightened geopolitical rivalry and

vulnerability, which aligns Zheng's China and Fukuzawa's Japan (both subjected to "unequal treaties") with Alexander Hamilton's fledgling United States. Even though Helleiner does not elaborate the point, one can infer that when the conditions that engender neomercantilism become generalized across the geopolitical terrain, they can coalesce into a "neomercantilist moment" such as the post-Napoleonic period, the late nineteenth century, and the interwar years. Here one might have expected a more sustained theorization of the relationship between neomercantilist ideas and their contexts, not least because Helleiner has shown elsewhere that projects of state-building under geopolitical duress can lead to the adoption of liberal rather than neomercantilist policies.

Relatedly, a major conceptual question left unresolved is the status of "mercantilism." Unlike neomercantilism's clearly post-Smithian provenance, mercantilism features in Helleiner's account almost as a transhistorical doctrine, extending at least back to the third century BCE and potentially occurring whenever commerce is instrumentalised in interpolity conflict. Such historical extension cuts against the received understanding of mercantilism as a distinctly modern language of statecraft responding to the novel conditions of a world economy forged by the violence of colonialism and merchant capitalism. If Helleiner intends to liberate "mercantilism" from its temporal/modern as well as its geographic/European prison (and thereby refashion an actor's category into an investigator's category), then this would necessitate a more focused theoretical engagement than the book presently furnishes.

The Neomercantilists is at once a timely intervention at a juncture of resurgent protectionism and geopolitical competition, and a timely contribution to the IPE literature that now abounds in global histories of liberalism and Marxism but lacks a matching study of neomercantilism. As such, it merits a place on the shelf next to Eli Heckscher's classic study of mercantilism.

Undermining American Hegemony: Goods Substitution in World Politics. Edited by Morten Skumsrud Andersen, Alexander Cooley, and Daniel H. Nexon. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021. 235p. \$99.99 cloth.
doi:10.1017/S1537592722001530

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This volume aces the two essential criteria for edited works: The chapters cohere, and they provoke. Editors Morten Skumsrud Andersen, Alexander Cooley, and Daniel H. Nexon propose that international orders, defined as "relatively stable patterns of relations and practices in world politics" (p. 9), are constructed and maintained by a hegemon or dominant power.

International orders possess three tiers (p. 11), "rules and norms," "international institutions," and a "goods

ecology,” meaning the structure (distribution) and “texture” (composition) of capabilities and conditions that enhance a political unit’s security, economy, status, or other desired outcomes. In their conclusion, Ole Jacob Sending and Iver B. Neumann (p. 185) usefully push their colleagues to distinguish between consumable “goods,” such as loans or military tanks, and “assets,” such as membership in a coveted club controlled by the dominant power, and make several pertinent observations about theory (see especially pp. 180–81).

The volume’s second big idea builds on prior work of editors Cooley and Nexon with Steven Ward, and clarifies the strategic choices for potential hegemonic challengers. Power transitions, which are inevitable, may occur gradually, as through differential rates of economic growth among major states, but throughout history often have invited adventurism and war. Meanwhile, counterhegemonic preferences, and thus strategies, vary along two dimensions: adherence or resistance to a particular *international order*—in this volume usually the post–World War II US-led liberal international order (LIO)—and acceptance or efforts to shift the current *distribution of capabilities* among the international system’s major powers (pp. 36–42 and *passim*). The polar ideal types are satisfied “status quo” states, who accept both the system’s order and its hierarchy, and “revolutionaries” (somewhat confusingly labeled “radical-revisionists” or simply “revisionists” elsewhere in the book), who hope to upend the reigning normative-legal-institutional order and also redistribute capabilities toward themselves. “Positionalists” broadly support the order, but seek greater influence within it, while “reformists” seek a different order with more congenial norms, rules, and institutions, but are satisfied with their own rank in the systemic hierarchy. Russia is, of course, a radical revisionist. China is sometimes positionalist, for example in its efforts with the BRICS to acquire larger quotas and votes within the Washington Consensus international financial institutions (pp. 44–45), but more often reformist, as when it creates parallel institutions that implicitly challenge the LIO, including the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (pp. 49–54), and the alternative development financing options, the New Development Bank, Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, and Belt and Road Initiative (see the chapters by Julia Bader, pp. 88–103, and Cooley, pp. 104–24).

When combined, the two themes generate the volume’s rationale and policy relevance. Within the LIO, guarantor of global free commerce and other global public goods (“assets”) that even dissatisfied powers value, there exist dense multilateral and transnational networks supportive of negotiated dispute settlement and the rule of law. Hot wars with revisionist or revanchist aims are less likely, although not impossible. In this content, the editors characterize most international diplomacy, as well as sovereign economic relations of

trade, aid, migration, health, and finance, as a mostly *intentional* process of “goods substitution.” Diplomacy substitutes for war. Challengers attempt to displace existing dominant states by offering alternative goods to their traditional clients, while lesser powers seek to profit from temporarily competitive supply conditions to negotiate better deals for themselves. Two chapters, rich in entertaining detail, apply the framework to least-likely cases: longtime clients within the United States’ vast network of security or economic dependencies. Andersen, examining Colombia (pp. 125–50) and Rebecca Adler-Nissen, Benjamin de Carvalho, and Halvard Leira, analyzing Iceland, Greenland, and the Faroes (pp. 151–75), find the framework fits.

The volume’s broad arguments are plausible and powerful, but here are three points to ponder. First, what are the theoretical consequences of conceptualizing norms, ideologies, and values (including quintessential liberal precepts of mutual tolerance of difference, or individual liberty within consensual rules) as international goods or assets deployable as implicit or explicit bargaining chips? Yes, in practice this occurs constantly, as international status is clearly a highly valued asset or attribute. Bahar Rumelili and Ann Towns (pp. 62–87) trace the paths by which relative rankings on global performance indicators, employing components chosen within the Global North, have become important status or “normative” goods precisely because of their concrete nature. Some dissatisfied states try to game the indices; another option is a counterhegemonic ranking or certification system, such as Russian election observers in Central Asia (pp. 122–23). Rumelili and Towns are convincing, but may go too far when they seem to suggest that it is *only* ideas that have become thus concretized that matter for international power competition or cooperation. One shouldn’t forget that ideas, even (or especially?) where diffuse and nonconcretized, may retain stunningly important *intrinsic* and persuasive international influence in a period of rising multipolarity, power transition, and multiple sources of confusion and doubt over the role and capabilities of government. Thus Daniel Drezner (“Counter-Hegemonic Strategies,” *Security Studies* 28(3): 505, 2019) interestingly argues that the optimal revisionist strategy is to sequence attacks on an international order’s ideational dimensions before its material ones. This seems accurate: Russia was quite successful with fake news.

Second, a useful path forward for this project, and incidentally for defenders of the LIO, may be its application to the experiences of positionalist revisionists, or those broadly sympathetic with the (mostly) liberal postwar order, but dissatisfied with their relative lack of voice within it. In the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Germany and the European Union legitimately will claim recognition as a global pole. Or consider Japan, the world’s third economy. During the Asian financial crisis of 1997–

99, Japan floated the idea of co-leadership in crisis management with the United States through an Asian Monetary Fund but was brushed off. Other important states, including India, have had similar experiences. Explicit attention by the declining hegemon to the allocation of status as well as material goods, and humility about the need for this, would go a long way. Moreover, and this is a theoretical as well as a policy-relevant point, when and if geographic neighborhoods of small and intermediate powers are able to constitute themselves as somewhat coherent “regions,” they are likely to be positionalist revisionists. This is true in Latin America, as argued in a recent book edited by Carlos Fortin, Jorge Heine, and Carlos Ominami (*El No Alineamiento Activo y América Latina*, Catalonia, 2021) making waves in the region.

Third, this volume is unduly stuffed with clever conceptual lists of theoretically intriguing concepts. Thus, the “alternative logics of goods substitution” (p. 13) include addition, exiting (client switches to a new dominant power provider), hedging (clients ensure against future risks of their current provider raising “prices,” by “buying” a bit from an alternative supplier ... such as China), and leverage (client prefers its current supplier, but pretends to switch to secure a better “price”). See also the editors’ short discussion (pp. 20–21) of the social construction of goods, which may bear symbolic, social, or performative qualities. I counted 10 such lists scattered throughout: A nice meta-theoretical task for the future would be to decide which are important and which merely clever.

Overall, *Undermining American Hegemony* provides a timely theoretical structure for seeing a few steps further into the fog.

Delegating Responsibility: International Cooperation on Migration in the European Union. By Nicholas R. Micinski. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2022. 232p. \$70.00 cloth, \$29.95 paper.

doi:10.1017/S1537592722001682

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Despite being central to the control of the territory and sovereignty of states, migration management was often delegated to European Union (EU) agencies, international organisations (IOs), and nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) during the 2015 refugee crisis. Nicholas R. Micinski’s book explores why new forms of cooperation emerged in Italy and Greece. The introduction offers a comprehensive overview of the puzzle and main argument, defines the main concepts, and explains the methodology succinctly. In chapter 2, Micinski proposes that cooperation is not equal but takes different forms along a cooperation decision tree (p. 17), moving from noncooperation

(unilateralism) to coordination, collaboration, and subcontracting. The choice between these forms of cooperation depends on two necessary conditions: administrative (state) capacity—defined as the ability to allocate resources for operating and implementing migration policies (p. 26)—and credible partners, with credible commitments “based on the state’s past behaviour and reputation” (p. 29). Their combination leads to a 2×2 typology: States with high capacity and credibility will decide to coordinate by agreeing to adjust their policies. When states are credible partners but have low capacities, collaboration—where implementation is carried out jointly (e.g., using agencies)—is likely to emerge. Third, if states are neither capable nor credible, they will subcontract to external actors like IOs and NGOs to help them credibly increase their administrative capacities. Finally, when states have high capacity but low credibility, they will prefer to go it alone. The chapter concludes by drawing on public goods theories to identify potential obstacles to cooperation, namely: credible commitments, divergent preferences or interests, defection, and free riders.

The following chapters test this typology empirically. Chapter 3 explains the evolution of EU migration management, showing how failures in coordinating asylum policies led to new forms of collaboration, notably through EU agencies. Chapter 4 examines Italy as a case of high administrative capacity and credibility. It shows how center-right and center-left governments actively sought to implement EU legislation and reinforced the state’s administrative capacities, which explains why coordination was sufficient in the aftermath of the 2015 crisis. In contrast, chapter 5 argues that the inability (or unwillingness) of Greek governments to implement EU legislation undermined both its administrative capacities and credibility. Hence, the main approach to manage the refugee crisis was to subcontract to IOs. The conclusion underlines the importance of, first, policy learning through failure and, second, implementation as a core stage of the policy cycle. It also opens new questions regarding the concept of sovereignty in the area of migration, asking how compatible it is with collaboration and subcontracting, which both require delegating competences (and hence responsibility) to external actors.

The main contributions of the book are threefold. First, it contributes to theories of cooperation through its typology; its careful operationalization helps to prevent further concept stretching and test these four subtypes empirically. Second, Micinski provides a comparative analysis with rich and original empirical data. As he acknowledges (p. 149), limiting the number of cases allows him to provide stronger and more solid evidence that can only be acquired through time-intensive (ethnographic) methods. Finally, his book fills an important gap in studies of implementation in EU migration governance. This is,