

Also the Turkish bath, Sitz-baths, the application of mustard, prolonged warm baths, wet packing, &c. "Perhaps the reader will think," concludes our author, "that in this direction lie the remedies that will remove chronic insanity out of the *opprobria medicinae*." Perhaps the reader will also think, say we, that although this conclusion is the result of a "confidence inspired by constant experience on the living subject," what is true in this production of sixty-three pages is not new, and what is new is not true.

Hume. William Blackwood and Sons, Edin. and London. 1886.

This is another carefully prepared biography of philosophers in the Classics for English readers, edited by Professor William Knight, with a frontispiece representing an apparently excellent likeness of David Hume. The present volume is written by the editor, who sketches the philosophy of Hume with fairness and lucidity. He recognizes the psychological inadequacy of the philosopher's explanation of many things. Take his contention in regard to Personal Identity. Hume requires to be shown the "impression" from which arises our "idea" of self. If this cannot be done the alleged idea falls to the ground. Again, he demands how all our distinct energies can belong to and be connected with the pretended self. Each of these may exist separately, and where is the need of anything to support their existence? A man cannot enter into what he calls *himself* without stumbling on some *particular*. Similarly, mankind is "nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions which succeed each with an inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux or movement." The identity of plants or animals is analogous to ours. Hume held that men confound the notion of a succession of objects which are in relation with the continuance of an identical object. The following passage cited by Professor Knight contains the pith of the contention on Hume's side:—"We feign the continued existence of the perceptions of our senses to remove the interruption; and run into the notion of a soul, and self, and substance, to disguise the variation." Hume perceived that the plant and the berry, the man and the child, were, notwithstanding their different periods of growth, one and

the same. For all that, he maintained that their identity was a figment of the brain, an imagination, and that the oneness was not real. He supported his position of the fictitious identity of the human mind by his doctrine of there being no real causation amongst phenomena, only an association of ideas, the result of custom. The memory of the past and the union with the present is the main source of personal identity, but only in the sense that it discloses it, the disclosure itself being a mere illusion. The notion of causation is acquired from such memory. Professor Knight regards Hume's position as inadequate, and as displaying analytic poverty and helplessness. He says, "A succession of states of mind *has no meaning*, except in relation to the substrata of self that underlies the succession, giving it coherence, identity, and intelligibility. The states are different, but the self—whose states they are—is the same. . . . If all that *I am* is this series of successive and detached 'impressions,' which I subsequently recall and bring back upon the stage of my experience as ideas—how are they *my* impressions—and *my* ideas? To make them *mine*, 'I' must exist beneath them or within them, and in a sense before them" (p. 178). This may serve as an illustration of the intelligent manner in which this little book is edited.

In concluding his philosophic sketch, the editor expresses his opinion that the antidote to the one-sidedness of the philosophy of experience as propounded by Hume, is to be found not so much in its opposite—Idealism—as the Philosophy of History, proving as it does that no narrow sectarian theory of knowledge suffices our human needs, and the study of the chief idealistic poets, from Dante to the poet who so greatly influenced John Stuart Mill, and who is able to hear "authentic tidings of invisible things." "Every materialistic movement must sooner or later be followed by an idealistic one, and every destructive theory be succeeded by a constructive one" (p. 238.)

What Hume said of Shakespeare, that he was a "disproportioned and misshapened giant," might perhaps be applied with more truth to Hume himself.

We have, in conclusion, only to speak in terms of praise of this publication.