After the three country case chapters, the book moves to a comparative analysis. Chapter 6 uses the most-similar cases approach to generate a comparative jurisdiction analysis of judicial regulation of the use of force in an internal security crisis in the three countries. Chapter 7 provides an effort to apply the theory of constitutional court as mediator in other countries outside Latin America (Israel, Turkey, and Pakistan), where the high courts have played an important role in civilian and military conflicts.

Overall, the book offers an interesting theory to contribute to the debates about the role of courts in new or developing democracies. We can infer from the book that third-party mediator is the ideal type of court for solving informational conflicts like military autonomy (but is not necessary when solving distributional conflicts like postelectoral disputes, where arbitrator is the desirable approach). However, as the evidence reveals, whether or not countries can adopt the mediator approach would be determined by their own institutional setting.

We learn from the book that judicial independence, accessibility, and capacity for judicial review are necessary conditions for that transformation to flourish, but none of them is sufficient by itself. Do courts in the desirable institutional setting always adopt a mediator role when facing an informational conflict? Or is it more a matter of choosing among different styles for conflict resolution (e.g., mediator or arbitrator), which would be determined by the particularities of the parties involved in the case? In other words, to what extent do other features, such as the culture of the legal community or the enabling conditions for civil society to organize and mobilize, also explain the emergence of mediator courts in informational conflicts? This book opens the door for future research in this area that would definitely shed light on key debates of the comparative judicial politics literature in Latin America and beyond.

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María Soledad Segura and Silvio Waisbord, *Media Movements: Civil Society and Media Policy Reform in Latin America*. London: Zed Books, 2016. Bibliography, index, 224 pp.; hardcover $95, paperback $29.95, ebook $23.96.

Media Movements, by the communication scholars María Soledad Segura and Silvio Waisbord, is an insightful study of the movements that have recently arisen in efforts to reform Latin American media systems and foster greater media pluralism in the region. In introducing the study, the authors note that media discourse in Latin America has been dominated by conservative media companies that have "tightly controlled opportunities for critical and progressive voices, which have been either distorted or simply invisible in mainstream media" (20).

Segura and Waisbord attribute the historic dearth of media pluralism to five factors: the concentration of media ownership and the narrow economic interests of media owners; the unwillingness of political elites to reform media systems out of fear of an adverse response from private media; the pressures and restrictions that

ruling political elites have placed on media by means of their discretionary control over state advertising revenues and vaguely worded libel and defamation laws; the tendency of ruling political elites to use "public" media as the propaganda arm of governments; and the lack of funding and broadcasting opportunities for alternative and community media.

The authors then proceed to describe the rise of media movements in response to the aforementioned state of affairs. Concentrating on movements in Uruguay, Argentina, Ecuador, and Mexico, they sum up the four central demands of media movements as calls for states to regulate media markets in such a way as to lessen or prevent the concentration of media ownership; remove libel and defamation laws that governments can use arbitrarily to penalize critics; establish freedom of information laws that create transparency and accountability by making state information available to the public; and increase media pluralism by opening up new spaces for community organizations and alternative media to broadcast their own programming.

Media movements have partially succeeded in several ways at bringing about such reforms. Drawing on the political opportunities approach, Segura and Waisbord posit that the successes of media movements have been largely rooted in their ability to take advantage of divisions among political elites or particular disputes between political elites and dominant media companies. They seek to illustrate that media movements strategically encourage governments to pass media policy reforms at precisely the moments when those governments could use such reforms to either weaken or gain leverage over their rivals.

This study is a highly useful analysis of how media movements can effectively pursue policy goals. However, I would be remiss not to offer two constructive criticisms. First, the study neglects to explore another important way that media markets limit pluralism. It does not take into account how news organizations' dependence on advertising revenue generates incentives for media to target middle- and upper-class audiences and ignore popular-class audiences. Since private advertisers are less interested in audiences with less disposable income, they are not willing to pay as much for advertising space in media that target those audiences (Baker 1995; Sparrow 1999). A historic example of the market bias against popular-class audiences was the demise of London's left-leaning *Daily Herald*, which had high circulation but went out of business because advertisers had relatively little interest in its working-class readership (Curran and Seaton 2009).

What implications might this history have for the new broadcasting opportunities that have opened up for community organizations and alternative media in Latin America? One risk is that the new broadcasting spaces could eventually be colonized by groups whose programming is aimed at the middle- and upper-class audiences who attract more advertising revenue. To guard against the possibility that the new arrangements will continue to discriminate against popular-class audiences, I would argue that media movements would need to consider strategies that go beyond those identified by Segura and Waisbord. Although it is beyond the scope of this review to specify what such strategies might look like, some modern history suggests that the *sine qua non* of meaningful media pluralism is popular-class organ-

izations that are powerful enough to take on a significant communication role. Such organizations would conceivably have the best prospect of developing and sustaining quality media programming aimed at popular-class audiences.

The exceptional history of media pluralism in Sweden may be instructive. By the end of the 1970s, the organized working class of Sweden had reached such a level of collective strength that its central labor confederation owned several social-democratic newspapers, controlling upward of 20 percent of total newspaper circulation in the country (Stephens 1979). Sweden's labor press also faced the problem of not being able to attract enough advertising revenue, but Sweden's Trade Union Confederation was sufficiently well financed to be able to subsidize its newspapers for a time (Stephens 1979). Thus, Swedes became accustomed not just to a robust business press but also to labor-owned newspapers that were left-wing and "clearly pro-labour in their content" (Stephens 1979, 407).

This brings me to the second criticism of Segura and Waisbord's book, which is that it arguably underestimates the importance of the rise of the Latin American left as a potential source of increased media pluralism. If popular-class organizations would have the best chance of expanding media pluralism, then we may have to ask how such organizations would be able to acquire the organizational strength necessary to take on an important communication role. The Swedish case suggests that one important way that popular-class organizations can expand their membership and increase their power is by developing relationships of mutual support with left parties. In such relationships, the popular-class organization helps to elect party representatives while the party works to enact policies that help the organization to achieve some of its policy goals and to gradually expand its membership.

Throughout the twentieth century, such a relationship between Sweden's unions and its Social Democratic Party was mutually fruitful, permitting the party to dominate Swedish politics for several decades and the unions to organize the highest proportion of workers in the Western world (Stephens 1979). This mutually supportive relationship was critical to the Swedish labor movement's ability to take on a key communication role and to bring about an arguably unprecedented level of media pluralism. Even as of 2011, the Swedish Trade Union Confederation still had a minority share in the country's largest-circulation daily (*Aftonbladet*) and retained the right to appoint the political editor of the paper (Allern and Blach-Ørsten 2011).

However, in fairness to Segura and Waisbord, it is important to specify their reasons for arguing that we cannot generalize about the Latin American left's media policy commitments. Their reservations are twofold. One is that some left-leaning administrations whose parties did not hold majorities in their countries' legislatures did not prioritize media policy reform. The other is that some left administrations have limited freedom of expression by enacting vaguely worded media laws that can be arbitrarily used to penalize critics.

Let us address the first argument first. Can we really assess the media policy proclivities of left parties on the basis of what policy agendas they do not prioritize when they do not command majorities in their countries' legislatures? In the case of Brazil's

Workers' Party (PT), for example, how can we conclude anything about its media policy commitments on the basis of the fact that it did not immediately prioritize media policy reform while it was forced to work in coalition with a centrist party that was not likely to support such reform? The litmus test of a left party's media policy commitments is not what it prioritizes in the face of seemingly insurmountable obstacles but rather what it would prioritize in the absence of such obstacles.

Although we cannot yet draw definitive conclusions about what media policy reforms (if any) the PT would have prioritized under a more auspicious set of conditions, we can certainly make some educated guesses on the basis of its historically antagonistic relations with Brazilian media owners. In the absence of legislative obstacles, the PT's interests would seem to lie in a more pluralistic media environment in which news organizations would not be so concentrated in the hands of groups antagonistic to the PT's moderately redistributionist agenda, and in which the PT's natural allies among popular organizations would have more avenues to broadcast alternative perspectives more conducive to the party's electoral prospects and policy agenda.

Virtually all the dominant left-of-center parties of South and Central America today are the only parties in the region with the combination of popular support and popular-class ties that give them the potential to create the kinds of policy environments in which popular organizations could secure the funding they would need to be able to develop quality media programming.

With respect to the Venezuelan and Ecuadorian governments' enactment of "truthful information" laws, these laws are indeed an affront to media movements insofar as they open the door to arbitrary actions against freedom of expression. Nonetheless, there is reason to doubt that we can say much about the modern Latin American left on the basis of the anomalous experiences of Venezuela and Ecuador. Unlike in most other Latin American countries, the rise of left-wing governments in Venezuela and Ecuador was accompanied by the near-total implosion of the countries' traditional parties. Dominant media companies and economic groups suddenly lost their old political allies and thus became fearful that a wholesale assault on their economic interests could be imminent. Hence, a somewhat unusual set of circumstances arose, particularly in Venezuela, where private media engaged in a relatively open campaign of political destabilization. The Chávez government responded by enacting laws that could be used (and potentially abused) against recalcitrant news organizations.

The important point, though, is that these are really not the typical circumstances under which left-wing governments have emerged in the region. Where left-wing parties have won elections but the traditionally dominant parties did not completely implode, media and economic elites have had greater assurances that new left-wing governments would have to negotiate with the dominant groups' political allies in the legislative branch. Thus, under more typical circumstances, media owners and economic elites are likely to be more restrained in their reactions to the election of left-wing governments. Most left-wing governments will, in turn, be less tempted to respond to dominant media companies with laws that can be used to

silence them. In other words, there is little reason to assume that Venezuela is a typical case of how the left is likely to behave.

In sum, I submit that the prospect of media pluralism in Latin America is still likely to be tied to the fortunes of a democratic left in the region (much as was the case in Sweden 75 years ago).

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Lee J. Alston, Marcus André Melo, Bernardo Mueller, and Carlos Pereira, *Brazil in Transition: Beliefs, Leadership, and Institutional Change*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016. Illustrations, tables, abbreviations, bibliography, index, 280 pp.; hardcover $39.50, ebook.

The arrival of this book may appear, at first blush, untimely. The authors' admittedly bold claim—that Brazil has undergone a critical transition that has placed the country on the path to sustainable development—sounds a dissonant chord in light of the troubling news emanating recently from Brazil: a contracting economy and a fiscal crisis, the mammoth scale of the Petrobras bribery scandal, the National Congress's removal of a president for misrepresenting public finances and the countercharge of a congressional coup d'état, a replacement administration loaded with figures tainted by corruption allegations, and polls suggesting declining public support for democratic institutions.

However, this book argues for an assessment of Brazil that goes beyond last year's growth rate or even this year's impeachment crisis. The authors' main argument is that Brazil's dominant actors have embraced a set of beliefs—economic orthodoxy, social inclusion, and political openness—that have laid the foundations for sustained but moderate economic growth rates, the growing force of the rule of law, and a more participatory politics. The analytical framework draws from the new institutional economics, specifically the variant that emphasizes the centrality of beliefs for institutional equilibrium. For the authors, an underlying consensus centered on "fiscally sound social inclusion" marks a positive and (perhaps) long-term institutional change in Brazil.