carved in stone on the east pediment of Olympia, *c.*460 BC, Pelops cannot be represented as a 'cheat' – rather, he must offer 'a model of courage and inspiration to the Olympic competitor'. So she argues that Pindar's 'clean' version of the Pelops story (*Ol.* 1.36ff) is the key to the sculptures – not the 'cheating' variant, imputed to the obscure Pherekydes a decade or two later. So here is a book with familiar illustrations but some challenges to rethink their usual captions (further chapters address monumental decoration at Athens, Delphi, and Bassae, and *heroon*-tombs in Asia Minor, particularly the funerary reliefs from Trysa). The argument becomes sophistic – but why not: however specifically the Eleans may have commissioned the sculptural programme at Olympia, it is evident that its meaning was not securely anchored. Yet it is sophistry's nature to cut both ways. Who is to say that the Pelops who outwits Oinomaus with chariot-wheel sabotage is thereby deemed a 'cheat' – rather than showing admirable *metis*?

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doi:10.1017/S0017383509990349

Philosophy

Acumen's 'Ancient Philosophies' series is shaping up into a very distinguished range of introductions. We have had *Presocratics* by James Warren (see *G&R* 55 [2008], 147) and John Sellars' *Stoicism*; this year sees four excellent new volumes. I'll start with *Ancient Scepticism* by Harald Thorsrud:[68] like other volumes, a lucid and reliable introduction to its subject, which it traces from Pyrrho, through the New Academy, to Aenesidemus and Sextus Empiricus. (As far as topics go, I will only note that medical empiricism gets a raw deal, with just two pages at 196–8, and no real sense of its importance as part of the background to Neopyrrhonism.) Thorsrud makes a special effort to outline the main scholarly controversies as he goes along – though he commits rather swiftly to one position that could have done with more discussion when he credits Cicero with the development of a fallibilist position that 'provides a synthesis of sceptical caution and Stoic confidence' (101). He acknowledges that the position is controversial (202 n. 6), and excuses his speed by saying that an exploration of his reasons would go too far beyond the scope of an introductory account (208 n. 5): perhaps, but it might also have shed some much-needed light on Cicero as a source for Academic scepticism. The 'guide to further reading' is well considered and thoughtfully set out (and even lists reviews of major works). The idea that Scepticism counted for the ancients as a constructive epistemological choice is challenged in Lloyd Gerson's *Ancient Epistemology*.[69] Gerson's argument (some aspects of which will be familiar from his previous important work on the Platonic tradition) is that the ancients in general were epistemological naturalists – that is, they viewed

[68] *Ancient Scepticism*. By Harald Thorsrud. Ancient Philosophies. Stocksfield, Acumen, 2009. Pp. xvi + 248. Hardback £45, ISBN: 978-1-844-65130-6; paperback £14.99, ISBN: 978-1-844-65131-3.

[69] *Ancient Epistemology*. By Lloyd P. Gerson. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2009. Pp. ix + 179. Hardback £45, ISBN: 978-0-521-87139-6; paperback £15.99, ISBN: 978-0-521-69189-5.

knowledge as a feature of the natural system within which humans are embedded. Furthermore, Gerson believes that what is distinctive about ancient (as opposed to modern) naturalism is that it goes with the view that knowledge cannot be a form of belief: it must rather be unmediated, infallible cognition. For Plato (ch. 3) and Aristotle (ch. 4), this ultimately means that knowledge is available only to incorporeal intellects, capable of reflexive identification with the objects of their thought. Gerson's most controversial claim (in a book with a number of contenders) is that the Epicureans and Stoics tried to develop much the same model, but on corporealist lines – a fact that made them vulnerable to objections moved by the Sceptics (chs. 5–6), and ultimately led to the return of the incorporeal knower (an unembodied intellect) in Plotinus (ch. 7). In discussing Plato, Gerson takes the line that the aporetic character of the *Theaetetus* is a deliberate consequence of the absence of forms from that dialogue. Paul Stern takes a rather different view in *Knowledge and Politics in Plato's* Theaetetus.[70] Forms, he thinks, are absent because they are not quite relevant to the inquiry at hand, which is more political than it is strictly epistemological. According to Stern, Socrates wants to direct our attention away from absolutist definitions of knowledge towards the exploration of the possibility of *partial* knowledge, and of *phronesis* understood as 'the wisdom concerning how we ought to live' (119). Socrates' midwifery is both the method of pursuing this question and the answer that it finally receives (esp. 292). Another way in which Stern is in diametrical contrast to Gerson is in downplaying the need to read the *Theaetetus* in the context of Plato's wider output. In fact, much of the plausibility of his case rests on the claim that the dialogue is programmatic for an understanding of the Socratic project as a whole. This means that, if anything, Plato's other dialogues have to be measured by the *Theaetetus*, not the other way round. In this context, Stern emphasizes the (admittedly interesting) fact that Socrates himself is supposed to have had a hand in correcting the record of the discussion (143a). But for all his stimulating ingenuity, here and elsewhere in reading the text, I found much of the argument too tendentious to command credence. There is further reflection on Plato's epistemology in *Essays on Being*,[71] which reprints eight papers published by Charles Kahn between 1966 and 2004 on the subject of the Greek verb *einai* ('to be'). They set out Kahn's well-known attack on the traditional distinction between predicative and existential uses of the verb and his own view that the 'copulative' use has historical and logical priority: that the basic use of *einai* is to assert that an *x* 'is' something-or-other. Kahn gestures at some interesting philosophical pay-offs that his philology has for Aristotle and Plotinus (3), but Plato and Parmenides are very much to the fore – Parmenides as Plato's philosophical forefather (from a 1988 essay, at 167 in this volume: 'If it was the encounter with Socrates that made Plato a philosopher, it was the poem of Parmenides that made him a metaphysician'). The long and the short of it, as far as they are concerned, is that the interest in 'being' usually has a decidedly epistemological bent to it – a fact that could explain how philosophy owes as much at its birth to the theory of knowledge as 'metaphysics' more narrowly conceived. Presentation of the papers has been standardized, but the original pagination is helpfully noted in the

[70] *Knowledge and Politics in Plato's Theaetetus*. By Paul Stern. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2008. Pp x + 315. Hardback £52, ISBN: 978-0-521-88429-7.

[71] *Essays on Being*. By Charles H. Kahn. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2009. Pp. 225. Hardback £30, ISBN: 978-0-19-953480-7.

margins (though *which* margin seems a matter of fluke: not the only typographical misfortune I spotted). The volume has its own Introduction and a brief 'Postscript' dealing with some details of Parmenides' system. Aristotelian dialectic is addressed in two books this year, most obviously Giesela Striker's superb translation of, and commentary on, Aristotle, *Prior Analytics*, Book 1.[72] This is intended 'as an aid to readers who are interested in reading Aristotle's treatise as a foundational text in the history of logic' (xx) – a gentle warning that, although Striker is a razor-sharp reader of the text as well, her discussion is more focused on philosophical than philological issues, and targets an audience with some prior familiarity with the terminology of this field. *Aristotle's Metaphysics Beta*,[73] the sixteenth *Symposium Aristotelicum*, edited by Michel Crubellier and André Laks, is the occasion for dialectical as well as metaphysical reflection since its subject is *aporia* ('difficulty' or 'impasse'). As the editors note in their introduction, *aporia* works for Aristotle as a starting point in philosophical inquiry that complements the doxographical approach to be found in *Metaphysics A*. The idea is that, having surveyed his predecessors, Aristotle now takes up 'difficulties' (for example about the nature of causation, substance, and principle) whose solution will be the basis for his own metaphysical system. André Laks goes on to discuss the introduction to *Beta* as an *aporia* about the use of *aporiai* (since the subsequent *aporiai* have conventional numbers, he calls this 'Aporia Zero'). Other contributors are: Michel Crubellier on *aporiai* 1–2, Frans de Haas on 3–5 (although insisting on the unity of 1–5, insofar as they deal with the application of the principles of the *Posterior Analytics* to the science of 'being'), Enrico Berti on 6–7, Sarah Broadie on 8 (with interesting reflections on Platonist suspicion about the existence of forms of artefacts), Christian Wildberg on 9–10, Walter Cavini on 11, Ian Mueller on 12 ('and 12 *bis*'), and Stephen Menn on 13–14. The seventeenth *Symposium Aristotelicum* is also published this year under the editorship of Carlo Natali, as *Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics VII*.[74] The work under discussion covers two related topics, perhaps combining two originally separate treatises, both central to classical ethical debate: *akrasia* ('weakness of will') in Chapters 1–10, and pleasure in 11–14. David Charles gets the plum Chapter 3, where Aristotle discusses whether 'true' or 'wide-eyed' *akrasia* is possible – that is, whether one can consciously draw the conclusion that one ought not to do a thing and at the same time voluntarily do it. Most commentators have taken it that Aristotle concedes enough to Socrates to make this an absurdity but, on Charles' reading, Aristotle says nothing to suggest that it is impossible. (*Inter alia*, Charles argues [63] that the knowledge that Socrates was right to say could not be dragged around – 1147b13–17 – is *proper* knowledge, that is, knowledge of universals.) Much of the work of the other chapters involves distinctions between types and meanings of *akrasia*, its relationship to pleasure, and the role of pleasure in turn in the good life. They have more of the commentary about them than

[72] *Aristotle's Prior Analytics Book 1*. Translated with an introduction and commentary by Gisela Striker. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2009. Pp. xx + 268. Hardback £50, ISBN: 978-0-19-925040-0; paperback £19.99, ISBN: 978-0-19-925041-7.

[73] *Aristotle's Metaphysics Beta*. Edited by Michel Crubellier and André Laks. Symposium Aristotelicum. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2009. Pp. 296. Hardback £40, ISBN: 978-0-19-954677-0.

[74] *Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, Book VII*. Edited by Carlo Natali. Symposium Aristotelicum. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2009. Pp. 296. Hardback £50, ISBN: 978-0-19-955844-5.

is usual even for this series, which means that they often defy useful summary, but will be invaluable to anyone working closely with this text, or with these issues in the *Ethics* as a whole. Susan Sauvé Meyer's *Ancient Ethics*[75] is an introduction to the major ancient systems of ethical thought that functions reliably as such: its highly readable text has its scholarly ballast in the endnotes to each chapter, and there is a bibliography that must stretch to well over 700 items. There are minor problems (I'm not sure about the suggestion at 162–3 that achieving preferred indifferents is the cause of the Stoic sage's experiencing *eupatheiai*, for example); and the discussion ends up generalizing across antiquity to argue the effective convergence of theorized notions of virtue and happiness in Plato, Aristotle, the Epicureans (see esp. arguments at 126–8), and the Stoics. I think that something is lost in the flattening out that this involves; I also cannot help feeling that a book with a more serious agenda to contribute to a 'comprehensive account of the tradition as a whole' (2) might have dared to step further outside the comfort zone that these schools effectively constitute anyway. The fourteen papers in *Passions and Moral Progress in Greco-Roman Thought*, edited by John Fitzgerald,[76] range a little more widely. Indeed, one of the most useful purposes that this volume serves, in a field where the ability to reduce a text to 'Peripatetic *metriopatheia*' or 'Stoic *apatheia*' sometimes passes for critical scholarship, is to take the debate beyond the familiar canon. Georgia Nugent (on Ovid and *akrasia*) and Troels Engberg-Pedersen (on the 'self-determining' self in Paul) are particularly inventive; other papers deal with Aristotle and Theophrastus (W. W. Fortenbaugh), the Stoics (Edgar Krentz), the Epicureans (David Armstrong), Plutarch (Richard Wright), the Cynics (David E. Aune), Neopythagoreans (Johan Thom), Philo (David Winston), the novelists Chariton and Xenophon (Loveday Alexander), the New Testament (David Charles Aune and James Ware, as well as Engberg-Pedersen), and Clement of Alexandria (Michael White). Having covered logic and ethics, I ought, in good Stoic fashion, to turn to physics, but first some books that are not so easily categorized. They include one on the Stoics themselves: *The Stoics Reader*, by Brad Inwood and Lloyd Gerson.[77] (See texts 2 and 5 for the Stoics on the philosophical curriculum.) The volume essentially repackages material in *Hellenistic Philosophy* by the same authors (*G&R* 37 [1990] 125) – but there is nothing lazy about the way they have done this. There is some reorganization, rethinking of translations, and extra material, especially on Panaetius and Posidonius. A particular virtue of *Hellenistic Philosophy*, enhanced in this volume, is the unbroken presentation of extended testimonia (e.g., Stobaeus on Stoic ethics) – the evidence, after all, is fragmented enough as it is. Brad Inwood turns up again this year as the editor of his first volumes of *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy*,[78] both of which

[75] *Ancient Ethics. A Critical Introduction*. By Susan Sauvé Meyer. London and New York, Routledge, 2008. Pp. xi + 244. Hardback £75, ISBN: 978-0-415-94026-9; paperback £21.99, ISBN: 978-0-415-94027-6.

[76] *Passions and Moral Progress in Greco-Roman Thought*. Edited by John T. Fitzgerald. London and New York, Routledge, 2008. Pp. xxiii + 392. Hardback £70, ISBN: 978-0-415-28069-3.

[77] *The Stoics Reader. Selected Writings and Testimonia*. Translated and with introduction by Brad Inwood and Lloyd P. Gerson. Indianapolis, IN, Hackett, 2008. Pp. xvi + 234. Hardback £29.95, ISBN: 978-0-872-20953-4; paperback £9.95, ISBN: 978-0-872-20952-7.

[78] *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy*. Edited by Brad Inwood. Vol. XXXV, Winter 2008. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008. Pp. 314. Hardback £45, ISBN: 978-0-19-955779-0; paperback £25, ISBN: 978-0-19-955780-6. Vol. XXXVI, Summer 2009. Oxford, Oxford

contain a healthy balance of dialectic (including Gail Fine in vol. 35 on whether Socrates said that he knew that he knew nothing), ethics (three articles across the volumes deal with pleasure alone), and physics (from Carl Huffman, vol. 35, on cosmology – or rather its absence – in Pythagoras, to the quasi-atomism that David Leith argues for Asclepiades in vol. 36). Patricia Curd and Daniel W. Graham have done an excellent job with *The Oxford Handbook of Presocratic Philosophy*,[79] managing to keep most of the reheated or outdated material one expects in such ventures to a section called 'Topics'. Elsewhere, there are wonderful, up-to-date articles on sources and methodology, and some sophisticated and original work on particular figures, all of which make this volume essential reading. Oliver Primavesi's piece on Empedocles, in particular, stands out for bringing new evidence to bear on the nature of Empedocles' cosmic cycle, and for its persuasive alignment of the mythical and physical in the *Purifications* and *On Nature*. I was also particularly struck by Alexander Mourelatos on Xenophanes and David Sedley on Democritus. The ancient reception of Presocratic thought is briefly covered at the end in an old essay by Michael Frede and a new one by John Palmer. William Desmond's *Cynics*[80] (another in the Acumen series) makes a valuable contribution to the synoptic literature on ancient Cynicism – valuable because there is not much of it already, and what there is tends to be more technical than many people will want, or more superficial than the subject deserves. Desmond gets it just right, while his own talent for the well-turned phrase does credit to the lively anecdotes in which so much of our evidence for Cynicism comes down to us. The most straightforwardly 'philosophical' material is in a chapter placed in the middle of the book that compares and contrasts Cynic ideas of '(living according to) nature' with those of other schools of thought; hinged around this are biographical and thematic surveys on the one hand and 'reception' issues on the other. Desmond comes down against the idea that Jesus was a Cynic (211–16), but finds Cynicism in surprising places elsewhere, from Petronius (Trimalchio) to Shakespeare (*King Lear* is 'a play that is strongly Cynic in orientation', 223) to Nietzsche. The twelve pages of suggestions for further reading are, as with other volumes in the series, superb. *Plato's Myths*,[81] a collection of essays edited by Catelin Partenie, offers some fresh and useful perspectives on this well-worn topic. In the sights of many of the contributors is the issue of how the Platonic myths relate to the (more straightforwardly) philosophical discussions of justice: Michael Inwood talks about Plato's myths of metempsychosis in this light; David Sedley integrates the *Gorgias* myth with the dialectic that precedes (concluding that the 'judgement' and 'punishment' of souls dramatize Socratic dialectic); Malcolm Schofield focuses attention on the foundation myths of Callipolis, G. R. F. Ferrari on Er, Charles Kahn on the *Statesman* myth (pointing towards a turn from 'messianic politics' to legislative

University Press, 2009. Pp. 348. Hardback £50, ISBN: 978-0-19-956810-9; paperback £22, ISBN: 978-0-19-956811-6.

[79] *The Oxford Handbook of Presocratic Philosophy*. Edited by Patricia Curd and Daniel W. Graham. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008. Pp. xii + 588. Hardback £87, ISBN: 978-0-19-514687-5.

[80] *Cynics*. By William Desmond. Ancient Philosophies. Stocksfield, Acumen, 2008. Pp. vi + 290. Hardback £50, ISBN: 978-1-844-65128-3; paperback £15.99, ISBN: 978-1-844-65129-0.

[81] *Plato's Myths*. Edited by Catalin Partenie. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2009. Pp. xvi + 255. Hardback £55, ISBN: 978-0-521-88790-8.

reform), and Richard Stalley on how the myth of reincarnation in *Laws* X relates to (and differs from) cognate myths in earlier dialogues. Other papers look at the structural dimension of Platonic myths: Gábor Betegh finds a narrative pattern that provides a context for assessing passages that conform to it but that are not normally considered as 'myths' (Socrates' account of his journey to a theory of causality in the *Phaedo*, for example); Christopher Rowe, using the *Phaedrus* myth as his example, sees myth as one way in which Plato layers his text to take the reader from an 'ordinary' to the 'Platonic' perspective on the world. M. F. Burnyeat reads the *eikos muthos* of the *Timaeus* as a 'myth' that is 'appropriate' in representing in terms of practical wisdom the theoretical operations of the demiurge. A final chapter (Elizabeth McGrath) surveys Renaissance illustrations of Platonic myths. Two Platonic dialogues receive systematic treatment. Nicholas Denyer follows up his 'Green and Yellow' commentary on the *First Alcibiades* (*G&R* 50 [2003] 126) with another on Plato's *Protagoras*.[82] Denyer's command of Greek (it would be faint praise to call it 'knowledge') and his ear for a good story or parallel make for notes that are really illuminating and enjoyable to read even at their most technical. The philosophy is not laboured here – though the reader is gently prodded to think about it along the way. M. C. Howatson and Frisbee Sheffield add *Plato. The Symposium*[83] to the *Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy* series, with a very readable translation and spare but sound editorial materials, including a lucid introduction that sets the scene for newcomers to the text. Footnotes to the translation are sensitive to the needs of readers without much classical background, and keep the inevitable difficulties facing the translator (and the reader of translations) in mind. Just occasionally, though, this gets a bit out of hand: at 12, the word 'boys', in a thoroughly straightforward context, is explained with the note: '*paides*, plural of *pais*'. The third and fourth of my Acumen volumes both cover the later Platonic tradition – and, by the way, lead us finally to physics. Pauliina Remes, with *Neoplatonism*,[84] promises to address an attitude towards her subject that 'dismissed its complex system of ideas as more mystical than philosophical' (back cover). She does this through engagement with thoroughly up-to-date scholarship, and lucid exposition with a focus on Plotinus' physics as well as his metaphysics. (The emphasis, perhaps inevitably, is on Plotinus; his followers are drawn into play largely to note where they differ.) This is a great advance; but even Remes is haunted a bit by ghosts of the past that she is trying to escape. She does not always go out of her way to convince her readers that Neoplatonism is much more than system-building, or that anything much is at stake (see esp. p. viii); and what does it mean to attack others for thinking of Neoplatonism as 'mystical', if she herself can say that it is 'predominantly spiritual in nature' (9)? Physics is also the focus of Miira Tuominen's timely introduction to the *The Ancient Commentators on*

[82] *Plato. Protagoras*. Edited by Nicholas Denyer. Cambridge Greek and Latin Classics. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2008. Pp. xiii + 207. Hardback £47, ISBN: 978-0-521-84044-6; paperback £18.99, ISBN: 978-0-521-54969-1.

[83] *Plato. The Symposium*. Edited by M. C. Howatson and Frisbee C. C. Sheffield, translated by M. C. Howatson. Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2008. Pp. xxxv + 91. Hardback £26.99, ISBN: 978-0-521-86440-4; paperback £9.99, ISBN: 978-0-521-68298-5.

[84] *Neoplatonism*. By Pauliina Remes. Ancient Philosophies. Stocksfield, Acumen, 2008. Pp. xii + 244. Hardback £45, ISBN: 978-1-844-65124-5; paperback £14.99, ISBN: 978-1-844-65125-2.

Plato and Aristotle ('timely' because recent work on the commentators has made them accessible and interesting as never before).[85] Even the 'epistemology', with which the book begins its substantive discussion, is introduced as 'what we conceive of as philosophy of science' (41); after this, the book goes through 'Science and Logic', 'Physics', and 'Psychology', only reaching 'Metaphysics' in Chapter 6 (and with 'Ethics' still to go). As in the case of Remes, this focus on the natural world keeps the work 'philosophically focused' (14), at least in the sense of maintaining a sense of purpose throughout the discussions. This is all the harder for Tuominen, since she has to grapple with summaries of Plato and Aristotle, as well as the relatively disparate group of thinkers who constitute the 'commentators' on them. Indeed, one of the questions that I had reading this book was what sense it makes to talk about the 'commentators' as a philosophically unified 'movement' in the first place (a question piqued, rather than satisfied, by the very clear and level-headed discussion of 'commentary' in the introduction). The whole exercise seems to me to lie a bit uneasily between a study in the reception of particular texts (which include Stoic texts as well as Plato and Aristotle, by the way, in ch. 7), and more direct engagement with particular philosophical systems (which include Aristotelian and Christian systems alongside Platonism). But that is only to say that there is something left to be done here. Tuominen's good sense and elegant exposition will undoubtedly help to promote the interest and engagement in the field that is needed if it is to be done. I end with three books that explicitly foreground the ancient study of the natural world. *Aristotle on Life*[86] is a collection of articles that hovers around the overlap between biology and metaphysics in Aristotle – an overlap created in the first place by the fact (interrogated here by Errol Katayama) that living things are 'paradigm instances of substances'. Indeed, they come close to exhausting the class. Although Margaret Scharle argues that even the natural elements depend for their behaviour on formal and final causality (in general, that '*all* efficient causation depends on formal and final causation', 43), Katayama shows why they do not answer to the several kinds of 'unity' that Aristotle expects from a substance. In a similar vein, Christopher Shields explores (and vindicates) the notion that artefacts cannot properly be 'substances'. John Mouracade suggests that DNA is a 'paradigmatic case' (175) of Aristotelian form; Paul Studtman distinguishes some twenty-six senses in which Aristotle uses the term 'form', and organizes them into a taxonomy focused on the idea of order. He agrees with Devin Henry that Aristotle distinguishes individual forms from species-forms – but at this point I start to miss the 'straight' biology. I wonder, for example, whether 'individual' forms emerge from metaphysical speculation but evaporate in Aristotle's reminder that it is, after all, a man that generates a man (a concrete individual, in other words, not a form of any sort). My own feeling is that a similar sensitivity to the distinction between concrete individual and form defuses Julie Ward's worry about calling 'human' certain beings that do not exhibit essential human functions (as, for example, children before the faculty of reason is matured in

[85] *The Ancient Commentators on Plato and Aristotle*. By Miira Tuominen. Ancient Philosophies. Stocksfield, Acumen, 2009. Pp. xii + 324. Hardback £50, ISBN: 978-1-844-65162-7; paperback £16.99, ISBN: 978-1-844-65163-4.

[86] *Aristotle on Life*. Edited by John Mouracade. *Apeiron* 41. Kelowna, BC, Academic Printing and Publishing, 2008. Pp. x + 197. Hardback $74.95, ISBN: 978-0-920980-96-5; paperback $28.95, ISBN: 978-0-920980-97-2.

them). Sylvia Berryman's *The Mechanical Hypothesis in Ancient Greek Natural Philosophy*[87] gives consideration to a branch of Greek thought whose influence on the development of ancient philosophical science has, in her view, been unduly marginalized. In practice, much of the book deals with the emergence of 'mechanics' itself as a discipline in the fourth century BC; contributions to philosophical theory are explored more systematically only in the final chapter. One of Berryman's arguments is that discussions from mechanics concerning levers, the void, the elasticity of matter, and pneumatics all helped shape the agenda for natural philosophy, in particular theories of matter. But on top of all this she argues that there is evidence for the development of a more-or-less 'mechanical' view of the cosmos, a little more comparable to the sort of view familiar to us from early modern philosophy than anything we usually recognize in antiquity. (Berryman does a good job of distinguishing mechanical models from the anti-teleological materialism of the ancient atomists, by the way.) It turns out that this view is only visible to us at all through arguments against it, and there is, one might think, scope to wonder whether it might have been as much a construction of its opponents as a position really held by their peers. Still, even that is enough to justify Berryman's claim that this is an area of thought that we should have more in mind. Her interesting discussion of anti-mechanistic moves made by Neoplatonists is enough on its own to show the importance of the topic. The (wholly apposite) pleasure in statistics shown by the editors of *The Encyclopedia of Ancient Natural Scientists*[88] does part of my job for me: on their own authority, I can tell you that Paul Keyser and Georgia Irby-Massie have orchestrated 119 contributors to produce 2,043 entries covering a period from Homer to the mid-seventh century AD. Of these entries (and here one really starts to get impressed), more than one-eighth (276 names, duly catalogued at 1034–7) have apparently never appeared in any other encyclopaedia, and three-fifths will still not be found in any other English-language reference work when *Brill's New Pauly* is complete (5). With numbers like that, the editors can expect to forestall even the most bullish objection to the inevitable anachronism of designating some thinkers (but not others) as 'scientists' – even before their own disarmingly sane reflection on the principles of inclusion at the beginning of the introduction (1). The entries themselves are reliable and, as appropriate, critical – though they do not, perforce, have time to drill down very deep. I went after 'atomism' for a bit, for example, and found nothing on Epicurean *minima* (arguably more interesting, as a scientific postulate, than 'atoms' themselves), and nothing to encourage comparison between self-designating 'atomism' and other particulate theories of matter, such as those of Plato or Heraclides. On the other hand, the utility of the space occupied by the entries is maximized by an accent on primary sources and well-targeted onward bibliography. And then there is the back matter: some 200 pages of metadata that really set the volume apart: there is a gazetteer and glossary (of course), but also a forty-seven-page timeline, and lists of authors by specialism, from agriculturalists to veterinarians (not forgetting encyclopaedists on

[87] *The Mechanical Hypothesis in Ancient Greek Natural Philosophy*. By Sylvia Berryman. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2009. Pp. x + 286. Hardback £50, ISBN: 978-0-521-76376-9.

[88] *The Encyclopedia of Ancient Natural Scientists. The Greek Tradition and its Many Heirs*. Edited by Paul T. Keyser and Georgia L. Irby-Massie. London and New York, Routledge, 2008. Pp. x + 1062. Hardback £200, ISBN: 978-0-415-34020-5.

the way). Non-Greeks, women, monotheists, poets, and rulers are identified too (not atheists, though, interestingly), as are those articles 'in which emendations are discussed or proposed'. One index of plants is cross-referenced from another that organizes them according to their botanical (Latin) name. Here are some more numbers: £200, which is 30% more than a new LSJ. That is eye-watering, but try not to let it be off-putting: this is a magnificent resource.

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doi:10.1017/S0017383509990350

General

Jacob Wackernagel (1853–1938) is one of the giant figures of classical and comparative philology. His 'Lectures on Syntax' originally delivered at the University of Basel in 1918–19 quickly established itself as an outstanding, if uneven (as the author himself acknowledged), introduction to the linguistic universe of Greek, Latin, Germanic, and everything. Up until recently, it has only been accessible in the original German (and out of print since 1996). David Langslow has now produced the first English translation of this monumental work – itself a monumental achievement, over ten years in the making.[89] Although many might regard this work as relevant only to those with a specialist interest in linguistics, it deserves the attention of anyone who has an interest in the way that languages work. Sections such as 'Nouns Lacking Singular or Plural Forms', 'Plural for Singular', 'Decline of the Infinitive in Greek', 'Proper Names and Adjectives', and a three-and-a-half-page discussion of the gender of the Latin *dies* exert a curious fascination. Take the following opening to Lecture I, 17, which nicely illustrates the balance of informal style and uncompromising scholarship:

> What though is the meaning of singular and plural? How do they compare with each other? The standard view is that the plural form expresses a multiple of what is expressed by the singular form. But even this is by no means always the case. Even in the personal pronoun this is not true. Gk ἡμεῖς means not 'I and I' but 'I and you', 'I and those who belong to me'; similarly, ὑμεῖς is not always an agglomeration of several single yous. (126)

When Eduard Fraenkel made his application for the Corpus Christi Professorship of Latin at Oxford in 1934 he included testimonials from 'a glittering array of scholars' (S. P. Oakley in Butterfield and Stray, 84). These included not only Wackernagel but his near contemporary A. E. Housman (1859–1936). Housman is most famous for his poetic oeuvre, in particular *The Shropshire Lad*; among Classicists, however, Housmania is also rife: Housman is revered and (in some quarters) reviled as a dominant (and dominating) figure in the field of textual criticism. In *A. E. Housman. Classical Scholar*, edited by David Butterfield and Christopher Stray, the spotlight is turned firmly away from Housman the poet and onto Housman the textual critic

[89] *Jacob Wackernagel. Lectures on Syntax with Special Reference to Greek, Latin, and Germanic*. Edited with notes and bibliography by David Langslow. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2009. Pp. xxii + 982. Hardback £150, ISBN: 978-0-19-815302-3.