

our thinking about how best to deal with the most conflict-prone dyads in the international system. The rich case studies Blum develops in the book further her compelling argument and provide a useful means to trace the development of islands of agreement, the issues they cover, and their effects upon rival states in three important enduring rivalries. This book is a must read for both scholars and policymakers alike.

–J. Michael Greig

DRIVEN BY FEAR

Ioannis D. Evrigenis: *Fear of Enemies and Collective Action* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008. Pp. xix, 232. \$85.00.)

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Fear figures prominently in political theory and the theory and practice of international relations. This volume examines fear as a source of political order and fear of enemies as a building block of group identity. Thomas Hobbes is rightly seen as the principal theorist of fear, but the author extends his analysis back to Machiavelli, St. Augustine, Sallust, Thucydides, and Aristotle and forward through Kant and Hegel to Schmitt, Morgenthau, and post–September 11 America.

The author's starting point is "Sallust's theorem" that *metus hostilis*, the fear of enemies, promotes social unity and its absence discord. He purports to develop a theory of "negative association," whose fundamental assumption is that "differentiation from outsiders shapes the identities of political groups and their members in fundamental ways" (p. xii). In times of crisis, appeals to the differences between one's group and adversarial others "may be the only way of forestalling their dissolution" (p. xiii). As self-preservation is assumed to be the universal "bottom line" for individuals and social groups, fear of death, when successfully aroused, is the most effective means of building and maintaining group identity.

Of necessity, the readings of so many philosophers in fewer than 200 pages must be brief and somewhat superficial. Some of the interpretations are also questionable. Thucydides is treated as a run-of-the-mill realist and the author buttresses his argument with secondary sources that reflect this orientation. There is no recognition that fear is not a constant in Thucydides' account of the Peloponnesian War, but becomes increasingly prominent as reason loses control of appetite and spirit in Athens and spirit in Sparta. In the Melian Dialogue, fear is the dominant motive for Athens, although not for the Melian leadership, who are prepared to die in defense of their freedom, just as the Athenians were when they faced the Persian threat. I believe that Thucydides intends us to understand Athenian behavior at this point in the war as pathological. Thucydides and Herodotus alike treat self-

preservation as one of many motives, not as any kind of prime directive. Nor do they see fear as a source of Spartan or Athenian identity.

The discussion of Aristotle is equally unsatisfying. His *Politics* is read to support the claim that defense and security are as central for Aristotle as they allegedly are for Thucydides. His *Rhetoric* and other works that discuss emotions are ignored, a surprising omission given Aristotle's very different take than many post-Darwinian moderns on the culturally specific nature of emotions and role of the intellect in mediating them.

The general discussion of emotions and fear makes a few genuflections in the direction of neuroscience but utterly ignores a rich corpus of research in social psychology on identity formation and the role played by hostile and negative stereotypes of others. This literature suggests that identities generally form prior to the creation of negative others, that stereotypes of others need not be associated with hostility, and that group identity and the defining characteristics of groups are remarkably fluid. It is remarkable that a political scientist would ignore research findings so central to his topic and take Kant and Hegel's views of the role of others in identity formation not as reflections of their particular understandings and projects, but as established social truths.

The readings of Hobbes, Kant, and Hegel are fairly conventional and unobjectionable as is the seemingly now-mandatory treatment of Carl Schmitt as part of the modern canon. The discussion of Morgenthau is another matter. Evrigenis exaggerates Schmitt's influence on Morgenthau, discounting the latter's reflections on this relationship as self-serving. The two men do share some fundamental assumptions, especially about the role of law, but also about the centrality of power. This is because they were both greatly influenced by Weber and Nietzsche. Evrigenis's attempt to see Hobbes being preserved by the Germans and reentering the American discourse through Morgenthau is overstated. So too is the labeling of Morgenthau as a conservative; his views evolved considerably during his decades in America and he became an early advocate of civil rights and opponent of the Vietnam War. By the 1970s, he considered it the principal task of international relations theory to educate political leaders of the need to accept supranational institutions to cope with the twin threats of nuclear weapons and environmental catastrophe.

Most objectionable of all is the author's treatment of "The Clash of Civilizations?" and the Bush administration's "war on terror" as natural mechanisms for preserving American unity (p. 196). The consequences of the "war on terror" and the invasion of Iraq have been to seriously erode American security and divide the American people in a way they have not been since the Civil War. Here too, the analysis is superficial and makes no use of empirical research, in this case, by fellow political scientists.

The theory of "negative association" is never developed. Nor is collective action – part of the title of the book – ever explored and connected to fear and "negative assumption." What we have, in effect, is a volume that

makes the claim for fear as a central concern of Western philosophers across the millennia, that asserts – contrary to evidence – that hostility to others is essential to form and maintain national identities. Intelligent readings of Thucydides, Homer, Vergil, Nietzsche, James Joyce, and above all, social identity theory from Gordon Allport on, would suggest a different and far more sophisticated take on this all-important subject.

–Richard Ned Lebow

HOLD THAT LINE

Ian Shapiro: *Containment: Rebuilding a Strategy against Global Terror* (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2007. Pp. xv, 192. \$24.95.)

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This book is largely written to provide a new strategy for the next (presumably liberal Democratic) administration in meeting the U.S. security challenges related to terrorism. For Shapiro argues that the “Bush Doctrine” has been a failure and the next president needs a new set of ideas as opposed to merely new tactics, which candidate John Kerry assumed in 2004. The author maintains that the Bush Doctrine should be replaced with the idea of containment, whose principal author was George Kennan in the 1940s. As it did with communism and the former Soviet Union, containment would expose the failures of current anti-Western regimes and movements over time, and it would do so at minimal costs to the United States. Shapiro says the primary goal of any new strategy should be the preservation of America’s democracy.

Most of the book is a series of criticisms of the Bush administration’s war on terror. Although other authors have focused more on the doctrine of preemption and the administration’s unilateralism, Shapiro associates the Bush Doctrine mostly with the idea of regime change. He offers a sustained critique of the administration’s numerous and egregious failures in Iraq. But for Shapiro, it is the *idea* of regime change that is flawed. In seeking to promote democracy, the United States should realize that forcibly changing another regime is itself an undemocratic action. Moreover, this policy entails such high costs that it threatens to undermine America’s own democracy over time.

Shapiro spends much of the book arguing that containment is the best strategy in the new age of terrorism, for, as Kennan recognized, it avoids costly foreign adventures and promotes a positive image of the United States as a strong, nonaggressive power. Containment has worked with Iraq before 2003, Iran, other rogue states, and even Hezbollah and Hamas. This strategy, as Kennan claimed, should also involve engagement and diplomacy, which Shapiro particularly recommends with respect to Iran and Hamas. Shapiro