

ARTICLE

# A Criminological Perspective on Recruitment of Men and Women to Daesh<sup>1</sup>

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## Abstract

Criminological research usually directs its focus at traditional forms of offending. The purpose of this article is to discuss the extent to which traditional criminological theories can be used to understand a modern form of terrorism. The main issue to explain is why young men and women from a Western European country, such as Sweden, are joining Daesh in Iraq and Syria. The conclusion is that many criminology theories are useful to analyse the factors behind the affiliation to Daesh. The majority of those recruited into this organization have in many respects a similar background to individuals recruited to other forms of serious organized violent crimes. It should be noted that many of the theories discussed in the paper are more relevant for the understanding of why men join Daesh. When it comes to the recruitment of women these theories' explanatory value is more limited. However, this applies also to these theories' ability to explain female crime in general.

**Keywords** criminological theory; Daesh; gender; violence

## INTRODUCTION

Criminological research usually directs its focus at traditional forms of offending such as theft offences and violent crime. Research on issues such as terrorism, crimes against humanity and other forms of ideologically motivated crime remains relatively uncommon within the discipline. The apparent reluctance of traditional criminologists to approach these issues may be due to the fact that the harms caused, in terms of human suffering, are often so massive as to be almost inconceivable. It is easy to feel a sense of powerlessness in the face of mass murder or of other acts that lead to large numbers of innocent people being killed or subjected to indescribable levels of suffering. One might think that crimes of this kind are so different from the types of offences that we usually study, that it is simply not possible to examine them on the basis of the same points of departure that we use in the study of traditional crime.

<sup>1</sup>This paper is an adaptation of a chapter written in the Swedish language (Sarnecki 2016a).

There is thus a sense of uncertainty about whether the theories and methods of criminology are appropriate for studying issues of this kind.<sup>2</sup>

At the same time, both terrorism and crimes against humanity, together with other forms of ideologically motivated offences, are nonetheless crimes, i.e. acts that are punishable in accordance with national and international law, and they are furthermore often very serious acts of this kind and it is therefore only natural that they should be studied by crime researchers, which is of course precisely what criminologists are.

An additional interesting link to the field of criminology, which will be discussed further below, is that a considerable proportion of the individuals from the West who become involved in ideologically motivated crimes of Daesh, particularly men, appear at some time in their criminal careers also to have engaged in various forms of traditional offending.

### *Research Questions and Method*

The aim of this article is thus to discuss whether criminological theory may be employed to understand recruitment of men and women from the West to Daesh, and, if so, to what extent. I will also discuss gender-specific differences in the usefulness of the various theories.

The presentation comprises a number of the criminological theories that are commonly employed in research on traditional crime. The utility of the theories will be examined by applying the different theoretical perspectives to the available empirical data on recruitment of young people from Sweden to Daesh.

There is in Sweden little empirical material available that can be used to this end. Generally speaking, the research into ideologically motivated crime in Sweden remains relatively limited (see, however, Carlsson 2016). The data that I employ here are in part drawn from the compilations of existing knowledge that have been produced in this area, for example in the form of reports on violent political extremism published by the Swedish Security Service and the Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention (SÄPO and Brå 2009), a report from the Swedish Security Service on violent Islamic extremism (SÄPO 2010) and a report published by the Swedish Cabinet Office on ideologically motivated violent crime in Sweden (Regeringskansliet 2014). I also draw on media reports on ideologically motivated violent crime and terrorism published during the first six months of 2016. Finally, I have also conducted seven semi-structured interviews with key informants who work actively with issues related to violent extremism and terrorism in Sweden. At their own request, these informants will remain anonymous.

Little information is available about the approximately 30 women who constitute about 10% of all who left Sweden for the war in Syria. The information we have concerns in particular the few females who have returned or never managed to reach their destination. In the discussion of women I use also a biography of Anna Sundberg (Sundberg and Huor 2016). This book is not about recruitment to Daesh but to another jihadist movement. The experiences presented in the book are, however, useful for understanding the processes that concern recruitment of women to militant Islamic organizations.

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<sup>2</sup>It should be noted, however, that the number of criminological studies focused on these issues is gradually beginning to increase. There are also examples of highly distinguished criminological research that has examined this type of problem. Johan Hagan and colleagues' eminent work on the nature and extent of the genocide in Darfur constitutes a noteworthy example (Hagan, Raymond-Richmond, and Parker 2005).

## THE APPLICABILITY OF CRIMINOLOGICAL THEORIES TO THE ANALYSIS OF IDEOLOGICALLY MOTIVATED VIOLENT CRIME

### *Individual Explanations*

There are several theories on the causes of crime, which focus their interest on the characteristics of individuals with a high propensity for crime. These theories often have a particular focus on attempting to explain the propensity for violence (Raine 2013), which makes them relevant to our discussion in the present context.

Many of the modern theories on individual propensities for violence focus their interest on the functions of the central nervous system. These theories view both injuries to this system and certain types of innate functions within the system itself as potential causes of a propensity for violence. Thus, scholars have pointed to traumatic injuries or congenital defects to different parts of the brain that may lead to impulse control difficulties, for example, injuries to the frontal lobe (Damasio 1995) and dysfunctions of the amygdala, which can affect emotional responses (Raine 2013).

There is now also an extensive body of research on the significance of neurotransmitters, and particularly the balance between serotonin and dopamine, for among other things the development of a so-called sensation-seeking personality. Individuals with an underactive serotonergic system, which is linked to the activity of the monoamine oxidase A (MAOA) gene, are both at greater risk of depression and have a higher propensity to expose themselves to various types of risk. Low levels of activity in the MAOA system have also been linked to the propensity for violence, particularly if they are combined with exposure to trauma in childhood, for example, in the form of physical abuse (Caspi et al. 2002).

### *Applicability*

There are currently no studies on the central nervous system functions of individuals who might be labelled violent extremists. By definition, these individuals have a propensity for violence, but we do not know why this is the case.

At the same time, many of the individuals in this group, both men and women, show clear signs of sensation-seeking behaviour. Leaving the relatively secure life in the West for a trip to Daesh-controlled areas, where there are war conditions, means obviously significant risks. Most people who do this are aware of these risks, although the jihadist propaganda tries, especially in relation to women, to give the impression that in the “Islamic State” living conditions are more-or-less normal.

As regards jihadists who have engaged in acts of terrorism, for example, in Syria and Iraq as well as in the West, we know that these acts have often been characterized by extreme and ruthless violence and by an acute lack of empathy.

The extremists’ propensity for cruelty has led certain writers to refer to psychopathy as a possible explanation for at least some of the most violent crimes. As is the case in relation to several of the theories discussed here, this would entail the ideological motives being ascribed a subordinate role, as a form of “excuse” that enables the individuals in question to give vent to their violent propensities. This idea has been criticized in light of the fact that the planning and implementation of many acts of terror require the maintenance of close and lasting relationships with other people, something which is not generally regarded as a strength in psychopaths (Horgan 2005).

It is also important to remember that Daesh and other similar terrorist organizations deliberately present themselves as being both brutal and ruthless. It is therefore likely that

the propaganda work of such groups, not least in the form of videos published online, is careful to present warriors as completely lacking any sense of empathy.<sup>3</sup> It is also possible that the cruelty and brutality witnessed are not linked only to individual characteristics but may rather also be a group phenomenon, and in some cases may also be linked to the use of various kinds of mind-numbing drugs.

Propensities for violence as the explanation of migration to Daesh seem to perform poorly when it comes to women. The information we have about women's motives for association with Daesh reveals that their main motive is the desire to live in a society governed by Sharia laws and to marry warriors. The desire to participate in violent acts is rarely mentioned by these women.

The general hypothesis is that individual-level biological and psychological explanations for migration to Daesh may in part be utilized to understand the extreme violence of the most male individuals involved, but can hardly provide any explanation neither for the phenomenon of Daesh nor for most of the atrocities committed in the name of the organization.

### ***Social Disorganization, Social Bonds***

In a classic sociological theory of crime, the Chicago scholars, Clifford R. Shaw and Henry D. MacKay (Shaw and MacKay 1942), attempted to explain why crime levels were much higher in slum areas populated by large numbers of poor immigrants.

One important observation made by these researchers was that criminality increased among those who moved into such areas, and then decreased when they moved out. They found that many immigrants stayed in these areas for a few years and then moved away once they had been able to establish themselves in their new country, that is once they had learned the language, obtained a permanent job and a regular income, etc. As a result of the high level of residential mobility, these areas were labelled "zones in transition". The instability that is characteristic of these areas was also employed as the point of departure for a theory on the causes of crime. Here crime was viewed as being caused by the social disorganization that characterized these areas as a result of the absence of various types of social structures to which the residents would otherwise have developed attachments. The areas lacked workplaces, voluntary organizations and representatives of public sector agencies.

Expressed in terms of Travis Hirschi's subsequent Social Bonding Theory (Hirschi 1969), the residents in these areas lacked social bonds to mainstream society. According to this theory, it is these bonds in the form of attachments to conventional individuals/activities, commitments in relation to the conventional social order, involvement in conventional activities and finally belief in the legitimacy of the social order that serve to restrain people from engaging in crime.

Thus, the theory focuses on how individuals with no ties, or only very weak ties, to the institutions of mainstream society and its norms and values are at greater risk

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<sup>3</sup>At least in relation to the enemy. At the same time, the groups' propaganda on "brothers" and not least "sisters" presents the opposite picture. According to the Swedish Security Service (SÄPO 2016), Daesh's propaganda has changed over recent years. The fear-inducing message (among other things in the form of videos showing brutal executions) has been toned down, since the group feels that it has built up a sufficient level of violent capital. Instead the principal focus has shifted towards presenting an idealised picture of life in the "Islamic State", a form of propaganda that is directed at women to a greater extent.

than others of committing negative acts against the same mainstream society. The theory is focused on crime in general without specifying specific types of offences.

### *Applicability*

Present-day Europe also contains areas to which newly arrived migrants move prior to becoming established in their new country. These take the form of urban districts, in Sweden, usually on the outskirts of large cities, where the opportunities for relatively cheap housing are better than elsewhere. The reasons for the relatively high supply of cheap housing in these areas are that they are viewed as unattractive places to live. The areas are characterized by a low standard of housing, high levels of unemployment and dependence on welfare payments, poor school performance, high residential mobility and usually, just as in the above-mentioned “zones in transition”, high levels of crime. In a recently published report, I label these urban districts socio-economically deprived areas (SDAs) (Sarnecki 2016b).

Another report (Polisen 2017) identified 53 areas of this kind. Of these, 15 were described as being subject to particularly high levels of deprivation. Criminality in these areas, which have higher crime rates than the remainder of the country, is often organized. Among other things there is a considerable amount of violence, not infrequently involving firearms, between rival criminal gangs. Another phenomenon characteristic of such areas involves intermittent conflicts between the police and young males who spend time in these districts. Reports have also noted (Polismyndigheten 2015) recruitment activities on behalf of Daesh and other jihadist terrorist organizations taking place in a number of the most deprived of these areas.

It is no mere coincidence that recruitment activities related to Daesh and other jihadist-oriented movements as well as recruitment into other types of organized crime take place in the same locations, and often in SDAs. The tenets of social disorganization and social bonding theory may readily be used to explain why this is the case. In areas characterized by an absence of attachments to mainstream society, there are considerable opportunities for the emergence of alternative social structures of kinds that may promote both traditional crime and ideologically motivated crime. Recruitment into both forms of criminal environment is conducted among the same types of individuals: first and foremost, young males, and to some extent females, who lack ties to mainstream society. These types of environment are also characterized by the use of violence. We also know that it is not uncommon for individuals who have initially been part of traditional criminal environments to migrate to environments that engage in ideologically motivated crime.

Possibly the recruitment of women is somewhat less linked to special geographic areas partly because the recruitment is done to a greater extent over the Internet. Religious background seems to be less important for the recruitment of women as compared with recruitment of men. The majority of women from Sweden who joined Daesh seem, however, to come from SDAs.

### *Learning, Differential Association*

Edwin Sutherland is one of the most prominent theorists in the field of sociological criminology. Edwin Sutherland's 1947 central thesis was that crime, like all human behaviour, is learned, and that this learning takes place in direct face-to-face contacts with other people (Sutherland 1947). If individuals who influence someone in a pro-criminal

direction dominate a person's social contacts, the individual will him/herself develop a propensity to break the law. If people who influenced him or her in an anti-criminal direction instead dominate an individual's social network, the individual's propensity to break the law will be low. Sutherland did not, of course, argue that it was a question of simply summing the people in an individual's social environment who had a pro- or anti-criminal influence. According to Sutherland, relations (associations) with other individuals are of a varying nature (differential), and their effects depend not only on the number of relations with different individuals but also on their frequency, durability, priority and intensity.

According to Sutherland's theory of Differential Association the learning of different types of antisocial behaviour is in part a question of learning more or less sophisticated techniques for committing offences, and in part a question of learning motivations, rationalizations and attitudes. This means that the theory may be used to explain how individuals learn both the use of violence itself and also the ideological background to the use of violence.

### *Applicability*

The theory of differential association may thus contribute further to our understanding of why recruitment into both ideologically motivated violent crime and other forms of organized crime occurs specifically in SDAs to such a major extent. There are quite simply a large number of people in these areas who are suitable targets for recruitment, and for this reason recruiters focus on these areas. In this type of area, it is easy for contacts to be established between people who live under similar conditions and who have similar views on life in general. There is also a plentiful supply of models of antisocial behaviour in the form of different types of crime. Simultaneously, the lack of bonds to mainstream society means that the likelihood of developing attachments to pro-social models is limited.

At the time when Sutherland developed his theory, the vast majority of important interactions still took place in face-to-face situations. We know that today recruitment activities related to violent ideologically motivated groups like Daesh in great extent take place via the Internet. Face-to-face interactions appear to remain important in relation to, among other things, introductions into these environments and also in relation to planned actions, prayer, concerts, etc., but much of the associated communication and its influence are exercised via modern media and information technologies. Among other things, this means that it is more difficult for family and other intimates to detect ongoing processes of radicalization and to intervene.

The fact that contacts are established online does not, however, undermine the applicability of differential association theory as an explanatory model. On the contrary, the Internet provides opportunities for individuals to establish a massive number of contacts of the kinds that they want and also to restrict or even completely isolate themselves from unwanted types of contact. In cases where an individual chooses to engage in antisocial relations of some kind, for example, those associated with religious extremism, these relations can become completely dominant within the individual's social network and can rapidly influence the individual to move towards an extreme position. It is also easier to develop a very high intensity of interactions when these are not restricted by factors associated with physical distance, difficulties finding places to meet, the presence of irrelevant others and also in some cases surveillance by authorities, etc.

My interview data suggest that face-to-face contacts may be more important in relation to the recruitment of young men than of young women. Many of the young women of Muslim background who are recruited to Daesh come from families that have severely limited their freedom of movement. While the young men get together when they played football, in the mosque, or in other contexts, these young women interact with their networks by computer.

One important aspect of Sutherland's thought is that his theory is not limited to SDAs or individuals. In his research on crime among the powerful, Sutherland (1949) instead argues that individuals' networks as we would label them in the context of modern social research influence them irrespective of the individuals' socio-economic or housing status. We know that recruitment into Daesh is far from being restricted exclusively to SDAs, even if it is more common in such areas. It also occurs in other areas of society.

Today the Internet facilitates the formation of networks based on extremist ideologies in a range of different environments, in which the significance of geographical, and perhaps also social, distance may be relatively limited.

### *Strain*

One common explanation used in relation to people joining the extreme organizations is that these individuals are experiencing frustration about the nature of their lives in contemporary society. Robert Merton (1938) presented what has become known as Strain Theory, which discusses the significance of just this type of frustration – referred to by Merton himself as strain – for the emergence of different types of deviant behaviour. For Merton, strain is caused by a mismatch between individuals' life-goals and the means available to them to achieve these goals. The established goals, that are in principle shared by all people living in a society such as ours, a Western welfare society, may be said to be linked to economic and social success. The accepted means for achieving these goals primarily take the form of education and work. People who for various reasons, for example, as a result of a lack of educational opportunities due to poor language skills, discrimination, residential segregation, a lack of family support, etc., cannot achieve the established goals experience strain, which is an uncomfortable emotional condition that people wish to avoid. According to Merton, strain may be dealt with in five different ways.

### *Conformity*

The individual continues to attempt to achieve the culturally established goals, and continues to use the socially legitimate means to do so, despite the fact that the individual remains unsuccessful. This may be regarded as destructive and leads to the experience of continued strain.

### *Innovation*

The individual realises that the established societal goals cannot be achieved with the available means. The individual abandons the means but retains the goals. If the goal is financial success, this may be achieved by means of various types of crime, which provide rewards in the form either of money or other things that can subsequently be monetized. Thus, the criminality may take the form of traditional offences such as burglary or robbery, but also drug dealing or economic crime.

### *Ritualism*

Here the socially established goals are rejected, or perhaps rather disappear from view, but the individual stubbornly continues to keep to the socially accepted means. Typical examples of this form of adaptation may be found in the inflexible bureaucrat or the blindly obedient soldier or police officer.

### *Retreatism*

The individual rejects both the established goals and the means and instead strives to achieve alternative goals with the help of means that are not accepted by society at large. One typical example of this type of adaptation to strain is found in drug abuse. A drug abuser's goals are the internal rewards associated with intoxication. The means used to obtain money for drugs may involve various types of offending property offences, drug dealing, etc. but also other forms of antisocial behaviour, such as prostitution.

### *Rebellion*

Finally, Merton also describes rebellion, which is the adaptation that is most relevant to our discussion in the present context. Rebellious behaviour also involves a rejection of both the goals and means that are accepted by society, but here this rejection assumes a significantly more aggressive form. The individual's goal becomes that of changing society's established goals and of doing so with the help of unacceptable means.

### *Applicability*

The last of the reactions to strain described above relates specifically to the type of behaviour discussed here. People who for various reasons perceive themselves to be unable to achieve the accepted goals of society with the help of socially accepted means reject these goals and the accepted means of achieving them and instead strive to change society by means of focused action. Daesh has explicitly formulated goals regarding the type of society it is struggling to achieve with the Worldwide Caliphate. Also, this struggle is conducted with the help of undemocratic means, which society regards as unacceptable and which often involves the use of violence.

One possible criticism that might be directed against this perspective is that strain theory largely proceeds on the basis of the individual's frustration at his or her own situation. As is the case in relation to many other aspects of this issue, there is currently too little research regarding who the individuals who engage in ideologically motivated violent crime are. The picture that emerged in my interviews, and also in the other material examined, is one of young people, and primarily males, who are located at a substantial distance from mainstream society and who have previously experienced setbacks in many areas of their lives. These take the form of difficult childhood conditions, failures in school, social setbacks, and difficulties on the labour market, etc. It is thus a question of individuals who may very well be experiencing high levels of strain. At the same time, however, many of those who become involved in Daesh, probably more often women than men, do not appear to have these characteristics.

As regards the individuals who appear to occupy leading positions within these movements, for example, the so-called recruiters, and those who lead various types of actions, these do not appear to come from such difficult conditions so often or to the



same extent. Many of them display some level of educational achievement, have jobs and surprisingly often are also members of well-functioning families, etc. I believe that many of the individuals who occupy somewhat more prominent positions in the various extremist environments may be experiencing a form of strain that is related not so much to their own situation as to the situation of the ethnic, religious or national group with which they identify. Here I would like to propose the hypothesis that the strain experienced by these individuals is of a more altruistic nature. Nor is it impossible that some of these individuals move to the forefront of groups of this kind in order not only to satisfy a desire for personal power and influence but also to pursue ideological goals.

### *Culture Conflicts*

Another theory that may be of relevance to an understanding of ideologically motivated violent crime is that presented by Torsten Sellin (1938). According to Sellin, one important cause of crime, particularly among youths, may be found in conflicts between the culture of majority society and the culture found in certain groups. This may, for example, involve conflicts between the cultures of different ethnic and/or religious minorities and the majority society. In present-day Sweden and other Western countries, this type of conflict may manifest itself, for example, in honour-related crimes, which involve the family exercising strict controls in relation to their daughters' relations with men. There are cases where young girls from certain minority groups are taken to their parents' countries of origin and forced into arranged marriages against their will, or are subjected to violence if they behave in a way that conflicts with a strict moral code that is quite alien to modern Western democracies. There are also a number of cases where women are known to have been killed for defying the demands of their families, and several more cases where there are suspicions that this has been the case. There are also cases involving girls being subjected to genital mutilation in accordance with the traditional values of their parents' culture of origin.

This type of culture conflict between the culture of origin of the individual/family and the dominant culture of the majority society tends to ease over time as people live and become established in the new country. However, this requires a well-functioning integration process. Further, Sellin (1938) also describes a risk for secondary culture conflicts, whereby the conflict may instead become intensified. Once again, it is reasonable to expect this type of development if the integration process does not function. If the members of a minority fail to become established in the new society and/or perceive that the dominance of the majority culture is excessively unyielding, they may turn against the majority culture and its representatives. In such cases, there is a risk that individuals will return to the group's original cultural values, or perhaps even become more radicalized in terms of these values, and then turn their backs on, or direct acts of hostility at, mainstream society.

### *Applicability*

As was the case with strain, we are once again dealing with a theory that was formulated approximately 80 years ago, but which may be utilized in order to understand modern social phenomena. As can be seen from the above description of the theory, it is secondary culture conflicts that are most relevant to our discussion.

In the light of the terrorist attacks against European cities witnessed in recent years, for example, in Paris and London, and the recruitment of young people to participate in the terrorist wars being waged in Syria, Iraq and Somalia, people have questioned how such things can be possible. The individuals, who have committed these acts of terror, and those recruited into extremist movements, have in the majority of cases been born, or at least raised, in Western democracies (SÄPO 2016). How could they suddenly become radical Islamists? In many cases, it has also been found that these individuals have only extremely limited knowledge of the religion they claim to represent (Pantucci 2015). Among these youths, religious engagement is not the result of a long process, but rather of a sudden decision to return to their roots, so to speak, often in the absence of even the most rudimentary knowledge about the nature of these roots.

The arguments here are very similar to those presented earlier in relation to strain. These young people are unable to, or at least believe that they are unable to, establish themselves in the society in which they have grown up or may even have been born. They perceive themselves to be subject to discrimination, for example, in the form of racism, class oppression or some other form of ideological oppression. As a result, they develop a longing to return to their, often idealized, "roots". They reject a society to which they do not believe they will ever belong and instead adopt a radical position in relation to their situation. This position sometimes leads to an identification with extreme groups that engage in acts of brutal violence against the society that the young people have failed to become part of. Repudiation, from modern society, in the circumstances described, happens both in men and women. However, the behaviour that this leads to is often quite different.

### *Other Forms of Conflict and Peacemaking Criminology*

Many criminologists have based their work to identify the causes of crime on social theories that focus on conflicts between the interests of different groups. One important source of inspiration for the work of these criminologists has been Marxism (Marx and Engels 1848), which views class antagonisms as the most central conflict in society, among other things, in relation to the explanation of crime (Spitzer 1975). Marxist theory may play an interesting, double role in relation to our understanding of ideologically motivated violent crime: on the one hand, violent extremism may be explained by reference to the prevalent antagonism between capital and labour, which leads the members of the oppressed underclass to defend themselves against the structural violence of the ruling class (Chambliss and Ryther 1975); on the other hand, the idea of class struggle inspires certain Marxists to join violent political organizations.

However, Marxist theory is far from being the only conflict theory that may be used to explain inter-group conflicts in society that may lead to violence. Some scholars argue that the conflicts between those with power and those who lack power are multi-dimensional and relate not only to class but also to gender, religion, race, etc. (Messerschmidt 1997).

An additional point here is that recent decades have witnessed the emergence of a new perspective in criminology in the form of Peacemaking Criminology (Pepinsky and Quinney 1991) which also looks to the role of conflicts in relation to crime and which focuses on how conflict resolution might be used to prevent crime.

### *Applicability*

The phenomenon of ideologically motivated violent crime is itself based on conflicts between different groups in society. The perpetrators of the violence engaged in by

extremist groups describe this violence as being motivated by a need to defend the interests of their own group against another group. It is therefore inevitable that social conflicts will play a central role in any understanding of the phenomenon of ideologically motivated violent crime.

In its propaganda, Daesh emphasizes the West's hostility towards Islam, its exploitation of the poor countries' assets like, for example, oil in Iraq, Western imperialism, racism and persecution of Muslims both in their own countries and in Western Europe and the United States. Furthermore, Daesh criticizes the West for focus on materialistic values and greed. This criticism gains much inspiration from both the Marxist and Postcolonial discourses in the West.

However, we must not forget that in the Western world there really exist strong forces hostile to Islam. The conflict between Islam and the West, which in part is a construction of various political forces, and in part a reality, can be used both as a theoretical explanation for recruitment to Daesh and as inspiration for Daesh anti-Western ideology and activities. This applies to both men and women.

### *Discrimination and Labelling*

According to labelling theorists (Tennenbaum 1938; Lemert 1951; Becker 1963) there is a considerable risk that individuals will conform to the expectations placed on them by their social environment. This means that negative expectations may lead to deviant behaviour. There is now a substantial body of empirical research that provides support for this theory, and which among other things shows that self-reported crime among young people tends to increase once they have been convicted of an offence (Farrington and Murray 2014). This is particularly true if society's reaction to the offence in question is repressive. A reaction of this kind provides a confirmation to the individual concerned that he/she is a deviant/criminal, which can then produce an outcome that is quite the reverse of that intended, namely an increase in the level of deviant/criminal behaviour.

A related phenomenon is the way in which people who are formally labelled criminals by society also face a raised threshold for entry into mainstream society as a result of reduced opportunities for employment. Among other things, this phenomenon manifests itself in employers increasingly requiring potential employees to produce a notification from the criminal records register when applying for work.

Thus, we can see a process whereby negative expectations, and the measures taken by society as a result of these expectations, may serve to aggravate the underlying problems.

Further, it can be argued that the groups at greatest risk of experiencing discrimination, like men who live in SDAs and poor immigrants from non-European countries of origin, are also those who run the greatest risk of experiencing the effects of labelling.

### *Applicability*

The social groups that labelling theory describes as being most affected by negative expectations are thus comprised of immigrants and those who come from the lowest social strata in society. It is not uncommon for individuals to simultaneously belong to both these groups. Labelling and discrimination focused on young people with roots in a Muslim country may lead to jihadist radicalization, whereas a similarly

prejudicial treatment of individuals with roots in a European Christian environment may instead lead to extreme right-wing radicalization.

The logic involved here does not differ very greatly from that discussed above. According to labelling theorists, negative expectations are primarily focused on young males from the underclass who live in SDAs. Further, such negative expectations are focused on immigrants, and in contemporary Swedish society, on Muslims in particular. All this also means that the risk of arrest and the likelihood of being given stiff, stigmatizing sentences is greater for these groups. According to Lemert (1951), this leads to secondary deviance, i.e. to individuals accelerating their involvement in crime as a result of the influence of their own negative self-image. This in turn leads to a new round of even tougher stigmatizing reactions.

The labelling process described above leads to the individual being singled out as a criminal in official registers, which in turn reduces the individual's opportunities for employment, housing, etc.

As regards discrimination in the criminal justice system, we know that the likelihood of being reported for and convicted of crime is greater for persons of foreign background, particularly for those from poor non-European countries (Sarnecki 2006; Dahlbäck 2009). It is very clear that discrimination of this kind occurs. At the same time, however, the effects of this type of discrimination are unlikely to be very large (Hällsten, Szulkin, and Sarnecki 2013).

For the purpose of our current discussion, however, it is not the actual level of discrimination that is of significance, but rather how this discrimination is perceived by the groups exposed to the discrimination themselves. There is very good reason to believe that levels of discrimination are greatly overestimated by young people living in SDAs (de los Reyes et al. 2014). This overestimation is in part a result of the ways in which the police act in these areas (Sarnecki 2016b) but is also an important mechanism for maintaining levels of social cohesion among young people and in particular young men in these areas. Having a common enemy such as the police, the authorities in general, or mainstream society as a whole increases the group's sense of security. At the same time, these perceptions lead to a dissociation from mainstream society and may contribute to the likelihood of joining extremist movements.

The discussion above relates primarily to men. However, even women of Muslim background are affected by negative expectations and discrimination. As for women, the negative expectations are, however, not so much focused on crime and violence, but on women's ability to get an education and get a job. Perhaps emigrating to Daesh-controlled areas, where the level of education and ability to work outside the home are not of importance for females, can be understood in terms of the labelling? By joining Daesh and being a wife and mother, and not work as a professional, meets precisely the negative expectations that Western society has for a woman with a Muslim background.

### ***Subcultures, Gangs and Networks***

As was described above, strain theory focuses on the way in which certain individuals react by becoming involved in crime when they lack or perceive themselves to lack the opportunity to achieve generally desired goals. However, Merton (1938) is far from being the only scholar who has adopted this lack of opportunity as the point of departure for theorizing about the causes of crime. The same point of departure,

although with a focus on the group rather than the individual level, is also employed by scholars whose theoretical work is usually described as belonging to the subculture theory tradition. These scholars include Albert Cohen (Cohen 1955), Richard Cloward and Lyoid Ohlin (Cloward and Ohlin 1960), and to some extent Walter Miller (Miller 1958). To generalize somewhat, one could say that these theoreticians direct their focus at the social mechanisms that emerge when young people, primarily men, lack the opportunities necessary to achieve the established societal goals and live in the same area.

These scholars argue that alternative norms and values emerge in such areas, which constitute a more-or-less open rejection of the middle-class norms and values that dominate in society at large. The alternative norms and values place a value on and reward different types of behaviour from those that are prescribed by the norms of mainstream society. Instead of striving to achieve success through education and work, for example, individuals may try to achieve a reputation as a successful criminal, for example, as a person who commits spectacular robberies. The characteristics that are valued in social environments of this kind may be causing trouble, like being tough or smart instead of projecting the politeness, conflict-avoidance and sophistication valued by middle-class society. In this type of environment, sensation seeking may serve to justify forms of risk-taking that would not be viewed as acceptable in other social contexts.

If we consider the zone in transition as described above, in which social relations are not working and where residents, primarily young males, lack ties to mainstream society, we can see that there is a lack of functional social control, a form of “social-control vacuum”. People find it difficult to live without being part of some kind of social structure, however. When the social structures that are usually present in society’s working life, justice system, clubs and associations, churches, etc. are absent or weak, other structures are created in their place to fulfil the needs of residents. People who live in SDAs, in addition to the fact that they strive like everyone else to experience a sense of community, also have a need for protection levels from exposure to crime, which can be high in these areas, and an income.

These alternative structures often take the form of gangs or criminal networks, which are common in these areas. Such gangs/networks are often formed by young men who are looking for protection and a sense of belonging with others who find themselves in a similar situation. Membership in such gangs/networks can also provide opportunities to transform the members’ collective potential for violence into money and/or power. Most commonly, such gangs engage in traditional forms of violent and property crime, but they may also become involved in other more advanced types of organized crime depending on the nature of the opportunity structure. Consider, for example, the prohibition era in the United States in the 1920s. We also know that it is common for violent conflicts to develop between gangs of this kind. The background to these conflicts may be territorial or economic but may also be the result of political or ideological differences.

### *Applicability*

There is considerable empirical support for the view that violent subcultures do in fact develop in SDAs (Polismyndigheten 2015). There is also evidence to suggest that these subcultures in Sweden have become more violent over the past 10–15 years, with the number of cases of violence involving firearms increasing during this period,

primarily in the 53 areas identified by the police in their report from 2015 (Brå 2015; see also Polismyndigheten 2015). We also know that there is some degree of mobility among violent youths between these violent subcultures and ideologically motivated violent extremist groups. The processes that lead to the emergence of subcultures characterized by a powerful rejection of mainstream culture have been discussed above. It may also be noted that the criticisms of society that are heard from members of violent groups that primarily engage in traditional crime, and from the jihadist and autonomist movements, in many cases appear to be quite similar. In both cases there is talk of injustice, racism, police brutality and other similar factors (de los Reyes et al. 2014).

The above discussion concerns almost exclusively males. It is unusual that women participate in gang activities and act openly in agreement with subcultural norms and values. This does not mean, however, that women are not affected by the subcultures and gang activities. This impact is, partly, about women who have relationships with gang/criminal network members and are influenced by their values. We know that young men who have abandoned the traditional gang life and emigrated to Daesh sometimes bring with them their girlfriends/wives and children.

From the empirical material that I studied, it appears, however, that women can turn themselves to Daesh due to the negative attitude they have towards related men's involvement in organized crime. These women want to live a life that is governed by Sharia laws, that they believe will protect them and their children from the negative consequences of a man's life in crime and drugs.

### *Neutralization*

Several criminological theories on the causes of crime including strain theory, as described above, are based on the view that a large majority of the population shares the same fundamental norms and values. These consensus theories therefore need to explain the mechanisms that lead people to sometimes act in breach of norms that they have actually internalized. Gresham Sykes and David Matza explain this apparently paradoxical phenomenon by arguing that people employ a range of neutralization techniques, which allow them to engage in acts that they themselves in fact perceive to be unacceptable. Sykes and Matza (1957) describe five such techniques:

Denial of responsibility, whereby the offender assigns responsibility for his or her actions to factors outside him-/herself and claims to have been forced to commit the criminal act as a result of circumstances beyond his/her control;

Denial of injury, whereby the injury caused by the crime is diminished or denied;

Denial of the victim, whereby the offender claims that the victim deserves the injury he/she has suffered and that it is rather the offender him-/herself that is the victim;

Condemnation of the condemners, whereby the offender focuses attention and anger on a third party, such as police officers who have intervened in connection with the offence;

Finally, the appeal to higher loyalties, whereby the offender justifies his/her actions by reference to a loyalty to a group to which the offender belongs, for example, an ethnic group or political movement.

### *Applicability*

Several of the techniques of neutralization listed above may be found among individuals associated with violent extremist environments. Propaganda from Daesh discussed in this article often argues that the violence they exercise is merely a response to the violence exercised by their opponents. The violence, including violence against innocent people, is motivated by the fact that these people are on the “wrong side” in the conflict, live ungodly lives, or are simply not a part of the community and therefore not really human.

As regards jihadist-inspired groups, my interview data suggest that the adoption of an extreme form of Islam occurs often in connection with the conclusion of the traditional criminal career. Scholars in the field of life-course criminology often speak of turning points in life, which may lead to desistance from crime (Sampson and Laub 1993). A religious awakening or conversion of some kind is described as one of the possible turning points that can lead to a reduction in or desistance from crime, either temporarily or permanently. This also seems to hold for links to violent jihadist environments, at least with regard to involvement in traditional crime, although there is no cessation of involvement in violence. According to one of my informants, this transition from traditional to ideologically motivated crime is based on the belief that engaging in the battle to achieve the good can purify the individual from the sins he or she has previously committed. These sins will definitely be forgiven if the individual dies a martyr’s death. This too may be regarded as a form of neutralization.

Again, the approach is more useful for understanding why men join Daesh than why women do so. When it comes to women, I cannot find any empirical cases in which women are abandoning an anti-social life in Sweden to join Daesh. Daesh propaganda does not seem to offer women the same possibility for forgiveness for sinful life that is offered to men. However, there are examples of how women who sympathize with Daesh use neutralizing techniques to disregard the cruelties committed by militant Islamists. There are also examples of women who are no longer able to use neutralization, as a result of some very cruel act committed by the jihadists, for example when the captured Jordanian pilot was burned alive, and leave Daesh.

### *Gender*

The question of masculinity-related power may be of special interest in relation to recruitment to Daesh. One of the most prominent researchers in this field, Raewyn Connell, has employed the concept of hegemonic masculinity to describe her understanding of masculinities as practices that sustain the dominant social position of men and the subordinate social position of women (Connell 1999). Connell’s theoretical work has been used in criminology as a means of understanding how men engage in typically masculine behaviours, such as violence, in order to establish or maintain a position of power. “Doing masculinity”, which is how this type of behaviour is referred to in feminist and post-constructivist research (Lander 2014), may manifest itself in different ways in different social classes. The promotion of violence, whether on the basis of political, religious or other forms of motivation, may be regarded as being typical of the lower social classes, where men lack the resources to do masculinity in other ways.

### *Applicability*

One central characteristic of violent extremist environment discussed in this paper is that the proportion of males is greater than the proportion of females. In Sweden about 90% are males.

The ways in which violence is used as a means of performing doing masculinity has been well described in the criminological literature (for example, Hatty 2000). This may involve exercising power over women, but also over other men. As it has been suggested above, violent manifestations of masculinity appear to be more common among men who lack other sources of power, which does not mean that they are not also found in other groups. In these cases, violence and the threat of violence are perhaps the only means available to these individuals for expressing power. In the jihadist movement, the special position occupied by men constitutes part of the ideology itself.

Despite the powerful male dominance among members of the jihadist groups, the memberships of these movements also include women. The majority of these women enter the movements through relationships with male members, first and foremost as girlfriends, wives and sometimes also as sisters or other relatives. In the majority of cases, they appear to a greater or lesser extent to share the ideology of the men concerned, but within the framework of the movement they play a different role from the men, and one that is assigned to them by men. They are expected to be good wives, sexual partners and mothers who will raise their children in accordance with the ideology of the movement. Using the terminology of post-modern feminism, they may be said to be “doing femininity” – a possibility that appears to attract at least temporarily certain young women in the Western world, who according to my interview informants, appear to join such movements precisely in order to have the chance to play this kind of role. In this way they can spend time with men whom they are attracted to and escape the demands placed on young women by modern Western society, which they perceive as onerous.

Among the cases that have recently been exposed by the media, being in a relationship with a man who wants to travel to the war in Syria often appears to be an important motivating factor for the women and girls who join the jihadist movement. Similar patterns have also been noted in Sweden in relation to young women who become involved in serious crime and drug abuse (Sarnecki 1996).

It should, however, be noted that the jihadist movement includes women with very strong ideological convictions, who actively participate in the movement’s struggle and sometimes also in violent activities and actions. In several reports from Daesh-occupied areas a female police force that actively participates in the enforcement of Daesh’s interpretation of the Sharia law against women is mentioned. The women in this police force show great brutality and a strong ideological commitment. Thus, these are women whose behaviour is more in line with the principles of traditional masculinity than those of traditional femininity. The presence of such women within the movement is emphasized among other things in Daesh propaganda, with the objective of attracting a greater number of Western youth. Whether these women are in reality permitted also to participate in regular battle is extremely uncertain.

### *The Life-Course Perspective*

Modern criminology has increasingly moved away from studying crime at the individual level on a single occasion (the so-called cross-sectional approach) to



instead focus more on the individual's criminal career over a longer period of time (the longitudinal approach). The reason for the increasing preference for this type of study is that life changes as individuals become older and the causes of individual behaviour may be different in childhood, adolescence and adulthood, respectively. While what happens later on in life is naturally influenced by incidents that occurred earlier in the life course, later events are also influenced by a wide range of subsequent factors. One important area of discussion in this context relates to the issue of the degree to which an individual's life course is determined, for example, with regard to involvement in crime, and the degree to which there is room for change in later stages of life.

Here there are two partially opposing theoretical approaches, one of which is advocated by Michel Gottfredson and Travis Hirschi (Gottfredson and Hirschi 1990), among others, who argue that individuals develop the capacity to control their actions early on in life. Those with high levels of self-control will have a lower propensity for crime than those with low self-control throughout the life course, even though the level of offending will vary over the course of the life-span within both groups, peaking during youth and then declining over time as individuals age.

The at least to some degree opposing theory of Robert Sampson and John Laub (Sampson and Laub 1993; Laub and Sampson 2003) argues that fundamental changes in criminal behaviour are possible even at later stages of life, depending on changes in the level of social control that is exercised in relation to the individual. In the context of this theoretical approach, such changes are referred to as turning points.

Research (Carlsson and Sarnecki 2016) has found a certain level of support for both of these theories. Individuals who begin their criminal career early and who are characterized by a large number of background risk factors in general commit more offences than other groups throughout the life course. However, there is substantial individual-level variation in criminal careers with regard to the time of onset, how the criminal career develops, possible breaks in this career, and how the criminal career ends.

### *Applicability*

As can be seen from the above discussion, there are good reasons for employing the life-course perspective in relation to individuals who engage in ideologically motivated violent crime, not least those who adhere to Daesh. Among other things, we are of course interested in how different factors in the backgrounds of those who engage in this type of crime influence their offending. One issue of interest related to these individuals' criminal careers is whether these careers are exclusively comprised of crimes that are motivated by ideology or instead involve a mixture of different types of crime based on different types of motivation. We are also interested in examining how crime, both that which is motivated by ideology and that motivated by other factors, covaries with the life situation of the individuals examined at different points in the life course. Turning points are also a major point of interest, both those that lead to increases in crime and/or to crime becoming ideologically motivated, and those that lead to reductions in crime, or to it ceasing to be ideologically motivated.

Empirically, these questions may be examined with the help of empirical data that provide an indication of change/stability across different areas of the life course and also so-called life-course interviews.

The following concluding discussion focuses on formulating hypotheses for the planned large-scale study on the basis of the life-course perspective.

To study the circumstances of an individual's earlier life with the purpose of finding why this individual has joined Daesh is equally relevant for men as for women. We can expect that many of the background factors behind joining Daesh will prove to be similar for both sexes. So, for example, the majority of both men and women joining Daesh are coming from families that have their roots in Islamic countries and who, after arriving in Sweden, had been living under relatively difficult socio-economic conditions often in SDAs. Our empirical data seem to indicate, however, that this applies to a somewhat greater extent to males than for females.

As for the continuing life course; we will, however, find significant differences between the genders. In men, there are often signs of significant involvement in crime and even drug abuse, before enrollment into Daesh. Joining Daesh for some of these men, as mentioned previously, constitutes a termination of the traditional criminal career. Although many of the women also come from difficult social conditions, crime and drug abuse seem to be very rare in the group. Joining Daesh for many of these women serves instead as a way to distance themselves from crime and drugs existing in their immediate social environment. The strongest motive in women's association with Daesh is the desire to find a righteous man. Sometimes it seems that these women seek out Daesh when their relationship with a man, for various causes, has failed and they look for a new one that they hope will fulfil their hope for a life ruled by Sharia law.

## **DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS**

The literature, media sources and my interviews all show that discussions of ideologically motivated violent crime largely relate to the same groups that have been the focus of traditional criminology, namely young males from socially disadvantaged families that live in SDAs. These individuals are often characterized by having problems in school and difficulties finding employment. Further, they have a propensity for violence and engage in illegal activities that are in no way always committed for ideological reasons. The women who join these environments often, though once again not always, come from similarly vulnerable backgrounds but are rarely either violent or offenders in the same way as the men.

The above review of traditional criminological theories shows that the majority of these theories to a greater or lesser extent, and sometimes following certain modifications, may be utilized to develop our understanding of the males joining Daesh. Certain of the theories may perhaps be of more explanatory value than others. However, none of the theories presented above can be completely discounted from an analysis of the phenomenon.

As is usually the case with regard to empirical data on social phenomena, these are complicated, and may be viewed on the basis of a range of different perspectives. It is therefore difficult to distinguish one or a few of the above-described theories that can explain the phenomenon in its entirety. The central hypothesis in this regard, however, is that criminological theories on the causes of crime will have greater explanatory value in relation to the criminality committed by male jihadists.

The situation is considerably more complex for women. As it has appeared from the above review, the criminological theories are appropriate to explain why women join Daesh to a lesser extent. This is due to two factors:

1. Criminological theories are generally less useful to explain crime by females versus crime by males;
2. The women's connection to Daesh is to lesser extent a criminal act, if one compare that with men's joining this organization. The men, who join Daesh, do it to a great extent, with the intent to actively participate in outlawed violent activities. Most women, who do this, admittedly accept Daesh violence, but few of them want, and will be allowed, to actively participate in this violence.

Criminological theories that have more general character and can also explain other behaviour than crime appear to be more appropriate to explain why women seek out jihadist groups compared with theories that focus solely on crime. One such a theory, among those discussed above, the Differential Associations Theory explains crime, and another learned behaviour, with the association of individuals with people from whom they learn the norms, attitudes, motivations and specific behaviours.

It can be further assumed that if the phenomenon of ideologically motivated violence can be explained using traditional criminological theories, then it is likely that traditional crime prevention measures are likely to work as a means of combating this phenomenon at least when it comes to men. In fact, it can be argued that it is at least in part a question of preventing one and the same phenomenon, namely crime and antisocial behaviour in general, since we are in part dealing with the same individuals. Given that there is now a fairly substantial body of knowledge on effective crime prevention measures, this insight ought to improve our chances of developing effective prevention strategies.

Since criminological research (for example, Sarnecki 2001) shows that a considerable part of women's crime and other antisocial behaviours is linked to men's criminality, in exactly the same way the women's links to Daesh are connected to men's. Then traditional crime prevention should be also useful for preventing women adhering to Daesh. Here mainly the broader crime prevention approach that focuses on socially oriented measures directed towards both men and women may be effective.

All this does not mean that the ideological aspects of jihadist movement are completely without significance. Indeed, the significance of ideological factors is emphasized in a number of the theories discussed above. One hypothesis that may be formulated on the basis of my own interviews with key informants is that social environments supporting Daesh contain key individuals whose levels of ideological awareness are much higher than those of the average member of these movements. For these individuals, men and women, it is the ideology that is central. Thus, to ensure that they are not successful in their work to recruit new members, they must be countered with ideological rebuttals. This is necessary not so much in order to change the views of these individuals themselves, which is very difficult, but rather in order to ensure that they do not stand unopposed in those areas where they enjoy high levels of credibility.

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## TRANSLATED ABSTRACTS

**Abstracto**

La investigación criminológica generalmente dirige su enfoque a las formas tradicionales de ofender. El objetivo de este capítulo es analizar en qué medida las teorías criminológicas tradicionales pueden utilizarse para comprender una forma moderna de terrorismo. El principal problema a explicar es por qué los hombres y mujeres jóvenes de un país de Europa occidental, como Suecia, se unen a Daesh en Irak y Siria. La conclusión es que muchas teorías criminológicas son útiles para analizar los factores detrás de la afiliación a Daesh. La mayoría de los reclutados en esta organización tienen antecedentes en muchos aspectos similares a los reclutados para otras formas de crímenes violentos organizados graves. Cabe señalar que muchas de las teorías discutidas en el capítulo son más relevantes para la comprensión de por qué los hombres se unen a Daesh. Cuando se trata de la contratación de mujeres, estas teorías tienen un valor explicativo más limitado. Esto se aplica también, sin embargo, a la capacidad de estas teorías de explicar el crimen femenino en general.

**Palabras clave:** teoría criminológica; Daesh; género; violencia

**Abstrait**

La recherche criminologique se concentre généralement sur les formes traditionnelles de délinquance. Le but de ce chapitre est d'examiner dans quelle mesure les théories criminologiques traditionnelles peuvent être utilisées pour comprendre une forme moderne de terrorisme. La principale question à expliquer est la raison pour laquelle des jeunes hommes et femmes d'un pays d'Europe occidentale, comme la Suède, rejoignent Daesh en Irak et en Syrie. La conclusion est que de nombreuses théories de la criminologie sont utiles pour analyser les facteurs derrière l'affiliation à Daesh. La majorité des personnes recrutées dans cette organisation ont, à bien des égards, des antécédents similaires à ceux des personnes recrutées dans d'autres formes de crimes violents organisés graves. Il convient de noter que nombre des théories présentées dans ce chapitre sont plus pertinentes pour comprendre pourquoi les hommes rejoignent Daesh. En ce qui concerne le recrutement des femmes, la valeur de ces théories est plus limitée. Cela vaut également pour les théories qui expliquent la criminalité féminine en général.

**Mots-clés:** théorie criminologique; Daesh; genre; violence

**抽象**

犯罪學研究通常將其重點放在傳統形式的犯罪上。本章的目的是討論傳統犯罪學理論在多大程度上可用於理解現代恐怖主義形式。要解釋的主要問題是為什麼來自西歐國家的年輕男女如瑞典加入伊拉克和敘利亞的Daesh。

結論是，許多犯罪學理論對於分析與Daesh的歸屬背後的因素是有用的。招募到該組織的大多數人在許多方面與招募其他形式的嚴重有組織暴力犯罪的個人具有相似的背景。

應該指出的是，本章中討論的許多理論與理解為什麼男人加入Daesh更為相關。在招聘女性方面，這些理論的解釋價值更為有限。然而，這也適用於這些理論解釋一般女性犯罪的能力。

關鍵詞：犯罪學理論, Daesh, 性別, 暴力

نبذة مختصرة  
عادة ما يوجه البحث الجنائي تركيزه على الأشكال التقليدية للإهانة. الغرض من هذا الفصل هو مناقشة مدى إمكانية استخدام النظريات الجنائية التقليدية لفهم شكل حديث من أشكال الإرهاب. تكمن القضية الرئيسية التي تفسر لماذا ينضم الشباب والشابات من دولة أوروبية غربية، مثل السويد، إلى داعش في العراق وسوريا الاستنتاج هو أن العديد من نظريات علم الإجرام مفيدة لتحليل العوامل الكامنة وراء الانتماء إلى داعش. ولجميع الذين جُندوا في هذه المنظمة، من عدة جوانب، خلفية مماثلة للأفراد المعينين في أشكال أخرى من جرائم العنف المنظمة الخطيرة. تجدر الإشارة إلى أن العديد من النظريات التي تمت مناقشتها في الفصل أكثر ملاءمة لفهم سبب انضمام الرجال لداعش. عندما يتعلق الأمر بتجنيد النساء فهذه النظريات القيمة التوضيحية أكثر محدودية. هذا ينطبق أيضا، مع ذلك، على هذه النظرية القدرة على تفسير الجريمة النسائية بشكل عام.

الكلمات الدالة: النظرية الإجرامية، داعش، النوع، العنف

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