Recensions / Reviews

Restructuring and Resistance: Canadian Public Policy in an Age of Global Capitalism
Mike Burke, Colin Mooers and John Shields, eds.
Halifax: Fernwood, 2000, pp. 392

The stated intention of this collection of 16 chapters and 17 authors is to contribute to our understanding of the implications of neoliberalism for Canada and to examine strategies for resisting it. Neoliberalism being closely wedded to globalization, the book is equally an indictment of globalization and neoliberalism.

The book, several of whose chapters first appeared at a symposium organized by the editors as part of the annual meeting of the Society for Socialist Studies in 1998, is presented in three parts. Part 1, entitled "Globalization, the State and Shifting Terrains," includes chapters that describe challenges to Canadian democracy and federalism posed by globalization, as well as a historical overview of the welfare state. Part 2 consists of six studies of "policy sectors that have been affected by restructuring" (16), including employment equity, labour market policy, municipal restructuring in Toronto, and communication policy. And part 3, "Restructuring and Resistance: Theory and Practice" includes essays on migrant workers, a left feminist critique of the social welfare state, working class resistance in Premier Mike Harris' Ontario, and (again) employment equity.

Setting an ambitious task for itself, this book does not always deliver, falling prey to a dual handicap. The first is that to which an avowedly normative and prescriptive collection is prone: a tendency for some authors to allow their ideological biases to run ahead of empirical support for their argument, and to resort to generalization where more nuance is warranted. The second is the shortcoming to which edited collections are vulnerable: chapters of varying quality and incoherence across individual contributions. The result is a collection that often makes for a frustrated reader. And this is a shame. Not only are there some chapters here that are well worth reading, but the overall message of the book—that the neoliberal policies that accompany globalization have many detrimental consequences—is an important one.

The strength of the volume lies with those chapters that bring empirical data to bear as they demonstrate the unjust results of neoliberal policies and expose the neoliberal biases of others. Examples are Bob Russell's historical overview of the social welfare state, the empirical account by Mike Burke and John Shields of inequality in the Canadian labour market, Stephen McBride's examination of the theoretical foundations of recent Canadian labour market policy, and David Hogarth's analysis of the democratic implications of recent developments in Canadian communication policy. There are other examples of careful analyses, including those where the relevance of "global capitalism" or "neoliberalism" is not obvious, including the discussion of the 1995 *Employment Equity Act* of Ontario by Janet Lum and A. Paul Williams, and Neil Thomlinson's tracing of the developments which led to municipal restructuring in Toronto. And readers who have not already read Neil Bradford's previously published article on "The Policy Influence of Economic Ideas: Interests, Institutions and Innovation in Canada" will find its appearance here a useful addition.

Lack of coherence across chapters, a weak research effort on the part of some authors, and a disappointing concluding section on "What is to be done?" detract from the merits of individual chapters. The incoherence occurs in particular with the treatment of globalization and its consequences. B. Mitchell Evans, Stephen McBride and John Shields offer a balanced

account of globalization in their chapter "Globalization and the Challenge to Canadian Democracy," where, consistent with the broader scholarly literature, they observe that "The forces of the international economy" have not succeeded in "usurping domestic policy autonomy" (87). Contrast this with the following statement: "federal and provincial governments in Canada are increasingly held hostage to the dictates, demands and needs of global capital interests" (138). Even as I read this chapter, Alberta Premier Ralph Klein was in New York, being received warmly by energy-hungry American politicians. A "hostage?" If so, a complicit one, like his predecessor who approved the 1989 Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement. What is needed here, and in some other chapters, is a more nuanced understanding of global and regional integration, better documentation of contestable claims, less reliance on secondary sources, and more timely (post 1995) data to support statements about rapidly evolving developments.

Perhaps the most disappointing part of the book is part 3 where we are presented with strategies for social resistance to neoliberalism. On offer are an organized alternative to the left of the New Democratic party, a mass international movement of workers, and rejection of the "third way." The volume concludes by exhorting the "class struggle [as] the only means of realizing genuine democracy" (336). Who would disagree with the goal? How many Canadians would find the means proposed consistent with our political culture and political institutions?

GRACE SKOGSTAD *University of Toronto*

Relations particulières – La France face au Québec après de Gaulle
Frédéric Bastien
Montréal : Editions Boréal, 1999, 423 p.

Le Québec a-t-il tenu une place importante dans la politique étrangère de la France après de Gaulle? La littérature québécoise et canadienne ne consacre habituellement que quelques chapitres aux relations diplomatiques qu'ont entretenues la France et le Québec durant la période post-gaullienne. Il faut donc se réjouir qu'un auteur québécois y ait consacré un ouvrage entier, par ailleurs très bien documenté. Contrairement à ce que beaucoup ont pu penser du peu d'intérêt de la France à l'égard de la question de l'indépendance québécoise après 1969, Frédéric Bastien montre q'un tel intérêt a bel et bien existé. Malgré quelques moments d'indifférence, la France a manifesté une volonté permanente d'apporter un soutien politique réel à la province francophone face au Canada.

Pour sa démonstration, l'auteur réunit tous les ingrédients d'une vraie recherche. Il s'appuie notamment sur une documentation impressionnante: quelque 150 entretiens ont été réalisés avec environ 75 personnalités – françaises pour la plupart – et des sources d'archives françaises, très peu exploitées jusqu'ici, ont été consultées.

Pour Frédéric Bastien, au vu de ses différentes sources, il est clair que le Québec a tenu une place importante dans la politique étrangère de la France. S'il est vrai que l'opinion française ne s'est intéressée qu'épisodiquement aux relations franco-québécoises, surtout à propos de la question de l'indépendance, les diplomates et le personnel politique français, quant à eux, « y ont consacré une énergie relativement grande, surtout si on compare le cas québécois à d'autres pays semblables sur les plans démographique et économique » (353). Sur le plan de la défense du fait français au Canada surtout, la France a maintes fois tenu tête au gouvernement fédéral, favorisant une autonomie de

la politique québécoise par une coopération directe avec la province et reconnaissant par là même ses revendications constitutionnelles en matière de relations internationales. Après de Gaulle, les présidents Pompidou, Giscard d'Estaing et Mitterrand, quel que fût leur intérêt sur le sujet, ont tous maintenu ce type de politique. De plus, la France a toujours privilégié des relations bilatérales avec la « Belle Province », tant du point de vue économique et technologique que de la recherche scientifique, liens qu'elle n'a jamais autant cultivés avec le reste du Canada, plutôt délaissé de ce point de vue.

Quant à la question de la reconnaissance du Québec par la France en cas d'indépendance, Frédéric Bastien est sans équivoque : il arrive à la conclusion que la France a toujours eu pour stratégie de reconnaître le Québec sans attendre la réaction du gouvernement canadien, dans le but de mettre la communauté internationale devant le fait accompli. Quelques chercheurs de l'Université Laval ont soulevé un débat sur le sujet. En se basant sur des méthodes d'analyse lexicométriques des discours de politique étrangère française, ils mettent en doute la détermination de la France à réagir de façon favorable au Québec en cas de victoire du Oui au référendum. Le débat reste ouvert sur cette hypothèse mais une chose est certaine : les documents d'archives que nous présente l'auteur montrent clairement que les présidents français se disaient prêts, jusqu'à une date très récente, à reconnaître rapidement l'indépendance du Québec. L'auraient-ils réellement fait en 1980 ou en 1995? Pour l'auteur, la réponse ne fait aucun doute et reste positive. Il atteste même qu'en 1995, une « préparation méticuleuse » avait été prévue à cet effet du côté français. Pourquoi ce parti-pris? « Parce que chaque fois que la France a eu à choisir entre le Québec et le Canada, elle a systématiquement pris parti pour le premier [et] dans l'hypothèse d'un Oui majoritaire, les déclarations publiques en ce sens illustrent bien que la France n'aurait pas modifié son attitude » (357). Tout le montre en effet dans la période récente : en 1997 et en 1999, le Président Jacques Chirac déclarait que « son pays accompagnerait le Québec » et en 1998, le Premier ministre socialiste Lionel Jospin a repris la même formule, qui signifie depuis longtemps dans la rhétorique diplomatique française une reconnaissance de la souveraineté québécoise, le cas échéant.

La diplomatie française n'est donc pas indifférente à « la deuxième communauté francophone du monde » – comme se sont plues à l'appeler les autorités françaises en 1980 à Dakar. Comme le dit l'auteur, face aux États-Unis et au Canada, la France ne pourrait pas s'effacer au moment de soutenir l'un des membres les plus importants de la francophonie sans remettre sérieusement en question son *leadership* politique sur la scène internationale. Gardons cependant à l'esprit que la question québécoise n'occupe pas une place prépondérante dans la politique étrangère française, celle-ci étant largement mobilisée par des dossiers plus brûlants.

Loin d'être une recherche scientifique au sens strict, le livre se présente, sans doute en raison de la double formation de l'auteur (diplômé de l'Institut des Hautes Études internationales de Genève et journaliste), à la fois sous la forme du récit historique et de la chronique journalistique. La narration est parfois trop linéaire mais donne vie aux personnages évoqués sur lesquels, outre l'essentiel, nous apprenons une foule de détails quant à leur personnalité et leurs motivations, ce qui nous les rend plus familiers. Nous entrons ainsi au cœur de la logique des protagonistes, de leurs représentations et de leur intérêt pour la question québécoise. À travers la chronique des différents voyages officiels des dirigeants québécois et français, nous pouvons suivre la fluctuation des relations tour à tour indifférentes et passionnées entre la France et le Québec. Quoi qu'il en soit, les arguments de ce livre, toujours

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0008423902778220 Published online by Cambridge University Press

soutenus par des documents d'archives ou par des entretiens, convainquent par leur précision. Cet ouvrage, qui se lit comme un roman, nous offre une intéressante chronique des coulisses du monde diplomatique. Espérons que cette recherche provoquera d'autres études – contradictoires ou non – sur une question qui pourrait peut-être un jour se révéler déterminante pour le Québec en cas d'indépendance.

Christine Bout De L'An *Institut d'Études politiques de Grenoble*

21st Century Canadian Diversity
Stephen E. Nancoo, ed.
Mississauga: Canadian Educators' Press, 2000, pp. 383

The surprise with this book is that it ignores the founding peoples of Canada. Coming with statistics about the demographics of this country, it tells us that new actors are entering the scene, more and more numerous, who will have to be accommodated. Their sheer numbers might dwarf the traditional competitions.

Immigration is responsible for some of these actors; social transformations for others. The result is diversity at a degree entirely new in its intensity. T. John Samuel and Dieter Schachhuber synthesize a "new" Canada replacing little by little the "traditional" Canada: the traditional society, European, Christian, English- or French-speaking, respectful of a common work ethic in an industrial economy, peaceful, moderate, consensus-seeking, accepting authority; the "new" Canada, a diverse and pluralistic citizenry, including non-whites, secular with "sprinklings of fundamentalism," outward-looking, hedonistic, international in a postindustrial economy, wary of authority, respectful of differences, of a low birth rate, aging with rapid economic and social changes, with a focus on individual and group rights.

The authors are not making a catalogue of all the new groups inside Canada. They acknowledge their existence. But they concentrate on ethnic and cultural diversity, on women trying to find their way in society, on the fate of family, on education and on aging in a multicultural milieu. Diffusion of information and values through mass media is changing. Order, human rights issues, anti-racism, pluralism, and common values of different religions lead to different chapters. One contribution shows the great task of transformation and adaptation faced by police. Three are about federalism and multiculturalism. Getting into more details, Deo H. Poonwassie and Nahum Kanhai have authored a chapter about the resurrection of the First Nations, faced for centuries by destruction. Now mostly urbanized, led by modern elites, surrounded by many children, reconquering control on certain territories, they have hope of being recognized as adults able to govern themselves, as in the case of the Inuits of Greenland. Too many of them are still reduced to abject conditions on reserves or in cities.

The different contributions attempt to discover how to balance a respect for the cultures of the new citizens with what has to be retained of the values of traditional Canada. Their answer is that it cannot be done without respecting differences. The new cultures are present in the press, but Robert S. Nancoo and Stephen E. Nancoo point out that "the mainstream Canadian mass media do not accurately reflect or represent [the] new diversity either in terms of content or personnel" (60). And Stephen E. Nancoo repeats this observation for police, despite many efforts to adapt it to the new realities.

Poonwassie wrote a refreshing chapter about education as a political field disputed for different motives. He offers excellent lines about the role of Ottawa and groups in this area.

Roberta Russell tries to find ways for women to build careers. But it is a qualified hope David Wicks and Pat Bradshaw present to women; they believe in fact that a step has been taken from denial and oppression to awareness and resistance: "by viewing the voices of opposition as *opportunities* for altering the existing structures of power, new discourses may be able to reveal the politics embedded in the dominant discourses by presenting an opposition, not simply a passive reaction, to them" (153); "a second strategy of resistance involves challenging the existing power structures by confronting them with speech and actions that embody a 'reality' totally incongruent with that currently in place" (154).

In all, the book is interesting as it presents the growing challenges to the official mosaic. But at times it would have been useful to present specific cases to illustrate the assertions of the authors. For example, Immigration Canada makes issuing visas to friends, fiancées, or wives of immigrants difficult; there is no discussion of women in politics; the assertion that the Canadian Secret Service, the RCMP, and the *War Measures Act* maintain the status quo (261) is made without refreshing our memories.

The book is easy to read and helps us to understand the new Canada developing around us. The chapter by John Sahadat, "Unity in Diversity not Uniformity: A Comparative Religion Perspective," is of a great loftiness grounded upon a large erudition. Despite some editorial and technical clumsiness in a work published by a very young publishing house, this book has considerable merit.

JEAN E. HAVEL *Laurentian University*

Qui profiterait de l'indépendance du Québec?
Jean-Paul Lefebvre
Coll. « Essais et Polémiques »
Montréal : Les Éditions Varia, 1998, 188 p.

Ex-syndicaliste, ex-député libéral à l'Assemblée nationale du Québec, ex-fonctionnaire fédéral et « retraité actif », Jean-Paul Lefebvre signe ce « plaidoyer » (182) qui comporte une introduction, six chapitres, une conclusion et un index dans le but de « mettre un terme au traumatisme des référendums » (12).

Dès les premières pages, l'auteur fustige l'idéologie des nationalistes québécois et ses tenants, à la tête desquels figurait René Lévesque qui a, lors du Congrès du Parti québécois en décembre 1981, « contribu[é] à la symbolique du mépris » (18).

Affichant la fierté que lui inspire sa double appartenance canadienne et québécoise (30), l'auteur appelle ses concitoyens québécois « de souche » à assumer et à dépasser l'histoire du peuple conquérant et du peuple conquis (34). Mais qu'est-ce qu'un Québécois de souche, se demande-t-il? Les autochtones, les anglophones et les allophones – les minorités (in)visibles – ont-ils « [. . .] droit à ce titre » (33)?

Selon l'auteur, les vrais problèmes qui confrontent la société québécoise sont la pauvreté, le chômage et l'analphabétisme. Il n'est pas sûr qu'un Québec souverain serait mieux équipé pour affronter ces problèmes dans un contexte de mondialisation et de compétition économique accrue. En fait, « [. . .] les coûts de la rupture avec le Canada sont susceptibles de dépasser largement les bénéfices recherchés » (29). Les vraies priorités de la société québécoise seraient ailleurs, à savoir expliquer Montréal au reste du Québec, résister à la pensée « magique » en matière économique et constitutionnelle et sauvegarder les acquis sociaux (chap. 5).

Mais qui profiterait de l'indépendance du Québec (chap. 2)? La réponse : les politiciens et les fonctionnaires de carrière du Québec. Ce « nouveau clergé laïc prétend que [les Québécois ont] un problème d'identité » (47), que seul un Québec souverain saurait résoudre. En revanche, l'indépendance affecterait négativement les travailleurs, les actionnaires et les dirigeants d'entreprise qui « ont un intérêt commun » (38), les employés et les propriétaires de petites entreprises, les retraités, les agriculteurs et les artistes.

Pour Lefebvre, le nationalisme au Québec (celui du PQ) est devenu problématique dès le moment où ses partisans ont commencé à raisonner en termes d'État. Selon lui, nationalisme et souveraineté ne sont pas nécessairement mutuellement exclusifs (169). Au nationalisme ethnique ou territorial qui reste néanmoins « teinté d'intolérance » (60), l'auteur préfère le nationalisme canadien-français d'Henri Bourassa et d'André Laurendeau.

Pour sortir du traumatisme des référendums (153-70) et faire évoluer le fédéralisme canadien (chap. 4), l'auteur réclame une « nouvelle stratégie » que seul un gouvernement libéral, sous la direction de Jean Charest, pourrait instiguer; celle-ci aiderait aussi à en finir avec les « virages successifs de Lucien Bouchard » (173). Mais est-il vrai qu'une fois élu Premier ministre du Québec, Charest – avec ses propres « virages successifs » – proposerait « rien moins qu'une véritable reprise de la Révolution tranquille » (179)? Il semble qu'il est plus prudent de suivre « la vieille sagesse québécoise [qui] a toujours admis qu'il n'était pas bon de mettre "tous ses oeufs dans le même panier" » (97).

Nemer H. N. Ramadan *Université du Québec à Montréal*

In Search of Sustainability: British Columbia Forest Policy in the 1990s
Benjamin Cashore, George Hoberg, Michael Howlett, Jeremy Rayner and Jeremy Wilson
Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2001, pp. x, 329

In Search of Sustainability: British Columbia Forest Policy in the 1990s relies on a theoretical framework for policy analysis, the policy regime framework, to address the pressingly contemporary issue of sustainable forest policy in BC. This framework encompasses aspects of the policy cycle model (agenda setting, policy formulation, decision making, implementation and evaluation), but goes beyond this model to incorporate also regime aspects (institutions, actors and ideas) and background conditions (markets, elections and public opinion). The authors visit several areas of forest policy in this edited volume: tenure, Aboriginal rights, pricing, timber supply regulation, land use and forest practices.

The authors are very careful not to fall into a trap that often befalls one who relies on a strict model such as the policy cycle model: that is, the inability to account for feedback and fuzziness between stages. As they note, "in applying the policy cycle model, it is frequently difficult to identify where one stage ends and another begins" (69). While they knew that the adherence to this model would pose some difficulties, they believed that "deployment of this model would sharpen the account of policy evolution" (232). Their use of the policy cycle model does provide a good heuristic by which one can garner greater understanding of the specific forest policy issue areas, and the authors are careful not to become too entangled in the model that they lose sight of the larger analytical picture. By going beyond the policy cycle model to the policy regime framework, the authors ensure that they account for not only what happens during the policy making process, but also take into account outside factors that shape and constrain available policy options.

The impetus for writing this book came with the 1991 election of the New Democratic party that "transformed the government from one openly hostile to environmental initiatives in the forests to one dedicated to bringing about 'peace in the woods' " (234). With this seemingly perfect opportunity for change in forest policy, why did policy makers face impediments to change and why, as the authors suggest, did the forest policy reforms of the 1990s fail to create any long-term stability in the sector? *In Search of Sustainability* intelligently asks and begins to answer those questions.

The use of the policy regime framework allows the authors to highlight the importance of historical background in all of the cases. They superbly illustrate how the various forest policy issue areas did not evolve in a vacuum, but were shaped by previous historical policy decisions. This also ties in with one of the principal findings of this work: the path dependent nature of forest policy in BC. For example, when analyzing the Timber Supply Review, Jeremy Rayner states that "the decision space was already bounded by the nature of the issue itself, characterized by acute path dependency as a result of the very long planning horizons of forest management and the consequent need to take account of timber supply decisions made many decades before" (174). This theme is echoed in each of the other cases visited in this volume and provides a major constraint to change in forest policy practices in BC. For those frustrated with the lack of change in BC forest policy and searching for answers, *In Search of Sustainability* highlights two further impediments that face forest policy makers in BC: spillovers between subsectors and the structural power of business.

If you are interested in a thorough examination of forest policy in BC, then you have the authors of this volume to thank. However, their work goes beyond a cursory "play by play" of events in each of the subsectors. The authors excellently bring together the separate sectors in their conclusion to draw comparisons between the different sectors. This work also highlights the importance of the technical nature of forest policy in determining policy outcomes and how the institutional nature of BC politics and the Westminster style of government provide unique challenges to environmental groups pressing for policy reform.

If you want a book that goes beyond simple description and keenly analyzes factors that shaped forest policy in BC in the 1990s and will continue to shape policy in this area well into the future, then you owe a debt to the authors of *In Search of Sustainability.* These authors not only accomplish this goal, but they do it in a straightforward and readable manner that is often difficult to find when dealing with a technical subject such as forest policy.

LORI POLONI-STAUDINGER *Indiana University*

Nunavut: Inuit Regain Control of Their Lands and Their Lives
Jens Dahl, Jack Hicks and Peter Jull, eds.
Copenhagen: International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs, 2000, pp. 223

Readers interested in the legal rights and political circumstances of indigenous peoples around the world are well advised to consult the extensive publications of the International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs. *Nunavut: Inuit Regain Control Of Their Lands and their Lives* represents a substantial, multidisciplinary addition to these publications. Its multidisciplinary character means that political scientists will find some of its chapters more useful than others. However, almost all of the contributions offer politically relevant insights.

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0008423902778220 Published online by Cambridge University Press

The centrepiece of the collection is an extended presentation of the Nunavut story by Jack Hicks and Graham White. This balanced, comprehensive and highly contemporary discussion is the best introduction to the topic currently available. It discusses the economy and social structure of Nunavut; the history of Inuit-Crown relations; the logic by which the Inuit land claim settlement and the creation of Nunavut form the two sides of the unique coin of Inuit self-determination; and the enormous challenges facing Nunavut, in particular fiscal weakness, social pathologies, and the lack of governance capacity. The chapter also features an excellent discussion of the proposal for gender parity in the Nunavut legislature and the referendum that rejected this idea.

Hicks and White identify two issues as central to the Nunavut story. The first is " . . . the prospects that the new regime in Nunavut will generate significant local control over the political and economic processes that affect its people's lives." The second is " . . . the extent to which the design and operation of the state in Nunavut does in fact incorporate the values and perspectives of its people." In affirming the local empowerment that Nunavut will provide, the authors critique dependency theory for giving too much weight to Inuit victimization and too little to the vigorous agency that the Inuit demonstrated in their protracted, impressively disciplined, and ultimately successful pursuit of Nunavut. However, Hicks and White fail to return to their fascinating second issue. Helle Hogh offers a relevant case study in recounting how the priorities of a pan-Nunavut agency (this before the creation of Nunavut and its government) led to the organization of the first officially sanctioned bowhead whale hunt in a manner that contradicted traditional practices. This alienated the local community rather than validating and reviving its hunting culture and the social relationships that draw their sustenance from wildlife harvesting. Hicks and White ought to have pursued their governance-culture question so as to help readers appreciate the importance and complexities of constructing a modern government that respects Inuit traditional values and enables them to adapt to changing circumstances with integrity. Still, readers unfamiliar with Nunavut will find their chapter the most accessible and comprehensive discussion of the new territory available, and will also benefit from its excellent and extensive bibliography.

The other chapters in the collection fall into three categories. The first is celebrations of Nunavut that reflect the elation of Aboriginal leaders at its creation. The second is reflections on the significance of the new territory that, while driven by their admiration for Nunavut to an overly rosy interpretation of Canada's policies towards its Native peoples, do offer valuable insights. Thus, for example, Peter Jull usefully notes how much better the Inuit of Nunavut have fared than have their Aboriginal counterparts in the northern portions of the provinces. He also wisely counsels Nunavut to shun the politics of "community-centered bargaining" that foregrounds local financial gain at the expense of pan-Nunavut identity and coherent policy development. The third category of chapters discusses issues of cultural maintenance—writing systems, place names, television broadcasting, as well as the wildlife harvesting that George Wenzel effectively argues to be the material basis of Inuit culture. These chapters demonstrate the difficulty of providing a small, scattered and financially poor people with the means to sustain their culture—and the commitment that exists to pursue this goal.

The authors of this collection are all admirers of Nunavut. However, most take a balanced position. Some report the views of observers who are skeptical or hostile to Nunavut. Others frankly identify such developing problems as the emergence of an Inuit elite that may introduce a new dimension

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0008423902778220 Published online by Cambridge University Press

of conflict that could upset the social unity that Nunavut needs if it is to confront its challenges successfully. Most acknowledge that the particular circumstances of Nunavut and its creation limit its direct relevance as a model for Aboriginal self-determination elsewhere, while seeing it as an inspiration to other Aboriginal peoples to struggle for arrangements that will meet their needs in their particular circumstances.

As a window on the views of advocates of Nunavut and for the excellent tour of the Nunavut horizon by Hicks and White, this is a book that deserves the attention of scholars interested in Aboriginal issues in general and Nunavut in particular.

GURSTON DACKS *University of Alberta*

The New Public Organization
Kenneth Kernaghan, Brian Marson and Sandford Borins
Toronto: Institute of Public Administration of Canada, 2000, pp. ix, 371

The past two decades have seen major changes in the organization and academic study of public organizations around the world. Collectively known as the New Public Management (NPM), these changes coincided with a systemic rethinking of the ways governments define their functions, determine and implement public priorities, manage public resources, deliver public services and promote greater internal and external accountability.

These developments challenged established concepts of government-society relations in ways that have often provoked the scepticism, if not outright hostility, of traditional scholars of public administration. NPM's introduction often coincided with neoconservative or neoliberal efforts to reduce the size and scope of state activities. By advocating the application of private sector methods to public administration, it also challenged public service claims to distinctiveness, rooted in state-centred views of the public interest. However, as "postbureaucratic" models of public management have taken root within Canadian governments, leading to useful innovations, service improvements, and a renewed sense of mission, more balanced appraisals of NPM's theory and practice are emerging.

The New Public Organization is a cross-disciplinary study of innovations and management reforms in Canadian public service organizations during the 1990s by three well-known teachers and practitioners—Ken Kernaghan, Brian Marson and Sandford Borins. The book generally succeeds in its efforts to take a balanced approach to management and cultural changes in Canada's increasingly diverse public organizations. Recognizing the constant challenge of balancing competing interests in the public interest while pursuing "client-centred" approaches to service delivery, it applauds efforts to build a new culture of public service that incorporates NPM methods appropriate to specific government functions and policy goals. It also notes factors that have contributed to failures in the application of these methods, and suggests ways of correcting these problems.

The first four chapters provide theoretical, historical and empirical background for the book. Chapter 1 outlines domestic and global forces that have contributed to public sector organizational and cultural changes since the 1980s. Chapter 2 summarizes a flexible "postbureaucratic" model of public organizations, emphasizing the trend to replacing organization-centred with citizen-centred approaches to service delivery, the use of performance standards to encourage results-oriented rather than process-obsessed management, and revenue-driven models of service delivery. Chapter 3 emphasizes the centrality of shared

values in creating successful alternatives (or complements) to traditional hierarchical, rules-based organizations to enhance management effectiveness and service quality. Chapter 4 summarizes research findings on major sources, approaches and obstacles to public management innovations during the 1990s. The following seven chapters provide useful outlines of specific management innovations associated with the authors' model. These include the reorganization and re-engineering of public organizations (chap. 5), improvements in internal and public service delivery (chap. 6), and efforts to empower managers, employees and clients of public organizations (chap. 7). They discuss the growing use of consultation and partnerships to mobilize public and stakeholder involvement in policy processes and program delivery (chap. 8) and the demands that these innovations create for continuous learning and ongoing adaptation to changing environments (chap. 9). Other chapters address technological innovation to enable change and enhance public services (chap. 10) and resulting challenges for managing policy within and across public organizations (chap. 11). A final chapter addresses the ongoing challenges of managing in a public service environment that contains elements of both traditional bureaucratic and postbureaucratic values. Noting that effective management requires leadership that consistently translates its proclaimed principles into action, the authors recognize that the public service is often characterized by "a command and control environment," risk-averse management that discourages innovation, and "inadequate recognition and rewards for good human resource management" (267).

The authors stress that the postbureaucratic model is more than a set of management tools or techniques. They contend that its success depends on cultural change rooted in a clear, consistent ethic of public service. It also depends on managers' capacity to move beyond traditional command and control methods in order to build trust and teamwork among employees and "partners" inside and outside government.

However, *The New Public Organization* also demonstrates the degree to which many public service organizations *have* evolved to become more flexible, responsive and service-oriented. It emphasizes that the consistent application of these values can attract future public servants in an era of generational change, fostering pride among the managers and front-line public servants who have done so much to make them successful. One of the book's strengths is its consistent use of case studies based on applicants for IPAC's Awards for Innovative Management. However, while these provide interesting examples of the potential for change in organizing and delivering public services, a subsequent edition of the book should revisit many of these cases to determine whether they have worked as well as intended or hoped.

This book is well suited for introductory and advanced courses in public administration and public management. It would also be useful for leaders of business and nonprofit organizations seeking to understand the changes sweeping Canada's public sector—particularly the broad and evolving range of "partnership organizations" used to deliver public services.

GEOFFREY HALE *University of Lethbridge*

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0008423902778220 Published online by Cambridge University Press

La CUM et la région métropolitaine : l'avenir d'une communauté
Yves Bélanger, Robert Comeau, François Desrochers et Céline Métivier, sous la direction de
Ste-Foy : Presses de l'Université du Québec, 1998, 176 p.

L'ouvrage fait suite aux actes du onzième colloque intitulé « La CUM et les nouveaux enjeux contemporains » qui avait comme thème les regroupements municipaux et le rôle des villes-centres. Les conférenciers ont élaboré une réflexion générale sur l'organisation de la région montréalaise et sur l'organisme « supramunicipal » qui doit maintenant s'adapter à de nouvelles réalités économiques, sociales et politiques très différentes du contexte dans lequel la CUM fut créée. Le système de représentation est le point de convergence de plusieurs de ces textes.

Le recueil se divise en trois sections. La première fait état des origines de la CUM et de l'environnement dans lequel elle a vu le jour. La seconde section relate divers points de vue sur l'organisme et sa mission. La dernière section porte sur les perspectives d'avenir de la CUM.

Les quatre premiers chapitres font une synthèse des évènements qui ont créé une conjoncture propice à la mise en place de la CUM et à son développement en tant qu'institution supralocale. Colin fait un « survol des stratégies et formules par lesquelles a été abordée la question métropolitaine ou régionale dans l'Île de Montréal depuis 1830 jusqu'à la création de la CUM » (6). De fragmentations en annexions successives plus ou moins consensuelles, Montréal absorbe graduellement les faubourgs. La stratégie annexionniste de Montréal « une île, une ville », dans le contexte d'étalement urbain du début du 20e siècle, présente déjà une problématique régionale importante. Bref, le désir d'implantation d'un palier intermédiaire est unanime et même urgent pour l'administration de Montréal et le gouvernement provincial, puisque les annexions à la ville-centre se sont traduites par un surendettement chronique.

La Commission métropolitaine de Montréal, instaurée en 1921, garde à son actif plusieurs tentatives sérieuses de dispensation régionale, dont la fiscalité et les expériences de concertation intermunicipale dans les années 1930. En 1959, la CMM est remplacée par la Corporation du Montréal métropolitain et en 1969 par la Communauté urbaine de Montréal. Pour Corbeil, la CUM est un compromis politico-financier circonstanciel entre Québec et Montréal destiné à gérer la précarité fiscale de la ville, la migration des populations et des industries vers les banlieues, la démarche « une île, une ville » et la grève illégale des policiers de la métropole face aux échéanciers électoraux municipal et provincial. Corbeil note une évolution en trois phases suite à la création de la CUM. 1) 1970-1982 : les factions Montréal et banlieues s'opposent et entretiennent des relations tendues. 2) 1982-1997 : les oppositions sont de moins en moins virulentes et la faction Montréal instaure une alternance de représentation à la CUM. 3) 1997- . . . : « l'unification des forces vives du milieu » (28) devrait faire l'objet des considérations d'avenir. Cousineau fait état du même processus de représentation et d'harmonisation croissante au sein de la CUM et note un élargissement de la responsabilisation des intervenants. Toutefois, Sancton écrit que la CUM est davantage un mécanisme de péréquation exemplaire qu'un gouvernement multifonctionnel à responsabilisation accrue. Pour lui, il s'agit d'une cohabitation de gouvernements locaux.

La seconde section dresse le portrait de l'organisme et de sa mission. Simard propose un bilan de la CUM en évaluant le degré d'intégration des enjeux régionaux à l'intérieur de la CUM puisque selon lui : « si les faiblesses de la CUM sont institutionnelles, ses forces résident dans ses 6500 employés et dans l'expérience acquise au fil des années dans la livraison de services » (39).

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0008423902778220 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Or, l'intégration des services (police, transports publics, environnement, loisirs et culture, aménagement du territoire, Office d'expansion économique, Conseil des arts), l'intégration de la fiscalité (justice distributive en fonction du potentiel fiscal), l'intégration politique (rapport entre Montréal et les banlieues de l'Île) sont autant d'ajustements dont la CUM a vécu les effets. Il tire finalement 13 leçons de l'expérience de la CUM depuis sa création et conclut par l'importance d'établir un nouvel ordre régional fondé sur ces enseignements. Dans un même ordre d'idées, Boivert et Hamel soulignent l'importance de revoir le cadre institutionnel tout en tenant compte de la diversité ethno-culturelle et démographique de la concentration urbaine. Mongeau relève aussi le phénomène de défavorisation, conséquence de cette même diversité ethno-culturelle et démographique. Masson, pour sa part, présente un sondage d'opinion publique. Quoique non scientifique, le sondage a le mérite d'être très comique et illustre bien la méconnaissance générale de la CUM. L'auteure présente aussi quelques pistes de réflexion sur le caractère d'essentialité de l'institution et le système de représentation. Zampino, quant à lui, souligne que la CUM souffre d'un mal chronique depuis sa création, c'est-à-dire une ambiguïté quant à son rôle et son statut. Bref, il dresse un bilan plutôt négatif de la CUM.

Marsan, Paquette, Tellier, Levine, Vaillancourt, Quesnel, Doré, Trent, Bossé et Trudel nous offrent leurs visions d'avenir et dégagent les défis et enjeux auxquels la CUM devra faire face dans un avenir imminent. Structures territoriale, économique, financière, internationale, socio-culturelle, technologique et démographique sont autant de questionnements que la CUM et ses différents membres locaux, régionaux et gouvernementaux auront à débattre, selon l'analyse des auteurs. Le débat a été lancé sur des thèmes nombreux et variés : élargissement de la CUM, rôle politique de la CUM, réformes institutionnelles et équité fiscale, intervention provinciale sur le plan de la gestion de la croissance urbaine, étalement illimité à faible densité (à l'américaine), fusions (une île, une ville), mégacité, structure de concertation, performance et efficacité, aménagement du territoire, etc. Je vous laisse le soin de lire le commentaire final de la présidente de la CUM, Mme Véra Danyluk, sur la question des iniquités fiscales de l'Île de Montréal comme problème fondamentalement politique. Bref, le nombre important de défis soulevés et non résolus démontre bien l'absence de consensus sur l'avenir de la CUM. Il est possible de relever ici et là le caractère partisan du discours de certains protagonistes qui prévalaient à l'époque. Il n'en reste pas moins que le débat est parfois fort intéressant, du moins sur le plan historique. Il nous est maintenant possible de relire cette page de l'expérience métropolitaine avec suffisamment de recul pour remettre en question la validité de certaines positions soutenues dans le nouveau contexte de l'agglomération montréalaise et, peut-être même, relancer le débat pour évaluer les nouveaux défis et enjeux de la région métropolitaine.

Bref, mes appréhensions quant à la question de la CUM me laissaient perplexe au départ face à la légitimité de ce volume. Toutefois, comme je le mentionnais précédemment, le livre prend toute sa valeur en présentant l'historique du débat politique sur le programme de réorganisation territoriale du gouvernement provincial de l'époque. Il s'agit d'un livre d'introduction aux transformations et débats entourant la CUM et le monde régional, que les néophytes pourront apprécier sans toutefois étancher leur soif de solutions. L'avenir nous éclairera sur la satisfaction des attentes des intervenants suite à la fusion municipale que vit actuellement l'agglomération métropolitaine. Réussite ou essoufflement de la métropole suite aux querelles de clocher sur le nouveau territoire fusionné? L'évaluation continue!

MARTIN ÉTHIER *Université du Québec à Montréal*

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0008423902778220 Published online by Cambridge University Press

The Constitutional Protection of Freedom of Expression
Richard Moon
Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000, pp. ix, 312

In this book, Richard Moon, a professor of law at the University of Windsor, knits together a series of articles published over the last 15 years. The seams show in places, but on the whole the book is well-written, largely free of legal jargon, and should prove accessible to a general audience. There are chapters on judicial decisions based on the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms regarding commercial and political advertising, pornography, racist expression, access to state-owned property and freedom of the press. These are prefaced by a critical examination of the leading contemporary theories of free expression and a lengthy, detailed consideration of the Supreme Court of Canada's approach thus far to the adjudication of free expression cases. Moon is a thoughtful and judicious critic of the Court's reasoning. His substantive chapters provide concise and useful accounts of the issues raised by a series of recent constitutional cases. But Moon also intends these accounts to support the argument of his more theoretical chapters that there is a tension between "the demands of freedom of expression and the structure of constitutional adjudication" (3). His argument will look familiar to anyone conversant with recent left "communitarian" critiques of the conventional liberal conception of personal/constitutional rights.

The conventional liberal approach to freedom of expression conceives of expression as a constitutionally entrenched right that protects individuals against unwarranted interference by the state, in effect creating a zone of personal autonomy insulated from the majoritarian political process. From this perspective, which dominates First Amendment jurisprudence in the United States and has strongly influenced the reading of section 2(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, it is the job of courts, exercising the power of judicial review, to police the boundaries of the rights-protected sphere. The Supreme Court of Canada is willing to entertain limits on freedom of expression only to prevent substantial harm to social or individual interests and only when no less restrictive means of preventing the harm in question will suffice.

Moon wants to persuade us that the conventional liberal approach is deeply flawed. In a communitarian vein, he objects that it mistakenly treats individual rights-bearers as though their identities and preferences were fully formed antecedent to their social relations and falsely assigns a merely instrumental value to community membership. The result, in his view, is an atomistic conception of the human self and a weirdly solipsistic conception of expression, as though the value of expression had nothing to do with communicating something to others. Moon counters that expression is valuable precisely because "individual identity/agency emerge in communicative interaction; because our lives and feelings and our understanding of self and the world develop through communication with others" (31). The *real* purpose of freedom of expression, then, is not as its defenders commonly argue to serve the truth (through free inquiry), or democracy (through vigorous public debate), or even individual autonomy (through the opportunity for self-expression/self-realization); the real purpose of free expression, according to Moon, is to protect "communicative relationships, and the joint activity of creating/interpreting meaning" that is constitutive of who and what we are, both individually and collectively (30).

It follows from this—contrary to the conventional liberal approach—that in order to protect free expression it may in some cases be necessary to regulate or even suppress what Moon terms "hurtful" or "manipulative" forms of

expression, which would otherwise poison communicative relationships. On this foundation he builds a case for greater public control over corporate and political advertising (because it is often manipulative) as well as for prohibitions on pornography and hate speech (because they are intrinsically hurtful to women and minorities and because they contribute to a culture in which sexism and racism thrive). Moon has much of interest to say on these subjects, yet his reading of the case law alerts him to the difficulty of distinguishing truly hurtful and manipulative expression from the merely offensive or impassioned kind and this leads him to soften the impact of his argument. Consider, for example, what he has to say about pornography. After suggesting that the pervasiveness of pornographic or sexist imagery in modern society may make a limited form of censorship necessary, he immediately goes on to question "whether police officers, prosecutors, and judges are in a good position to decide which images are harmful and should be restricted and which encourage a more critical understanding of sexuality" (125). Just this concern has led a number of feminist legal scholars to oppose the Supreme Court's decision in *Butler* and to reject Moon's own, seemingly ambivalent conclusion that limited censorship of pornography is socially necessary. It is not readily apparent from anything he says here that an approach to freedom of expression grounded upon our "communicative relationships" will be any more helpful than the conventional, rights-oriented approach when it comes to defining the harms of pornography or deciding how to deal with them.

Moon finds fault with the liberal, rights-oriented approach to freedom of expression not only because he believes that it distorts our understanding of the nature and value of expression, but also because he thinks it sometimes operates as a constraint on free expression. This is because the courts give equal weight to everyone's rights, ignoring the impact on the capacity for expression of inequalities of wealth and differential access to communicative resources. Moon thinks it is ludicrous that giant media corporations and the average consumer of information have the same constitutional protection against compelled expression when requiring privately owned media to provide some degree of public access might be the most efficacious means of realizing free expression for the majority of persons. I find it impossible to disagree; however, to move in this direction requires a political rather than a juridical approach to freedom of expression, one focused on the distribution of communicative power rather than on the protection of individual rights. Not surprisingly, Moon concludes that any attempt to define the scope of freedom of expression will unavoidably entail "complex questions that go to the heart of the social/economic order." These are not issues easily dealt with by courts, which "for both structural and political reasons . . . are not well positioned to engage in a review of the distribution of communicative resources or to assess the relative harm or value of expression, which turns in part on social/economic consideration" (218). He is surely right on this point, but that does not mean we should abandon freedom of expression to the vagaries of the political process.

A judicially enforced constitutional right to free expression still seems to me to be of inestimable value as a safeguard against the abuse of power by the state. Moreover, the notion that freedom of expression is a *right* and not just a noble political aspiration assigns it a higher degree of moral importance, which is no small advantage when confronting intolerance. Moon neglects this dimension to the conventional approach. Nonetheless, his book does the cause of freedom of expression a great service in pointing out that having a constitutional right to free expression cannot assure everyone of the opportunity or the capacity to express themselves freely. To get beyond the

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0008423902778220 Published online by Cambridge University Press

minimum guarantee of liberty present in the right, we must look beyond the orderly world of courts and constitutional law to the rough and tumble of the political process.

STEPHEN L. NEWMAN *York University*

Continuity and Change in House Elections
David W. Brady, John F. Cogan and Morris P. Fiorina, eds.
Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001, pp. xv, 297

As the editors of this important collection of essays note in their introductory essay, the elections to the United States House of Representatives in 1994 "shook the foundations of the post-Michigan incumbency consensus" (5). The 1996 House elections, in which the Republicans maintained control despite President Bill Clinton's landslide re-election, did little to establish a new orthodoxy. Congressional election scholars, who for the entire post-Second World War era had been comfortable (and relatively united) in their explanations of voting in House elections, needed to rethink basic assumptions. In 1997 the Hoover Institution at Stanford University sponsored a conference to re-examine what political scientists knew and did not know, what had changed and what remained the same, about House elections. This book is the result of that conference.

Virtually all of the articles in this collection are excellent; some deserve special mention. Gary Jacobson's opening essay contains ten figures and four tables that put the election in its appropriate context. He looks at important, easily accessible data that are often overlooked but essential in understanding the postwar history of House elections—partisan trends in seats at risk, nationally and by region; in incumbency advantage; in marginal seats; in retirements and newcomers; and in seats without major party competition. One cannot understand the context of House elections unless one looks at these factors. Jacobson continues to demonstrate the importance of these trends in explaining contemporary election results, an effort in which he has been involved for two decades.

The articles by David Brady, Robert D'Onofrio and Morris Fiorina ("The Nationalization of Electoral Forces Revisited") and by Robert Erikson and Gerald Wright ("Representation of Constituency Ideology in Congress") present interesting new analysis about the roles of policy differences in congressional elections. Brady and his colleagues present compelling evidence that congressional elections have become more nationalized since the 1970s, findings that contradict the conventional wisdom on the importance of local factions in elections in the years in which scholarship was aimed largely at explaining incumbent advantages. Their efforts to find causes for these changes were less successful. Erikson and Wright, while not refuting evidence that nonpolicy items matter in congressional elections, provide an elaborate analysis of how policy and ideology also do matter. That finding is clearly important for any theory of representative democracy to flourish. David Leal and Frederick Hess ("The Effect of Party Issue Emphasis in the 1994 House Elections") discuss the role that political parties play in how the electorate sees the issues in a campaign, using interviews from candidates and campaign staffs in a sample of districts.

While the individual essays in this book each make important contributions to our understanding of different aspects of congressional elections, the book as a whole is less successful in fulfilling its mission of charting a new direction for research on congressional elections. In this it suffers the same

malady as do many other books that grow out of conferences—some of the most interesting articles contribute only marginally to the overall theme. In this case, articles on partisan change in southern congressional delegations by Charles Bullock, on the sources of incumbency advantage in fundraising by Stephen Ansolabehere and James Snyder, on majority-minority districts by David Epstein and Sharyn O'Halloran, and on the impact of public disapproval of Congress by John Hibbing and Eric Tiritilli all are worth close examination on their own merits, but they contribute less to the overall book. The editors make a heroic effort to unite these disparate elements; but in the end, many of the chapters stand as just that—individual analyses of important questions about congressional elections not connected to the theme of the book.

Finally, one is left to question the timing of this book. The conference was held in 1997. The concluding essay was written after the 1998 election. The book appeared just after the time of the 2000 election. On a number of different points it is useful to look at the conclusions of the authors in light of the 1998 and 2000 results. Extend the timeline of Jacobson's data. Ask questions about nationalizing campaigns and the party roles in issues in the most recent elections. The result of these exercises, for this analyst at least, is more questions than answers. The essays in this book provide important insights into the 1994 and 1996 elections, but the task of building theory remains for future work.

L. Sandy Maisel *Colby College*

The President and His Inner Circle: Leadership Style and the Advisory Process in Foreign Affairs
Thomas Preston
New York: Columbia University Press, 2001, pp. x, 349

Thomas Preston examines six presidents of the United States (Harry Truman and the Korean War, Dwight Eisenhower and the Dien Bien Phu Crisis, John F. Kennedy and the Cuban Missile Crisis, Lyndon Johnson and the Partial Bombing Halt in Vietnam, George Bush and the Gulf War and Bill Clinton's general leadership style) to assess the degree with which presidential personality and leadership style influence the structures and processes of foreign policy making within small groups. Richard Nixon, Gerald Ford, Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan are not reviewed. Both Alexander Georges' personality study of Woodrow Wilson and Richard Neustadt's conception that the personal qualities of presidents are vital components in developing sources of power and persuasion inspired Preston's work. He relies heavily on the political psychological literature in the areas of personality and leadership, the individual's need for power, cognitive complexity, and prior policy experience to develop a typology of presidential leadership. The research strategy is a multimethodological approach using oral histories, interviews and memoirs housed in presidential libraries, author interviews with aides, and secondary materials. Characteristics of presidential leadership are measured with Margaret Hermann's Personality at-a-Distance (PAD) technique to predict leadership style.

With regard to the strengths of this study, notions of personality, power, cognitive complexity and policy experience are fully delineated in the typology of presidential personality and leadership style. Using the PAD technique, two dimensions are produced which are applicable to an array of issue areas in foreign policy. The first dimension revolves around the interaction of

policy experience with degrees of leader control: *Director*—high experience, high need for control; *Administrator*—high experience, low need for control; *Magistrate*—low experience, high need for control; and *Delegator*—low experience, low need for control. The second dimension combines the interaction of prior policy experience with degrees of leader complexity and attentiveness to information and others: *Navigator*—high experience, high complexity and attentiveness; *Sentinel*—high experience, low complexity and attentiveness; *Observer*—low experience, high complexity and attentiveness; and *Maverick*—low experience, low complexity and attentiveness. Unlike James David Barber's classic active-passive, positive-negative character framework, Preston's typology is grounded in personality theory and effectively linked with prior policy experience.

The application of the typology to the cases successfully captures the dynamism of presidential leadership. While it provides 16 possible political psychological combinations that successfully link personality variables with political behaviour, Preston observes four separate associations in his case studies. As Magistrate-Mavericks, presidents Truman and Johnson combined formal, hierarchical advisory systems to centralize information in small inner circles, due in large measure to their lack of extensive prior foreign policy experience. Preston sees Eisenhower and Kennedy as Director-Navigators with high experience who were actively involved in policy decisions, dominated their inner circles, and organized open structures to support their high need for advice from multiple and competing sources.

Unlike their Cold War predecessors, Bush and Clinton exhibited two very different leadership styles. Preston sees Bush's Gulf War objectives in association with the Administrator-Navigator. As an experienced and actively involved leader with a high need for information, Bush employed an advisory system similar to Eisenhower that would allow him to engage in a limited search for advice. In contrast, Preston sees Clinton's general leadership style as a Delegator-Navigator, in which the president delegated much of his authority to others and used informal structures to encourage information from multiple and competing perspectives to make up for his limited policy experience. The symmetry in each chapter ensures the cases are evenly handled, although Preston is limited to secondary sources with Bush and Clinton. The chapters are organized chronologically and begin with short introductions and overviews, and then intertwine the case studies with the typology.

While the practice of using chronological order has its advantages, a more effective method may have been to group the presidents according to the four observed associations. This grouping technique still supports the typology while guaranteeing that the reader focuses on the leadership characteristics. Although the cases are well done and extremely thorough, effective linkages could be established within and between the combinations. Another drawback of the study is that it places relatively little importance in historical context and its impact on opportunities and constraints available to presidents. It would have been interesting to illustrate how the Cold War and the post-Cold War political settings affected presidential leadership style, since the policy-making process is shaped and influenced by developments in the greater global environment. Perhaps historical context could help explain similarities in the leadership styles of Truman and Johnson and Eisenhower and Kennedy during the Cold War and why there was considerable variation in the post-Cold War with Bush and Clinton.

Despite these criticisms, some of which go beyond Preston's design, this book makes a significant contribution to our understanding of presidential personality and leadership style. Preston's typology will be another effective

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0008423902778220 Published online by Cambridge University Press

research tool for evaluating the strengths and weaknesses of presidential leadership style well into the future.

Chris Dolan *Presbyterian College*

The War against the New Deal: World War II and American Democracy
Brian Waddell
DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2001, pp. x, 226

Two intertwined objectives frame Brian Waddell's *The War against the New Deal*: to shift scholars' preoccupation in studying the presidency of Franklin D. Roosevelt from the formation of the welfare state during the Depression to the formation of the warfare state during the Second World War and to change the terms of the larger debate about state building by restoring the importance of class forces. Although Waddell's book is brief, containing only 165 pages of text, it makes a cogent case on both counts.

Mobilization of the United States for the Second World War has been the subject of numerous studies, but Waddell brings a fresh perspective to the topic with his theoretical focus on the interplay of state and class forces. Unlike earlier authors of neo-Marxist bent who portrayed the state largely as responsive to the activities of capitalist elites or the functional imperatives of economic management, Waddell credits the insights of state-centred analyses from such scholars as Stephen Skowronek and Theda Skocpol. However, whereas Skocpol famously strove to "bring the state back in," Waddell wants to bring class back in to the study of American political development. Class forces, he writes, are "strategically important to state officials during periods of institutional change because they may present either a barrier or necessary complement to any attempts to stabilize governance. . . . Not only do state officials have their own reasons for utilizing class forces as allies in their governmental battles, but class forces seek to impose themselves in the state-building process" (13).

Wartime mobilization offers a rich empirical record for Waddell's theoretical approach. As the Roosevelt administration shifted its focus in 1939 from economic depression at home to an approaching war on a global scale, the stalemate of FDR's second term between New Deal liberals seeking greater public authority over the private economy and resurgent business and regional conservatives hostile to the activist New Deal state set the stage for competing approaches to military mobilization. New Dealers wanted a more autonomous state apparatus that would ensure a rapid conversion from civilian to military production, avoid domination of wartime production by monopoly corporations, and provide the managerial capacity for postwar economic planning of full employment. Corporate elites wanted to shape economic mobilization in terms of their priorities and profits and to head off a further consolidation of the New Deal state. The crucial third force was the military, which, by siding with corporate elites, fostered wartime state-building that represented a fundamental reversal of what had been won by progressive forces in the battles of the 1930s.

The tangled story of wartime mobilization, with its bewildering array of short-lived government agencies, its "dollar-a-year" business executives flocking to Washington, its remarkable contribution to a corporate concentration that the New Deal had only recently denounced, has been told very effectively in *The War against the New Deal*. Waddell shows how corporate executives gained a powerful role in the 1939-1941 period because Roosevelt, wary of isolationist forces and calculating an unprecedented bid for a third presi-

dential term, feared businessmen's resistance to expanding defence production and needed their expertise. Backed by the new corporate elites entrenching themselves in defence agencies, the military successfully insisted on its dominant position in procurement. The alliance between corporate and military forces, the nascent "military-industrial complex," burgeoned through the war years and generally prevailed over the overmatched New Deal liberals, labour leaders and academics. Waddell credits these New Deal forces with some limited successes in checking the worst abuses of the corporate-military alliance, but their struggles to bring a democratic and progressive outcome to wartime state-building were, for the most part, doomed to failure.

In a brief chapter on postwar governance, Waddell traces the expansion of the wartime alliance between corporate elites and military officials into the national-security state of the Cold War era. The national security state marked the definitive response to the earlier debates about the character of the American state: by contrast to postwar European states, the US version would be a strong warfare state and a weak welfare state. "In a reversal of the 1930s template," Waddell remarks, "the national state reoriented its energies from domestic to international activism, reducing domestic employment, relief, and planning commitments while pursuing a powerful national state apparatus around military and foreign policy commitments" (157).

Although Waddell's work avoids determinist explanations and acknowledges the importance of political contingencies, its focus on the battles over wartime economic mobilization at times provides insufficient attention to political and ideological factors. The book provides a clear account of the political contingencies of the 1939-1940 period, but wartime politics—especially the declining fortunes of the New Deal at the polls and in Congress—receives short shrift. More important, Waddell may be ascribing too exclusive a role to the experience of wartime economic mobilization in explaining the decline of New Deal efforts to build public authority that could intervene in the private economy for democratic purposes. He fails to grapple with Alan Brinkley's influential argument in *The End of Reform* (New York: Vintage Books, 1996) that by the war years the New Dealers were, on their own, retreating from their original aim of an active state that would regulate and reform capitalism and turning instead to a fiscal state that would promote full employment and social welfare without intruding on the institutions of the private economy.

Institutionalist accounts of political development have brought a critical new perspective to the analysis of American politics. By incorporating the insights of the institutionalists, and then by challenging them to recognize the pivotal role of class forces in state-building, Waddell has written an impressive study that should interest anyone concerned with the historical development of the modern American state and the theoretical issue of how we can understand it.

BRUCE MIROFF *State University of New York, Albany*

American Business and Political Power: Public Opinion, Elections, and Democracy
Mark A. Smith
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000, pp. ix, 245

Mark Smith's book about the political power of business interests in the United States asks scholars not only to revisit but also to reconsider wholly one of the most common assumptions made about business power. The

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0008423902778220 Published online by Cambridge University Press

assumption is that business is most powerful (in terms of achieving its goals) when it takes a unified position on matters of policy. That is, when business unites, it is the interests of business and not the demands of the general public that elected officials respond to. In contrast, Smith's hypothesis is that when business acts in unison, the public—through their choices at the polls and their general attitude toward the role of government—is likely to have the *most* impact on government decisions. This occurs, Smith argues, because business tends to unify on ideological, partisan and salient issues. This means that citizens are likely to have knowledge of and opinions about the issues that unify business; they are able to discern the parties' positions on these issues and therefore make choices among the candidates; and their general attitudes on these issues will be clear to the legislators elected to represent them.

Smith makes creative use of a diverse array of data to test his ideas about business power and representative democracy after first carefully constructing a solid foundation for his analysis. That foundation is presented in chapters 2 through 4, which Smith devotes both to explaining the approach he takes to identify unifying issues, and to presenting evidence about their characteristics, prevalence and importance. As a way of identifying issues that unify the business community as a whole, Smith turns to the issues on which the Chamber of Commerce took a position. Unlike trade associations or specialty organizations that represent the interests of large employers, small business, the technology sector, or some other specific piece of the business community, the Chamber is the most broadly focused business organization in the US. Thus, the 2,364 legislative proposals between 1953 and 1996 that the Chamber either supported or opposed serve as Smith's set of unifying issues. For each of the 44 years he studies, Smith creates a measure that describes how favourably the Congress acted toward business on the unifying issues it considered. This aggregate measure of business success (which is a composite of six legislative outcome measures ranging from agenda consideration and committee consideration to bill enactment) is Smith's primary dependent variable.

With this empirical foundation in place, Smith turns his attention to building an empirical case for his central argument. First, he demonstrates that both conservative public mood about the role of government (using a measure developed by James Stimson [*Public Opinion in America: Moods, Cycles, and Swings* (2nd ed.; Boulder: Westview, 1959)]) and the proportion of Republicans serving in Congress have a substantial impact on how favourable Congress is toward business. Smith then takes up the question of whether any of the remaining variation in aggregate legislative outcomes is explained by one or more of the three potential dimensions or "faces" of business power (Charles E. Lindblom, *Politics and Markets* [New York: Basic Books, 1977]; Stephen Lukes, *Power: A Radical View* [London: Macmillan, 1974]). In subsequent chapters he demonstrates that neither the direct political activity of business (specifically their contributions to candidates' campaigns), nor the structural advantages business may enjoy in a capitalist society have a significant impact on legislative activity. Moreover, neither of these potential sources of business power diminishes the impact that election results and public mood have on legislative outcomes. However, Smith does provide evidence that business interests are successful in shaping public preferences for policy. Specifically, he shows that news coverage of conservative-leaning policy institutes, or "think tanks" (many of which receive considerable financial support from business), as well as reporters' reliance on think-tank representatives as sources of information have a significant impact on

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0008423902778220 Published online by Cambridge University Press

public mood. This latter source of business power must compete with other forces that shape public attitudes so that it may be most accurate to say that "business influences but does not dominate public opinion . . . " (213).

Smith's aggregate level analysis reaps obvious benefits. He is able to provide information about business influence on public opinion, to present data about the impact of public opinion on policy outcomes, and to demonstrate why the policy success enjoyed by the business community varies over time. In short, his approach is well suited to the questions he re-evaluates. As he recognizes, however, his study cannot account for the success or failure of business (or other) interests over the course of a single issue, nor does it help to explain how success or failure are shaped by important issue characteristics other than ideology, partisanship or salience, characteristics such as the type of opposition issues engender. This means that the book runs the risk of being dismissed by those most comfortable with micro-level analysis. But they do so at their peril. Smith's book constitutes an excellent example of how much we learn when we put under close scrutiny the enabling assumptions that govern our work.

MARIE HOJNACKI *Pennsylvania State University*

Politics and the Environment: From Theory to Practice
James Connelly and Graham Smith
New York: Routledge, 1999, pp. x, 340

The number of textbooks available for teaching environmental politics or policy continues to grow. Many otherwise excellent environmental textbooks, such as *Environmental Politics and Policy* by Walter A. Rosenbaum (Washington: CQ Press, 1985) or *Environmental Policy and Politics* by Michael E. Kraft (New York: Longman, 2001), are ill-suited for Canadian universities. These texts are of limited use in teaching environmental policy in a Canadian context due to their strong emphasis on legislation, politics and institutions in the United States. In contrast, *Politics and the Environment,* a comprehensive text from the United Kingdom, is less parochial in its focus. What really makes this text worthwhile, however, is its sophisticated and even-handed approach to environmental questions, which emerges from the exhaustive research that has obviously gone into writing this book.

An introductory course in environmental politics can have a number of objectives. These can usually be reduced to trying to answer three questions: What are the major environmental problems and their causes? What are the possible solutions to these problems? Why do we have the environmental policies that we have? This book devotes more attention to the second question than the other two. It is not organized by environmental problem or by medium (that is, air, water and so forth). Thus this book is better suited to a course for advanced undergraduates, able to grasp the subtleties of abstract concepts. This is not the text to use for a descriptive course focusing on the lexicon of major environmental problems. Nor is it the preferred text for a course on environmental politics seeking to explain how we get particular policies rather than the content of those policies. This text is best for a course with a problem solving and policy analysis focus.

Although the book devotes little space to the science of environmental issues, it covers the social scientific concepts that undergraduates need in order to understand fully environmental issues. It sets out ethical and philosophical frameworks such as utilitarianism, distributive justice, the precautionary principle and Malthusianism. With regard to economic concepts, the

text addresses public goods, tragedy of the commons, cost-benefit analysis, hedonic valuation, uncertainty and intergenerational equity, among others. On the policy instruments side, the text covers regulation, economic instruments and voluntary approaches.

The book is organized quite differently from most environmental policy textbooks. Part 1 examines the philosophical and ideological roots of environmental thinking, as well as Green parties. Part 2 presents the economic concepts important to environmental issues and policy responses. Part 3 examines environmental policy through the prism of different levels of jurisdiction, from the local to the international. Nesting the different levels of jurisdictions in this manner is an interesting way of presenting the material. Unfortunately, part 3 is less relevant for the Canadian context, where most environmental policies are determined at the provincial level and federal-provincial negotiation is of overwhelming importance. With chapters on European integration, national responses and local authorities, this portion of the book is much more specific to the UK and Europe.

Each chapter has a case study to illustrate its concepts. Almost all of these cases would be relevant for Canadian students. The case study for the chapter on "National responses" examines the Dutch National Environmental Plan. This plan was selected because it is considered to be the best national plan for implementing sustainable development. The case explains what makes this plan so unique and sophisticated and contrasts it with the UK plan, presenting cogent arguments for why the Dutch plan looks so different.

The book will expose students to a wide variety of points of view and proposed solutions to environmental problems. The book takes a thoughtful but critical stance in presenting these points of view. The authors draw from a very wide range of literatures. For example, in presenting critiques of cost-benefit analysis, the authors cite the American legal scholar Cass Sunstein as well as the development economist Amartya Sen (168). The book does not cover certain conservative viewpoints, largely because these do not occur in the European context. In North America, the Wise Use movement and conservatives arguing for decentralized environmental regulation and resource management present a unique point of view and are a political force to be reckoned with.

Politics and the Environment marks a welcome addition to the catalogue of environmental policy textbooks. It is not for all students and all courses, however. The book assumes no prior knowledge of economics or political science but by virtue of its focus on abstract concepts, it is best suited to more advanced undergraduates. As well, as a stand-alone text, the book is not sufficient to acquaint students with the substance and technical features of our most pressing environmental problems, such as biodiversity, global climate change and water pollution.

INGER WEIBUST *Iowa State University*

Think Tanks and Civil Societies: Catalysts for Ideas and Action
James G. McGann and R. Kent Weaver, eds
New Brunswick: Transaction, 2000, pp. 617

This lengthy volume provides a comprehensive analysis of an increasingly important, pervasive—and under-studied—organization of civil society: public policy institutes, or "think tanks." Think tanks are "nonprofit [organizations], independent of the state, and dedicated to transforming policy problems into appropriate public policies." Their numbers have exploded to more

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0008423902778220 Published online by Cambridge University Press

than three thousand since the 1970s, taking hold in national capitals on every continent. Collectively, the authors argue, think tanks have become "an integral part of the civil society and serve as an important catalyst for ideas and action." Think tanks produce research and expertise that government leaders use to shape policy, and they often publicly promote information and ideas to transform broad-based opinion.

The book's argument is well supported in 26 chapters that take the reader to every region of the globe. The book begins in North America and proceeds through Western Europe, Northeast Asia, Eastern Europe, Russia, the Middle East, North Africa, South and Southeast Asia, Australia, Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America. Most regions are handled with an overview chapter, written by an academic researcher and touching on characteristics of the population and roles of think tanks generally in the region, followed by one or more chapter-length case studies of individual think tanks in the region, usually written by the think tank's president or director. The format is helpful for giving the reader a sense of both the "forest" and the "trees" with regard to think tanks, and dispels any notion that think tanks remain a peculiarly Western phenomenon. The reader finishes the volume convinced that think tanks are an organizational form worth noting for their connection to evolving civil societies, for their sometimes substantial contributions to politics and policy making, and for their varied features and roles. This last subject receives the greatest attention in each chapter, and the book should become the pre-eminent comparative reference source on the characteristics and roles of think tanks in all regions of the world.

Collectively, the chapters portray a complicated common challenge for contemporary think tanks: to establish policy influence while at the same time maintaining organizational independence, based in civil society. The authors nicely illustrate the temptation think tanks face (and to which some succumb) to build close alliances with governing coalitions to secure short-term influence at the expense of long-term organizational independence and credibility. This temptation is made all the more appealing by the necessity for think tanks in many countries to rely on their governments for financial support. As the editors put it, think tanks are competing in two markets: one for policy advice and one for funding. The latter is often more relevant to whether a large and diverse population of think tanks exists in a country—and often depends on whether governments provide support, which, when provided, often brings attendant risks to independence. Besides government sources, the range of support for think tanks is often very limited and unstable, with organizations based in the Middle East, Africa, Asia and Latin America often reliant on sometimes fickle international foundations and the World Bank to sustain themselves. The distinctive institutional and political configurations of countries further shape the possibilities and challenges for think tanks, contributing, for example, to whether working for a think tank is part of a viable or appealing career track for researchers (which in many countries it is not). In the end, the book paints a portrait of think tanks experiencing growth in many parts of the world but facing vastly unequal challenges across regions.

For many, the mere volume of empirical information contained in the book should make it worth reading. Area specialists who focus on policy making and civil society should consult sections about particular countries and regions for the substantial new data presented about the number and features of think tanks. Overall, the book correctly elevates the visibility of think tanks in scholarly understandings of policy making and civil society. In its entirety, the book elaborates a valuable, sophisticated and complex framework for understanding how research and ideas are packaged and promoted

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0008423902778220 Published online by Cambridge University Press

to affect government and politics, laid out in the first chapter and illustrated in comparative perspective in the chapters that follow. The framework should be useful for scholars, and the lessons derived from it, touched on in each chapter, should be of great practical value to think tank managers and anyone interested in fashioning influential policy advice.

ANDREW RICH *Wake Forest University*

Shades of Citizenship: Race and the Census in Modern Politics
Melissa Nobles
Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000, pp. xiv, 248

Scholars interested in race have wrestled with the Brazil-United States comparison for years. The similarities are compelling (both countries share a history of slavery and European settlement; the descendants of African slaves currently populate both nations in high numbers) but the outcomes—racial discrimination in the US and so-called "racial democracy" in Brazil—are polar opposites. Or so it would seem.

In Shades of Citizenship, Melissa Nobles puts a new twist on this old comparison, and her overarching contention is hard to argue with: "concepts of race are made and remade" (2) in many ways and through a myriad of institutions, but census bureaus are often overlooked as key participants in this process. Although Nobles is not the first to maintain that census categorization is more aptly characterized as a creature of politics than of science (see, William Alonso and Paul Starr eds., The Politics of Numbers [New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1987]; Sharon Lee, "Racial Classifications in the U.S. Census: 1890-1990," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 16 [1993], 238-42; Anthony Marx, *Making Race and Nation: A Comparison of South Africa and the United States* [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998]; Yen Espiritu, *Asian American Pan-Ethnicity: Bridging Institutions and Identities* [Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1992]; Michael Omi and Howard Winant, *Racial Formation in the United States: From the 1960s to the 1990s* [New York: Routledge, 1994]), Nobles' *Shades of Citizenship* both adeptly revisits the concept and demonstrates that, through consideration of recent developments in the US and Brazilian censuses, politics continues to trump "objectivity" in statistics. Moreover, it turns out that the two countries might not be polar opposites after all: racial discourse has served similar functions in both places through the census. In other words, although the outcomes are different, the process is similar. In Brazil, the census has been used to promote aggressively the idea of racial democracy (even when political democracy was not a reality and racial discrimination persisted), while in the United States the census has been used to uphold the idea of white racial superiority (in spite of the inconvenient fact that the requisite "evidence" to prove it was not forthcoming).

In short, whether used to advance the idea that Brazilians have "[formed] a single 'new' race, composed of three original races" (xii) or to justify slavery and Jim Crow in the United States, the idea of race has mattered profoundly in the national development of both countries. Nobles' argument is that the census "show[s] us how" (xii). Along these lines, the author makes four central claims: race is not an objective category; census bureaus are not politically neutral institutions; racial discourse influences both the rationales for public policy and its outcomes; and individuals and groups seek to alter the terms of racial discourse in order to advance political and social aims (1-2).

While all four claims are on target, the ways in which the third contention plays out in both countries today is given short shrift in the book, while the freshest of all four central assertions (the latter one) is the least explored. Both of these omissions stem from the overall structure and orientation of the book, which is more thorough when dealing with history than with the present, and is somewhat stronger on Brazil than it is on the United States.

While Nobles is right to point out that "the census today, as in the past, remains the arena where ideas about race are worked through . . . and then applied to public policy" (84), the current-day U.S. Census Bureau is not the willing social engineer of days past, and in fact, the bureau has been desperately trying (in vain) to extricate itself from racial politics throughout most of the post-civil rights era. These and other factors, such as the uneasy overlap of liberal and conservative racial ideology briefly discussed on page 78, render the current public policy environment significantly different from the state of affairs discussed in the bulk of the book and deserve further attention.

Although the author gives a worthy nod toward the "story of racial discourse and census politics from the bottom up" (129), the role of social movements and individual activists to alter the terms of racial discourse is also under-specified. For example, are we to believe that the American multiracialists do indeed exhibit a long-standing commitment to the civil rights struggle (142) or not (137)? Are the Brazilian and US cases better understood in terms of Resource Mobilization theory (positing that social movement success is best explained through the presence of resources internal to the group such as organizational strength and money) or Political Opportunity structures (contending that success is more closely related to external factors, such as being in the right place at the right time)? Even though *Shades of Citizenship* only scratches the surface of these issues it digs deeply on others: the overall result makes for a fine book and a welcome contribution to the comparative study of racial politics.

Kim Williams *Harvard University John F. Kennedy School of Government*

Between Revolution and the Ballot Box: The Origins of the Argentine Radical Party
Paula Alonso
New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000, pp. xiii, 242

As the oldest existing political party in Argentina and one of the two that has dominated the political stage during the very turbulent twentieth century in this country, the Radical Party has been the focus of a large number of studies. Most of this literature has analyzed the role of the party in the period following the electoral reform of 1912—which made the already existing universal adult male suffrage compulsory and introduced the secret ballot—and the party's subsequent presidential victories between 1916 and 1930. Alonso's contribution to the historiography of the Radical Party lies in her detailed exploration of its formative years during the 1890s, encompassing its foundation in 1891 and its temporary demise by the end of the decade. More generally, the study provides the means for the author to develop an alternative perspective regarding both the significance of the decade for the later political transformation of the country and the very nature of politics and political competition in this critical period.

The book is premised on the understanding that the 1890s provided the context for the consolidation of features that were to become central in

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0008423902778220 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Argentina's political system. More importantly, the author's argument is that one of the main consequences of the Radical Party's original perception of its objective and dynamics as a political force was the confrontational and polarized nature that politics later acquired in the country (213). In advancing such a proposition, Alonso makes a strong case for considering the 1890s as a pivotal period in Argentina and the emergence of the Radical Party as one of its most emblematic moments. The study also seeks to document the significant transformation that took place within the party itself between the 1890s and its re-emergence to prominence under the leadership of Hipólito Yrigoyen in the second decade of the twentieth century.

Alonso's account provides the means for a re-examination of a period that has often been too narrowly depicted in terms of the tight political control exercise by the conservative PAN (*Partido Autonomista Nacional*—National Autonomist Party). Alternatively, the author successfully presents a vision of the decade where the Radical Party engaged consistently in electoral competition, and where elections, while marked by fraud and corruption, were not always events with predetermined outcomes (147). Electoral participation, nonetheless, had not always been the party's main strategy. The most direct political antecedent of the party—the Civic Union—was created as an instrument for the revolutionary overthrow of the PAN regime. Moreover, revolutionary rhetoric along with the justification of violence as a legitimate political tool remained key characteristics of the party in the 1890s (106).

As the author argues, though, the very notion of revolution needs qualification when used in reference to the Radical Party. For in its case, revolution meant the struggle for the restoration of the institutional order established by the national constitution and betrayed by the PAN, and thus it was in essence a conservative principle (111). Probably because this was the case, it was not extremely conflictive for the party to focus its efforts increasingly on electoral politics. The conservative nature of the Radical Party was also reflected in its defence of free trade and its doubts about the merits of economic modernization (170-71). This, in turn, might explain the electoral support that higher income groups provided to the party (160). While the shift to electoral competition away from revolutionary actions was undertaken successfully during the first years of the 1890s, it nonetheless led to the development of some major frictions within the leadership and to the party's eventual demise in 1898.

Alonso's work represents a key contribution to an understanding of this decisive political phase in Argentina. However, it leaves a number of factors insufficiently explained. First, while the author generally distinguishes her work from most of the existing literature, the reasons for the misinterpretations she identifies in it are never clarified. Thus, the relationship between her work and the existing scholarship on the subject is not clear and it is also hard to perceive the grounds for the errors in the alternative accounts her work seeks to rectify. This is related to some extent to a second shortcoming in the text: while the author develops a number of connections to key events in the period, others are missing or not sufficiently developed. Thus, there is a sense that Argentina was suffering the effects of an economic downturn, but its origins and main consequences are not sufficiently specified. Neither does the text elucidate for the reader the deep and very rapid economic transformation that the country had already undergone by the decade under study. Along with economic transformation there were also critical new social realities—for instance immigration, urbanization and the consolidation of a national state—that while present as variables in the analysis are not fully integrated as dynamic elements. Nonetheless, this is an important book that deserves a

careful reading by all those who seek to understand the complex nature of Argentine politics in the twentieth century.

Viviana Patroni *York University*

Peace, Power and Resistance in Cambodia: Global Governance and the Failure of International Conflict Resolution
Pierre P. Lizée
New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000, pp. xi, 206
Intervention and Change in Cambodia: Towards Democracy?
Sorpong Peou
New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000, pp. xxiv, 572

From 1991 to 1993 the United Nations, through the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), embarked upon an unprecedented effort at peacemaking, democratization, and economic development. Following the 1991 Paris Peace Agreement to end Cambodia's civil war, the UN helped administer state institutions and rebuild the impoverished economy. To many observers, this action signified the advent of a new, more active UN role in peacekeeping and peace building.

In spite of the influx of resources and increased international attention that followed years of isolation, Cambodia's democracy for the rest of the decade remained unconsolidated and characterized by a disregard for the rule of law, widespread human rights abuses, corruption, political violence, continued civil conflict, a coup d'état, and stalemates as political parties refused to recognize election results. The question of why the path to democracy in Cambodia has been so arduous and has suffered so many setbacks preoccupies scholars as well as those involved in the process. Many explanations attribute the setbacks to poor implementation of the Paris Agreement or a lack of sufficient resources. Two recent works, however, challenge these explanations and offer novel views on Cambodia's democratization and the new UN role.

In *Peace, Power and Resistance in Cambodia: Global Governance and the Failure of International Conflict Resolution*, Pierre P. Lizée asserts that obstacles to peace and democracy lay not in the implementation of the Paris Agreement but in the very model the agreement proposed. Lizée's analysis offers an important contribution to literature on Cambodia and UN activity in the 1990s by providing a detailed examination of the theory behind and influences upon the negotiations that culminated in the 1991 agreement. As stated by Lizée, the model of peace outlined in the Paris Agreement—the "peace as democracy model"—is based on the ideals of Western liberal democracy, in which peace is maintained by state control of violence and political conflict is nonviolent. This model is operationalized through the introduction of democratic, representative government; the placement of authority in a centralized state; the ability of the state to regulate violence and protect basic rights; and the promotion of capitalism.

A critical factor in the success of the peace agreement was the co-operation of the four Cambodian factions that participated in the agreement: the Cambodian government to 1990, led by Hun Sen; the Khmer Rouge; the royalists under then-Prince Norodom Sihanouk; and the republican faction, led by Son San. Lizée argues that the peace agreement neglected the importance of social influences on the behaviour of the factions' elites. Although these leaders signed the peace agreement, their failure to adhere fully to the plan's provisions was influenced by a Cambodian model of peace and the factions' self-interest. As noted by Lizée, Cambodia lacks a tradition of democratic

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0008423902778220 Published online by Cambridge University Press

government. Cambodian social institutions impart a specific conception of peace that differs from the model employed in the peace agreement. Historically, state institutions in Cambodia have been weak and have relied upon violence to confront threats from its neighbours as well as internal factionalism. Cambodian royalty largely controlled business activities, preventing the emergence of a bourgeoisie that could challenge existing power structures. Individual rights and representative government were diminished under a system, influenced by Brahmanism and Buddhism, where hierarchy and patronage determined social order. Lizée describes the models of peace to emerge from these influences as those of peace as factional balance or hegemony, in which violence is diminished (though not eliminated) through a rough balance of power among factions or the dominance of one faction, and peace as restored social harmony, in which the community mobilizes in order to transform social order and decrease violence. Although Lizée stresses the importance of social traditions, he does not address the underresearched topic of how social institutions have been transformed or sustained by the vast changes that have occurred throughout the country in recent decades.

The conceptual problems of the peace agreement began to manifest themselves as early as the two-year period preceding the 1993 elections. According to Lizée, one of the greatest obstacles to the UN plan during this period was the Khmer Rouge's refusal to abide by the terms of the agreement and disarm their forces. In turn, the remaining three factions formed the Supreme National Council to work with the UN but refused to demobilize and created alliances that inhibited the promotion of a neutral political environment. The obstacles to enacting the Paris Agreement were exacerbated by economic difficulties, including widespread corruption, trade imbalances and hyperinflation.

Despite the lack of the neutral political environment needed to secure the free and fair elections proposed in the peace agreement, the UN held elections in 1993. In part, these elections were held because they served as a key indicator of the mission's success. However, Lizée contends that this decision contributed to the instability experienced in the post-election period. Indeed, the aftermath of the election and the years that followed were characterized by the turbulence described at the beginning of this article. Although the royalist faction of Prince Norodom Ranariddh, the National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful, and Co-operative Cambodia (FUNCINPEC), won the elections, they were forced to enter a powersharing agreement with Hun Sen and the Cambodian People's Party (CPP), which still controlled large parts of the country. This arrangement, brokered through King Norodom Sihanouk, broke down in 1997, when Prime Minister Hun Sen overthrew his co-prime minister, Norodom Ranariddh. In late 1998 the two parties agreed to form a coalition government with Hun Sen as the sole prime minister and Prince Ranariddh as National Assembly president.

In a decade where the end of the Cold War brought about increased ideological unity on political and economic policies within the international community, Lizée's study is a sobering reminder that such policies will be influenced by the unique political, social and economic traditions of the countries in which they are implemented. In Cambodia, these unique traditions would have been addressed in a model of peace that, according to Lizée, would have facilitated the UN's commitment to a greater level of force in order to create successfully a neutral political environment *before* the elections and subsequent inauguration of democratic, representative government—a goal that would have required substantial investments in resources and time but would have also diminished the post-1993 political instability.

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0008423902778220 Published online by Cambridge University Press

An important element of Lizée's argument is the role of social traditions and culture in the process of democratic consolidation. Central to Lizée's thesis is the role of the international community in promoting democratic governance. A second work to address the issue of democratization in Cambodia, Sorpong Peou's *Intervention and Change in Cambodia: Towards Democracy?*, also looks at the ability of the international community to promote democracy. However, a key difference in these two works is their explanation of what factors have inhibited democracy: while Lizée stresses social traditions and culture, Peou disputes the argument that Asian societies are not open to democracy. Instead, Peou argues that while political systems are, in part, a product of the relations between the state and other social groups, they are also the product of relations between local factions and external powers—especially in weak states such as Cambodia.

Peou provides an extensive evaluation of political change in Cambodia, with a focus on the postindependence era, including key documents in the appendices and a concluding comparison to the experience of democracy in other Asian countries. Peou describes each of the regimes in the postindependence era as "anti-democratic": Prince Norodom Sihanouk's paternalistic authoritarianism, from 1955 to 1970; President Lon Nol's republican authoritarianism from 1970 to 1975; Prime Minister Pol Pot's revolutionary totalitarianism from 1975 to 1978; the People's Republic of Kampuchea/State of Cambodia's socialist dictatorship from 1979 to 1990; and, lastly, the period of unconsolidated democracy from 1990 to 1998. Each of these periods lacked what Peou classifies as "a fundamental precondition for democratic emergence": a hurting balance of power (2).

Peou's hurting balance of power exists when there is a non-hegemonic power structure. According to Peou, a hurting balance "generally implies the inability of adversaries to eliminate each other by force, as well as the painful reality that maintaining the balance hurts them equally" (20). This hurting balance can exist on two levels: within the state, when no one person or party is dominant, and between state and society, when the state is not able to suppress society and society is unable to undermine the state. Peou asserts that political vulnerability increases the state's propensity to use violent as opposed to nonviolent means. Therefore, the most vulnerable state, Pol Pot's revolutionary totalitarian regime, was also the most anti-democratic.

While Peou acknowledges that external powers can either promote or inhibit democratic growth, he acknowledges that in most cases they have done the latter. For example, Prince Sihanouk's decision to end diplomatic ties with the United States during the US-Vietnam war facilitated the 1970 coup. While the US supported the subsequent government of Lon Nol, China and Vietnam's support of the Khmer Rouge as well as the US bombing of the country helped usher in the genocidal reign of Pol Pot. Cold War politics continued to influence the fate of democracy in Cambodia, as the Soviet Union and Vietnam helped install the People's Republic of Kampuchea while China, the US, and others helped support various elements of the opposition. It would have been interesting for Peou to comment on competing perspectives and policies concerning Cambodia within the key foreign states, especially in view of current politics. Although one of the goals of UNTAC was to promote democracy, Peou contends that its ability to do so was constrained by its inability to create a hurting balance of power. For example, the CPP was able to remain a hegemonic force after the Paris Agreement, as the remaining three factions no longer presented a unified opposition. While there was a degree of relative stability in the CPP/FUNCINPEC coalition from 1993 to 1995, external donors and investors considered Hun Sen the stronger coali-

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0008423902778220 Published online by Cambridge University Press

tion partner. The external donors and investors, concerned with a neoliberal economic agenda, were preoccupied with the need for stability. As such, with the exception of the US, the major donors (including Australia, Canada, China, France, and Japan) did little to protest the 1997 coup and the ongoing human rights abuses. Peou cautions external forces who "push weak states to the brink of collapse and then blame their leaders for not overcoming the structural overburden laid on them" (428). Peou also notes that hegemonic stability may not lead to liberal democracy and that neoliberalism may be harmful for weak states, as demonstrated in the Cambodian example.

Both Peou and Lizée provide thought-provoking analyses of democratization and peace in Cambodia. While the authors differ in the importance they accord social traditions and culture in these processes, they share an emphasis on the role—positive and negative—played by external actors as well as the time and resources that are needed to achieve a situation in which democracy, peace and respect for human rights may be strengthened. As the UN struggles to define its role in the post-Cold War world, these works offer important insights into the success of future efforts.

Irene V. Langran *University of Toronto*

Belarus: A Denationalized Nation
David R. Marples
Amsterdam: Harwood, 1999, pp. xiv, 139

Belarus is a country that North American scholars and the public at large know very little about, and its politics have attracted little attention from political scientists. In recent years, however, there has been a surge of interest due mainly to flagrant human rights violations, including the disappearance of prominent opposition figures and other oddities of a rising authoritarian regime.

In this 130-page volume with a dissonant and engaging title, historian David R. Marples offers his view on recent developments in Belarus. The book has been very much welcomed and widely read. In the author's own words, "Its goal is to examine the contemporary situation in Belarus: in politics, society, and the economy, with the intention of providing a useful guide for scholars, university and college students, and for those doing business in or visiting Belarus" (xi).

Chapter 1 begins the book with a historical digression, a concise compilation of writing produced by Belarusian historiography by the 1990s as a result of Gorbachovian perestroika and glasnost, and the initial years of independence characterized by an intensive revision of official Soviet historiography. Marples' conclusion to this chapter is that contemporary Belarusians tend to look to the Soviet past with nostalgia and therefore the path towards democracy is going to be a difficult one.

Chapter 2 discusses the economic situation between 1986 and 1996 and gives a gloomy picture of the economic slump caused by lack of reform and sound economic policy.

Chapter 3, "Perestroika and Independence, 1985-1993," spotlights an array of topics. It analyzes the language issue and Russification, as well as politics, devoting a subsection to the Belarusian Popular Front, a political movement that has played a prominent role in pushing Belarus towards reform. The conclusion is quite pessimistic: during the period of independence, Marples asserts, the ruling elite has embarked on the conscious negation of its own culture and history (54). Belarus floundered without a clearly defined policy for economic change, with static political leadership

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0008423902778220 Published online by Cambridge University Press

generally devoid of new ideas, and with an opposition too small to exert significant influence on the heavily Russified and Sovietized population (66).

Chapter 4 recounts the intrigue of the election of the first Belarusian president in 1994 and discusses the new president's retrogressive solutions to Belarusian problems.

Chapter 5, with the self-explanatory title, "Lukashenka's Consolidation of Power," gives an account of the events that led President Lukashenka to achieve a total power grab through the controversial 1996 referendum.

In chapter 6, the reader finds Marples' explanation of Belarus's relations with Russia from independence to the conclusion of the 1997 Union Treaty. Although his account is replete with interesting and well-written anecdotes, the reader seems to be left in the dark as to the underlying causes of the inconclusive Russian-Belarusian minuet.

Despite his initial proposition—Belarus is a denationalized nation—the author quite unexpectedly states in the conclusion that " . . . Belarus will survive and find its place in the world of the 21st century" (123). Until this moment, nothing in the volume would suggest such an optimistic conclusion.

Marples is at his best when he analyzes the history of Belarus and Lukashenka's clamp on the media, recounted here in interesting details, giving not only facts but conveying also the poignancy of the atmosphere. The author's fieldwork contributed significantly to gaining these insights. The narrative is very engaging: for example, giving an account of clashes with police during one of many violent demonstrations, Marples reports that police arrested a man, deaf and mute from birth, on charges of shouting anti-Lukashenka slogans (83). The author writes with a lot of sympathy for the Belarusian people.

The style adopted in this book is closer to investigative journalism than to academic analysis conducted according to a rigorous research design. Indeed, the author does not ground his work in explicit theories. Hypotheses are not deduced nor even formally stated, and he is not shy about expressing his own normative commitments.

Many arguments put forward by Marples are not always convincing. Thus, Lukashenka did not revert to the old Soviet-style economy because "the government lacked any firm direction in economic policy" (35), as the author maintains, but rather because of deliberate action by the Belarusian leadership to preserve what they see as the economic base of political power, that is, the state ownership of the means of production and a state-run economy. The president of unreformed Belarus can easily mobilize all the resources of the republic for the pursuit of his political goals, which would be completely impossible in a privatized economy. The imaginary people's property seems to benefit only certain actors.

Conspicuous by its absence is any comprehensive discussion of the constitutional and legal foundation of the current Belarusian state and the resulting distribution of power. The author dwells at length on the first presidential election without mentioning where the presidency had come from and what role it was to play in Belarusian politics.

To characterize the so-called Masherau Years (1965-1980) as a distinguished historical period seems very questionable. I do not believe that Belarusian Communist Secretary Macherau, no matter how strong and independent a personality, had any serious effect on Belarusian identity or on political and economic developments in this country. He, like all other communist bosses, was portrayed through the dominated media as father of the Belarusians, but could hardly move beyond the communist ideological carcass. Certain events presented in the book seem to be uncritically viewed through the lens of the author's local contacts.

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0008423902778220 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Unfortunately, there are quite a lot of inaccuracies, inexactitudes and even errors in this short volume. Thus, Marples states, "On April 12 1995, Belarus and Russia announced the signing of a monetary union" (34). In fact, the Monetary Treaty was signed a year earlier. This chronological blunder confuses the reader and hides the real cause for the signing of the Monetary Treaty, which in reality translated Moscow's desire to place its preferred candidate for a newly established presidency in Belarus. The treaty was signed just a few months before the first Belarusian presidential election scheduled for July 1994. Russia had a stake in the outcome of these elections and put its weight behind them, securing the needed outcome. The signing of the treaty even led to a major reshuffling of the Russian cabinet in 1994: Deputy Prime Minister Gaydar and Finance Minister Fedorov resigned from the government in protest against the monetary treaty with Belarus. Simply shifting a date by one year broke the cause-effect relationship, misleading the reader about the internal dynamics of the Russian-Belarusian monetary unification attempt.

This chronological mistake further "allows" Marples to claim that the chairman of the National Bank of Belarus, Bahdankevich, resigned in September 1995 because he opposed the monetary union with Russia (37). Although reticent about the deal, Bahdankevich had participated in the preparation of the Monetary Treaty in 1994. His resignation one year later could not be linked to the Monetary Union Treaty, because the latter had been abrogated one year prior to his resignation. The Treaty of Friendship that Russia and Belarus signed in 1995 was a non-descript political agreement and contained no provisions on monetary unification. Sadly, Marples elaborates at length on this false cause of Bahdankevich's resignation, and as is the case with Masherau, he tends to overstate the role of Bahdankevich in economic reform.

The author mistakenly indicates that there are 9 constitutional court justices (89), while the 1994 Constitution and the amended current constitution provided respectively for 11 and 12 justices. This sort of mistake diminishes the value of the book as reference for political science students.

Furthermore, Sharetsky, the speaker of the disbanded Parliament, never worked in the Hrodna region, and it is commonly considered that the Mahileu region is the most Russophone, and not Homel. The author mistakenly names Gennadiy Serlechnikov (95) as Speaker of the Russian Duma in 1996, while the real name of the speaker is Seleznev. These kinds of rather innocuous but annoying mistakes are quite frequent in the book.

These weaknesses aside, the book provides, however, a wealth of descriptive information that many scholars of Belarus and comparativists will find useful.

Whether the reader ultimately concludes that Belarus is a denationalized nation is less important than the fact that the book encourages interest in this republic and provides a lively reading experience on the contemporary history of Belarus.

ALEXANDER DANILOVICH

Canadian Political Philosophy: Contemporary Reflections
Ronald Beiner and Wayne Norman, eds
Don Mills: Oxford University Press, 2001, pp. 408

Canadian Political Philosophy is a collection of 26 papers by leading Canadian political thinkers, rather than an exploration of distinctly Canadian themes or achievements in political philosophy. As such, it is not the place to look for the political or philosophical equivalent of the great Canadian novel.

But it is the best place to get a sense of the range of ideas and intellects that animate one of the most interesting corners of Canadian academic life.

The editors of this volume, Ronald Beiner and Wayne Norman, have put together a nice mix of contributions from younger and older scholars, the soon-to-be-known alongside the already well-established. And they have effectively highlighted the areas, citizenship, constitutionalism, cultural pluralism and creative use of the history of political thought, in which Canadian political philosophers are making their most notable contributions. Of course, there may be some quibbles about people who should have been included in the volume, but all the contributors have earned their place in the collection. The fact that one could easily add many more is just one more sign of the depth and vitality of the field.

Beiner and Norman speculate that Canada's "more or less permanent constitutional crisis" helps explain the strength of Canadian political philosophy, since it forces Canadians to address fundamental questions about citizenship and identity that rarely come up in more settled regimes. No doubt they have a point, especially with regard to some of the themes that preoccupy so many of us. But I suspect that academic, rather than political history provides the primary reason for the strength of the field among Canadian scholars.

Canadian universities were slow and often unwilling to jump on the bandwagon of two postwar movements that challenged the legitimacy of political philosophy as an intellectual enterprise: the behavioural revolution in political science and the analytic revolution in philosophy. As a result, political philosophy remained a serious and normal field of study in Canada while it was fighting for survival in British and American universities. Its Canadian practitioners were thus well-placed to take leading roles when philosophy and political science departments elsewhere began to take the field seriously again. Moreover, having avoided the worst of these battles about the legitimacy of their field, Canadian political philosophers have not been as preoccupied with methodological and metatheoretical navel-gazing as many of their American counterparts. Whatever the reason, the influence of Canadian scholars in contemporary political philosophy is certainly disproportionate to their numbers. And the depth and confidence of their debates stands out in a field where arguments are so often defensive and apologetic.

Since the volume contains so many papers on so many different issues, it makes little sense to describe, let alone evaluate, them in a short review like this. Suffice it to say that it is an impressive collection. Some of the best pieces, such as Denise Réaume's essay on multiculturalism and the law or Melissa Williams' reflections of a "Yankee-Canadian" on the distinctive characteristics of Canadian constitutionalism, are by the younger contributors to the volume. But the best-known figures, such as Charles Taylor, James Tully and Will Kymlicka, also make very valuable contributions.

But what can the volume as a whole tell us about the distinctive character of Canadian political philosophy? First of all, it suggests that political philosophy in Canada tends, for the most part, to be an academic endeavour, an activity to be conducted under the sponsorship of universities rather than in a broader public forum. (Of course, this is much less the case in Quebec than in the rest of Canada, as can be seen in Stéphane Dion's and Guy Laforest's contributions to the volume.) I am not suggesting that Canadian political philosophers have been less politically active than their counterparts elsewhere. Far from it. After all, one of the volume's best-known contributors is a federal cabinet member, another a perennial candidate for the House of Commons. It is merely to note that the preferred form of communication among Canadian political philosophers tends to be the academic article or treatise,

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0008423902778220 Published online by Cambridge University Press

rather than appeals to a broader public audience. For good or ill—mostly for good, in my opinion—Canadian political philosophers have generally resisted the rather superficial model of the public intellectual that has seduced many of their American colleagues. (Indeed, the volume contains a provocative critique by Tom Pangle of the whole idea of a public philosophy.)

Second, if this collection accurately represents the larger community of Canadian political philosophers, and I believe that it does, then it suggests that this community generally leans left, however softly. The majority of the papers argue for ways of expanding or transcending liberal ideals and institutions in order to promote greater and more meaningful forms of democracy, equality, diversity and community. Moreover, explicitly conservative viewpoints are relatively rare in the volume, as they are in Canadian political philosophy generally.

There is considerable irony in this ideological tilt, if, as Melissa Williams suggests in her paper, Canada is a "Burkean society," in which "getting along takes precedence over getting it right." If Canadians are so much more concerned about humanity and stability than abstract principles of justice, why are Canadian political philosophers so much more favourably disposed towards innovations that many of their British and American counterparts would criticize as utopian? Are Canadians in rebellion against their political culture? I rather doubt it. Paradoxically, as Williams also notes, it may be precisely the tendency to put humanity and stability ahead of abstract principles of justice that creates room for greater experimentation in Canadian political theory and practice. For if you can count on your compatriots to try to keep things together, even when the parts do not seem to fit very well, then you can focus more attention on new ways of dealing with old problems and less on how to sort out the inconsistencies you create by doing so.

Canadians, I would suggest, are used to counting on each other in this way. What do they gain and what do they lose by doing so? What kind of political assumptions sustain this kind of political culture? To what extent, if at all, does it make sense to imitate these features of Canadian political culture elsewhere? These would all be worthy questions to explore in further collections of the work of Canadian political philosophers.

Bernard Yack *University of Wisconsin, Madison*

Sovereign Virtue: The Theory and Practice of Equality
Ronald Dworkin
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000, pp. 511

This book gathers together a highly influential series of essays, written over the last 20 years, in which Ronald Dworkin has elaborated an original and powerful conception of liberal equality. Dworkin has made only minor editorial changes to the previously published essays and added only a couple of new pieces. However, this does not diminish the value of the book. Grouped together for the first time, the essays provide the most comprehensive statement of Dworkin's theory available. Given the importance of his contributions to political philosophy this is indeed welcome.

The point of departure for Dworkin's work is that an abstract but substantive principle of equality is the "sovereign virtue of political community." According to this principle, " no government is legitimate that does not show equal concern for the fate of all those citizens over whom it claims dominion and from whom it claims allegiance" (1). Dworkin's project is to develop a systematic interpretation of the theoretical and practical implica-

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0008423902778220 Published online by Cambridge University Press

tions that flow from acceptance of this principle. The first part of the book is devoted to the theoretical interpretation of equal concern. The second part applies the theory to various controversies in American politics such as health care, welfare, affirmative action, euthanasia, free speech, genetic experimentation, homosexuality and electoral reform. Dworkin's discussion of these practical matters is sophisticated and insightful. Whether or not his liberal analysis is always sound, one cannot help but be impressed by his capacity to explain the relevance of basic principles of justice to the resolution of public policy disputes. However, Dworkin's most profound contributions to political philosophy lie with his articulation of the theory of liberal equality.

Treating equality as the sovereign virtue of political morality does not diminish the importance of ideals traditionally identified as basic to liberalism. Properly interpreted, liberty, tolerance, democracy and individual responsibility are harmonious ideals that can be treated as facets of the best conception of equal concern. Dworkin argues that the best mutual accommodation of these ideals occurs within the framework of the distinctive account of distributive justice called equality of resources. A political community treats its members as equals by ensuring that each has access to an equal share of resources. However, what constitutes an equal share is no simple matter for Dworkin. To begin, equality of resources aims at a form of equality that is sensitive to the fact that choices individuals make about how to conduct their lives can legitimately play a role in determining the resources to which they are justly entitled. Economic inequalities that are traceable to choices made by individuals do not violate the principle of equal concern. Yet many of the factors that influence the success of a person's life are not matters of choice. Some disadvantages are attributable to morally arbitrary features of a person's circumstances. For example, the burdens faced by persons with congenital disabilities are unchosen. Equality of resources requires that compensation be made available to persons with disabilities. Similarly, inequalities in natural talents pose a challenge. A person lucky enough to be born with a valued natural talent is not entitled to every economic advantage that can be garnered through its exercise. Dworkin's theory requires the adoption of a system of redistribution that can fairly mitigate the impact on economic distribution of arbitrary differences in people's natural talents. A scheme for resource distribution succeeds in treating people as equals if it displays sensitivity to individual choices while ensuring that no one is disadvantaged by arbitrary aspects of their natural or social circumstances.

A striking and contentious feature of Dworkin's approach is his invocation of the market as a device for giving content to this conception of equal concern. He contends that an idealized market plays a crucial role in defining ideal distributive equality because it supplies a special metric of opportunity costs through which the value of resource shares can be fairly determined. A complex scheme of hypothetical insurance markets is used to generate an account of disability compensation, a view of just health care and a model of redistributive taxation. Dworkin also contends that the market structure of equality of resources holds the key to finding a secure place for individual liberty within empire of equality. Dworkin's attempts to use the market as a device for the articulation of egalitarian justice are intricate and ingenious. He succeeds in demonstrating that the across-the-board antipathy to the market traditionally evinced by egalitarians is misplaced. But the market-driven interpretation of equality is flawed in many respects. The underlying conception of fairness that Dworkin so eloquently articulates would be better served by abandonment of the claim that there is a deep intrinsic link between markets and the theory of equality. Dworkin does recognize that real markets are

often not the allies of equality that he credits to their theoretical counterparts. But the liberal political reforms he envisions, though radical as judged by the standards of contemporary political discourse in the United States, consist mainly in tinkering with the welfare state to make it modestly more generous.

Dworkin's otherwise wide-ranging discussion fails to examine some important matters. First, there is virtually no examination of equality in and between families even though the family is a significant institution through which inequality can be generated. Second, Dworkin is curiously silent about matters arising from recent discussions of equality, minority rights and multiculturism. Third, Dworkin does not address the issue of global justice even though the most distressing forms of inequality are those that obtain between citizens of affluent nations and citizens of poor nations.

Dworkin's account of the foundations of liberal equality is provocative. Although he eschews state perfectionism, he favours a comprehensive form of liberalism that is rooted in a distinctive conception of the good life. Living well involves responding skilfully to challenges, and Dworkin argues that good lives can be led within the parameters supplied by his egalitarian conception of distributive justice. The details of Dworkin's discussion of the relationship between equality and the good life are fascinating and address many intriguing puzzles. The reconciliation of equality and the good life that Dworkin defends is perhaps more optimistic than it is sound. Nonetheless, reading Dworkin on this, or any of the other diverse issues explored in the book, is certainly a challenge worth embracing. These essays show Dworkin at the height of his considerable powers. Although there is much to be debated here, no one who is interested in understanding the current status of discussions of the theory and practice of equality can afford to ignore this book.

COLIN M. MACLEOD *University of Victoria*

Virtue, Vice, and Value
Thomas Hurka
New York: Oxford University Press, 2001, pp. ix, 272

In this volume Thomas Hurka provides an elegant account of the virtues, vices and their place in a broader value theory. Hurka is not a virtue theorist as such; he does not hold that the virtues are in some sense foundational to morality and the explanation of value. Indeed, the final chapter of his book is devoted to a critique of such efforts to ground morality in the virtues. Rather, his approach is a sophisticated form of consequentialism.

Hurka refers to his account of the virtues and vices as the "recursive account." Broadly, the recursive account involves taking a range of states to be intrinsically valuable (Hurka does not enter into how these are to be determined). In turn, appropriate attitudes towards these base states will themselves be intrinsically good. Hurka's basic principles are: (BG) Pleasure, knowledge and achievement are intrinsically good. (12); (LG) If x is intrinsically good, loving x (desiring, pursuing, or taking pleasure in x) for itself is also intrinsically good. (13) Thus, a desire that there be pleasure in the world would itself be intrinsically good. The recursive element enters as correct or appropriate attitudes towards lower-level attitudes are in turn seen as good (a love of a love of knowledge would be intrinsically good, and so on).

Hurka treats intrinsic evil in a parallel fashion—certain basic states such as pain or false belief are seen as intrinsically evil. A love of intrinsically evil states is itself intrinsically evil. Finally, Hurka notes that a hatred of intrinsi-

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0008423902778220 Published online by Cambridge University Press

cally evil states is intrinsically good, while a hatred of intrinsic goods is intrinsically evil.

Upon these foundational principles Hurka builds a thoroughly developed and insightful value theory. He includes discussion of instrumental goods and evils, the importance of having appropriately proportioned attitudes (consider a person who is made only slightly unhappy by great evils which occur to others, but who is made extremely unhappy by even the slightest evil which affects him), the diminishing value of iterated attitudes, disanalogies between virtue and vice, and many other important issues that arise, given his basic recursive theory.

Hurka shows his insight in anticipating a wide range of possible objections to his account, and showing how the theory could be modified to meet the intuitions that guide the objections. Indeed, it seems most objections that spring to a reader's mind will be addressed by Hurka within a few pages! On the other hand, it can be a bit difficult to determine which modifications of the basic theory Hurka himself endorses. His basic goal is to show how his basic recursive theory can account for wide ranges of intuitions and corresponding developments. Still, a firmer statement of which modifications of the recursive account Hurka himself endorses would be welcome.

What, then, are the virtues and vices on Hurka's account? He suggests that "The moral virtues are those attitudes to goods and evils that are intrinsically good, and the moral vices are those attitudes to goods and evils that are intrinsically evil" (20). Hurka's account differs significantly from traditional accounts, in that it "treats virtue atomistically, finding it in occurrent desires, actions, and feelings regardless of their connection to more permanent traits of character" (42). Thus, it would seem that the serial killer who feels regret over the suffering of his victims for a fleeting instant would possess the virtue of compassion for that instant. Many, of course, will question whether this sort of "atomistic" account adequately captures common notions of virtue and vice as deep-seated character traits. Still, Hurka does provide a substantial defence for his characterizations, and suggests that one could modify his account to value character traits (though he himself seems to reject this move).

While primarily focusing on issues in ethics and value theory, there is much of interest in Hurka's book for political theorists. In chapter 5, Hurka provides a sharp critique of conservative arguments that government welfare does not adequately allow for voluntary, virtuous charitable acts by citizens. He draws on his recursive account of virtue to show, plausibly, that our primary concern here should be the basic goods of those needing assistance, and not the ability of wealthy agents to perform virtuous acts of charity. Chapter 7, "Extending the Account," contains discussion of such topics as distributive justice, retribution, loyalty and nationalism. While Hurka's treatment of these topics is (understandably) brief, given the main focus of his book, he makes several worthwhile points, and clearly integrates his discussion of these issues within the framework of his recursive value theory.

Hurka's book is an important contribution to value theory, and the growing literature on the virtues. His recursive account is sophisticated, wide-ranging, and flexible, and provides a strong consequentialist alternative to recent virtue theories. There is good reason to expect Hurka's book will be the focus of a great deal of discussion in many circles.

JASON KAWALL *University of Tennessee at Chattanooga*

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0008423902778220 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Rethinking the Communicative Turn: Adorno, Habermas, and the Problem of Communicative Freedom
Martin Morris
Albany: State University of New York Press, 2001, pp. v, 245

Martin Morris' *Rethinking the Communicative Turn* is an attempt to reconstruct a critical theory that takes its inspiration from the work of Theodor Adorno. This reconstruction is made possible by way of a critical confrontation with Jürgen Habermas' theory of communicative rationality. In pursuing the Enlightenment's ideal of true society, Habermas finds the total critique of reason, given by the first generation of the Frankfurt School, to be self-contradictory and, as such, unavailing. Such a critique, then, according to Habermas, is prone to resignation and conservatism. In order to overcome the Frankfurt School's assessment of the dominance of instrumental rationality, Habermas presents communicative action as a primary mode of reason. This alternative is made possible by virtue of Habermas' "linguistic turn" which entails abandoning the subject-centred philosophy in favour of an intersubjective philosophy of language. Morris' engagement is aimed at presenting a response to Habermas' critique by appealing to "a concept of communicative freedom coupled with an ethics of communicative interest in and respect for the other and otherness that are inspired by a reconsideration of Theodor W. Adorno's critical theory" (1).

The book begins with an introductory chapter that gives an historical account of Critical Theory, which frames the Frankfurt School's critique of modernity and Habermas' reaction to that assessment. Morris' summary of the history of the Institut für Sozialforschung is concise, and his juxtaposition of Habermas' project with that of Adorno's and Horkheimer's clearly sets up the scene for the discussion of their works in the following chapters. While in the second chapter Morris presents an account of the main themes in the original program of the Frankfurt School—most notably the crisis of ideology critique—in order to provide the context for the major arguments of his thesis, the third chapter discusses Habermas' version of ideology critique in the form of the critique of reification. Together these two chapters allow for an engaging comparison between Adorno's and Habermas' approaches to the critique of ideology. In the fourth chapter, after a brief discussion of Habermas' theory of communicative action, Morris examines the former's critique of Adorno, which is cast as a critique of performative contradiction. Finally in the last chapter of the book, Morris attempts to present a reading of Adorno's aesthetic-critical theory that would allow for reconstruction of a radical democratic political theory.

Morris' discussion throughout the book is detailed and attentive to the history of the tradition of critical theory of which he demonstrates a genuine knowledge. His intimate familiarity with the works of his interlocutors, in turn, allows for an insightful interpretation. There are, however, two points worth noticing with his presentation:

First, there seems to be two moments in Morris' critique of Habermas: an appeal to Adorno's aesthetic and the negative force of art is presented as an alternative to the communicative rationality that allows for a greater freedom and inclusion; an appeal to Marxist concepts and categories such as labour, class, ideology critique, domination, classless society and so forth, is made to argue for ineffectiveness and complacency of Habermas' theory as a part of the ideology of the status quo. Morris' critique is much more successful in its first moment, where he fleshes out the theoretical potentials and possibilities of some Adornoian concepts, which neatly lend themselves to a rad-

ical theory of democracy where politics is seen as an ongoing process of negotiation and contestation among diverse groups. The second moment of the critique remains unconvincing because the usefulness of Marxist categories, for example class, as socio/political tools with analytic power has long been questioned. Based on the first moment democracy and freedom can be understood as an agonistic pluralism, while the Marxist thrust of the second moment conceives freedom and democracy as only attainable after the abolition of capitalism and in a classless society. Morris is right to emphasize the utopian aspect of the critical theory. In this respect, the difference between the two moments of his critique reflects the difference between a realistic utopia and an unrealistic one.

Second, Morris' book is not accessible to many people. Both Habermas and Adorno are notoriously difficult writers whose complex, abstract and loaded language does not get clarified in Morris. Instead, he, too, writes with a great deal of complexity, assuming that his readers are well versed in, not only the writing of different generations of the Frankfurt School, but also in writings from Hegel to Marx to Foucault and to Derrida. Consider the following: "Given that the subject is an ineradicable element (but not a 'bad' element in itself that ought to be eradicated, were it even possible), subjective consciousness has the potential to realize itself only when it gives itself over to the object such that its subjective reason is substantially mitigated under a new set of interobject and intersubject political conditions. 'The subject is the more the less it is, and it is the less the more it believes in its own objective being' " (159). Only those who are familiar with the tradition of Critical Theory and German Idealism will have the ability to make sense of such passages. The problem of the obscurity of language is compounded by some typographical and syntactical errors from repetition of a phrase, as in "The struggle with the question of what it is that limits the thought that limits the thought has consequently led . . . " (44), to ungrammatical sentences such as, "The phenomena *ideology* is designed to name do not operate simply to mask 'real relations' but are somehow . . . " (42), to such awkward sentences as "The condition of claiming validity, Habermas argues, is that reasons must always be able to be given that demonstrate the validity of a claim to the . . . " (102). These errors, coupled with the obscure language, will hinder the readers' grasp of the insight of the book.

Andollah Payrow Shabani *University of Ottawa*

Political Theory in Transition
Noel O'Sullivan, ed
New York: Routledge, 2000, pp. xii, 264

The short essays collected here are designed as an introduction to contemporary political theory, with special reference to those new themes which have emerged in the 15 years since communitarian criticism first deflected attention from the arguments about distributive justice sparked by John Rawls's *A Theory of Justice*. Topics considered include identity, nationalism, globalization, citizenship, deliberation and ecology. While the editor's own contribution, an Oakeshottian reflection on power and authority, seems curiously dated in this company, Noel O'Sullivan has produced an excellent and stimulating introduction to the current concerns of political theorists.

The essays are loosely organized under headings such as "the concept of the individual," "citizenship," "national and global contexts" and "the nature and limits of political theory," but it is striking how a concern with the

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0008423902778220 Published online by Cambridge University Press

clash between political reality and normative reflection provides an underlying theme to the diverse topics considered. In Morag Patrick's essay on the politics of recognition, this figures in the form of a criticism of liberalism for failing to acknowledge ontological and symbolic themes in political life. She argues we must pay greater attention to the role of symbols in mediating self-understandings, and especially, as Paul Ricoeur contends, narrative forms. This suggests an interesting avenue for exploration by social critics, but it is not so clear that it prevents an insuperable challenge to liberal theory. Rather, it seems, as Andrew Mason suggests in his review of the various communitarian challenges formulated in the 1980s, that liberalism can acknowledge the importance of these themes and incorporate them within its normative framework. Such challenges may, he allows, prompt further reflection on the nature of "community" and the interaction of different levels of community within and across states.

Andrea Baumeister is similarly unwilling to revise substantially liberalism's normative commitments in her account of the "New Feminism": a family of approaches concerned broadly with identity and gendered perspectives, and especially the way that male experience functions as normative in social and political contexts. As such, these mark a departure from the more easily assimilable concerns of first- and second-wave feminists with equality and inclusion. Baumeister criticizes Iris Young's account of group representation for falling back into the essentialism which she ostensibly rejects, and Chantal Mouffe (who contributes an essay contrasting deliberative democracy with her own "agonistic" model) for avoiding essentialism but surrendering the principled defence of diversity to the contingencies of power relations. Baumeister concludes that a revisitation of Kantian liberalism may provide more adequate resources to cope with context and particularity than liberalism's critics suppose.

Other contributors, such as Richard Bellamy, David Archard, Brown and Hirst, examine the challenges posed by developments primarily affecting social and political institutions themselves. Bellamy counters the North American bias of much anglophone political theory by focusing on the import of European integration for our conceptions of citizenship. Neither traditional cosmopolitan nor communitarian models can cope with the emerging "bricolage" of sub-, supra- and international institutions. What is to be preferred is a republican, deliberative style of politics which aims at *producing* civic compromises rather than *assuming* a pre-political consensus, whether this is conceived in liberal or communitarian terms. Hirst and Brown both address globalization and its implications for sovereignty and the current state system. Hirst's scepticism about globalization is essentially social-theoretic rather than normative, and while Brown explicitly addresses the conflict between these alternate ways of doing political theory, he plumps in the end for an "agonistic" style of politics which effectively replaces normative concerns with essentially explanatory problems.

Archard's reflections on nationalism and the liberal-nationalist strategy of "making a virtue out of necessity" by pointing to the potential benefits of national solidarity, conclude with the thought, comforting to neither nationalists nor liberals, that nations may simply be more resistant to being molded in the desired fashion than either should like. While we can choose between re-evaluating nationalism, or seeking to depoliticize it, this phenomenon may simply constitute a limit to the ambitions of normative political theory to remake the world as it ought to be.

Essays by Paul Kelly and Bhiku Parekh on the nature of political theory itself conclude the volume. Kelly argues that anti-foundationalist critics like

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0008423902778220 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Gray misrepresent the rather modest, pragmatic approach of contemporary liberal political theory and have not yet set out a viable alternative to it. Parekh questions the idea that political theory was "dead" prior to Rawls and would have us reject both "narrow" normativism and liberalism which, as Kelly points out, constitute the core commitments of mainstream political theory. If it is the case that theoretical outlook and political preference are indeed so closely interconnected then we may expect little agreement on the nature and scope of political theory any time soon. The contributors are to be congratulated, however, in providing such a fine introduction to the diverse topics and concerns of contemporary political theorists.

CILLIAN MCBRIDE *London School of Economics*

Politics, Theology and History
Raymond Plant
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001, pp. xv, 380

This is a thoroughly engaging, if flawed book about the role Christianity can and ought to play in arguments about public policy in liberal democracies. While it is not entirely convincing in laying the ground for Christian politics, it certainly succeeds in demonstrating the necessity of philosophical inquiry to right-thinking in politics. This has been an enduring feature of the illustrious political and philosophical career of Raymond Plant—a peer of the realm, Labour Party spokesperson for Home Affairs (1992-1996), Professor of European Political Thought at the University of Southampton, and author of many scholarly works on moral and political philosophy. In *Politics, Theology and History* Plant offers a range of discussions of a theological, political and philosophical sort, focused on questions about the basic moral foundations of liberal societies, and directed to the task of finding the appropriate place for religious beliefs and principles in the structure of liberal democratic discourse. Regrettably, the failings of the book are contextually conditioned, and no amount of shrewd dialectic can disguise the fact.

Plant's initial chapters on political theology and theological narrative contain the foundational arguments of his case for rethinking the place of Christian beliefs in pluralist politics. They are not well enough focused to achieve their central aim, and there is an evident quaintness in the analysis of Augustine and Aquinas, theological narrative and early natural law theory, and their potential to provide arguments about the proper grounding for public discourse. More appealing to political theorists will be the middle chapters which deal with issues to do with freedom, social justice, human rights and the market order. Drawing on the work of Michael Walzer and John Rawls, among other philosophers and theologians, Plant—as we might expect from an "Old" Labourite—is acute in his critique of "free market" morality. The final section of the book sets out to unite the two themes of Christian beliefs and the moral basis of liberalism by focusing on the central question of the relationship between religious beliefs and the moral bases of a liberal society. In so far as normative justification in liberal society has to take on issues of substantive moral ends, then religious beliefs can play a significant role in this enterprise, Plant argues. In particular, to be at all justifiable, liberal doctrines have to draw upon quite rich views of human nature and human flourishing, and religious believers are well-placed to contribute to this debate. After all, is not the Christian enjoined by scripture to seek the common good? It is in this regard that the believer can contribute most in liberal society, that is, by participating in the debates about where the common good lies in

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0008423902778220 Published online by Cambridge University Press

resolving issues. In Plant's view, this is above all true of questions related to political economy and social justice, areas in which he launches a scathing attack on the amoral or non-moral positions taken by neoliberals.

In support of his case for the legitimacy of a Christian political perspective, Plant creatively adopts Rawls's conception of "overlapping consensus" and his idea of a "reasonable comprehensive doctrine," the latter meaning a doctrine that recognizes the existence of other conceptions of the good set within other competing comprehensive doctrines which it is reasonable to pursue. Modern Christianity, for Plant, is one such reasonable comprehensive doctrine, which shares with other reasonable comprehensive doctrines the values and norms regulating the public world, endorses constitutional principles such as liberty, rights and freedom of expression, and resists the use of political power to repress comprehensive views that are not unreasonable though different from its own.

The inherent difficulty of Plant's project is most obvious in the navigation he attempts between two seemingly incommensurable perspectives. The first is the communitarian one, which "is rooted in context and the politics of difference and the narrative and ethos which holds a society together, with consequential problems for a cogent account of the nature of the scope of the moral values held by a Christian" (34). The second perspective centres on the supposed universality of the Christian values espoused. In other words, the issue is the appropriate balance between particularism and universalism: on the one hand, the cultural specifics of individuals who inhabit different societies and, on the other hand, the transcendental "universal" beliefs associated with the nature of the Christian God. Plant feels this is a necessary conjunction to make, since universal principles have to be applied in particular cultural contexts. However, the consequent slippage between the two positions leaves the reader wondering how firm can this ground be upon which to build a case for an unproblematic perspective on public policy.

As innovative as Plant's discourse is at times, the central argument is far from watertight, and one cannot help feeling that he is whistling in the secular wind. Much of the debilitating debris of religion has long been swept from the liberal democratic shores, and what remains of religion in public debate is often narrowly focused and more likely to kindle division rather than to reach accommodation. Against Plant, we might reasonably say it is enough that liberal democracies take seriously the right of individuals to believe and worship, within certain boundaries, as they will. At the very least *Politics, Theology and History* provides important theological and philosophical lessons for those who would attempt to base their politics on religious convictions. But Christians and nonbelievers alike can take comfort in the fact that there exist other and more persuasive grounds to reject libertarian and free market arguments, and to promote community-oriented solutions to public issues.

JAMES E. CRIMMINS *Huron University College*

Cruelty and Deception: The Controversy over Dirty Hands in Politics
Paul Rynard and David Shugarman, eds
Peterborough: Broadview Press, 2000, pp. ix, 280

The subject of ethics and politics has long been of interest to students of politics, although it has probably never before attracted as much attention as at the present time. The Canadian scholarly literature in this field has been primarily empirical, often in the form of studies of institutional practices designed to ensure political integrity and surveys of Canadian attitudes on ethical concerns. Yet, the philosophical dimension of ethical politics has been

sadly under-appreciated in the mainstream political science literature, a lacuna that *Cruelty and Deception* is intended to address.

The 14 essays of this edited work stem mainly from papers presented at an academic workshop on dirty hands held at York University in December 1993, some of which were also later published elsewhere during the mid-1990s. Divided in equal number into two parts between those essays that support and those that reject the notion of dirty hands, the editors introduce each part with a summary of the commonly shared general position as well as the specific argument of each individual contribution. In addition, David Shugarman in his capacity as editor opens the book with a concise introductory explanation of the controversy over dirty hands, which also probably should be re-read as a Conclusion because it so effectively ties together the contending strains of thought that underpin the topic. Finally, along with the inclusion of a select bibliography of related readings, the volume contains excerpts from the works of five authors (Niccolo Machiavelli, Leon Trotsky, Max Weber, Jean-Paul Sartre and Michael Walzer) who are frequently quoted in respect to dirty hands in order to provide the reader with an immediate, familiarizing reference. So much for the format of the book, but what can be said of its contents?

The editors have positioned their collection of essays "in the fields of practical ethics, political theory, and policy studies" in respect to "moral issues and their public policy ramifications" (7), so the book may legitimately be reviewed from different perspectives. Given the book's broad intended audience of "students in philosophy, politics, sociology, psychology, public administration, and ethics" (7-8), it is probably most appropriately reviewed from the policy perspective. This is especially true given the fact that most readers no doubt will approach *Cruelty and Deception* as a companion volume, or a sequel in the editors' words (8), to *Honest Politics* which was authored by Ian Greene and David Shugarman in 1997 (Toronto: Lorimer). Whereas this initial book was more empirical in content with its focus on several ethical problems and the institutional mechanisms that have been adopted to foster greater political integrity in Canadian public life, *Cruelty and Deception* undertakes a more philosophical look at the specific issue of dirty hands (which had been the subject of one of the chapters in the earlier book).

Dirty hands may be viewed as a procedural notion, involving a clash of moral values, whereby a political leader commits an action that would normally be considered a moral wrong in order to achieve what is perceived to be the greater public good. This proves to be an unfortunate topic selection because, although the notion of dirty hands has spawned a considerable body of literature since the writings of Machiavelli, it is much too limited a concept from a policy studies perspective; besides, the nebulous nature of the dirty hands metaphor has a pejorative quality that does more to mislead or inflame than to inform. The language of both the pro essays of the first part and several of the con essays of the second part of *Cruelty and Deception*, with examples of torture, killings and other acts of violence to demonstrate their case, is particularly irksome. These practices are more typical of war or revolutionary situations and of actions in authoritarian states than everyday politics in contemporary democracies. While Machiavelli is known for his *realpolitik* account of his early sixteenth-century world, it is unfortunate that these neo-Machiavelli authors were content to interpret and rehash the thoughts of Machiavelli and other earlier writers rather than to buttress their discussions with a fuller appreciation of the constitutional setting of current democratic states, a point made by both

Sharon Sutherland and David Shugarman in their separate essays critical of dirty hands.

Cruelty and Deception also fails to meet the editors' intent for it to be a more philosophically oriented sequel to *Honest Politics*. Much of the strength and popularity of the latter book was that it was so persuasively logical, concise and integrated in presentation, yet thorough and in-depth in coverage that it effectively informed the reader. This is not the case with the current edited collection of essays in part because the contributors are content to go diversely in their own separate directions, with their own categorizations, points of emphasis and interpretations. At the same time, by focusing solely on dirty hands, there is no philosophical discussion of other, more common, ethical concerns. An established scholar or graduate student in the field of political thought may find the readings challenging, but the intended audience, especially those who found *Honest Politics* so rewarding, will be disappointed.

STEWART HYSON *Saint John, New Brunswick*

Gramsci and Contemporary Politics: Beyond Pessimism of the Intellect
Anne Showstack Sassoon
New York: Routledge, 2000, pp. 173

Antonio Gramsci's writings on politics—best known from the collection published as *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*—successfully combine theoretical speculation with empirical investigation to produce a compelling analysis of the evolving relations between economics, politics, culture and everyday life in advanced capitalist societies. The fertile, suggestive and open-ended quality of his work has inspired many attempts to use his ideas in thinking through contemporary social and political issues: among the better known include Stuart Hall's analysis of the rise of Thatcherite conservatism in Britain (*The Hard Road to Renewal: Thatcherism and the Crisis of the Left* [London: Verso, 1983]), Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe's discussion of "post-Marxist" political theory in *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy* (London: Verso, 1985) and Robert Cox's use of hegemony to theorize international political economy in *Production, Power and World Order* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987).

In a series of short essays, Anne Showstack Sassoon draws upon Gramsci in the hopes of stimulating an approach to contemporary political analysis that moves beyond the fatalistic cynicism that, she argues, has come to characterize much centre-left academic work in the last decade. The book is divided into three sections. The first consists of largely exegetical essays that examine Gramsci's ideas on intellectuals and his unique use of political language. In the second section, which constitutes the core of the book, Sassoon presents four pieces that explore gender and citizenship, the role of the welfare state in the evolution of civil society, the British Labour Party's 1994 Commission on Social Justice report and the "new labour" policies of Prime Minister Tony Blair. She concludes with three essays that reflect upon the possibilities for rethinking socialism, the relationship between teachers and parents and the role of personal experience in the production of academic knowledge.

While *Gramsci and Contemporary Politics* raises some important questions, it generally fails to break new ground either in its interpretation of Gramsci or in the application of his ideas to current political issues. Those looking for a theoretical engagement with Gramsci's work are better advised to return to Sassoon's earlier and much more detailed survey of his political

philosophy in *Gramsci's Politics* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987) and/or the collection of essays she edited in *Approaches to Gramsci* (London: Writers and Readers Publishing Cooperative, 1982). Rather than open up new perspectives on Gramsci's thought, the interpretive essays in the current book do little more than offer brief, straightforward summaries of Gramsci's ideas. The exception is the piece on political language in which Sassoon develops the argument that Gramsci used "ordinary" words to signify both conventional meanings as well as his own ideas. Unfortunately, the brevity of this essay—eight pages—disallows full exploration of the implications of this claim for reading Gramsci's work.

In the second section, the work on civil society and citizenship begins with the criticism that most contemporary scholarship in this area has remained excessively abstract, leading to overly theoretical accounts of these concepts that are not rooted in the specificity of concrete social formations. Gramsci's combination of theory and historical investigation certainly stands as an exemplary corrective to this tendency. Yet Sassoon largely fails to take her own advice on this score as her own writing rarely moves beyond vague prescriptions for how academic work ought to be done differently.

The two essays on Blair and the politics of "New Labour" are perhaps the most disappointing, consisting of little more than a plea for those on the left to give this project more credit for trying to build a "hegemonic politics" around the themes of inclusion and social justice. Relying upon little more than Labour Party rhetoric (as contained in the Social Justice Commission Report and Blair's speeches), she makes the astonishing claim that Blair shares with Gramsci a common goal of social and political transformation by organizing the active consent of the people. At their core, Gramsci's politics are animated by the conviction that the organization of society by capitalism inevitably produces exploitative social relations that not only stifle the autonomous self-development of most people but also inhibit the growth of society as a whole. Blair's pragmatic accommodation with the "realities" of capitalist globalization (and consequent acceptance of the narrowing of the possibilities for democratic self-governance) has little in common with Gramsci's revolutionary aspirations.

The final three pieces are perhaps the most interesting in the collection, discussing in more personal terms the role of intellectuals in the production of academic knowledge. Here, Sassoon takes her cue from Gramsci's famous claim that "[t]he popular element 'feels' but does not always know or understand [and] the intellectual element 'knows' but does not always understand and . . . does not always feel" (28), arguing for the inclusion of both everyday experience and one's own "deepest feelings" (114) in intellectual work. As she notes, such a combination has long informed feminist academic practice and is a promising avenue for making critical academic work of all kinds more " organic."

Ultimately, the biggest shortcoming of *Gramsci and Contemporary Politics* is its general neglect of both economic and cultural processes in its discussion of politics, a rather surprising omission in a work that claims Gramsci as its theoretical inspiration. Rarely do the economic and the cultural appear on their own terms, either as imposing restrictions upon or furnishing resources for political action. With respect to the role of intellectuals, for instance, a contemporary Gramscian perspective must surely address the remarkable success of the culture industry at harnessing organic cultural activity (and its associated intellectuals) to the processes and structures of corporate capitalism. Similarly, explorations of citizenship must take into

account the dramatic foreclosure of politics accompanied by the reconstruction of the citizen as consumer/taxpayer. Above all, the severe limitations imposed upon a progressive politics that confines itself to reforms *within* capitalism à la Blair cannot be ignored.

The phrase "pessimism of the intellect, optimism of the will," borrowed by Gramsci from Romain Rolland, loses its eloquence and power when it is read as tracing a binary, linear progression from the former to the latter. Instead, it signals the necessity of holding these two moments together, for progressive social thought is energized by the very tension that springs from their uneasy union. And it is hard to imagine a more productive or ethical disposition for intellectuals in a world such as our own in which "the old is dying and the new cannot be born" (Gramsci, ed. and trans. by Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks* [New York: International, 1972], 275).

SHANE GUNSTER *Ryerson Polytechnic University*

The Platonic Political Art: A Study of Critical Reason and Democracy
John R. Wallach
University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2001, pp. ix, 468

The Platonic Political Art is a learned, politically and theoretically ambitious, hugely bibliographic work. Its arrival will be welcomed by students of contemporary debates about democracy, especially those who try to glean insights from parallels drawn to ancient Athenian democracy—a literature that has grown in recent years.

The operative political perspective that informs John Wallach's work is openly deployed in the premise that we have arrived at the need for a "Post-Liberal" democracy (410-11). It is asserted that liberalism can no longer rely on the private realm to supply the necessary guideposts for moral and political life— which will be vigorously challenged by more than a few. Therefore, those guideposts must be generated from within *public* life as, we are told, was the case in ancient Athens. But for this to happen, public deliberation must come to be informed by a new critical discourse.

More often than not, it is to Athenian practice that contemporary partisans of democracy turn for guidance. But Wallach wants to turn to Plato, despite the widely held opinion that Plato is anti-democratic. Wallach's argument is that Plato is primarily critical of conventionalism and conventional deployments of power. In his time the conventions were democratic and that accounts for Plato's seemingly anti-democratic bias. But, it is asserted, since our conventions are not democratic—given the wide disparities of income and wealth and alleged inefficacy of the postmodern demos—a critical Platonic political art turned loose on our institutions could be used for a democratic purpose. In this fashion, Wallach believes that Plato can be saved for the political left despite the older left having blacklisted him as a totalitarian, and the newer poststructuralist left having stigmatized him as the father of metaphysics, the ultimate post-age sin.

The Plato that Wallach presents is a "politicized" Plato whose primary motivation for writing the Platonic dialogues was to solve the problem of justice. That problem centres around the correct relation between ideas and deeds. Wallach's Plato is not a philosophical Platonist—indeed, apparently was not a theoretical philosopher in any sense. It was Aristotle, we are told, who first made theory autonomous and "depoliticized logos." In this fashion, Wallach tries to position his Plato in an evolving literature of "deliberative

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0008423902778220 Published online by Cambridge University Press

democracy" which appears to be the successor that emerged in the 1990s to the "participatory democracy" of 35 years ago.

The author describes his hermeneutic approach to Plato as "critical historicism," which at first blush seems to border on an oxymoron. Where does a true historicist find a place that stands still in the swirl of history from which to launch criticism? If such a cognitively discernable place exists, one is after all not an historicist. But Wallach has something more or less commonsensical in mind that might have been better served by a different term. He believes that Plato's central political art can be detached from the concrete circumstances that called it into being and then "resituated" in our different historical circumstances. "[C]ritical historicism [is] an approach that falls between relatively ahistorical and radically historicist approaches. It rejects *both* immediately available (in a naturalist or playfully textualist vein) readings *and* characterizations of [Plato's] ideas as wholly external an alien to our own" (393; emphasis added). "Critical historicism subordinates questions of authorial identity to questions about the discursive and practical problems that an author addresses, without ignoring authorial intention" (37; emphasis added).

An interesting side issue that follows the reader throughout *The Platonic Political Art* is why the "post-liberal" left needs Plato. It is the modern authors who are seemingly the more open proponents of equality and democracy, not the premoderns. Perhaps it is the realization that the poststructuralist left (also know as postfoundationalists) leads us toward a dead end where it becomes impossible to enjoin substantive moral and political discussions that propels *The Platonic Political Art* in this direction. But is there also the further perception lurking in *The Platonic Political Art* that modern thought—with some kind of inevitability—leads either to liberal capitalism, which is seen as intrinsically undemocratic, or toward the postmodernist reaction of Nietzsche and Heidegger that in turn leads to a poststructuralist dead end?

Be this as it may, *The Platonic Political Art* depicts a Plato who is primarily engaged in trying to inform, elevate and transform public life and public deliberation—that is, primarily engaged in a *political* art. This understanding of Plato as a rarified politician conditions the readings of the various Platonic texts which occupy the middle portion of the book. Those who approach Plato from Wallach's perspective, and with his questions, will find the textual treatments interesting. Those who approach the texts from a more philosophical perspective will undoubtedly find those analyses less satisfying. For example, there is almost no attempt to enjoin any of the substantive conclusions of the large body of literature that has been generated in the last 40 years that philosophically approaches the texts internally and takes every detail with the utmost seriousness. And Wallach makes some generalizations about the positions of several commentators on Plato that devotees will undoubtedly also find unpersuasive—those associated with Hans Georg Gadamer and Leo Strauss being major examples.

Despite neglecting almost completely the sizeable textual and philosophical literature on Plato, in other areas Wallach launches into an exhaustive chronicling of debates in the secondary literature which he then proceeds to engage asserting his own positions as he proceeds. Many footnotes read like short journal articles. On one level this bibliographic treatment makes the book useful as an introduction to a segment of the extant literature and many of the scholarly debates. But so many of these engagements are tangential to the main argument of *The Platonic Political Art* that they ultimately border on becoming diversionary.

Finally, it is not clear what Wallach ultimately makes of the distinction between politics and philosophy. Plato is never presented as in any way being

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0008423902778220 Published online by Cambridge University Press

a philosopher pursuing the truth as an end in itself. There seems to be a background understanding of Wallach's that philosophy is always politics by a means other than that pursued by most in the public arena. There seems to be no sense that philosophy can be a self-sufficient, private undertaking. The entire focus of the book is to bring morality and virtue back into the public realm and make them a part of public deliberation. But one wonders if the vision informing *The Platonic Political Art* is not ultimately that philosophy and everything else should be brought into the public realm as well. In attacking the liberal glorification of the private realm as leading to the moral degeneration of the public—and by extension the destruction of democracy—does there remain in Wallach's vision a legitimate place for the private, with philosophy being one of the activities that can prosper there?

GREGORY BRUCE SMITH *Trinity College, Hartford*

Empire
Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000, pp. xvii, 478

Empire's dust jacket features a satellite photo of spiraling white clouds above indistinct purple seas. Beyond the earth's edge, it displays black nothingness. The designer must have read the book. Although Saskia Sassen's blurb describes it as "An extraordinary book, with enormous intellectual depth and a keen sense of the history-making transformation that is beginning to take shape," Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri orbit so far from the concrete realities of contemporary change that their readers see little but clouds, hazy seas and nothingness beyond. Behold their central claim: an invisibly virtual Empire (always capitalized and always singular) is now displacing and surpassing the capitalist state—even the United States of America—as the locus of world power. Territorial, racial, sexual and cultural boundaries cease to matter. "With boundaries and differences suppressed or set aside," Hardt and Negri declare, "the Empire is a kind of smooth space across which subjectivities glide without substantial resistance or conflict" (198). Moreover, the Empire's "biopower" extends beyond tools, machines and organizations to bodies, thoughts and social life as a whole. Despite existing in no particular place, Empire exercises unitary agency. It advertises itself as history's eternal end.

That claim is false: in a new dialectic, Empire creates its antithesis in a connected multitude (never capitalized, but always singular) whose rising will eventually re-appropriate and transform imperial means of control. The organizing argument sounds global echoes of the *Communist Manifesto*. Unlike Marx and Engels, however, Hardt and Negri consider their redeeming multitude to consist not of workers, not even of persons, but of "productive, creative subjectivities of globalization" (60). Much of the book's first half glosses nineteenth- and twentieth-century world history as a shift from European to American imperialism, with the United States as the new system's peace police but not its master. Resistance to American imperialism, in that gloss, destroyed American hegemony by connecting everyone with a worldwide network of capital. In the process, international migration became the principal means of class struggle; exploited people opted out. (Enthusiasm for this argument leads Hardt and Negri to dismiss nineteenth-century Atlantic migrations wrongly as "lilliputian" compared to their late twentieth-century counterparts; proportionately speaking, the 30 million Europeans and 9 million Africans who crossed the Atlantic exceeded today's international flows.)

Their analysis aligns Hardt and Negri against other leftists who call for resistance to globalization, especially those who advocate local action against global forces. It also leads them to disparage defenders of nongovernmental organizations and new forms of international law—including the impeccably leftist Richard Falk—as dupes of institutions whose moral intervention actually advances the imperial work of globalization. As if that shucking off of potential sympathizers were insufficient, Hardt and Negri reject the stirring concreteness of the *Communist Manifesto,* making a virtue of that rejection. They cast their argument abstractly, in idiosyncratically defined terms, with few concrete illustrations of the social processes they have in mind. They insist, in fact, that the coming of Empire has annihilated all external criteria for judging political systems: "In Empire, no subjectivity is outside, and all places have been subsumed in a general 'non-place.' The transcendental fiction of politics can no longer stand up and has no argumentative utility because we all exist entirely within the realm of the social and the political" (353). As Hardt and Negri declare, such a position rules out conventional forms of measurement and evidence. A skeptical reader can nevertheless legitimately question the book's presumptions and assertions. Given the world's recent fragmentation, inequality and internecine conflict, what warrant have we for concluding that it is, as Hardt and Negri claim, rapidly becoming a seamless web of control? What process of capitalist conquest and in filtration could possibly have woven that web? How did capital activate its three alleged means of control—bombs, money, ether—and how did those three means produce their effects on the whole world's population? Is it true, for example, that expanded communication "imposes a continuous and complete circulation of signs" (347)? Might we not have thought, on the contrary, that the Internet (currently accessible to about 6 per cent of the earth's population, with dramatic inequalities of information available to different segments of that 6 per cent) exacerbates discontinuities in the availability of information? Until we hear more about how Empire's causes produce their effects, it would be wise to retain a measure of skepticism.

CHARLES TILLY *Columbia University*

Global Democracy: Key Debates
Barry Holden, ed
New York: Routledge, 2000, pp. xii, 224

This collection of essays explores the connection between globalization and global democracy. Globalization is sometimes thought to mean the demise of the nation-state; consequently, the traditional view of democracy as a state-centric concept ought to be replaced by the notion of a borderless, cosmopolitan democracy. Others reject this "hyperglobalist" thesis, arguing, on the contrary, that the nation-state remains the primary site of democracy even in the context of globalization. On this view, global democracy should take the form of a trans*national* democracy, a democracy of "democracies rooted in nation-states" (214). These divergent views are represented in this volume by some of the key players in the field.

Part 1 of the collection focuses on the conceptual and theoretical aspects of globalization and democracy, whereas part 2 discusses the prospects for global democratization. Opening the discussion, David Held argues that "the changing nature of political community" (17) in the context of globalization means that it is no longer appropriate to regard the nation-state as the sole site of democracy. With increasing global integration, individuals are being more

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0008423902778220 Published online by Cambridge University Press

profoundly and adversely affected by decisions made within other countries, and so the locus of decision making should not remain at the level of the territorial state, but should instead be dispersed across different levels of transnational democratic institutions and authorities.

In his response to Held, Michael Saward expresses concern over the former's stress on territorially based transnational institutions, arguing that democracy would be better served by also taking into account "intermediate and fine-grained" (35) responses to different issues, such as the fostering of co-operation between democratic nations, establishing frameworks for this cooperation, and the establishing of "loose confederation" of democracies (35-36). This reluctance to displace the nation-state as the primary site of democracy is expressed also in the "afterword" by Richard Bellamy and R. J. Barry Jones.

Turning to the globalization side of the equation, Paul Hirst and Grahame Thompson reject the hyperglobalist view that global economic competition and integration has spelt the end of state sovereignty, and hence the end of the liberal welfare state. They argue that the evidence suggests that states continue to retain sufficient autonomy over macro-economic and social policies. In a similar vein, taking the European Union as a "laboratory experiment in globalization" (180), Jonathan Golub shows that "there has been nothing like a collapse of national democratic political control" (198) among the member states of the Union. Jonathan Perraton agrees with Paul Hirst and Grahame Thompson that some of the exaggerations surrounding globalization should be rejected, but warns against ignoring the significant changes that globalization has nonetheless brought about (for example, increased international trade, the increased mobility of multinational corporations, the growing importance of international finance, and so forth). To do so is to risk ignoring the new challenges facing our increasingly integrated world.

In his provocative essay, "The Lords of Peace," Danilo Zolo takes cosmopolitanism to entail a world constitutional state, and this, he argues, can be none other than a form of Western imperialism. Indeed, instead of being a precondition for world peace, a cosmopolitan global order is all the more likely to result in increased violence in the form of military interventions to defend "cosmopolitan" values. In reply, Tony Coates argues that a pre-enlightenment account of cosmopolitanism, which traces its roots to the Thomist-Aristotelian tradition, escapes the radical and Eurocentric individualism of enlightenment cosmopolitanism without succumbing to the ethical relativism of Zolo's anti-cosmopolitanism. On Coates's view, cosmopolitanism, pace Zolo, need not imply world-statism.

If globalization has made global democracy necessary, how is global democracy possible? In his "An Agenda for Democratization," Boutros Boutros-Ghali outlines how regional and global institutions and actors, such as NGOs, regional bodies, academics and businesses, could be incorporated within a more democratic United Nations system. This theme is further developed in two essays by Daniele Archibugi, Sveva Balduini and Marco Donati, and Johan Galtung. A significant addition to Boutros-Ghali's agenda is the proposal of these authors for the formation of a People's Assembly in the United Nations.

A precondition of democracy is a flourishing civil society. Richard Falk is cautiously optimistic about the prospects for a global civil society "as the global village becomes more an experienced, daily reality" (176). But, Falk's optimism notwithstanding, it remains to be seen whether the sense of solidarity and common sympathies among individuals that underpin a civil society can be engendered globally. Shared experience and reality may not be sufficient.

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0008423902778220 Published online by Cambridge University Press

These proposals for global democracy are recognized by the authors as schematic, and indeed far from inevitable. But even as certain questions remain, their writings help point the ways or at least the issues to be confronted towards achieving this goal. In sum, this volume is not only invaluable to researchers in globalization and democracy, but is also an excellent textbook for students seeking an entry point into this very timely and important topic.

Kok-Chor Tan *Queen's University*

Morale et relations internationales
Pascal Boniface, sous la direction de
Paris : Presses universitaires de France, 2000, 179 p.

Les relations internationales peuvent-elles être morales? Cette question est on ne peut plus actuelle, si l'on pense aux événements du 11 septembre dernier, aux conflits de Sierra Leone et du Kosovo, à l'arrestation de Pinochet ou encore à l'impact de la mondialisation sur les relations interétatiques. Pour y répondre, il faut d'abord définir ce qu'est la morale, et c'est là un obstacle majeur. Comment doit-on la définir? Un des auteurs fait ici un clin d'oeil en citant Léo Ferré qui disait « N'oubliez jamais que ce qu'il y a d'encombrant dans la morale, c'est que c'est toujours la morale des Autres. »

Il faut également connaître plusieurs notions et principes lorsque l'on traite des États, dont le principe du droit d'ingérence, de l'immunité des présidents, de la souveraineté des États et de la bonne foi de ces mêmes États. Ces divers principes, qui ont été développés par le droit international et étaient jusqu'à récemment conçus comme un acquis des États, sont, depuis quelque temps, remis en question.

Boniface cherche à savoir si l'on peut concilier les impératifs de la politique et de la morale, question soulevée dans l'introduction et à laquelle chacun des auteurs du collectif tente d'apporter un élément de réponse. Les relations internationales peuvent-elles être morales? Le droit international peut-il régir le monde? Les auteurs tenteront de répondre à ces questions en expliquant certaines données et en proposant des pistes de réflexion pour comprendre le lien actuel entre la morale et les relations internationales et pour agir sur celles-ci afin qu'elles deviennent plus morales. Ils abordent notamment les thèmes de l'emploi de la force, du commerce international et des finances internationales.

Comme il s'agit d'un collectif, l'ouvrage reflète différents courants théoriques, mais la plupart des auteurs sont partisans du réalisme. Quelques-uns se situent à mi-chemin entre réalisme et idéalisme, dont Jean-Claude Casanova. Trois grands traits du monde contemporain rendent, selon lui, réaliste une politique d'inspiration idéaliste : le développement de la démocratie, la croissance des échanges et du commerce et la communion ou la proximité des opinions qui fait que chacun vit sous le regard de l'autre (31).

De nombreux auteurs s'accordent pour dire que les relations internationales comportent de plus en plus souvent une dimension morale, que les États n'agissent plus seulement selon leurs intérêts stratégiques, mais aussi parfois du seul point de vue de la morale. Boniface donne ici l'exemple de l'intervention de l'OTAN au Kosovo. Tous s'entendent également pour dire que des améliorations pourraient être apportées, par différents moyens. C'est ici que l'on peut opérer une classification des auteurs. Il y a d'abord ceux qui voient dans le droit et la mise en place d'institutions universelles ou régionales la meilleure façon d'agir pour concilier les impératifs de la politique et de la morale. Hubert Védrine, de son côté, prône davantage la concertation à

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0008423902778220 Published online by Cambridge University Press

l'échelle mondiale que l'avancement d'un droit qui traduirait la volonté d'une partie et non de l'ensemble de la population mondiale. La morale par la morale, en quelque sorte : des avancées moins rapides, mais plus efficaces.

Lorsqu'il se demande comment obliger les autres à respecter la morale, Hubert Védrine écrit: « La seule voie constructive est de travailler à une synthèse des aspirations éthiques et des exigences de la réalité, de réfléchir aux unes et aux autres en tenant compte non seulement de nos convictions, mais aussi des messages et des avis venus du monde entier » (19). Concrètement, cette démarche signifierait faire évoluer la pratique du principe de souveraineté nationale; réformer les institutions multilatérales; définir les principes régissant la mondialisation; organiser la multipolarité; préserver la diversité culturelle et juridique du monde; renforcer la lutte contre l'impunité; reconnaître et tirer profit de l'action et des propositions des nouveaux acteurs de la vie internationale.

Les autres insistent sur l'institutionnalisation d'un droit international pour arriver à la morale par l'action. François Loncle cite l'écrivain Henry David Thoreau : « La morale ce n'est pas seulement être bon, mais c'est aussi être bon à quelque chose » (37). Si l'on considère que la morale et le droit sont indissociables, la mise en place d'un droit humanitaire international s'impose et, pour que celui-ci soit efficace, il est impératif de se doter d'autorités politiques capables de le faire respecter. Concernant ces autorités politiques, il est question, dans les différents textes, de la Cour pénale internationale, de l'Organisation des Nations unies et de l'Union européenne.

Selon Badinter, la lutte faite aux criminels contre l'humanité est au cœur de la relation entre morale et relations internationales. Il souligne donc l'urgence de mettre sur pied la Cour pénale internationale, dont la création bute sur le refus des États-Unis et de la Chine, entre autres, tous deux jouissant toujours du droit de veto au Conseil de sécurité dont dépend la création d'un tribunal pénal international *ad hoc*. Selon Casanova, une réforme des Nations Unies s'impose : réforme de sa Charte et de son Conseil de sécurité. Cette réforme viserait à doter la communauté internationale d'instruments adaptés à la mise en application et au respect de la politique internationale qu'elle a développée. Dans la mesure où cette réforme ne produirait pas les effets escomptés, Loncle affirme que ce rôle devrait être imputé à l'Union européenne. Ce à quoi François Fillon répond en disant : « Le seul organisme international réellement respecté, et ayant les moyens de son autorité, c'est la Fédération internationale de Football (FIFA). La multiplication des règlements et des engagements multilatéraux est malheureusement proportionnelle à leur effectivité et à leur durée de vie. » (47).

Chacun a sa propre conception de la morale, cette conception variant d'une personne à l'autre, d'un pays à l'autre. Il est donc impossible de définir hermétiquement ce concept; il n'y a pas de réponse qui soit totalement satisfaisante. C'est pourquoi, lorsqu'on demande s'il est possible de concilier les impératifs de la politique et ceux de la morale, on ne peut trouver de réponse exacte et définitive. Il faut se contenter d'apporter des éléments de réponse et des pistes de réflexion, ce que les auteurs ont bien réussi. Les nombreux exemples qu'ils évoquent montrent bien l'actualité du débat et la complexité de cette problématique.

Cependant, les auteurs restent très vagues quant aux réformes des institutions déjà existantes. Miser sur une organisation internationale pour que les relations deviennent davantage morales, c'est sous-estimer l'importance des rapports de force entre les membres et les aspirations contraires de ces mêmes membres. Cela semble particulièrement important dans le cas de l'Union européenne. En effet, comment peut-on espérer qu'une Europe élar-

gie puisse se faire le justicier de la planète alors qu'à quinze, elle ne parvient pas à régler ses propres guerres intestines? De plus, la situation internationale ne s'en verrait pas grandement améliorée puisque l'on ne ferait que substituer à la suprématie américaine, une suprématie européenne.

Notons que le rôle joué par la démocratie et l'opinion populaire dans les relations internationales n'est que trop peu évoqué. En effet, un seul texte en fait mention. Ce sont exclusivement les perspectives occidentales qui sont explorées, exception faite du texte de Védrine, ce qui laisse trop peu de place à ceux qui souffrent réellement de l'*immoralité* des relations internationales.

MARIE-FRANCE LORANGER *Université du Québec à Montréal*

The Global Covenant: Human Conduct in a World of States
Robert H. Jackson
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000, pp. xvi, 464

Robert Jackson's *The Global Covenant* ought to rank among the most distinctive and important books of international relations theory written by a Canadian scholar. Situated within the "classical" or English School tradition, which it intends to rearticulate in a post-Cold War context and for a new trans-Atlantic generation, it is really an ambitious exercise in political philosophy. It unfolds a conversation in which Hobbes, Burke, Collingwood, Oakeshott, and Berlin have pride of place, next to Hedley Bull and Martin Wight, and it brings what might be called a conservative skepticism to bear on the nature of academic inquiry and on contemporary political judgments about armed humanitarianism.

Jackson places the trademark notion of international *societas* at the centre of his analysis. He traces its origins out of the *universitas* of medieval Christendom, explores the constitutive norms of this "global covenant," and asks what kind of theorizing is appropriate to a subject that is, by nature, historical, social and linguistic ("an unfolding human institution," "a realm of dialogue and discourse"). Much of this is accomplished with the author's customary care and clarity; it has much to teach those who think and teach within the discipline.

This is, however, also an argumentative book—sometimes, alas, almost scolding in tone. It has at least two very broad targets. The first comprises various modes of behaviourist, structuralist, constructivist, critical, and postmodern inquiry, as well as the activist inclinations of academics generally. Against all this Jackson sets out a "human science" orientation: interpretive, "worldly," attentive to lived experience, less prone to scholarly hubris, and concerned, above all, not to discover patterns or frame hypotheses but to make sense of the political-diplomatic realms of meaningful human conduct. Jackson's engagement with positions he dislikes often is limited, and neglectful of potential points of contact. He is a lonelier theorist than he needs to be. Still, his introduction to interpretive human science will be properly provocative and highly instructive. So far, so good. Jackson is less persuasive in distinguishing theory from practice as categorically different modes of understanding, and then in defending, on that premise, a detached, disinterested, intellectual interest in politics that is satisfied once it has entered "into its mentality" or given a "plausible and coherent interpretation of the political practitioner's world" (84). His own affirmation that the interpreter can only "make sense of the world of human affairs because he or she is part of it" (58) suggests a less rigid distinction. So does his interest in the language of practice. More than that, his tendency to treat state leaders' "responsibility"

to their populations as a kind of trump card against ethical criticism of their actions represents a curious, and rather deferential, lapse of interest in the history of constitutive political ideas. Thus moral agency in international relations is still the property of a few. Every one else is constrained by the need to understand the prince's dilemmas as the prince sees them—either that or join "the high-minded condemnations of alienated idealists with outsider mentalities who cannot or will not enter into the situation of ordinary, morally flawed statespeople"(136).

The second target in this book includes both those convinced of a fundamentally new era of globalization and, more pointedly, partisans of "human security" or "solidarism." A vigorous intellectual defence of international society as the best of all possible worlds is a rare and, as such, a valuable thing. Jackson's defence rests on communitarian claims about territorial states. He embraces Westphalian doctrines of sovereign equality and non-interference in terms of the historic achievement of pluralism, anti-paternalism, and "international freedom"—one that consigned conflict over core religious or political values to the realm of "unnecessary conflict." While he delineates international, human and global-environmental, as well as national dimensions of the "foundational value" of security, and notes how political action is justified and held to account by reference to each, clearly state responsibilities come first; for the state has proven itself "the superior security arrangement" (206). International order carries a high value and is protected by the global covenant. By that measure Jackson approves of Operation Desert Storm, waged against Iraq, as "about as close to a lawful and legitimate war as one could realistically expect" (248) against an "aggressive military dictatorship that had violated the constitution of international society" (243). In contrast, on Kosovo, he reaches the "inescapable conclusion" that Yugoslavia was a "victim of unwarranted military action" (286), and that NATO thereby had abandoned Westphalian norms for the equivalent of nineteenth-century colonialism's standard of civilization and the unequal treaties imposed on subject peoples. Thus the rise of the "international party of democracy," he writes, has revolutionary and "unsafe" implications, whereas "international liberalism" in the tradition of John Stuart Mill would leave states free to adopt any form of government. The global covenant is neither universalist nor relativist. Its norms are pluralist, beginning with "recognition of the other" (13) and respect for human diversity.

It is easier in a short review, of course, to advertise such a book's positions than to engage the complexity of its reasoning. Jackson knows he is swimming against the tide. He surely can be challenged on his insistence that world politics is best represented by the "egg carton" of a society of states. Market-led globalization suggests more of an omelette—one scorched at the bottom of the pan where states have dissolved into diamond-trading private armies. He can also be challenged from within on his reformulation of the English School tradition, which is perhaps truer to Bull than to Wight, though he is right to hold it to a rigorous interpretivism against the recent temptation of a lazy, inclusive methodological pluralism. For all that, this book greatly enriches the conversation that is scholarly and political life, and secures for its author a conspicuous place in that conversation.

Roger Epp *Augustana University College*

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0008423902778220 Published online by Cambridge University Press