

Feeling of absolute dependence or absolute feeling of dependence? (What Schleiermacher really said and why it matters)¹

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Abstract. Friedrich Schleiermacher is known as the theologian who said that the essence of Christian faith is a state of mind called ‘the feeling of absolute dependence’. In this respect, Schleiermacher’s reputation owes much to the influential translation of his dogmatics prepared by Mackintosh, Stewart and others. I argue that the translation is misleading precisely as to the terms which Schleiermacher uses in order to refer to the religious state of mind. I also show that the translation obscures a problem of some substantive depth regarding what Schleiermacher thought to be the nature of pious feeling.

In the English-speaking world Friedrich Schleiermacher is known primarily as the theologian who said that Christian faith, and indeed all authentic religion, has as its essence a state of mind called ‘the feeling of absolute dependence’. This thesis is said to be expressed in Proposition 4 (hereinafter: §4) and the discussion following it in the second (1830) edition of Schleiermacher’s magnum opus *The Christian Faith*.² Of course, since Schleiermacher himself wrote in German, it is probable that the expression ‘the feeling of absolute dependence’ comes from his influential translators, working under the editorial supervision of H. R. Mackintosh and J. S. Stewart, and more particularly from the Rev. D. M. Baillie, the translator of the general ‘Introduction’ (§§1–31) to *The Christian Faith*.³ It is my contention that Baillie at best took considerable liberties, and at worst committed an egregious grammatical mistake, in translating the expressions which Schleiermacher had used to write about the religious state of mind. I also contend that the liberties which Baillie took, or the mistakes which he committed, are not harmless, and that they tend to obscure a substantive matter of some depth. While I am not prepared to say that the points I am

¹ An earlier version of this paper was delivered before the annual meeting of the A.A.R.’s western chapter, held in Berkeley in March 1997.

² Schleiermacher published two editions of *The Christian Faith* during his lifetime: the first in 1821/2, the second (heavily revised) in 1830. Both editions have been republished, with notes, by Walter de Gruyter. The full bibliographic information for the second edition is as follows: Friedrich Schleiermacher, *Der christliche Glaube* (1830), 2 volumes, edited by Martin Redeker (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1960).

³ Friedrich Schleiermacher, *The Christian Faith*, translated by H. R. Mackintosh, J. S. Stewart et al. (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1928). Terrence Tice is currently working on a translation of Schleiermacher’s dogmatics that will bear the title *Christian Faith*, and which is likely to supplant the one prepared by Mackintosh and Stewart. Since this paper is about an expression introduced into the English-language discussion of Schleiermacher by the earlier translators, I will use the title of their translation.

about to develop render 100 years of English-language scholarship null and void, I do believe that they cannot be dismissed as mere niceties, and that they ought to be taken into consideration in any responsible interpretive endeavour.

In §4 of *The Christian Faith*, Schleiermacher writes:

That which all the various expressions of piety have in common, and through which they are distinguished from all other feelings, [or] in other words: the self-same essence of piety, is this, that we are conscious of ourselves as absolutely dependent, or, which amounts to the same thing, [that we are conscious of ourselves] as in relation to God (CG 1830: §4).⁴

Both the proposition itself, and the seven-page discussion following it, are notoriously difficult to interpret. In the discussion, Schleiermacher introduces a variety of new technical (or at least technical-sounding) vocabulary in order to explicate the idea ‘that we are conscious of ourselves as absolutely dependent’. Some of this new vocabulary appears nowhere else in his writing. Often, it is unclear from what literary sources he is drawing. But even if one were able to solve the problem of Schleiermacher’s sources, there would remain the even less tractable one of his meaning, which must be determined in relation to the context provided by *The Christian Faith*. (For example, the problem of what a term like ‘self-positing’ [*Sichselbstsetzen*] (§4.1) means for Schleiermacher is not yet solved when one has determined that he must have got it from Fichte and that for Fichte it has such-and-such a meaning.)

In this paper I will focus on the ways in which Schleiermacher develops the idea ‘that we are conscious of ourselves as absolutely dependent’, and will show how Baillie’s translation proves to be misleading. I will proceed in three steps: First, I will identify and classify the various technical expressions which Schleiermacher uses in the discussion to §4 in order to convey this central idea. Second, I will give an initial interpretation for the technical expressions identified, based on an analysis of their grammatical structure. This initial interpretation gives rise to an important substantive puzzle, a puzzle about the very point of the claim ‘that we are conscious of ourselves as absolutely dependent’, and its role in the overall argument developed in the general ‘Introduction’ to *The Christian Faith*. The puzzle is whether Schleiermacher sought to deliver a kind of proof from religious experience for the existence of God, and if so, whether his version of the proof has any merit. I will argue that the policy of translation followed by Baillie serves to obscure this puzzle.

⁴ ‘Das Gemeinsame aller noch so verschiedenen Aeußerungen der Frömmigkeit, wodurch diese sich zugleich von allen andern Gefühlen unterscheiden, also das sich selbst gleiche Wesen der Frömmigkeit, ist dieses, daß wir uns unsrer selbst als schlechthin abhängig, oder, was dasselbe sagen will, als in Beziehung mit Gott bewußt sind.’ Except where otherwise noted, all translations used in this paper will be my own. Since part of my aim is to criticize Baillie’s work as a translator, it would make little sense for me to rely upon his work-product.

SCHLEIERMACHER'S TECHNICAL TERMINOLOGY

Schleiermacher uses two grammatically distinguishable types of expressions to talk about the central idea of §4. The expression used in §4 itself, 'that we are conscious of ourselves as absolutely dependent' is a verbal expression; by contrast, the expression for which Schleiermacher is known in the English-speaking world today, the expression 'the feeling of absolute dependence', is a nominal expression. To judge from the relative frequency with which he uses the two types of expressions in the discussion to §4, it appears that he preferred the use of nominal expressions. Overall, nominal expressions occur nine times in §4, while verbal expressions occur only twice. (In the discussion to §5, the ratio is 16:4. The overall ratio for both propositions is 25:6.) For the most part, the translation prepared by Mackintosh, Stewart et al. accurately tracks Schleiermacher's alternation between nominal and verbal expressions, and reflects Schleiermacher's own preference for nominal over verbal expressions.

The first instance of a nominal expression used to express the idea 'that we are conscious of ourselves as absolutely dependent' occurs at §4.2. There, Schleiermacher tells us that an 'absolute feeling of dependence' [*schlechthiniges Abhängigkeitsgefühl*] is incapable of expressing our relation to the world. In §4.3, nominal expressions occur three times. Schleiermacher tells us, first, that to say 'that we are conscious of ourselves as absolutely dependent' is to say that we have 'an absolute feeling of dependence' (literally: 'our proposition [i.e. §4] ... demands an absolute feeling of dependence'); second, that our consciousness of not being absolutely free is itself 'a consciousness of absolute dependence' [*ein Bewußtsein schlechthiniger Abhängigkeit*]; and third, that without any 'feeling of freedom' [*Freiheitsgefühl*], 'an absolute feeling of dependence' [*ein schlechthiniges Abhängigkeitsgefühl*] would be impossible.

These are the first four instances in which Schleiermacher uses nominal expressions to express the idea 'that we are absolutely dependent'. What should be immediately apparent is that these nominal expressions are of two grammatically distinguishable types. The second instance in §4.3 is of a type distinguishable from that of the other three instances. From now on I will refer to the two types of expressions as 'Type 1' and 'Type 2' expressions. They are given here in both their definite and their indefinite forms:

Type 1

Definite form: 'the feeling (consciousness) of absolute dependence' [*das Gefühl (Bewußtsein) schlechthiniger Abhängigkeit*].

Indefinite form: 'a feeling (consciousness) of absolute dependence' [*ein Gefühl (Bewußtsein) schlechthiniger Abhängigkeit*].

Type 2

Definite form: ‘the absolute feeling (consciousness) of dependence’ [*das schlechthinnige Abhängigkeitsgefühl (bewußtsein)*].

Indefinite form: ‘an absolute feeling (consciousness) of dependence’ [*ein schlechthinniges Abhängigkeitsgefühl (bewußtsein)*].

The important thing to notice is that the two types of expressions are not necessarily interchangeable, for the position of the adjective ‘absolute’ within them is determinative of their meaning. Thus, in Type 1 expressions, the adjective ‘absolute’ modifies the noun ‘dependence’, while in Type 2 expressions it modifies the noun ‘feeling’. This grammatical point is often overlooked, perhaps because in English-language scholarship, the focus has been on the definite form of these expressions. In reading the German expression ‘*das schlechthinnige Abhängigkeitsgefühl*’, it is easy to think that *schlechthinnige* modifies *Abhängigkeits-* rather than *Gefühl*, because in the definite form, the ending of the adjective *schlechthinnige* does not vary with the gender of the noun it modifies. But to read the expression in this way is to make a grammatical mistake. German grammar requires that *schlechthinnige* be read as modifying *Gefühl*. The easiest way to see that this is the case is to consider the indefinite form of the Type 2 expression: ‘*ein schlechthinniges Abhängigkeitsgefühl*’. Used indefinitely, the adjective *schlechthinnig* changes its form depending on the gender of the noun it modifies. If the noun is masculine, it takes the form *schlechthinniger*; if the noun is feminine, it takes the form *schlechthinnige*; and if the noun is neuter, it takes the form *schlechthinniges*. Now *Abhängigkeit* is feminine, while *Gefühl* is neuter. In the neuter form *schlechthinniges*, the adjective can only modify *Gefühl*.⁵

While Schleiermacher used both types of nominal expressions, the text of *The Christian Faith* evidences a clear preference for those of Type 2. Type 1 expressions occur once in the discussion to §4 (‘the consciousness of absolute dependence’, at §4.3) and once in the discussion to §5 (‘the ... feeling of absolute dependence’, at §5.2). Type 2 expressions occur eight times in the discussion to §4, and 15 times in the discussion to §5. The ratio for §4 is 1:8, that for §5 is 1:15, and the overall ratio is 2:23.

Although Schleiermacher himself gives preference to expressions of Type 2, Baillie does quite the opposite, making the Type 1 expression ‘the feeling of absolute dependence’ his term of choice. In translating §4 and the following discussion, Baillie uses the term ‘the absolute feeling of dependence’ only once (correctly translating Schleiermacher’s first use, at §4.2, of a nominal expression to express the idea ‘that we are conscious of ourselves as

⁵ Of course, the indefinite expression ‘*eine schlechthinnige Abhängigkeitsgefühl*’ is ungrammatical. German grammar does not permit one to place *schlechthinnig* in the feminine form in the hope of making it modify *Abhängigkeit* rather than *Gefühl*.

absolutely dependent'), but Type 1 expressions like 'the feeling of absolute dependence' eight times. Thus, while in the original text the ratio is 8:1 in favour of Type 2, in Baillie's translation the ratio is completely reversed: it is 1:8 in favour of Type 1. Note also that Baillie is more consistent in his preference for Type 1 expressions than Schleiermacher is in his preference for Type 2 expressions. For example, at §8.2, Schleiermacher uses Type 1 expressions twice and Type 2 expressions three times; Baillie, by contrast, uses Type 1 expressions all five times.⁶ Not only did Baillie fail to preserve Schleiermacher's preference for Type 2 expressions in the translation, but he also imposed a standard of uniformity which Schleiermacher himself had not observed.

In what follows, I will endeavour to show what distorting effects Baillie's policy as a translator has on our understanding of Schleiermacher's argumentation. At this point, however, I would like to dwell for a moment on the problem of accounting for the choice of policy. Why did Baillie, and his colleagues following him, not translate the Schleiermacherian expressions literally? The fact that Baillie does use a Type 2 expression in his translation of '*schlechthinniges Abhängigkeitsgefühl*' at §4.2 suggests that he was not ignorant of the grammatical distinction I have developed. It suggests, rather, that he may have followed his own substantive assumptions about what it was that Schleiermacher wanted to say in fashioning the translation. He appears to have concluded, first, that the terminology used in talking about pious feeling ought to be kept uniform, that a choice should be made between expressions of Type 1 and expressions of Type 2, and that the choice once made should be maintained throughout the translation; and second, that expressions of Type 1 are somehow better adapted than expressions of Type 2 to the purpose of conveying what Schleiermacher thought about the religious state of mind. Implicit in Baillie's policy is the notion that a translator may in the process of translation correct the work being translated, when the original author failed to express himself with sufficient clarity.

If Baillie's first conclusion, that the nominal expressions used to talk about the religious state of mind ought uniformly to be of one type only, is correct, then his second conclusion, that Type 1 expressions alone ought to be used, finds some support in the circumstance that the verbal expression used in §4, 'that we are conscious of ourselves as absolutely dependent' is paralleled in structure by nominal expressions of Type 1: in the verbal expression used in

⁶ Baillie sustains this policy throughout his translation. In §31.1, for example, Schleiermacher twice uses the expression '*das schlechthinnige Abhängigkeitsgefühl*', and in both cases Baillie translates it as 'the feeling of absolute dependence'. A quick perusal of *The Christian Faith* shows that Baillie's policy of translating German Type 2 expressions using English Type 1 expressions was adopted by the entire team of translators working under Mackintosh and Stewart. It appears, in fact, that the expression 'the feeling of absolute dependence' gained such currency within the team, that it came to be used for all instances of expressing the idea 'that we are conscious of ourselves as absolutely dependent'. The Rev. W. R. Matthews, for example, goes so far as to translate '*das im unmittelbaren Selbstbewußtsein Sich-schlechthin-abhängig-Finden*' (§32) as 'the immediate feeling of absolute dependence'.

§4, ‘absolutely’ modifies ‘dependent’, while in expressions of Type 1, ‘absolute’ modifies ‘dependence’. Baillie may have reasoned that the literal meaning of §4 itself should be read into the following discussion, even to the point of requiring the translator to disregard the structure of nominal expressions used in the discussion in order to bring such expressions into conformity with the literal meaning of §4.⁷ What speaks against Baillie’s decision to favour Type 1 over Type 2 is Schleiermacher’s own preference for Type 2. My argument, however, is that there is no compelling need to resolve this issue, because Baillie’s first conclusion, that calling for uniformity of expression at the expense of grammatical accuracy, is false. The difference in meaning between Type 1 and Type 2 expressions cannot be dismissed as a vagary of language, and Schleiermacher’s alternation between Type 1 and Type 2 expressions cannot be put down to mere sloppiness. Rather, the difference in meaning between the two types of expressions goes to the heart of the substantive issues with which Schleiermacher is wrestling in §4 and following. For that reason at least, the difference must be preserved in the translation.⁸

AN INITIAL INTERPRETATION

For Schleiermacher, Type 1 and Type 2 expressions are two ways of identifying and characterizing the religious state of mind, or what elsewhere he more neutrally calls ‘pious feeling’ [*das fromme Gefühl*]. The two types of expressions draw attention to two different characteristics of pious feeling. For Schleiermacher, a feeling has (i) an introspectible content, and (ii) an object, something of which it is a feeling. I would like to claim that Type 2 expressions identify pious feeling according to its introspectible content, while Type 1 expressions identify pious feeling according to its object.

What, then, do Type 2 expressions tell us about the religious state of mind? What is an ‘absolute feeling of dependence’? According to Schleiermacher, it is possible for us introspectively to identify a ‘feeling of dependence’ or ‘dependence-feeling’ [*Abhängigkeitsgefühl*] and a ‘feeling of freedom’ or ‘freedom-feeling’ [*Freiheitsgefühl*]. The former can also be described as a sense of passivity, the latter as a sense of spontaneity or activity. These feelings would seem to be capable of occurring in any of three combinations: first, as a pure feeling of dependence, that is, as a feeling of dependence not mixed

⁷ Note, however, that the verbal expression ‘that we are conscious of ourselves as absolutely dependent’ [*daß wir unsrer selbst als schlechthin abhängig...bewußt sind*] unambiguously parallels Type 1 thanks only to the presence of the adverb ‘as’ [als]. The German ‘*daß wir uns schlechthin abhängig fühlen*’ (e.g., at §32.2) is ambiguous between ‘that we feel ourselves to be absolutely dependent’ and ‘that we absolutely feel ourselves to be dependent’. The only English translation capable of preserving this ambiguity is ‘that we feel ourselves absolutely to be dependent’.

⁸ In general, a translator is not at liberty to avoid the literal meaning of the text being translated; the literal meaning is essential to the text, and must be approximated to the extent possible in the translation. What I argue is that even those who do not appreciate the merits of literal translation in general will have to concede that here literal translation is necessary, because a matter of substantive importance is at stake.

with any feeling of freedom; second, as a pure feeling of freedom, as a feeling of freedom not mixed with any feeling of dependence; and third, as a mixed state of mind including both a feeling of freedom and a feeling of dependence. According to Schleiermacher, however, introspection tells us that only two of these combinations actually occur: the pure feeling of dependence, and the mixed feeling of freedom and dependence. Schleiermacher calls the first of these the ‘absolute feeling of dependence’, and by ‘absolute’ here he means nothing more than ‘pure’ or ‘unmixed’ (§4.2–4.3).⁹

And what do Type 1 expressions tell us about religious feeling? What is a ‘feeling of absolute dependence’? In Schleiermacher’s usage, for a being X to be ‘dependent’ on, or to stand in a relation of dependence with respect to, another being Y, is for X to be causally determined by Y. For a being Y to be ‘free’ with respect to another being X, is for Y causally to determine X. To say that X and Y stand in a relation of ‘reciprocal interaction’ [*Wechselwirkung*] to one another is to say that there is some respect in which X is dependent upon Y, and also some respect in which Y is dependent upon X. By contrast, to say that X is ‘absolutely dependent’ upon Y, to say that X stands in a relation of ‘absolute dependence’ to Y, is to say that X is causally dependent upon Y, but that there is no respect in which Y is dependent upon X. To say that I feel absolutely dependent, or that I have a feeling of absolute dependence, is to say that I have a feeling whose object is a real relation of absolute dependence (§4.4).¹⁰

It does not appear to be analytically true that an absolute feeling of dependence has to be a feeling of absolute dependence. The mere analysis of what it means for something to be an absolute feeling of dependence cannot generate the conclusion that it is also a feeling of absolute dependence. It is conceivable for a feeling of dependence to be unmixed with any feeling of freedom, and at the same time not to have as its object a real relation of absolute dependence. For example, it is conceivable for someone to have an absolute feeling of dependence but for there to be no such thing as a relation of absolute dependence, say if nothing were absolutely dependent on anything else. If every being stood in a relation of reciprocal interaction with every other being, then no being would be absolutely dependent upon any other, and it would be impossible to have a feeling of absolute dependence,

⁹ The notion of a feeling’s being ‘unmixed’ or ‘mixed’ with another is problematic in Schleiermacher’s thinking. One thing is certain: that a feeling occurs simultaneously with another in the mind does not imply that the two are ‘mixed’. Schleiermacher thinks that feelings both of dependence and of freedom are always present in the mind, yet that it is possible to have an unmixed or absolute feeling of dependence.

¹⁰ The expressions ‘feeling of dependence’ and ‘feeling of freedom’ are ambiguous, in the sense that they can be used to identify feelings either by their introspectible content or by their objects. The expression ‘feeling of dependence’ can be used to identify a feeling either as having a certain introspectible content (a certain sense of passivity), or as having as its object a relation of dependence. What I am suggesting here is that the expressions ‘absolute feeling of dependence’ and ‘feeling of absolute dependence’ are not ambiguous in the way that the expression ‘feeling of dependence’ is, because the position of the adjective ‘absolute’ removes all such ambiguity.

which is a feeling the object of which is a real relation of absolute dependence. Likewise, it does not appear to be analytically true that a feeling of absolute dependence has to be an absolute feeling of dependence. It is conceivable for a feeling to have as its object a real relation of absolute dependence and at the same time to have an introspectible content very different from that of an absolute feeling of dependence.

A SUBSTANTIVE PUZZLE

If my initial interpretation of the two types of nominal expressions is correct, if indeed the two types are not equivalent in meaning, but if in fact they represent two different ways of identifying the religious state of mind, then it is possible that matters of a substantive nature depend on which expression is used. Schleiermacher's choice of expression must be regarded as significant, and must be traced carefully in any translation. If I am right, furthermore, then Schleiermacher's practice of alternating between the two types of expressions must be taken to raise a serious substantive puzzle. If the proposition 'a feeling of absolute dependence is an absolute feeling of dependence' is not analytically true, then the question arises whether the proposition is true at all, whether, as Schleiermacher would have us believe, the two types of expressions in fact refer to one and the same state of mind, and if so, how we know that they do. What, if not conceptual analysis, justifies Schleiermacher in alternating between the two types of expressions?

The puzzle I have raised must be considered within the overall context provided by the general 'Introduction' to *The Christian Faith*. It cannot be resolved apart from a consideration of what it is that Schleiermacher is trying to accomplish in that context. I would like to propose that one of the things which Schleiermacher does in the 'Introduction' is to develop an account which one might be tempted to describe as a proof for the existence of God, and more specifically as a variant of the familiar proof from religious experience. The account can be reconstructed around a series of three conclusions:

- (1) I have an absolute feeling of dependence.
- (2) My absolute feeling of dependence is a feeling of absolute dependence.
- (3) I am absolutely dependent upon God.

In (1), the existence of a certain kind of religious experience, the absolute feeling of dependence, is asserted. In (3), the existence of God is implied, for it is possible to be absolutely dependent upon God only if God exists. The account is a proof for the existence of God, rather than just a series of factual assertions, just in case (3) can somehow be derived from (1). Such a derivation can only take place via something like (2), where the previously

identified absolute feeling of dependence is asserted to have as its object a real relation of absolute dependence.

We have seen that in §4, Schleiermacher takes the position that the truth of (1) is known by introspection. The characterization of pious feeling as an absolute feeling of dependence is a characterization of pious feeling in terms of its introspectible properties; and Schleiermacher thinks that introspectively we can verify the existence within ourselves of a feeling which answers to that characterization. Note that this point would be obscured by a characterization of pious feeling as a feeling of absolute dependence. A characterization of pious feeling according to the real relation which is its object does not convey the idea that such feeling can be identified introspectively. Only Type 2 expressions, but not Type 1 expressions, are capable of conveying the accessibility of pious feeling to introspective identification.

Likewise, it is clear from an examination of §8, and especially of what I call the ‘Refutation of Fetishism’ at §8.2, that Schleiermacher takes (3) to follow immediately from the claim that I stand in a real relation of absolute dependence to something.¹¹ The Refutation of Fetishism proceeds by asserting that the being upon which I am absolutely dependent must be either finite or infinite. Fetishism is the view that it is finite, Theism the view that it is infinite. An analysis of what it means to be absolutely dependent reveals that it is impossible to be absolutely dependent upon something that is finite; my relation to any other finite being is necessarily one of reciprocal interaction. Since either Fetishism or Theism must be right, there being no third possibility, and since Fetishism is wrong, Theism must be right. That upon which we are absolutely dependent must be infinite being, that is to say, God.¹²

Note that the Refutation of Fetishism appeals to the notion of a real relation of absolute dependence, because it is that relation which Fetishism misinterprets. The identification of pious feeling as an absolute feeling of dependence has no place in the Refutation of Fetishism. In §8.2, therefore, Schleiermacher is forced to go against his usual preference for Type 2 expressions and to use a Type 1 expression in characterizing the fetishistic mistake. In Fetishism, he tells us, ‘the feeling of absolute dependence is reflected as coming from a single sensible object’. But it is only because pious feeling is here identified as a feeling of absolute dependence (and not as an

¹¹ I discuss this argument at length in my article, ‘The Order of Nature in Pious Self-Consciousness: Schleiermacher’s Apologetic Argument’, *Religious Studies* 32:1 (March 1996), pp. 93–108.

¹² Sometimes Schleiermacher suggests that ‘God’ just means ‘that upon which I am absolutely dependent’, so that the proposition ‘I am absolutely dependent upon God’ follows analytically from the proposition ‘I am absolutely dependent’, and is compatible with any particular conception of that upon which I am absolutely dependent. For example, at §4.4a he writes, ‘The word “God” is represented here as meaning nothing other in our area of language than that which is co-positd in the original absolute feeling of dependence.’ For the purposes of the line of argumentation I am developing, however, the concept of God is the concept of infinite being, and the proposition ‘that upon which I am absolutely dependent is infinite’ is synthetic.

absolute feeling of dependence) that we can see the fetishistic reflection to be mistaken. It is impossible, Schleiermacher argues, for us to stand in a relation of absolute dependence to any ‘single sensible object’.

If it is true that an absolute feeling of dependence is introspectively identifiable, and if the Refutation of Fetishism is sound, then the merits of a Schleiermacherian proof from religious experience turn on the justification which can be given for (2), the claim that our absolute feeling of dependence is at the same time a feeling of absolute dependence. From what I have been able to discern, such a justification is missing in the text of *The Christian Faith*. Although Schleiermacher at several points freely alternates between Type 1 and Type 2 expressions for talking about the religious state of mind, he delivers no argument to show that such expressions must all refer to the same state of mind, and thus that the alternation between them is justified.

Some commentators have endeavoured to show that imbedded in the ‘Introduction’ to *The Christian Faith* it is possible to find a ‘transcendental argument’, an argument which proceeds from the known content of consciousness to the objective conditions under which alone it is possible for consciousness to have such content. An argument to the effect that there could be no absolute feeling of dependence in consciousness unless there were a real relation of absolute dependence between the subject of consciousness and something else would be a ‘transcendental argument’ in this sense.¹³ Maureen Junker-Kennedy suggests that in the search for such an argument we look to the middle of §4.1, where Schleiermacher shifts from the description of the two ‘elements’ of every self-consciousness, called ‘self-positing’ and ‘not-having-positing-oneself-thus’, to a theory of structures ‘in the subject’ which ‘correspond to’ these elements, namely the structures of ‘receptivity’ and ‘self-activity’. In the following discussion, Schleiermacher claims that a self-consciousness ‘expressing the affection of receptivity’ would be impossible if the subject were not together with something other than itself. Commenting on this claim Junker-Kennedy writes, ‘By distinguishing the real manifestation of the acts of subjectivity from the condition of this possibility, namely the subject’s essential structure as unity of “receptivity” and “self-activity”, it assumes the character of a transcendental argumentation.’¹⁴ But this surely is too strong a conclusion. The distinction between the content and the object of self-consciousness, together with the claim that

¹³ The notion of a ‘transcendental argument’, of course, comes from the literature on Kant’s *Critique of Pure Reason*, and is used to describe the type of argument which Kant delivers in his ‘deduction’ of the categories. The notion that there is something ‘transcendental’ in what Schleiermacher is doing probably comes from his biographer Wilhelm Dilthey, who called Schleiermacher ‘the Kant of theology’ and credited him with grasping the ‘transcendental standpoint’ from which alone God-talk is possible. See Dilthey, *Leben Schleiermachers* (2 vols), edited by Martin Redeker (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1966), Vol. II, p. 535. More recently, Maureen Junker-Kennedy has claimed that Schleiermacher uses a ‘transcendental mode of argumentation’ and delivers a ‘transcendental explication of God-consciousness.’ See Junker-Kennedy, *Das Urbild des Gottesbewußtseins* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1990), pp. 59, 71; and ‘Schleiermacher’s Transcendental Turn’, in *New Athenaeum/Neues Athenaeum* 3 (1992), p. 25.

¹⁴ Junker-Kennedy, ‘Schleiermacher’s Transcendental Turn’, p. 26.

a certain content is possible only when accompanied by a certain object, perhaps suggests the need for a transcendental argument, but does not itself 'assume the character' of such an argument.

I would like to draw three conclusions. First, if indeed Schleiermacher sought to deliver a proof for the existence of God, he omitted the critical step in the argument and either purposefully or inadvertently covered his tracks by means of a linguistic slight of hand. Lacking an argument for (2), he simply alternated between Type 1 and Type 2 expressions, perhaps in the hope that no one would worry too much about their literal meaning and would call for an explanation. Second, Schleiermacher's use of both Type 1 and Type 2 expressions to talk about pious feeling is significant in that it expresses his vacillation between an account of pious feeling focussing on the introspectible content of such feeling, and an account focussing on its real relations to entities distinct from itself. Whether or not Schleiermacher sought a proof from religious experience, he approached the characterization of pious feeling in two importantly different ways. Third, Baillie's decision to use only Type 1 expressions in his translation has the effect of both obscuring the latent ambiguity in Schleiermacher's account of pious feeling and of drawing the reader's attention away from any latent or explicit argument that Schleiermacher may have for getting from the introspectible content of pious self-consciousness to the theistic hypothesis. Type 2 expressions are needed to anchor the account of pious feeling in introspectible experience; while Type 1 expressions are needed in order to show that Theism but not Fetishism is a correct interpretation of pious feeling.