dispute underlies empirical disagreements over such things as the representativeness of party systems.

Bringing out this normative dimension more explicitly —as Brown does in her book—might better situate the empirics and the important underlying questions. For example, it would push the editors and authors to engage with counterarguments; or another example, either Mark Blyth or the late Peter Mair might argue that the findings of consonance between voter preferences and parties on some scale miss how the issue space underlying left-right scales has plausibly shrunk dramatically in the last twenty years.

Both Mair and Streeck would surely also point to changes in the relationship between the EU and its member states. These upheavals are pushed to the sidelines of the volume—Hassel briefly mentions them, Häusermann and Kriesi talk about how external politics may change citizens' preferences, and the volume's conclusions finally discuss the financial crisis as an "external shock" and clash of national approaches—yet it is surely more than that.

Peter Gourevitch famously joked that for a comparativist, happiness "is finding a force or event which affects a number of societies at the same time." In a recent essay, however, he has argued that the economic crisis did not involve "external forces shaping internal outcomes," but "the two interacting." These kinds of interactions are uncomfortable for comparativists to think about, but are crucial to understanding what has happened in a Europe where some states now find their economic policies largely being made for them by the "Troika," while other states are subject to more intrusive monitoring and potential intervention than in the past. It simply may not matter much that the policy preferences of Greek citizens and parties match with a .95 r^2 if those citizens and parties aren't making the real decisions.

These are difficult questions—and not just for Beramendi et al. It may be that the comparative political economy of Europe cannot just be comparative any more, since so much of what is important is happening at the EU and even international levels. Addressing both the normative questions raised by Brown and the empirical questions raised by Beramendi et al. doesn't simply mean giving normative arguments stronger empirical grounding or drawing out the normative claims implicit in empirical work. It also involves both approaches coming to terms with a world where the crucial causal forces simply cannot be cleanly segmented into neat national spaces.

The Awakening of Muslim Democracy: Religion, Modernity, and the State. By Jocelyne Cesari. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014. 440p. $99.99 cloth, $34.99 paper.
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— Quinn Mecham, *Brigham Young University*

Jocelyne Cesari's *The Awakening of Muslim Democracy* is an ambitious attempt to tell a comprehensive story about the origins of Islam's politicization in the modern era, the reasons for Islamist movements' popular success, and the ongoing problems faced by Muslim countries as they experiment with regime change. Careful research, coupled with a systematic comparison of political developments in five Muslim majority countries, makes this book an essential resource for those interested in recent developments in the Middle East and South Asia. The book's most significant contributions result from its sustained focus on the evolving relationship between Islam and the state, as well as its careful depiction of how Islamist movements have adapted and struggled in the wake of democratic transitions.

Cesari uses a methodology that "combines institutional and norm diffusion approaches" (p. 19) to evaluate the sources of Islam's politicization in the modern world. She argues that political Islam and state development in Muslim majority countries are inseparable because Islam has been present from the beginning of the nation-building process and that Islam's politicization is thus "a component of nationalism" (p. 18). She correctly notes that one cannot understand political Islam simply by studying political violence or political parties because Islam as a "hegemonic religion" has become deeply embedded in the state-building project throughout most of the Islamic world. The author is articulate in thinking through differences in conceptions of secularism, and appears to have a normative preference for secularity, which is defined in the book as "protection by law of all religions and equidistance of the state vis-à-vis all religions" (p. 4). She is not optimistic that either secularity or a fundamental respect for the individual "self" will be incorporated into the countries of her study in the near future, but forecasts a future of either praetorian regimes, communal federations, or "unsecular" democracies in the countries of the study.

The book uses a comparative case study approach, looking at the study's core questions by comparing the experiences of five supposedly "secular" Muslim majority regimes: Turkey, Pakistan, Iraq, Egypt, and Tunisia. These "secular" states are shown throughout the book to be deeply preferential to Islam from their beginnings, although to different degrees. Very brief comparisons are also made to Iran and Saudi Arabia, and later to Indonesia and Senegal, in order to illustrate broader comparative points. By showcasing the ways in which Islam became embedded in the state even in secularly-oriented regimes, the author makes a persuasive case that new states inevitably began to politicize Islam as soon as they moved to control and surround it. This occurred in a variety of predictable ways, including by supporting Islam through constitutional provisions, nationalizing and controlling Islamic institutions, by giving Islam preferential treatment in codified legal regimes, or by teaching Islam in public education systems.

One of the book's major strengths is its systematic focus on these multiple ways in which states intervene in public conceptions of religion and use Islamic references "to forge

a public morality of what is good and what is wrong in politics and who is a good and who is a bad citizen" (p. 111). Even the most avowedly secular of the Arab states, such as Bourguiba's Tunisia or Saddam's Iraq, did this on a regular basis and shaped the context under which these regimes would ultimately be challenged by Islamist opposition forces. The author spends considerable time on post-2011 debates over Islam in the Egyptian constitution, on the ways in which legal systems preference Islam through blasphemy, heresy, and conversion laws, and on how political systems use "women's bodies as a contested political site" (p. 112). A uniquely valuable contribution of the book is an original survey of public school textbooks, which tend to highlight Islam's singularity, superiority, victimhood, as well as misrepresenting other religious groups.

The second part of the book focuses on the reasons for Islamists' political popularity. The theoretical contribution of this discussion is not particularly significant, primarily borrowing from other authors to assess the institutions, ideology, legitimacy, and social mobilization potential of Islamist movements and parties present in the country cases. In terms of descriptive inference, however, the author provides a wealth of synthesized material on developments over time in the primary Islamist movements across her cases. Much of this material comes from the very rapid developments that took place in the Arab world between 2011–2013, making it a valuable resource for students and scholars who are interested in developments within Islamist movements during this chaotic period. Egypt and Tunisia are given particular attention in this regard, yet they are effectively placed within a broader context across time and space. The original political benefits of being the first among repressed opposition groups is shown to erode once Islamist oppositions move into government, at which point much of their popularity declines.

The final section of the book addresses Islam in the context of regime transitions, highlighting a number of significant issues. These include the difficult challenge of acquiring democratic legitimacy in a persistently authoritarian state system, the need to maintain popular appeal across different social groups, and the necessity of moving away from identity politics as Islamists enter into government. If these challenges can be navigated, the author asks, "is it possible to talk about the emergence of Muslim democracies?" (p. 233).

Although the book doesn't make the answer to this question explicit, in general the author seems to answer this question with a "no." The reason for the negative answer is that Islam has been embedded in each of these states as a hegemonic religion, which prevents them from realizing religious freedom and protection of all civil liberties. The author argues that "the protection of religious freedom is the conundrum of Muslim-majority countries" (p. 239) and that civil liberties continue to be rejected as "a threat to the national community" (p. 240).

As the author defines it, true democratization requires a full range of religious, civic, and personal freedoms, which most Muslim countries are not currently in the position to provide. This is illustrated, in part, with a lengthy discussion of Egyptian and Tunisian arguments over civil liberties in those countries' recent constitutional debates. Indonesia and Senegal are examples of Muslim countries that come closer to this requirement than the book's primary cases, with Indonesia illustrating positive cooperation between the state and religion and Senegal maintaining a principled distance with respect to national religions. However, the author notes that even these countries fall short in supporting individual freedoms on difficult personal rights issues like blasphemy or homosexuality. The book's somber conclusion is that largely because of their political foundations, Muslim majority countries are much more likely to support military (praetorian) regimes, competitive authoritarianism, or in the best case scenario, unsecular democracies.

Overall, Cesari's book is best at provoking discussion around conceptual issues in democracy and secularity, as well as providing a wealth of descriptive detail regarding religion, state, and the evolution of Islamist movements in the book's five focus countries. In this sense it is a requisite book for scholars engaged in these issues, while also serving as a reasonably comprehensive introduction to political Islam for advanced students. It also includes a helpful index of religious political violence in the appendices.

There is not much here that will change theoretical thinking on why Islamist movements do what they do, or why they ultimately succeed or fail. Those with different normative preferences for liberal political values and individual rights may also take issue with some of the underlying assumptions in the book. The contribution of a broader theoretical foundation, as well as more synthesis that highlights the implications of the descriptive case material, would go a long way to elevating this book to a central place in studies of political Islam. *The Awakening of Muslim Democracy* does offer some of the best thinking on the role of religion in the "secular" state across the Muslim world, as well as some of the richest descriptive material on recent developments in Islamist movements to date. It is highly recommended for all scholars of religious politics and especially for scholars and students of political Islam.

Popular Memories: Commemoration, Participatory Culture and Democratic Citizenships. By Ekaterina V. Haskins. Columbia: The University of South Carolina Press, 2015. 188p. $49.95.
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— Graeme Orr, *University of Queensland Law School*

Memory is at once subjective and ineffable, yet the basis of all meaning. This makes it a thorny enough concept for psychologists, let alone social scientists grappling with