

eras, an interview with Yan by Lu Xin, and an essay by Yan on the absence of a “Chinese School” of IR. The latter two pieces underscore Yan’s longstanding interest in marrying the study of IR with China’s early political traditions.

The authors could have enriched the volume by relating their ideas more explicitly and consciously to existing work on Chinese philosophy and history in addition to IR, sociology and other social sciences. Notably, the contributors see “justice,” “benevolence,” and “rites” as critical for humane authority and hegemony, treating them as self-evident and unproblematic. Responding directly to intellectual historians Theodore de Bary, Peter Bol, Chien Mu, Hsiao Kung-chuan, Willard Peterson, Wang Fan-Sen and Yu Ying-shih, who identify traditionally fierce literati debates over these concepts, could prove instructive. In arguing for the limits of existing scholarship on pre-Qin inter-state politics, Yan and Huang could react to research by political scientist Victoria Hui and sociologist Zhao Dingxin, alongside older work by historians Lei Haizong and Lin Tongji (pp. 25–26, 109–112). When stressing morality, legitimacy, and norms in pre-Qin perspectives on order, hierarchy, and inter-state relations, the authors could likewise reply to parallel positions advanced by G. John Ikenberry, Alastair Iain Johnston, Allen Carlson and David Kang.

Yan and his collaborators could more clearly pursue their goal of using pre-Qin thought “not just to analyse actual international politics but also to predict trends in international politics” (p. 215). Readers may find greater systematic substantiation and evaluation of the authors’ claims about the practical and moral advantages of pre-Qin approaches to foreign policy and IR particularly useful. The authors could articulate precise, testable theories and hypotheses derived from pre-Qin insights, which they may then assess against empirical evidence. This could move the book’s evidentiary basis beyond brief anecdotes that variously reference everything from IMF rules and American foreign intervention to Chinese grand strategy. These enhancements could more fully underline the value of pre-Qin philosophy to IR theory, foreign policy analysis and the social sciences.

By trying to tie together the study of IR and pre-Qin thought, *Ancient Chinese Thought* reminds social scientists about the possible gains of drawing from a broad array of intellectual sources. Such inter-disciplinary outreach may benefit readers most when they engage robustly with related literatures and empirical material. More extensive dialogue in this direction can enable scholars and students to better problematize and grapple with matters of legitimacy, authority and dominance in inter-state politics, which are among the contributors’ main concerns. Readers may therefore wish for more care and rigour in the treatment of pre-Qin thinking and IR. Taking these expectations seriously could help the project become more than a reference point on present thinking about IR theory and foreign policy in China.

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*China, the United States and 21st-Century Sea Power: Defining a Maritime Security Partnership*

Edited by ANDREW S. ERICKSON, LYLE J. GOLDSTEIN and NAN LI

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It is unusual for a book on military affairs to be suffused with optimism, but this one is optimistic as well as interesting. It consists of papers presented at a Conference at

the US Naval War College in December 2007, with some added later. The authors and editors do a good job of integrating and relating subsequent events up to March 2010. Even so, sad to say, the prospects for military maritime co-operation appear far less promising in mid-2011 than they did in early 2010.

Perhaps the main reason for the book's optimism is the favourable Chinese response to the October 2007 announcement of the official new US *Maritime Strategy*. The *Strategy* proposed a "Global Maritime Partnership" of all the world's navies to unite for search and rescue, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and fisheries enforcement, and against common concerns like piracy and smuggling. A key passage of the *Strategy* states that, "No one nation has the resources required to provide safety and security throughout the entire maritime domain ... Partnerships of common interests are required to counter ... emerging threats." The Chinese found this admission, and the *Strategy* generally, a welcome contrast to the usual perceived American arrogance.

Unfortunately, aggressive Chinese assertion in 2010 of their maximum sovereignty claims vis-à-vis their neighbours, in the East and South China Seas, and the American declaration of interest in the latter have since dampened enthusiasm for maritime co-operation. So did the US "Air-Sea Battle" doctrine of 2011 that clearly envisions China as the prospective enemy.

Many of the papers focus on "nontraditional security" issues that allow states to side-step the traditional security dilemma. There is plenty of room for "nontraditional security" co-operation, and there have been some successes. If you read only one chapter, make it Bernard Moreland's fascinating account of US Coast Guard co-operation with China. It would no doubt be even more effective if there were a true Chinese Coast Guard, rather than the five competing bureaucracies described by Lyle Goldstein. Citing a study by the Border Guards Maritime Police Academy, Goldstein writes that, "The balkanization of maritime enforcement entities in China has severely inhibited the coherent development of Chinese coast guard entities."

Although the first chapter, by Zhuang Jianzhong, is mostly Beijing boilerplate, he endorses the US *Maritime Strategy*. Like most of the Chinese contributors, he is admirably brief and concludes that successful co-operation depends entirely upon American behaviour; Chinese actions, of course have been and will always be purely defensive, peaceful, non-threatening and transparent!

Gabriel Collins devotes his chapter to a fact emphasized by virtually every contributor: China is increasingly dependent upon the "maritime commons." That could lead either to increased conflict or co-operation: "China's choices on how to deal with its dependence on the global maritime commons will shed light on Beijing's broader world view."

Good intentions and pieces of paper are not enough. David Griffiths, among others, notes that China and the US had a Military Maritime Consultative Agreement (MMCA) in place in 1998, intended to prevent incidents at sea and to provide communications if they occurred. The MMCA failed completely during the April 2001 EP-3 incident. Griffiths recommends an updated version of the US-Soviet Incidents at Sea (INCSEA) agreement of 1972, which worked reasonably well. The MMCA was negotiated by diplomats, whereas INCSEA was worked out by professional military seafarers who shared an international culture and experience. The key is to allow military professionals "political space" to negotiate, communicate, and review incidents. Routine military to military relations help reduce misperception, which Griffiths sees as a basic problem in most incidents.

Erickson writes that Chinese ports that are the source of 42 per cent of US-bound containers now participate in the Container Security Initiative (CSI), to both

countries' demonstrable benefit. China is formally and actively participating in a bevy of international agreements, initiatives and systems. The key is demonstrable mutual benefit and respect. Goldstein and William Murray provide the fascinating example of the International Submarine Escape and Rescue Liaison Office agreement of 2004. Zhu Huayou's admirably brief chapter on Southeast Asia provides a whole list of international agreements and mechanisms involving "non-traditional security" to which China is a state party.

Julia Xue Guifang provides an excellent discussion of "China and the Law of the Sea." Chinese interpretations of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) are contrary to those of most other signatories, especially with respect to passage of warships and various activities in China's Exclusive Economic Zone. Her concise argument for China's claims in the South China Sea is the most cogent and logical I have seen.

Peter Dutton follows with a discussion of legal differences from the American viewpoint. Dutton and Xue mostly identify the same points of agreement and disagreement, highlighting the different perspectives of a developing coastal state versus those of an established maritime power. Eric McVaden and Su Hao both point out the mutual benefits to be gained through co-operative disaster relief and humanitarian operations. McVaden also covers intelligence collecting in the EEZ and military to military relations.

Michael Green concisely cuts to three fundamental problems: "First, maritime co-operation is not insulated from capricious political actions." Second, paper agreements like the MMCA are not being exercised or tested. "Third, U.S. congressional frustration with lack of reciprocity is a continuing danger." American authors refer repeatedly to the regrettable way Sino-American military-to-military relations have been frozen by one or the other government in retribution for various crises du jour.

James Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara depart from the focus on the South China Sea with their essay on the Indian Ocean. They foresee trouble in US-Indian as well as US-Chinese relations. Meanwhile, China is beginning to consider what the Indians have "cried wolf" about for decades: establishing a naval presence, including bases, in the Indian Ocean.

Yu Wanli's penultimate chapter is one of the best in the book; frank, clear, and straightforward. Acknowledging that Chinese strategic thinking is dominated by a land power military culture, he describes the current debate in China over issues of sea power and national strategy. Like all the Chinese contributors he believes that rising Chinese sea power will inevitably provoke "contradiction and conflict" with the US, but still shares in the book's optimism that it can be handled.

Yang Yi ends the volume with a brief, fairly optimistic, view of the prospects for non-traditional security co-operation. He admits that "China must move beyond a 'victim mentality' and move toward a more confident and open-minded approach in the face of new ideas" like the Global Maritime Partnership. But there remain problems of trust, which are entirely the fault of (surprise!) the US.

One drawback of the book is that many chapters are repetitive and verbose (the American contributors are the worst offenders by far). However, undergraduates, graduate students, and most China scholars will find this book interesting and informative.

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