in Ha Tinh, Vietnam. In all three cases, performative governance broke down when further information came to light, exposing local officials' ineffectual approach to solving the problem. This certainly whets the appetite for a more systematic comparative study (indeed, one wonders, given the understandable lack of fieldwork underpinning these cases, whether this was performative governance in the sense detailed so persuasively in earlier chapters). An interesting case to consider, in the eyes of this reviewer, would be Russian environmental governance – arguably characterized by lower levels of state capacity and higher levels of public scrutiny, due to its somewhat less restrictive media environment. In Russia, independent public scrutiny is largely associated with "foreign agents," consequently delegitimized, and replaced with avenues for manufactured public scrutiny (an eventuality that Ding accounts for on p. 33). Indeed, for performative governance to exist, officials must surely have a certain regard for citizens' views in the first place.

Ding's concept of performative governance is particularly refreshing since it departs from familiar debates around democracy and authoritarianism by presenting a model of state–society relations not centred on electoral participation. In developing an alternative dyad for comparative analysis, Ding's framework suggests that all states that lack the resources to implement much-needed policies may engage in performative governance, regardless of their political regimes – although, as Ding suggests, citizens in democracies may be more likely to expose performative governance thanks to a freer media environment (p. 152). Nevertheless, one wonders whether, in this period of post-pandemic austerity, we may see more performative governance around the world as struggling government departments attempt to appease clamorous citizens.

In sum, this is a brilliantly written book, which combines perceptively observed vignettes of the routine lives of street-level bureaucrats and citizens with thought-provoking theoretical assertions and debates in order to expose the gap between what China's bureaucrats say they do and what they actually do. It will be of great interest to a wide range of students and researchers. On an empirical level, its sweeping depiction of the evolution of environmental governance in China will be valuable to students of China's green politics. On a theoretical level, its story of imperfect policy implementation and its concept of performative governance will be of great relevance to researchers in comparative politics and public administration more broadly.

Innovate to Dominate: The Rise of the Chinese Techno-Security State

Tai Ming Cheung. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2022. 414 pp. $44.95 (hbk). ISBN 9781501764349

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The author, currently the Director of the UC Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC) at the University of California, San Diego, has been working on this book for a long time. It is the product of a decade-long research project, funded by the US Department of Defense, studying innovation and technology in China.

This book encapsulates a voluminous study of how the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) – and especially supreme leader Xi Jinping – are engaged in a grand strategy of transforming China into a gigantic "techno-security state." By harnessing state-of-the-art technologies, Xi and the CCP hope to realize paramount external and internal goals: externally, to construct a militarily strong China that is better able to assert itself in international affairs and carve out a place for itself as a leading global power (perhaps even supplanting the US); and, internally, reinforcing CCP control over nearly aspects of life, society and the economy inside China, with Xi at the centre as "the chairman of everything."

According to Cheung, building the techno-security state depends on the interplay between three critical processes: SAMI (selective authoritarian mobilization and innovation), IDAR (introduce, digest, assimilate and re-innovate), and military–civil fusion. SAMI is a top-down, statist technology-development strategy that focuses selectively but powerfully on a few high-priority projects. In other words, it involves putting a lot of resources into a few, highly prized (and hopefully high-impact) mega-projects. It is, as Cheung notes, an innovation process nearly as old as the People's Republic, specifically referring to China's "two bombs, one satellite" strategy for building up a nuclear weapons and strategic missile capability. It is also hardly unique to China: the Manhattan Project – the US effort to build the first atomic bomb – is a classic example of SAMI.

The difference today, Cheung argues, is that China is now pursuing a much more expansive SAMI model. Under Xi, SAMI is no longer focused and selective; rather, it has been inflated to cover a whole range and hosts of projects. In other words, everything is a priority.

SAMI fits the techno-security ideal of state-run innovation, but it still needs the requisite technologies to get the job done. This is where IDAR comes in. IDAR generally emphases the acquisition (legally or otherwise), exploitation and adaptation of *foreign* technologies, so as to eventually raise the overall standard of the national R&D base. Again, IDAR strategies are not new, nor are they unique to China. IDAR is basically just another example of "technonationalism," a rather common technological-industrial development strategy. Richard Samuels, in his ground-breaking book on the rise of Japan's postwar arms industry, *Rich Nation, Strong Army: National Security and the Technological Transformation of Japan* (Cornell University Press, 1994), described Tokyo's technonationalist approach to defence industrialization by dividing it into three stages: indigenization, diffusion and nurturing – that is, the acquisition, assimilation and circulation of technology (often foreign in origin) into the national technological base, which is then further "processed" into indigenous R&D. Similar technonationalist strategies have been used by South Korea to develop its automobile and shipbuilding sectors, or by Brazil to become a leading aerospace manufacturer.

The modern twist to China's IDAR lies in the third process: military–civil fusion (MCF). MCF is based in part on the transfer of cutting-edge commercial technologies – particularly information and communications technologies – to the military-industrial sector. More significantly, however, MCF is about creating a common, mutually reinforcing civil-military economic and technology base for developing cutting-edge technologies to serve the civilian but especially the military sectors – in other words, a shared "technology well." Not surprisingly, MCF has become a "prized strategy" for Xi. MCF is essential, Cheung insinuates, to empowering SAMI and IDAR, which in turn will help to build the techno-security state.

Nevertheless, MCF still faces significant structural, normative, institutional and operational obstacles. Cheung quotes a speech by Xi in 2015 in which he bemoans the lack of policies, ideas, concepts, top-level coordination and management systems to make MCF work. Furthermore, it is uncertain whether Xi's expansive, state-run, top-down innovation system can craft the technologies to build an effective techno-security state. In particular, Xi's personalization of power and his efforts to tightly control everything could severely retard innovation and suppress technological risk-taking. This could particularly affect the development of so-called "fourth industrial revolution" technologies, such as artificial intelligence (AI), robotics and cloud computing, as well as next-generation microelectronics. Nevertheless, even a partially successful Chinese techno-security state, with a more technologically advanced R&D and industrial base, and a

subsequently more powerful military, could all seriously challenge the US for global military, economic and geostrategic primacy in the 21st century.

Be forewarned: this is a dense book. Some sections, such as the chapter on MCF, are a particularly deep dive, full of acronyms, policy pronouncements, government initiatives, graphs, matrixes and case studies. That said, this volume ploughs a lot of new ground, especially when it comes to assessing China's efforts to exploit MCF (easily the best chapter). Overall, Cheung makes an important contribution to understanding China's building of a new and potentially sinister national security state.

The Wuhan Lockdown

Guobin Yang. New York: Columbia University, 2022. 328 pp. $28.00; £22.00 (pbk). ISBN 9780231200479

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Guobin Yang's book is a vivid and highly readable account of the first months of what became the COVID-19 pandemic in Wuhan as revealed through the online diaries of Wuhan residents. Materials from the diaries are lightly contextualized in existing scholarship on issues ranging from civil society and health system reform through nationalism and authoritarian resilience. Yang's core interests, though, are in Wuhan citizens' experiences and on the state's interactions with those citizens during the lockdown, a subject to which he brings much expertise from many years of research on the internet, media and activism in China.

The book begins with three scene-setting chapters. The first summarizes the 20 days of state prevarication during January 2020 before the "Wuhan lockdown" began on 23 January. Here Yang emphasizes how local government efforts to give the appearance of prosperity and developmental success overrode concerns about "unknown pneumonia" and led them to cover up the extent of the outbreak. Chapter two recounts the tightening restrictions on civil society and the internet in the period from the Arab spring of 2011 and after Xi Jinping took over the leadership of the Communist Party. This, argues Yang, meant that the pandemic erupted in "a political environment hostile to free expression" where whistle-blowers were silenced, thus enabling the cover-up and subsequently requiring – as set out in chapter three – the lockdown of Wuhan and a "hardcore" response using "blunt force" and national mobilization.

The core, and strength, of Yang's book is the online diaries he collected as events unfolded. In chapter four he introduces the diarists – mostly more educated Wuhan residents, including professors, schoolteachers, students, health care workers, writers, lawyers and officials. A notable exception is "Old Ji," a delivery driver who provides insight into the experiences, bravery and humour of people on the frontlines. Chapter five then focuses on hospital experiences as revealed through the diaries of doctors and patients. Here moving accounts show their encounters with a terrifying and still little-understood virus at a time when protections were limited and vaccines unavailable. Subsequent chapters focus on civil society and the online activities of China's netizens. Despite the limits on NGOs by 2020, Yang shows how civic organizing did emerge, whether to rescue