

the notion that the Tirpitz Plan was designed as the foundation of “a social imperialist policy of domestic stabilization.” Instead, “bureaucratic self-interest” and “an expansionist understanding of world politics” were far stronger motives (p. 324). He argues persuasively that the vital interests of the groups normally associated with the *Sammlung* were fundamentally at odds with the premises of German naval expansion, which reflected the sentiments of liberal nationalist *Flottenprofessoren*, not conservative preindustrial elites. In addressing the role of “bureaucratic self-interest,” however, Hobson does not go as far as Patrick Kelly or the reviewer in emphasizing the importance of Tirpitz’s personal quest for power within the navy and, in a broader sense, within the Second Reich.

Hobson has produced a welcome addition to the literature on the Imperial German navy. While specialists will find this work especially appealing, the even-handed discussion of the historiography makes it accessible to a broader audience of scholars and students seeking an introduction to the field.

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*Inventing the Schlieffen Plan: German War Planning, 1871–1914.* By Terence Zuber. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2002. Pp. vii + 340. \$72.00. ISBN 0–19–925016–2.

The Schlieffen Plan — the plan that would trigger World War I and nearly annihilate France, Belgium, and the BEF — was woefully poorly guarded. According to Terence Zuber, when the great field marshal resigned his command of the German General Staff in 1906, he casually left many of the voluminous papers and *Denkschriften* that collectively formed the plan in his study at home. When Schlieffen died in 1913, his daughters, Maria and Elisabeth, inherited the Schlieffen Plan, and wedged it into a shelf between their photo albums and scrapbooks. Knowledge of this security lapse, unthinkable in our own security-obsessed age, would doubtless make hard-working spies like Colonel Redl sit up in their graves.

And yet it is the argument of Terence Zuber in *Inventing the Schlieffen Plan: German War Planning, 1871–1914* that had a spy like Redl snatched the Schlieffen Plan — from Frau Schlieffen’s parlor or the vaults of the *Grosser Generalstab* — it would have made absolutely no difference to the conduct or outcome of World War I. Why? Because there was no Schlieffen Plan. That plan of legend, that crutch of the modern war college (which views Schlieffen as the wrecking ball of harmonious civil-military relations), that catch-all explanation

for the outbreak of World War I, is pure fiction. As Zuber sees it, the “Schlieffen Plan” was concocted *after* the Great War, not before it. It was invented by academics like Gerhard Ritter to point a moral about the evils of militarism. It was invented by pundits like Hans Delbrück as a sort of mirror, to reflect the errors of 1914, and thereafter. It was invented by generals like Erich Ludendorff and Wilhelm Groener to excuse their defeat in World War I.

What Zuber argues is that what historians refer to as the “Schlieffen Plan” was just a *Denkschrift* or “thought piece” that the field marshal wrote in January 1906 (but, confusingly, referred to as the “*Denkschrift* of 1905”). In the event of a Franco-German War — not unlikely in view of the Moroccan Crisis — Schlieffen called for a vast wheeling envelopment of the hard-charging French army. While the French advanced into Lorraine and Alsace, the Germans would roll them up from the right, much as they actually attempted to do in 1914.

However, and here is Zuber’s principal objection, Schlieffen was not writing a war plan, he was merely thinking about ways to fight the French. He was arguing for a better use of German manpower. Draft a big army, he was saying, and we can mass enough troops to encircle and annihilate the French. But that *Denkschrift* of 1905 did not concern itself with a two-front war with France and Russia. Thus, Schlieffen in 1905–6 allowed himself the luxury of packing eighty-two German divisions into the right hook that he aimed at the French, whereas Moltke the Younger in 1914, distracted by the Serbs and Russians and the French dash into Lorraine, provided just fifty-four.

Zuber is not defending the wisdom of Schlieffen, rather he is arguing that Schlieffen has been misconstrued. While he sheds new light on the way Schlieffen has rather unfairly evolved into a punching bag for liberal professors, his book is too narrow in its approach. Schlieffen after all did a study of Germany’s strategic situation in 1892, just after assuming command of the great general staff, and concluded that France and Russia together outnumbered the German army 2:1, and would have to be dealt with. Noting the “railwayless vastness of Russia” in that 1892 study, Schlieffen proposed smashing France and then turning on Russia. He later assured his Austro-Hungarian allies, who trembled at the growth of the Russian army, that “the fate of Austria will be decided not on the Bug, but on the Seine.” A war-opening German envelopment of the French army, in other words, would permit a leisurely transfer of German troops to the East to assist the Austro-Hungarians in mopping up the Russians.

What these remarks and commentaries prove is that there *was* a Schlieffen Plan. Though it may not have been written down and stored in a safe, it was a collection of Schlieffen’s ideas, memoranda, and a general philosophy that coursed through the Wilhelmian general staff, which was far more aggressive than the late Moltkean one. In 1912, observing the expansion and

modernization of the French and Russian armies and infrastructure, the Germans passed a 400 million Mark Army Act aimed chiefly at giving the Schlieffen Plan a hope of success against the unexpectedly nimble Russians and suddenly more numerous French.

Quite correct in a narrow, literal sense, Zuber's denial of the Schlieffen Plan is quite incorrect in the broad context of Wilhelmian politics and war planning.

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*Cities, Sin, and Social Reform in Imperial Germany.* By Andrew Lees. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 2002. Pp. xiii + 432. \$65.00. ISBN 0-482-11258-9.

Fears of the city as seedbed of "sin" ran high in Germany toward the end of the nineteenth century, as indeed they did throughout Europe and the United States, where moralists both religious and secular joined in an abhorrent chorus, denouncing all manner of urban "decadence" and "degeneracy" at the fin de siècle. Deviant sexuality, promiscuity, prostitution, alcoholism, crime, greed, materialism, "smut and trash," commercialism, bad taste, and the breakdown of moral order in general topped the litany of complaints laid at the feet of the modern metropolis. Historians of Imperial Germany have long been accustomed to stuffing such lamentations into bulging folders marked "antimodernism" and "cultural despair" as further evidence in the case for an intellectual and cultural *Sonderweg* laid out decades ago by Fritz Stern, George Mosse, and others. Yet complaints about life in the big city do not necessarily express *hostility* to the big city (ask any New Yorker). Nor are attacks on immorality *always* signs of flight from modernity into lunacy, fanaticism, and (eventually) genocide. As Andrew Lees shows in this well-researched book, even the bitterest diatribes of German moralists sometimes contained professions of "civic pride" and an "urban ethos" that helped to create a "discursive framework in which moral criticism could be expressed constructively" (p. 49). Like many other voices in the transatlantic refrain, German reformers and critics not only reviled the sinfulness of cities but also advanced practical strategies to cure the modern ills they descried.

The book is divided into four parts, which cover the stance of moralist critics of the city from several methodological approaches, exploring broader discursive and institutional frameworks as well as offering case studies of four reformers deemed representative of the constructive outlook Lees sets out to uncover: 1) Viktor Böhmert, editor of *Der Arbeiterfreund* (the journal of the Centralverein für das Wohl der arbeitenden Klassen), who worked to provide