

in a democracy. To get a fuller picture of political participation, Boulding and Holzner make good use of data from LAPOP's AmericasBarometer, which asks questions about a range of different activities. Yet although this made it possible to measure nonelectoral forms of participation, the book arguably relies a bit too heavily on survey data. (The way the book assembles this data into its Political Participation Index also raises questions, as discussed later.) The inclusion of case studies would have been useful for bringing the material to life and teasing out causal mechanisms. As a book titled *Voice and Inequality* and concerned with the diverse forms that political action can take, it also should have at least mentioned Albert O. Hirschman's classic, *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty* (1970).

In addition to shedding light on how the poor participate in politics, the book has implications for several other literatures. One is the literature on clientelism. Although it has long been assumed that the granting of particularistic goods or favors in exchange for political support is harmful, recent works have offered a more nuanced perspective. The authors share this revisionist take, arguing that clientelism "can be an important source of political voice for poor people" and "may, under some conditions, be a positive force for democracy" (pp. 17–18). The book also makes an important contribution to our understanding of the "left turn" in Latin America, the topic of chapter 6. Boulding and Holzner show that the election of radical leftists led to lower rates of participation by the poor relative to the nonpoor than the election of moderate leftists, a result that they attribute in large part to radical leftists' tendency to undermine civil liberties and electoral competition.

Despite the book's many strengths, it also has some shortcomings. The biggest one, in my view, is how the authors assemble their Political Participation Index. This is at the heart of the book's main finding—that the poor in Latin America participate in politics at roughly the same rate as the nonpoor—and so it is not a minor issue. As they explain on pp. 53–54, this index is constructed from an additive scale that looks at three types of participation: voting, protesting, and contacting local government officials. Yet even though one might expect that this would result in a scale of 0–3, with each type of participation corresponding to one point, in fact the book uses a scale of 0–4. This is because contacting government officials is separated into two components—"Contact local government" and "Petition local government"—with each given a point of its own. In other words, 50% of the Political Participation Index seems to be based on just one type of political participation, with the other two assigned only 25% each.


I was persuaded by the authors' argument that contacting government officials constitutes an important—and often overlooked—form of political participation. It was not clear to me, however, why this form of participation should be given twice the weight of voting or protesting.

One possible reason is that contacting and petitioning government officials are very different activities. The questions from the LAPOP survey that the book uses for its two measures of contacting government officials, however, do not correspond to very different activities. Here is the first question: "In order to solve your problems have you ever requested help or cooperation from a local public official or local government: for example, a mayor, municipal council, councilman, provincial official, civil governor or governor?" (p. 54). Here is the second question: "Have you sought assistance from or presented a request to any office, official or councilperson of the municipality within the past 12 months?" (p. 54). The authors acknowledge in appendix 1 and in an endnote on p. 217 that the two questions are similar and claim that they collapse the two into a single dichotomous variable. However, they do not actually seem to do this in their Political Participation Index. At best, this was confusing. At worst, it left me wondering whether the book's main finding would still hold if this form of political participation were given the same weight as voting or protesting, since it is the only one of the three in which the poor participate more than the nonpoor.

Nevertheless, this book is a welcome addition to the comparative politics literature. It addresses an important and understudied topic, is well written, presents a wealth of survey data, and makes a number of conceptual and theoretical contributions. It will no doubt serve as a touchstone for future research on the relationship between poverty and political participation, both in Latin America and beyond.

### Response to James Loxton's Review of *Voice and Inequality: Poverty and Political Participation in Latin American Democracies*

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Our book and that by James Loxton approach important questions in Latin American politics with very different research strategies. We are glad that Loxton saw the value of our work and how it might reshape scholars' understanding of who participates in politics and how. We also appreciate this conversation that highlights the contributions of quantitative and qualitative research.

Loxton's main critique focuses on how measurement choices related to our Political Participation Index might undermine the book's main finding—that poor people are overall more politically active in Latin America than the nonpoor. Luckily, this is an easy matter to resolve empirically. During our analysis, we estimated models using a version of the index that gives contacting the same weight as voting and protesting, and we can report that the substantive findings are very similar to the ones in the

book. In making his critique, however, Loxton is pointing to a bigger question that we thought a lot about: How should we best measure the dependent variable and ensure that our findings do not depend on how we operationalize political participation?

In the end, the findings in the book are very robust to different specifications, but we faced some difficult trade-offs. For example, we initially created an index of political participation that included *eight* different modes of political participation asked in LAPOP surveys up until 2012. This index was more robust and less susceptible to bias from one kind of political act alone. It also produced a stronger negative relationship between wealth and political participation than the 4-point index we eventually used. One of the most difficult decisions we had to make was whether to include our full index of political participation valid only up until 2012 or to use the 4-point index that allowed us to bring the analysis closer to the present. Given that the core substantive results were essentially the same regardless of how we constructed the index, we opted for using the most up-to-date information available to us at the time.

Perhaps more importantly, readers should not worry that our results depend on how we constructed the Political Participation Index. As we describe at length in chapter 3, we sometimes use the additive index, but the bulk of the analysis is based on separate statistical models for voting, protesting, and contacting government officials. In this way readers can see for themselves how each political act contributes to or detracts from political equality.

We agree with a second point raised by Loxton: the book would have benefited from the inclusion of case studies to bring the numbers to life and help tease out causal mechanisms, exactly the kind of rich case-study material that makes Loxton's book so compelling. That said, we drew heavily from our extensive fieldwork experience in several countries and from excellent qualitative studies by other scholars that enriched our understanding of political participation, partisan mobilization, and community organizing. In the end, this book came together as a complex quantitative story, one that we believed was important to make available.

### **Conservative Party-Building in Latin America: Authoritarian Inheritance and Counterrevolutionary Struggle.**

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Unstable party systems have been a defining feature of politics in Latin America since the 1980s, when most

countries in the region made the transition from authoritarianism to democracy. During this time hundreds of new parties emerged, but according to Steven Levitsky, James Loxton, and Brandon Van Dyck (*Challenges of Party-Building in Latin America*, 2016), only 11 (less than 5%) managed to survive for more than a few electoral cycles. Conservative parties did not fare well: across the entire region since 1978 only four new conservative parties became electorally significant and enduring political actors. However, all four successful cases of conservative party-building were authoritarian successor parties; that is, political parties that emerged from and had close ties with the outgoing authoritarian regimes. Why would conservative parties with close ties to repressive military dictatorships thrive while center-right parties with more democratic origins failed to take root? *Conservative Party-Building in Latin America* is a fascinating book that provides an empirically rich and theoretically persuasive explanation of why the most successful new conservative parties had deep roots in dictatorships.

According to the party-building literature, new parties need strong party–voter linkages, a territorial organization, and a source of cohesion to succeed. Loxton's framework draws on this literature to argue that, rather than handicapping new conservative parties, authoritarian inheritance provided some conservative parties with precisely these ingredients of party-building that allowed them to compete and survive under democracy. Specifically, Loxton identifies two crucial factors: authoritarian inheritance and counterrevolutionary struggle. Authoritarian inheritance provides parties with party–voter linkages in the form of an identifiable (and credible) party brand, strong preexisting partisan identification, and even access to clientelistic networks. Authoritarian successor parties may also inherit a territorial organization that enhances their capacity to mobilize electoral support, allows them to draw on the enthusiasm of committed party activists on the ground, and may help them win subnational office, which allows them to build a track record of successful governance under democracy. Additionally, counterrevolutionary struggle experienced under authoritarianism provides new conservative parties with an important source of internal cohesion that can serve as a powerful “glue” to hold parties together through crises, electoral defeats, and the death or exit of the founding leaders. In other words, rather than damning authoritarian successor parties, their roots in prior authoritarian regimes provide valuable resources and political capital that allow them to gain a solid footing under democracy. In contrast, the task of building a new party from scratch proved too difficult for conservative parties with more democratic origins.

This explanation is outlined in chapter 2, and the bulk of the book is dedicated to four detailed case studies of conservative party-building efforts: the UDI (Unión