

to the UN War Crimes Commission after the war, including Italian commanders, officers, internment camp managers, soldiers, and civilian staff members for whom they asked for prosecution and trial. This number of likely war criminals, despite the possibility of exaggeration, shows the true nature of that occupation, which, according to Adriano and Cingolani, “can not be considered as hostile.” Despite all these mistakes, the book written by Adriano and Cingolani can be regarded as useful in certain aspects, because there is no such study available in the English language.

Goran Miljan graduated in Zagreb and defended his doctoral thesis at the Central European University in Budapest. In his book about Ustaša youth, he exhibits a distanced objectivity characteristic for a person from another country, but with an active level of knowledge about the subject at hand, which is often only possible for someone writing about the history of their own country.

For a long time, the subject of the Ustaša youth (*Ustaška mladež*) was historiographically neglected as the research topic, as were other elements of Ustaša ideology. In the last two decades things have begun to change. There is now a list of books and key papers that have attempted to situate various aspects of Ustaša rule in the context of pan-European Nazi-fascism. For example, Martina Bitunjac recently published a very informative analysis of the role of Ustaša women, *Le donne e il movimento ustascia* (2009), and *Verwicklung, Beteiligung, Unrecht: Frauen und die Ustasa-Bewegung*, (2018).

Miljan’s book for the first time examines and analyzes the ideology, practices, and international connections of the Ustaša youth organization. The Ustaša youth was an all-embracing fascist youth organization established in 1941 by the Ustaša. It was closely modelled after the youth organizations in Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy. The goal of the organization was to reeducate young people in the model of an ideal “new” Croat. This youth organization presented a crucial element in the Ustaša’s all-embracing, totalitarian, national revolution, which in reality consisted of specific interconnected, mutually-dependent practices. The Ustaša *poglavnik* (or, “führer”) Ante Pavelić stated in 1941 that our youth “must be raised” in such spirit that “it will be determined in ideas, decisive in its will, determined to be the first battalion in the most difficult times to its people” (*Ustaški godišnjak*, February 17, 1945, 15). On the one hand, persecution, oppression, mass murder, and the genocide, and on the other, youth regimentation and reeducation that served the purpose of creating a “pure” and “new” Croatian nation.

The first versions of the Miljan’s paper were published in Zagreb, with some chapters published elsewhere. This text is a broadened version. It gives a well-documented picture of an important and integral part of the Ustaša movement. Miljan’s book is certainly an inescapable foundation that no new research into the history of the Ustaša movement will be able to bypass.

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***Beyond Balkanism: The Scholarly Politics of Region Making.*** By Diana Mishkova. Routledge Borderland Studies. Abingdon, Oxon, UK: Routledge, 2019. x, 282 pp. Notes. Bibliography. Chronology. Index. \$112.00, hard bound.  
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This well-researched book sets out to provide an overall synthesis of scholarly conceptualizations of “the Balkans” as a spatial category. It builds on the author’s years-long research into the comparative history of regional concepts. A sizeable literature

on “Balkanism” has so far mainly looked into western fiction, travelogues, and journalism in order to deconstruct popular distinctions between the European “Self” and Balkan “Other.” But how did academic discourse feed into such images and mental mapping? And what kind of self-representations emerge from scholars in the region?

Daria Mishkova starts her analysis in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, when the Balkans moved to the forefront of European attentions as the Ottoman Empire disintegrated. From there she takes the reader to the interwar era, when the “pristine Balkans” figured as a way of “expressing the widely shared feeling of estrangement from modern life” (121). Representations of transnational commonality and interaction by intellectuals like Jovan Cvijić, Ivan Shishmanov, Nicolae Iorga, and Nikola Županić reflected national and geopolitical concerns, as did various federalist projects forwarded by either liberal or leftist thinkers before and after WWII. Many believed a regional collective identity was a prerequisite for closer cooperation and common security. During the Cold War, southeast European institutes and specialized international associations continued interdisciplinary discussions on the region through conferences and journals. In western political perception, meanwhile, the Balkans emerged mainly as a sub-region of communist eastern Europe, although after the break-up of Yugoslavia the region returned as a metaphor for ancient hatred and endemic violence to public discourse.

*Beyond Balkanism* is written from an original and intriguing perspective. It convincingly demonstrates how academic discourse functions as a social mechanism to construct cognitive maps and, ultimately, political realities. Not to forget: entanglement of politics with scholarship also happened in that a number of scholars were personally active in both fields. At the end of this thoroughly researched study, however, there is no clear picture of Balkan self-representations as they were linked to distinct and sometimes even opposing ideologies and value systems.

Only occasionally the analysis lacks historical context: for instance, when dealing with the German “Südostforschung.” Leading scholars like Fritz Valjavec appear mainly in their capacity as academics. But this picture is incomplete, as during WWII he and other scholars took an active role in advancing Hitler’s new racial order and the greater economic area under Nazi leadership, fighting loyally on both ideological and military fronts. The assessment that a dedicated advocate of the Nazi expansionist and racial program, and active member of the SS, should have “promoted views that chimed with the local understanding of the Balkans as a living cultural/historical entity with a political future rather than with the German understanding of a new . . . Southeastern Europe” (129) is simply wrong. To the contrary, the Nazi political and ideological context has influenced German academic discourse to a large extent.

While regional representations have become an established field of research, discussions of whether regions are formed by structural commonalities or constructed by imaginations continue. “Tailoring academic research to established spatial categories predetermines to a large extent its conclusions,” the author underlines (236). Irrespective of this concern, *Beyond Balkanism* focuses on self-representations that explicitly do assume some kind of regional identity. Many Albanian, Greek, Serbian, Romanian, and Bulgarian intellectuals, however, did not believe that they would belong to some kind of sub-region when advocating federalist concepts such as the pan-European idea, the Danubian-Balkan federation, or the European Union project. But these were apparently beyond the scope of the research.

Although Mishkova agrees that “none of the ‘regional’ historical experiences and legacies was exclusively a Balkan one . . . ; nor did they affect this geographical space as a whole and in the same degree,” (236) she defends the area studies approach against global and transnational history challenges. True, from the perspective of more recent approaches, the question of whether the Balkans exist—either as reality

or imagination—is largely irrelevant. But Mishkova remains faithful to the idea of historical regions and their making, while proposing to reconfigure the meaning of the Balkans into a “fuzzier, processual and open-ended one” (239).

The book is inspiring and deeply reflective. It is highly recommended to all interested in area studies and symbolic geography.

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***The Search for a Cold War Legitimacy: Foreign Policy and Tito's Yugoslavia.*** By

Robert Edward Niebuhr. Balkan Studies Library, vol. 22. Leiden, Netherlands: Brill, 2018. xx, 248 pp. Appendix. Notes. Bibliography. Index. Photographs. Maps. \$114.00, paper.

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“Language is like a musical instrument,” ASU’s Robert Niebuhr quotes Dante Alighieri’s translator John Ciardi. Therefore, to unveil the specific logic of the text to the readers, a word-for-word translation is not necessarily the best or the only way to go. Frankly, I was rather surprised by this statement in the first sentence of the Note on Translations and Terms by someone who co-authored the beginner-level textbook on standard Croatian (and Serbian, Bosnian, and Montenegrin). The historiography of Cold War Yugoslavia, or even less so, the historical documents in the Archives of Yugoslavia or most Cold War archives, as a matter of fact, are hardly comparable to anything Dante wrote. The impression this book gives is that sometimes some of Niebuhr’s conclusions are not polished enough, but his overall thesis, the whole logic of the book, seems to be rather solid and convincing.

*The Search for a Cold War Legitimacy* covers a long time period and tries to explain Tito’s Yugoslavia from the war years to the break-up of the federal state in 1991. That is, perhaps why there are too many strong conclusions and statements per page in this book, but it would be wrong to say that they are not stirring or that they are problematic or unconvincing. Many interpretations are not radical—some are only new ideas in old bottles, and it would probably be better to give more attention and argumentation to some of them, but they are, in spite of the unusual approach of some, intriguing and intellectually provoking. The footnotes are very long, sometimes a bit too peculiar, but never boring. Some of them should have been included in the main narrative.

Niebuhr is primarily a diplomatic, but also a military historian, so a significant number of pages in this publication is dedicated to territorial defense and the role of the Yugoslav People’s Army that Marshal Tito was commander-in-chief of. Being positioned in-between the two blocs left Yugoslavia vulnerable, and it was necessary to find a credible strategy for how to secure the independence for the Federation of the Southern Slavs. Legitimacy was found in the Partisan movement during the WWII, Marxism in the peculiar Yugoslav interpretation, and specific, active, and visible foreign policy. Josip Broz Tito was “a Cold War Otto von Bismarck, stuck in the middle of two overwhelming blocs” (214), Niebuhr claims. Decentralization, which was one of the Yugoslav obsessions, was a substitute for democratization. Legitimacy and the attempt to find it was always connected with Tito’s foreign policy plan, which “stood at the center of his governance strategy” (210). This statement, which is one of the main theses in the text, sometimes seems to be overstretched, but it is an intriguing argument that is consistently elaborated throughout the book.

As Marshal of Yugoslavia, Tito “took his internal reform a step further by integrating his reformist ideology with foreign affairs,” (5) states Niebuhr. After Tito was