

but feels the least successful part of the work. By emphasising the relative 'success' of the later images over the earlier Anglo-Norman manuscript illustrations, O'Hear stresses visual exegesis as Sachexegese, arguing that such images can never truly offer detailed dissection of a biblical text but rather must 'evoke via visual means what they or their patrons believed the essence or Sache selbst of the Book of Revelation to be' (p. 200). Interesting points are raised here, such as the particular status of John as visionary, but not really developed to the extent one might hope.

A final word must go to the illustrations, so vital to a work of detailed visual commentary such as this. Some forty-three (mostly half- or quarterpage) colour plates are reproduced in a central section, enough to satisfy broad illustrative purposes but insufficient either to gauge the scope of the Anglo-Norman Apocalypse illustrations or to parse the detail of John's vision in the St John Altarpiece (where the single plate opts for showing the broad context of the altarpiece over the detailed corner of the right-hand panel, which is the focus of much of chapter 3). Some of the images are readily available on the internet and, where possible, links have been provided; but in the case of the Lambeth Apocalypse or Koberger Bible, detailed engagement with O'Hear's argument still necessitates readers having to hand the more extensive monographs on particular works.

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William Hasker, Metaphysics and the Tri-Personal God, Oxford Studies in Analytic Theology (Oxford: OUP, 2013), pp. viii + 265. £65.00.

William Hasker offers the first book-length examination of the doctrine of the Trinity from the perspective of the emerging field of 'analytic theology'. Analytic theology uses the tools and methods of analytic philosophy in the service of constructive Christian theology. Hasker aims to construct and defend a broadly orthodox, philosophically coherent account of the Trinity which answers the logical question: how can there be three divine persons but only one God?

Hasker is a 'social trinitarian' and so he defends an account of the Trinity on which the Father, Son and Spirit are 'distinct centers of knowledge, will, love, and action' as well as 'distinct centers of consciousness' (p. 22). Put another way, the three persons are also three distinct divine agents. When they act together, they act in concert (and necessarily so, according to Hasker), but their actions remain numerically distinct. The challenge for social trinitarians

is to avoid tri-theism. Prima facie, it is difficult to see how the three persons, so construed, nevertheless count as a single God.

Hasker does not just assume social-trinitarianism, but argues that it is the best way to make sense of the scriptural data and the witness of the patristic fathers. Indeed, he spends ten chapters, roughly one-third of the book, discussing the scriptural and patristic foundations of the doctrine of the Trinity. He engages with both primary sources (Gregory of Nyssa and Augustine) and contemporary scholarship (Lewis Ayres figures prominently). Throughout this section, Hasker shows a noteworthy deference to the patristic tradition and to creedal orthodoxy, even as he also recognises that 'if we are to have a visible and coherent trinitarianism for our own time, we need to do better . . . than [our patristic forebears] were able to do' (p. 77). To that end, in the next section, he surveys four theologians (Barth, Rahner, Moltmann and Zizioulas) and seven analytic philosophers who have offered contemporary accounts of the Trinity, before turning to his own constructive account in the final section.

Hasker argues that the three divine persons each instantiate a single, numerically identical, concrete divine nature – in analytic parlance, 'a single trope of deity' (p. 236). Having previously defended the doctrine of the divine processions and the eternal generation of the Son and procession of the spirit, Hasker is able to say that the Father communicates the single divine nature to the Son and Spirit. Similarly, he defends an understanding of perichoresis on which the Father, Son and Spirit necessarily act in complete unity and harmony. So the fact that the three persons are constituted by a single divine nature and necessarily act in harmony is what ultimately guarantees that the three persons are one God and not three.

Hasker appeals to the metaphysics of constitution as the best philosophical framework in which to understand these traditional doctrinal claims. Matters get technical here, and I lack the space to lay out Hasker's account even in abbreviated form. But the basic idea is that the single divine nature constitutes the three persons. Constitution does not entail identity, and so the divine nature is not identical to any of the three persons, nor are any of them identical to each other, yet they are one insofar as they are constituted by the same trope of deity. A remote analogy: a piece of cloth, for example, can constitute a flag without being identical to the flag (since we could destroy the flag by bleaching it without destroying the cloth).

While there has been a major resurgence of trinitarian thought in contemporary theology, theologians seldom address basic questions about the doctrine's underlying coherence. The Christian church (broadly construed) has traditionally regarded the doctrine of the Trinity as the height of mystery, to be sure, but not as an absurdity or a bare contradiction. It seems to me that theologians therefore ought to welcome Hasker's book, and his attempt to defend the coherence of the most fundamental tenet of the faith. William Wood

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Michael Barnes, Interreligious Learning: Dialogue, Spirituality and the Christian Imagination (Cambridge: CUP, 2012), pp. xiv + 292. £64.99/\$95.00 (hbk)/£19.99 (pbk)/\$79.99 (e-book).

Michael Barnes' Interreligious Learning: Dialogue, Spirituality and the Christian Imagination is an unusual book. Almost uniquely in this growing literature, it places questions of method or anxieties about the place of interreligious engagement in the university largely to one side (although not quite). Taking the form more of meditations than of lectures, the reader is invited to consider what Barnes names a 'dilemma' which is stated at the outset in the preface, and which returns in the postface at the end: 'The tension between the virtues of faithfulness and openness runs through this book' (p. x). This is not really a dilemma, it turns out, but a false opposition between doing justice to Christian theology and doing justice to the integrity of other traditions, as if one must always choose between them. Barnes' meditations are an attempt to overcome this false opposition by articulating a Christian theology whose inner logics demand that one do justice to the integrity of other traditions. The dominant categories are thus native to Christian theology and at the same time outward facing: 'hospitality', 'meeting', 'generosity', 'humility', 'conversation'. These are confidently and clearly articulated. The dominant mode is (to repeat) meditation, which leads to a beautifully sensitive account of Buddhist meditation and its attraction for Christians (pp. 141–52), which is nonetheless not uncritical: the attractions are queried and even corrected later on through an engagement with Rowan Williams (pp. 159ff.). This is itself a performance of the structure of the book: from 'crossing' to 'return', as I shall suggest.

The book is composed of eleven meditations ordered through three themes: 'meetings', 'crossings' and 'imaginings'. These three turn out to be a matter of 'schools' (where persons and ideas meet), 'translation' (where persons and ideas travel and are changed) and 'return' (where transformed persons and ideas resource and illuminate Christian theology). The role of the 'everyday' plays a big dual role in the study. On the one hand it is an alternative to a focus on 'textual traditions': it is persons rather than artefacts