

Paul and Pain: Paul's Emotional Therapy in 2 Corinthians 1.1–2.13; 7.5–16 in the Context of Ancient Psychagogic Literature*

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Paul's 'therapeutic epistle' in 2 Cor 1.1–2.13; 7.5–16 provides material for a comparative analysis of Paul's view of the emotions and emotional therapy in the context of ancient psychagogic literature. Paul's treatment of 'remorse' and 'repentance' demonstrates his familiarity with the discourse of the philosophers on the role of the passions in moral progress. Paul's account of 'pain' is shown to be anomalous in the context of ancient psychagogic literature shaped by a Stoicizing theory of the emotions. Paul emerges from this comparative analysis as the harbinger of change in the ancient theory of the emotions and the practice of emotional therapy.

Keywords: pain, emotions, therapy, therapeutic epistles, Stoicism, psychagogy

In 2 Cor 7.10, Paul asserts that a certain kind of 'pain' (λύπη)—namely, that which is 'according to God' (κατὰ θεόν)—produces a 'repentance not to be regretted' (μετάνοια ἀμεταμέλητος) and leads to 'salvation' (σωτηρία). A proper appreciation of the novelty of Paul's thought on the role of pain in producing psychic health can be gained when Paul's statement is read in the context of ancient psychagogic literature,¹ particularly the writings of popular

* I dedicate this essay to Benjamin Locke Welborn in gratitude for memorable conversations in New Haven on the theory of the emotions in Descartes, William James, Paul Ekman, and others.

¹ Studies of psychagogic literature in relation to Paul's epistles include Clarence E. Glad, *Paul and Philodemus: Adaptability in Epicurean and Early Christian Psychagogy* (Leiden: Brill, 1995); David E. Fredrickson, 'Paul, Hardships, and Suffering', *Paul in the Greco-Roman World* (ed. J. Paul Sampley; Harrisburg: Trinity, 2003) 172–97; John T. Fitzgerald, ed., *Passions and Moral Progress in Greco-Roman Thought* (London: Routledge, 2008); Ivar Vegge, *2 Corinthians, a Letter about Reconciliation: A Psychagogical, Epistolographical, and Rhetorical Analysis* (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2008).

philosophers who sought to combine the Stoic theory of the emotions with Platonic psychology. In this literature, we discover numerous, illuminating parallels to Paul's description of the Corinthians' remorse and their emotional journey from remorse to repentance. But Paul has few, if any, predecessors in the constructive role that he attributes to 'pain' (λύπη).² Paul emerges from our comparative study as the harbinger of an upheaval in the ancient therapy of the emotions, indeed, as the architect of a new concept of the 'self as sufferer', which, by the end of the second century, had achieved significant cultural currency.³

Our study begins with Paul's account of the 'remorse' of the Corinthians over their complicity in the affair of the 'wrongdoer'. Paul's vivid description of the Corinthians' emotional journey from 'remorse' to 'repentance' in 2 Cor 2.5–11 and 7.5–16 aligns remarkably well with the analyses of the function of 'remorse' in the psychagogical literature of Paul's contemporaries, establishing not only that Paul was conversant with the discourse of the popular philosophers on 'remorse' and moral progress, but also, and more importantly, that Pauline psychagogy and philosophical psychagogy are members of a comparable class. Our attention then turns to the letter in which Paul offers his emotional therapy, the letter now preserved in 2 Cor 1.1–2.13; 7.5–16.⁴ Knowledge of the social situation and rhetorical conventions of a letter written in the 'therapeutic' style enhances appreciation of the heightened emotional intensity of Paul's epistolary discourse.⁵ We focus special attention upon the constructive role that Paul attributes to 'pain' (λύπη), a valorization whose originality becomes apparent through comparison with the emotional therapy of Paul's Stoicizing contemporaries who sought strenuously to banish 'pain' from the life of the wise person. We seek the source of Paul's anomalous conception of the role of 'pain' in his understanding of the exemplary suffering of the crucified Christ. Our study concludes with observations on Paul's psychagogical strategy in offering a novel emotional therapy to his Corinthian converts.

2 The meaning of λύπη is broad and, from a modern point of view, ambiguous: it can refer to physical pain or psychological distress, sorrow, grief, sadness, bordering upon the modern concept of depression. See, in general, LSJ, 1065–6, s.v. λυπέω, λύπη; Bauer, *Greek-English Lexicon*, 604–5, s.v. λυπέω, λύπη; see esp. Rudolf Bultmann, 'λύπη', *TDNT* 4.313–24.

3 Judith Perkins, *The Suffering Self: Pain and Narrative Representation in the Early Christian Era* (London: Routledge, 1995) 1–14 and passim.

4 The hypothesis that 2 Cor 1.1–2.13; 7.5–16 was originally an independent letter goes back to Johannes Weiss, *Das Urchristentum* (ed. R. Knopf; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1917), followed by many others. See below n. 22.

5 On the 'therapeutic' style of 2 Cor 1.1–2.13; 7.5–16, see Hans Windisch, *Der zweite Korintherbrief* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1924, 2nd ed. 1970) 8–9 and the discussion below.

1. The Sting of Remorse

Paul's anomalous assertion about a 'pain' that leads to 'salvation' is made in the context of his attempt to conciliate the Corinthians, who had been wounded by the actions of an anonymous 'wrongdoer' (2.5–11; 7.12), and subsequently by Paul's 'painful epistle' (7.8–9). In pursuit of reconciliation with his wounded friends, Paul sent Titus on a mission to Corinth (2.12–13; 7.5–7, 13b–16). Paul reflects rather fulsomely upon the report that Titus brought back from Corinth in 7.5–7. Titus reported the 'longing' (ἐπιπόθησις), 'mourning' (ὄδυρμός), and 'zeal' (ζῆλος) of the Corinthians on Paul's behalf (7.7). These strong emotions are all aspects of the Corinthians' 'grief' (λύπη), a 'grief' that is mentioned no less than eight times in the paragraph which Paul devotes to Titus's report (7.8–13a).⁶ Paul makes no attempt to conceal the fact that the cause of the grief that Titus encountered in Corinth was the rupture of Paul's relationship with one Corinthian in particular. In 2.5 Paul concedes that all of the Corinthians, and not himself alone (οὐκ ἐμὲ...ἀλλὰ...πάντας ὑμᾶς),⁷ have been grieved by an unnamed individual. Equally, in 7.8 Paul acknowledges that the letter which he wrote in response to the wrongdoing had caused 'grief' to the Corinthians.

Among the Corinthians, the one who felt the sharpest pain and experienced the deepest remorse was the 'wrongdoer'. This is a necessary inference from Paul's account of the 'excessive grief' (περισσοτέρῃ λύπῃ) that threatened to 'overwhelm' (καταποθῆ) this individual in 2.7, unless Paul's account is regarded as hyperbolic. The verb καταπίνειν is frightful in its force: in the passive voice which Paul uses here, καταπίνεσθαι means 'to be swallowed up by waters', 'to be drowned'.⁸ The image that Paul's language evokes is that of a man being drowned in his own tears.⁹ Paul intensifies the portrait of the wrongdoer's grief

6 For ἐπιπόθησις as 'yearning' and 'deep desire', see Bauer, *Greek-English Lexicon*, 377 s.v.; cf. Victor Paul Furnish, *II Corinthians: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary* (Garden City: Doubleday, 1984) 386. For ὄδυρμός as 'mourning' and 'lamentation', see the texts cited in LSJ, 1199 s.v.; Bauer, *Greek-English Lexicon*, 692 s.v.; see esp. *Tab. Cebeis* 10, where one who stands under 'retribution' (τιμωρία) is afflicted by 'grief' (λύπη), 'sorrow' (ὀδύνη), and 'lamentation' (ὄδυρμός); cf. Windisch, *Der zweite Korintherbrief*, 228. For ζῆλος as a subcategory of 'pain' (λύπη), see Aristotle *Rhet.* 2.11.1–7; L. L. Welborn, 'Paul's Appeal to the Emotions in 2 Cor 1.1–2.13; 7.5–16', *JSNT* 82 (2001) 54–7.

7 On the sense of the expression οὐκ ἐμὲ...ἀλλὰ...πάντας ὑμᾶς as 'not only to me...but...to you all', see Windisch, *Der zweite Korintherbrief*, 84–5; Furnish, *II Corinthians*, 389.

8 Bauer, *Greek-English Lexicon*, 524 s.v. καταπίνω 1b. Note esp. the transferred sense, in reference to mental and emotional states, in Philo *Gig.* 13; *Deus. Imm.* 181. Cf. Philip E. Hughes, *Paul's Second Epistle to the Corinthians* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1962) 67 n. 12: 'The intensive force of the compound καταπίνεσθαι should be brought out: 'to swallow up completely' or 'to engulf'.

9 Furnish, *II Corinthians*, 156; Margaret E. Thrall, *A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Second Epistle to the Corinthians*, vol. 1 (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1994) 177; Glad, *Paul and Philodemus*, 316.

by adding the comparative adjective *περισσότερος*, functioning as an elative superlative—‘excessive’.¹⁰

An illuminating parallel to Paul’s account of the grief of the wrongdoer is found in Pseudo-Demosthenes’ apology for his excessive sorrow, at the conclusion of his conciliatory epistle to the council and assembly of Athens. Acknowledging that he had committed ‘some slight offence’,¹¹ and appealing at length for forgiveness and restoration, the orator seeks to excuse his excess of grief:

Let not one of you think, men of Athens, that through lack of manhood or from any other base motive I give way to my grief (*ὀδύρεσθαι*) from the beginning to the end of this letter. Not so, but every man is ungrudgingly indulgent to the feelings of the moment, and those that now beset us—if only this had never come to pass!—are sorrows and tears (*λύπαι καὶ δάκρυα*), longing (*πόθος*) both for my country and for you, and pondering over the things which I have suffered, all of which cause me to grieve (*ὀδύρεσθαι*).¹²

The psychagogic literature of antiquity and especially some of Plutarch’s essays, permit us to form a more robust conception of the ‘remorse’ and ‘regret’ attendant upon the wrongdoing of one Corinthian in particular, and the complicity of others in his wrong. In the *Tabula* of Cebes, the one who ‘commits all that is injurious’, and is delivered to ‘Retribution’ (*Τιμωρία*), is described as living with ‘Grief’ (*Λύπη*) and ‘Sorrow’ (*Ὀδύνη*), personified as ‘ugly, filthy women dressed in rags’, as well as ‘Lamentation’ (*Ὀδυρμός*) and his sister ‘Despondency’ (*Ἀθυμία*), portrayed as ‘deformed, emaciated, and naked’. Eventually the wrongdoer is thrown into the house of ‘Unhappiness’ (*Κακοδαμονία*), ‘and here he spends the rest of his life in total unhappiness’, unless he is rescued by ‘Repentance’ (*Μετάνοια*).¹³ In Plutarch’s essay on delays in the divine vengeance, he speaks of ‘the intervening sufferings, terrors, forebodings, and pangs of remorse to which every wrongdoer, once he has done evil, is prey’ (*τὰ δ’ ἐν μέσῳ παθήματα καὶ φόβους καὶ προσδοκίας καὶ μεταμελείας οἷς ἀδικήσας ἕκαστος ἐνέχεται τῶν πονηρῶν παραλείπομεν*).¹⁴ In his essay on vice as the cause of unhappiness, Plutarch pictures the psychological suffering of a man who does evil: ‘vice..., when it has joined itself to the soul, crushes and overthrows

10 Bauer, *Greek-English Lexicon*, 806 s.v. *περισσότερος* a: ‘excessive’. Cf. Murray J. Harris, *The Second Epistle to the Corinthians* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2005) 229: ‘τῆ περισσοτέρῃ λύπῃ means “by excessive sorrow” or “by excess of grief”’.

11 Demosthenes *Ep.* 2.1.

12 Demosthenes *Ep.* 2.25. See the commentary in Jonathan A. Goldstein, *The Letters of Demosthenes* (New York: Columbia University, 1968).

13 *Tab. Cebes* 10; text and translation in John T. Fitzgerald and L. Michael White, *The Tabula of Cebes* (Chico: Scholars, 1983) 76–9.

14 Plutarch *Mor.* 554E–F; cf. Fredrickson, ‘Paul, Hardships and Suffering’, 173.

it, and fills the man with grief and lamentation, dejection and remorse' (κακιά..., τῆ ψυχῆ συνελθοῦσα συνέτριψε καὶ κατέβαλε, λύπης ἐνέπλησε θρήνων βαρυθυμίας μεταμελείας τὸν ἄνθρωπον).¹⁵

The psychagogic literature is also helpful in comprehending the movement from 'remorse' to 'repentance' implicit in Paul's account of the response of the Corinthians in 7.7b–11. Plutarch attributes a crucial role to the consciousness of wrongdoing. In his essay on tranquility of mind, Plutarch invokes 'the conscience (ἡ σύνεσις)' of someone who 'knows he has done a dreadful deed', and continues with a simile: 'like an ulcer in the flesh, [the knowledge of wrong] leaves behind it in the soul regret (μεταμέλεια) which ever continues to wound and prick it'.¹⁶ Similarly, in his treatise on delays in the divine vengeance, Plutarch explains: 'the thought that the soul of every wicked man revolves within itself and dwells upon is this: how it might escape from the memory of its wrongdoings (ἡ μνήμη τῶν ἀδικημάτων), drive out of itself the consciousness (τὸ συνειδός) of guilt, regain its purity, and begin its life anew'.¹⁷

In sum, what Titus reported to Paul regarding the response of the Corinthians, and the wrongdoer in particular, was remorse and repentance (7.7b–11). As Hans Windisch observed, 'in μετάνοια ist mit einem Worte zusammengefasst, was Paulus V. 7b aus dem Bericht des Titus hervorhob: die Äusserungen der Sehnsucht, des Schmerzes und des Eifers für Paulus waren eben die erfreulichen Zeichen einer "Sinnesänderung", die die Gemeinde durchgemacht hatte'.¹⁸ Paul emphasizes the 'repentance' (μετάνοια) of the wrongdoer and the Corinthians because a fundamental 'change of attitude' was understood to be the only way out of deadly remorse, the interim stage along the path from 'pain' (λύπη) to salvation (σωτηρία) (7.10). In the *Tabula* of Cebes, when 'Repentance' (Μετάνοια) encounters a man in the grip of despondency, 'she releases him from his ills and introduces him to another Opinion (Δόξα), who leads him to true Education (Παιδεία)'.¹⁹ Plutarch explains the psychological process: 'For the other pangs (λύπαι) reason does away with, but repentance (μετάνοια) is caused by reason itself, since the soul, together with its feeling of shame, is stung and chastised by itself'.²⁰ Titus's report inspired Paul to hope that the repentance of the wrongdoer and the Corinthians was genuine and lasting, a confidence expressed by the

15 Plutarch *Mor.* 498D; cf. Fredrickson, 'Paul, Hardships and Suffering', 173.

16 Plutarch *Mor.* 476E; cf. Windisch, *Der zweite Korintherbrief*, 232.

17 Plutarch *Mor.* 556A. See also the definition of 'regret' (μεταμέλεια) in Ps. Andronicus Περὶ Παθῶν 2.44: μεταμέλεια δὲ λύπη ἐπὶ ἁμαρτήμασι πεπραγμένοις ὡς δι' αὐτοῦ γεγνόσιν, in A. Glibert-Thiry, *Pseudo-Andronicus de Rhodes «ΠΕΡΙ ΠΑΘΩΝ»* (Leiden: Brill, 1977) 227.

18 Windisch, *Der zweite Korintherbrief*, 231.

19 *Tab. Cebes* 11.

20 Plutarch *Mor.* 476E.

elegant oxymoron μετάνοια ἀμεταμέλητος ('repentance not to be regretted') in 7.10.²¹

2. Paul's Therapeutic Epistle

The letter that Paul wrote to the church at Corinth in the afterglow of Titus' report is now preserved in 2 Cor 1.1–2.13 and 7.5–16.²² Since the time of Günther Bornkamm, it has become customary to refer to the letter of 2 Cor 1.1–2.13; 7.5–16 as the 'letter of reconciliation' ('Versöhnungsbrief').²³ This usage may have encouraged the idea that all was now well between Paul and the Corinthians, and that Paul only needed to 'set the seal' upon his conciliatory efforts, so to speak. But close reading of this epistle reveals that Paul still had work to do, in order to allay suspicions of insincerity and, above all, to heal his wounded friends at Corinth.²⁴ With regard to the occasion of this epistle, Johannes Weiss observed: "There is still some mistrust (2 Cor 1.13–14). The opinion still seemed

21 Construing ἀμεταμέλητον with μετάνοια, rather than σωτηρία: so, Alfred Plummer, *A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Second Epistle of St. Paul to the Corinthians* (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1915) 221; Windisch, *Der zweite Korintherbrief*, 232; Furnish, *II Corinthians*, 388; Thrall, *Second Epistle*, 492 n. 42.

22 Johannes Weiss, *The History of Primitive Christianity* (trans. F. C. Grant; 2 vols.; New York: Wilson-Erickson, 1937) 1.345–53; followed by Rudolf Bultmann, *Der zweite Brief an die Korinther* (ed. E. Dinkler; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1977) 20–3; Walter Schmithals, *Die Gnosis in Corinth: Eine Untersuchung zu den Korintherbriefen* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1969) 63–74; Günther Bornkamm, *Die Vorgeschichte des sogenannten Zweiten Korintherbriefes* (SHAW.PH 1961, 2. Abhandlung; Heidelberg: Winter, 1961) 16–23; Dieter Georgi, *The Opponents of Paul in Second Corinthians* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1986) 9–13, 335; Philipp Vielhauer, *Geschichte der urchristlichen Literatur* (Berlin: W. de Gruyter, 1975) 150–5; Helmut Koester, *Introduction to the New Testament. Vol. 2. History and Literature of Early Christianity* (New York: W. de Gruyter, 1987) 52–3, 127–30; Hans Dieter Betz, *2 Corinthians 8 and 9: A Commentary on Two Administrative Letters of the Apostle Paul* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1985) 150–5; L. L. Welborn, 'Like Broken Pieces of a Ring: 2 Cor 1.1–2.13; 7.5–16 and Ancient Theories of Literary Unity', *NTS* 42 (1996) 559–83; Margaret M. Mitchell, 'Paul's Letters to Corinth: The Interpretive Intertwining of Literary and Historical Reconstruction', *Urban Religion in Roman Corinth* (ed. D. N. Schowalter and S. Friesen; Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 2005) 318–35; among others.

23 Bornkamm, *Vorgeschichte des Zweiten Korintherbriefes*, 16–23. But see already A. Loisy, 'Les épîtres de Paul', *Revue d'histoire et de littérature religieuses* 7 (1921) 213–50, esp. 213: 'letter de conciliation'. See further Franz Zeilinger, *Krieg und Friede in Korinth. Kommentar zum 2. Korintherbrief des Apostels Paulus. Teil 1. Der Kampfbrief, der Versöhnungsbrief, der Bettelbrief* (Vienna: Herder, 1992); Albert Brendle, *Im Prozess der Konfliktüberwindung: Eine exegetische Studie zur Kommunikationssituation zwischen Paulus und den Korinthern in 2 Kor 1,1–2,13; 7,4–16* (Frankfurt am Main: Lang, 1994); Erich Grässer, *Der zweite Brief an die Korinther, Kapitel 1,1–7,16* (Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlaghaus, 2002).

24 For this reason, Mitchell employs the somewhat infelicitous but more accurate designation 'letter toward reconciliation' in her essay 'Paul's Letters to Corinth', 335.

to some extent to prevail that Paul had dealt with the Corinthians with worldly subtlety and not with complete sincerity, and that mental reservations were concealed beneath the words of his letters (2 Cor 1.12–13).²⁵

Paul's assurance of the 'simplicity and sincerity' (ἀπλότης καὶ εἰλικρίνεια) of his conduct in 1.12–14 constitutes the proposition (πρόθεσις) of this epistle.²⁶ This is a sure indication that this letter, like the preceding two epistles,²⁷ is still to some extent 'apologetic' in character.²⁸ Accordingly, in the first argument (1.15–22),²⁹ Paul appeals to his volition (βούλησις) as proof of his sincerity against the charge of 'foolish irresponsibility' (ἐλαφρία)³⁰ in his failure to keep his promise to return to Corinth.³¹ In the second argument (1.23–2.4), Paul explains that he exercised caution (εὐλάβεια), 'sparing' (φειδόμενος) the Corinthians further grief by his decision not to come to Corinth. In the third argument (2.5–11), Paul proves his sincere goodwill by his magnanimous treatment of the one who had caused grief, recommending that the Corinthians 'forgive' and 'console' him, and that they 'reaffirm love'. Paul next (2.12–13; 7.5–7) adduces the anxious state in which he awaited news of the outcome of Titus' mission as proof of the genuineness of his affection. Paul's final argument (7.8–13a) appeals to the beneficial results of his painful epistle as proof of the integrity of his conduct: the grief of the Corinthians has produced repentance, salvation, and joy.

Yet, the overarching purpose of the epistle preserved in 1.1–2.13; 7.5–16 is the healing of Paul's wounded friends at Corinth, especially the wrongdoer. The Corinthians had been doubly grieved—first, by the actions of the wrongdoer (2.5), then by Paul's severe response (7.8). So, from the first word of this epistle to the last, Paul offers consolation.³² Paul opens the *prooemium* (1.3–7) with praise of God as the 'God of all consolation' (θεὸς πάσης παρακλήσεως). Paul represents himself as 'afflicted' (θλιβόμεθα) and 'comforted'

25 Weiss, *Primitive Christianity*, 1.346.

26 H. D. Betz, 'Corinthians, Second Epistle to the', *ABD* 1 (1992) 1148–54; Welborn, 'Paul's Appeal to the Emotions', 57.

27 In accordance with the hypothesis that 2 Corinthians is a composite work, the preceding two epistles are 2 Cor 10–13 (a polemical apology) and 2 Cor 2.14–7.4 (a conciliatory apology). Cf. Weiss, *Primitive Christianity*, 1.345–53; N. H. Taylor, 'The Composition and Chronology of Second Corinthians', *JSNT* 44 (1991) 67–87.

28 Windisch, *Der zweite Korintherbrief*, 8. Cf. George A. Kennedy, *New Testament Interpretation through Rhetorical Criticism* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 1984) 87.

29 On the disposition of Paul's argument, see already the observations of Windisch, *Der zweite Korintherbrief*, 93; Betz, 'Corinthians, Second Epistle', 1152–3.

30 For the meaning of ἐλαφρία, see Bauer, *Greek-English Lexicon*, 314 s.v.; cf. A. E. Harvey, *Renewal through Suffering: A Study of 2 Corinthians* (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1996) 38–40.

31 On this point, see esp. Weiss, *Primitive Christianity*, 1.346.

32 On the concentration of occurrences of παράκλησις and παρακαλέω in 1.3–7 (6 instances) and 7.5–16 (3 instances), see Thrall, *Second Epistle*, 102.

(παρακαλούμεθα) ‘on behalf of’ (ὑπέρ) the Corinthians, so that he may be able to extend consolation to his wounded friends (εἰς δύνασθαι ἡμᾶς παρακαλεῖν τοὺς ἐν πάσῃ θλίψει διὰ τῆς παρακλήσεως ἧς παρακαλούμεθα). Equally, Paul portrays the Corinthians as the source of ‘consolation’ and ‘joy’ for himself and Titus: ‘But the God who consoles the downcast consoled us by the coming of Titus (ἀλλ’ ὁ παρακαλῶν τοὺς ταπεινοὺς παρεκάλεσεν ἡμᾶς ὁ θεὸς ἐν τῇ παρουσίᾳ Τίτου), and not only by his coming, but also by the consolation by which he was consoled by you (καὶ ἐν τῇ παρακλήσει ἢ παρεκλήθη ἐφ’ ὑμῖν),³³...so that I rejoiced’ (7.6–7). The jubilant peroration of this epistle (7.13b–16) reiterates Paul’s consolation and joy in response to the good report of Titus: ‘In addition to our own consolation (ἐπὶ δὲ τῇ παρακλήσει), we rejoiced still more at the joy of Titus, because his mind has been set at rest by you all’.

The epistolary form which subsumes both the apologetic and the consolatory moments in 2 Cor 1.1–2.13; 7.5–16 is the ‘therapeutic’ (θεραπευτική) type of letter described in the handbook on epistolary style attributed to Libanius: ‘The therapeutic style is that in which we conciliate someone who has been caused grief by us for some reason’ (θεραπευτικὴ δι’ ἧς θεραπεύομέν τινα λυπηθέντα πρὸς ἡμᾶς περὶ τινος).³⁴ Pseudo-Libanius adds: ‘Some also call this the apologetic style’ (ταύτην δὲ καὶ ἀπολογητικὴν τινες καλοῦσιν). The author provides a concise example of the letter type.³⁵

The conciliatory letter. In addition to making the statements that I did, I went on (to put them) into action, for I most certainly did not think that they would ever cause you sorrow. But if you were upset by what was said or done, be assured, most excellent sir, that I shall most certainly no longer mention what was said. For it is my aim always to heal my friends rather than to cause them sorrow.

Θεραπευτικὴ. Ἐγὼ μὲν ἐφ’ οἷς εἶπον λόγοις μετῆλθον ἔργῳ, τὸ γὰρ σύνολον οὐκ ἐνόμιζόν σέ ποτε λυπηθῆσεσθαι· εἰ δ’ ἐπὶ τοῖς λεχθεῖσιν ἢ πραχθεῖσιν ἠχθέσθης, ἴσθι, κράτιστε ἀνδρῶν, ὡς οὐκέτι τῶν ῥηθέντων

33 On the emphatic phrase τῇ παρακλήσει ἢ παρεκλήθη, see Thrall, *Second Epistle*, 488 n. 18.

34 Ps.-Libanius *Ep. Char.* 19, in Abraham J. Malherbe, *Ancient Epistolary Theorists* (Atlanta: Scholars, 1988) 68–9. On the authorship and date of this handbook, see H. Hinck, ‘Die Ἐπιστολμαῖοι Χαρακτῆρες des Pseudo-Libanius’, *Neue Jahrbücher für Philologie und Paedagogik* 99 (1869) 537–62; H. Koskenniemi, *Studien zur Idee und Phraseologie des griechischen Briefes bis 400 n. Chr.* (Helsinki: Suomalainen Tiedeakatemia, 1956) 56. The handbook is attributed to Proclus in one stream of the manuscript tradition. J. Sykutris (‘Proclus Περὶ ἐπιστολμαῖου χαρακτῆρος’, *Byzantinisch-Neugriechische Jahrbücher* 7 [1928–1929] 108–18) argues that the form ascribed to Proclus is more original.

35 Ps.-Libanius *Ep. Char.* 66, in Malherbe, *Ancient Epistolary Theorists*, 76–7. See also no. 107 (θεραπευτικὴ) of the exempla found in certain codices of Ps.-Libanius in V. Weichert, *Demetrii et Libanii qui feruntur ΤΥΠΟΙ ΕΠΙΣΤΟΛΙΚΟΙ et ΕΠΙΣΤΟΛΙΜΑΙΟΙ ΧΑΡΑΚΤΗΡΕΣ* (Leipzig: Teubner, 1910) 62–3.

λόγον ὅλως ποτὲ ποιήσομαι. σκοπὸς γάρ μοι θεραπεύειν ἀεὶ τοὺς φίλους ἐστὶν ἥπερ λυπεῖν.

The rudimentary nature of the sample letter in the handbook clearly reveals its structure, the principal sections being marked by the μέν - δέ contrast. The first section reviews what was said and done that occasioned grief, climaxed by an assurance that pain was not intended. The second section acknowledges that distress has been caused, and outlines remedial measures to be taken. The letter concludes with reassurance that the author aims at healing his friends, rather than causing them sorrow.

The agreement between the therapeutic letter in the handbook and Paul's therapeutic epistle in 2 Cor 1.1-2.13; 7.5-16 is striking. The account of what was said and done in the sample letter (ἐγὼ μὲν ἐφ' οἷς εἶπον λόγοις μετῆλθον ἔργῳ) corresponds to the twin prongs of Paul's proposition in 1.12-14, regarding (1) his conduct towards the Corinthians (ἀνεστράφημεν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ, περισσοτέρως δὲ πρὸς ὑμᾶς), and (2) the proper understanding of what he wrote (οὐ γὰρ ἄλλα γράφομεν ὑμῖν ἀλλ' ἢ ἃ ἀναγινώσκετε ἢ καὶ ἐπιγινώσκετε), expounded in the first and second proofs, respectively (1.15-22; 1.23-2.4). Paul then explains to the Corinthians that he had no intention of causing them sorrow (ἔκρινα γὰρ ἐμαυτῷ τοῦτο τὸ μὴ πάλιν ἐν λύπῃ πρὸς ὑμᾶς ἐλθεῖν καὶ ἔγραψα ὑμῖν...οὐχ ἵνα λυπηθῆτε, 2.1-4), just as the sample letter of the handbook recommends (τὸ γὰρ σύνολον οὐκ ἐνόμιζόν σέ ποτε λυπηθήσεσθαι). In conformity to the second division in the argument of the sample letter (marked by the δέ clause, εἰ δ' ἐπὶ τοῖς λεχθεῖσιν ἢ πραχθεῖσιν ἠχθέσθης), Paul acknowledges that distress had been caused, first by the wrongdoer (εἰ δέ τις λελύπηκεν, κτλ., 2.5), and then by his own epistle (ὅτι εἰ καὶ ἐλύπησα ὑμᾶς ἐν τῇ ἐπιστολῇ, κτλ., 7.8). Finally, Paul reassures the Corinthians that his aim had always been therapeutic, namely, to provoke the repentance that leads to salvation and brings no regret (7.9-10), just as the author of the handbook recommends. The letter of 2 Cor 1.1-2.13; 7.5-16 is much closer to the sample letter of the handbook in form, structure, and content than any other surviving example of a conciliatory epistle, e.g., Apollonius of Tyana *Ep.* 45, *BGU* II.531 (Chairemon to Apollonius). Only if the letter of Marcus Aurelius to Herodes Atticus, excerpted by Philostratus (*Vit. Soph.* 2.1.562-63),³⁶ had survived in its entirety, might we have a more perfect example of the therapeutic type of letter than we possess in 2 Cor 1.1-2.13; 7.5-16.

An innovation—of degree rather than kind—is observable in Paul's therapeutic epistle, in comparison with other letters of the conciliatory type: the intensity of Paul's appeal to the emotions. To be sure, all conciliatory epistles speak to the emotions, since the aim (σκοπός) of such writing is to heal a wounded

36 Philostratus states that he extracts from the letter only that which bears upon his narrative.

friend.³⁷ Thus, Chairemon's conciliatory apology to his 'dear friend' (φίλτατος) Apollonius (*BGU* II.531) is characterized by a more affectionate tone than is found in other papyrus letters.³⁸ Marcus Aurelius plays upon the emotions of his friend Herodes Atticus in an attempt to establish a basis for reconciliation in the commonality of affliction: Marcus dwells upon the rigors of his military quarters, laments the recent death of his wife, and remarks upon his own bad health.³⁹ Yet, there is nothing in the surviving epistolary corpus that approaches Paul's preoccupation with the emotions in 2 Cor 1.1–2.13; 7.5–16. A summary of the semantic evidence will indicate the depth of Paul's concern with the emotions in this letter.

Paul opens the exordium (1.3–7) with praise of God as 'the father of pities' (ὁ πατήρ τῶν οἰκτιρμῶν) and 'God of all consolation' (θεὸς πάσης παρακλήσεως). In the verses that follow, a complex and effective rhetorical figure is created by repetition of a highly charged emotional vocabulary: θλίψις ('affliction', 'distress'), παρράκλησις ('comfort', 'consolation'), πάθημα ('suffering', 'passion'), etc.⁴⁰ Paul asserts that his 'distress' and 'comfort' are 'on behalf of' the Corinthians, and voices his hope for the emergence of a community of affection in which he and the Corinthians would be 'partners in the same passions' (κοινωνοὶ τῶν αὐτῶν παθημάτων).⁴¹ Paul grounds the possibility of a renewed community of affection with the Corinthians in the fact that 'the passions of Christ overflow into us' (περισσεύει τὰ παθήματα τοῦ Χριστοῦ εἰς ἡμᾶς).

In the narration (1.8–11), Paul suppresses mention of the specific incident that caused his 'affliction' (θλίψις) in Asia,⁴² and focuses instead upon his resulting

37 Ps.-Libanius *Ep. Char.* 66.

38 Bror Hjalmar Olsson, *Papyrusbriefe aus der frühesten Römerzeit* (Uppsala: Almqvist & Wiksells, 1925) 120.

39 Philostratus *Vit. Soph.* 2.1.562–63.

40 To the terms mentioned, we might also add the verb πάσχειν and the noun ὑπομονή in 1.6. These terms are usually taken in a physical sense: thus θλίψις is translated 'affliction' and πάθημα 'suffering' in the NRSV. But θλίψις, πάθημα, and πάσχειν also refer to experiences in the emotional sphere: see Bauer, *Greek-English Lexicon*, 457, 747–8, 785.

41 I have chosen to translate πάθημα as 'passion'. This risks confusing the reader, since in ordinary English 'passion' often connotes 'enthusiasm', which does not belong to the Greek concept. Yet the usual translation of πάθημα as 'suffering' fails to capture the affective dimension of the word. On the other hand, 'feeling' is too weak to describe the intensity of experience suggested by πάθημα. Hence I have tried to preserve some of the rich ambiguity of the Greek by the translation 'passion', since πάθημα is both 'that which is suffered or endured' and 'an inward experience of an affective nature'; Bauer, *Greek-English Lexicon*, 747–8. The case is the same with πάθος, which means both 'suffering' and 'emotion', and which may also be translated 'passion'.

42 Scholars have debated the precise nature of Paul's 'affliction' (θλίψις); see the summary of the various proposals in Thrall, *Second Epistle*, 115–17. The majority posit a severe persecution (e.g. Wilhelm Bousset, *Der zweite Brief an die Korinther* [Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1908] 169; Philipp Bachmann, *Der zweite Brief des Paulus an die Korinther* [Leipzig: Deichert, 1922] 38; C. K. Barrett, *A Commentary on the Second Epistle to the*

psychological condition: ‘We were so utterly, unbearably crushed (καθ’ ὑπερβολὴν ὑπὲρ δύναμιν ἐβαραίθημεν) that we despaired of life itself (ἐξασπορηθῆναι ἡμᾶς καὶ τοῦ ζῆν)’.⁴³ The proposition that Paul sets forth in 1.12–14 concerns the motivation of his conduct, his ‘simplicity’ (ἀπλότης) and ‘sincerity’ (εἰλικρίνεια); the issue of the epistle is a matter of ‘conscience’ (συνείδησις).

In the arguments by which Paul justifies his actions (1.15–2.4), he explains that the criterion that guided his conduct towards the Corinthians was his determination to be neither the agent nor the victim of ‘pain’ (λύπη), but rather the sponsor and recipient of ‘joy’ (χαρά). Paul concludes the paragraph with a vivid depiction of the emotional state in which he wrote to Corinth: ‘much distress’ (πολλὴ θλίψις), ‘anguish of heart’ (συνοχὴ καρδίας), ‘many tears’ (πολλὰ δάκρυα), clear indications of the abundant ‘love’ (ἀγάπη) that he feels for the Corinthians. Above all, Paul is concerned for the emotional well-being of the wrongdoer (2.5–11), urging the Corinthians to ‘forgive’ (χαρίσασθαι) and ‘console’ (παρακαλέσαι) him, and reaffirm their ‘love’ (ἀγάπη), lest he be ‘drowned by excessive sorrow’ (τῇ περισσοτέρῳ λύπῃ καταποθῆ). Paul’s account of the emotional state in which he awaited news of the effect of his letter upon the Corinthians (in 2.12–13; 7.5–7) vividly portrays his anxiety: ‘I did not have any relief in my spirit’ (οὐκ ἔσχηκα ἄνεσιν τῷ πνευματί μου); ‘our flesh had no rest’ (οὐδεμίαν ἔσχηκεν ἄνεσιν ἢ σάρξ ἡμῶν); ‘afflicted in every

Corinthians [New York: Harper & Row, 1973] 83–4), perhaps an imprisonment that Paul anticipated would end in death (so, Furnish, *II Corinthians*, 122–3; Thrall, *Second Epistle*, 116–17). Others suggest a grave illness that Paul feared might prove fatal (E.-B. Allo, *Saint Paul: Seconde Épître aux Corinthiens* [Paris: Gabalda, 1956] 11–12, 15–19; Murray J. Harris, ‘2 Corinthians 5.1–10: Watershed in Paul’s Eschatology?’ *Tyndale Bulletin* 22 [1971] 57). Cf. Harvey, *Renewal through Suffering*, 1–31. But serious consideration should be given to the proposal of David Fredrickson (‘Paul’s Sentence of Death [2 Corinthians 1.9]’, *God, Evil, and Suffering* [ed. T. Fretheim and C. Thompson; St. Paul: Word & World, 2000] 103–17; Fredrickson, ‘Paul, Hardships, and Suffering’, 181–2) that here Paul reveals to the Corinthians how much anguish he suffered following his painful experience at Corinth. Fredrickson draws upon the research of R. L. Fowler (‘The Rhetoric of Desperation’, *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology* 91 [1987] 5–38) into the ‘rhetoric of desperation’, a speech-form encountered from Homer to Epictetus, whose generic components include: (1) an indication of the crushing weight of affliction borne by the speaker; (2) the impossibility of finding a way out of the dilemma; (3) questioning whether life is any longer sustainable under such circumstances; (4) not knowing whether to choose life or death. For the hypothesis that Paul’s ‘affliction’ refers to a severe depression caused by Paul’s humiliation at Corinth, see already Richard Drescher, ‘Der zweite Korintherbrief und die Vorgänge in Korinth seit Abfassung des ersten Korintherbriefs’, *ThStKr* 70 (1897) 49–51; Gerald F. Rendall, *The Epistles of St. Paul to the Corinthians* (London: Macmillan, 1909) 49.

43 On the pathos evoked by Paul’s use of the expressions καθ’ ὑπερβολὴν, ὑπὲρ δύναμιν, ἐβαραίθημεν, ἐξασπορηθῆναι καὶ τοῦ ζῆν, see Welborn, ‘Paul’s Appeal to the Emotions’, 31–60.

way' (ἐν παντί θλιβόμενοι); 'fightings without' (ἔξωθεν μάχα); 'fears within' (ἔσωθεν φόβοι). But the arrival of Titus brought 'consolation' (παράκλησις) for the 'downcast' (ταπεινός) apostle. Paul's summary of what Titus reported from Corinth focuses entirely upon the Corinthians' emotional response: 'yearning desire' (ἐπιπόθησις), 'mourning' (ὀδυρμός), 'zeal' (ζήλος). Paul's final argument (7.8–13a) appeals to the emotional effect of his letter upon the Corinthians as proof of the integrity of his conduct. Paul acknowledges that he 'grieved' (ἐλύπησα) the Corinthians by means of his epistle, and that for a time he even 'regretted' (μετμελόμην) having sent it. But second thoughts have been replaced by rejoicing (χαίρω) at the discovery that the grief that the Corinthians experienced (ἐλυπήθητε) resulted in 'repentance' (μετάνοια), rather than 'despair', or 'spiritual death' (θάνατος).⁴⁴ Paul then asserts, remarkably, that there is such a thing as 'godly grief' (ἡ κατὰ θεὸν λύπη) and that the Corinthians have experienced it, and then proceeds to analyze in extraordinary detail the stages of an emotional progress: 'earnestness' (σπουδή), 'eagerness to clear oneself' (ἀπολογία), 'indignation' (ἀγανάκτησις), 'fear' (φόβος), 'yearning desire' (ἐπιπόθησις), 'zeal' (ζήλος), 'retribution' (ἐκδίκησις).⁴⁵ Paul assures the Corinthians that they have proven themselves entirely 'guiltless' (ἀγνοί) in the affair of the wrongdoer and pronounces himself 'comforted' (παρακεκλήμεθα).

The peroration of the letter (7.13b–16), at once jubilant and circumspect, celebrates the restoration of Paul's 'confidence' (θαρρέω) in the Corinthians by appealing to the 'joy' (χαρά) of his envoy Titus. Once again, the content of Titus' report is completely supplanted by Paul's account of its emotional effect: 'We rejoiced (ἔχάρημεν) even much more at the joy (χαρά) of Titus, because his spirit has been set at rest (ἀναπέπαιται τὸ πνεῦμα αὐτοῦ) by you all'. Titus' emotional response to the Corinthians is viscerally described, fully warranting Paul's 'boast' (καύχησις) in the Corinthians, so that he was not 'put to shame' (κατησχύνθη): Titus' 'bowels' (σπλάγχνα) go out to the Corinthians, as he remembers how they welcomed him with 'fear and trembling' (φόβος καὶ τρόμος). The peroration climaxes with a heartfelt affirmation: 'I rejoice because I have complete confidence in you!' (χαίρω ὅτι ἐν παντί θαρρῶ ἐν ὑμῖν).

Even a summary of the evidence already makes clear that the emotional vocabulary of this letter far exceeds the φιλοφρόνησις required to maintain or restore a relationship. What a summary cannot convey is the heightened affective atmosphere created by the repetition of key terms, such as θλίψις, παράκλησις, πάθημα, λύπη, χαρά, and their associated verb forms,⁴⁶ and by the repeated

44 For θάνατος as 'spiritual death' in 7.10, see Bauer, *Greek-English Lexicon*, 443, s.v. For overtones of 'despair', see the resonance with 1.8–9, ἐκ τηλικούτου θανάτου.

45 Cf. Thrall, *Second Epistle*, 493.

46 For θλίψις, see 1.4 (twice), 6, 8; 2.4; 7.5; for παράκλησις/παρακαλέω, see 1.3, 4 (four times), 5, 6 (three times); 2.7, 8; 7.6 (twice); 7.7 (twice); for πάθημα/πάσχω, see 1.5, 6 (twice), 7; for λύπη/λυπέω, see 2.1, 2 (twice), 3, 4, 5 (twice), 7; 7.8 (twice), 9 (three times), 10 (twice), 11; for

use of hyperbolic expressions, such as *πάς, περισσοτέρως, καθ' ὑπερβολήν, ὑπὲρ δύναμιν*, etc.⁴⁷ Nor can a summary give a sense of the sonority achieved by rhetorical figures, such as *tradio*,⁴⁸ or the excitement generated by the skillful use of the particles,⁴⁹ or the caution embodied in the conditionals,⁵⁰ or the sensitivity suggested by the repeated recourse to metonymy.⁵¹ All in all, it is difficult to imagine that there is another letter from antiquity so obsessive in its concern for the emotions, so vulnerable in its disclosure of the author's emotional state, or so solicitous in its practice of what should be called 'emotional therapy'.

3. The Therapy of Pain

A full appreciation of the originality of Paul's appeal to the emotions in 2 Cor 1.1–2.13; 7.5–16 requires some attention to emotional therapy as practiced by Paul's contemporaries. Among the philosophers of the Hellenistic and Roman age, a vigorous discussion arose about the nature of the emotions and their function in moral life.⁵² The surviving literature, which is unfortunately

χαρά/χαίρω, see 1.24; 2.3 (twice); 7.7, 9, 13 (twice), 16. On repetition as a figure in 2 Corinthians, esp. 1.3–7, see Windisch, *Der zweite Korintherbrief*, 36–43.

47 For *πάς*, see 1.3, 4 (twice); 2.3, 5, 9; 7.5, 11, 13, 15, 16; for *περισσοτέρως*, see 1.12; 2.4; 7.13, 15. The expressions *καθ' ὑπερβολήν* and *ὑπὲρ δύναμιν* are compounded with one another in 1.8 as modifiers of *ἐβαρήθημεν*. These are by no means the only examples of pleonasm in 1.1–2.13; 7.5–16: see, e.g., *τηλικούτος* in 1.10, *πολλοί* in 1.11 (twice). On pleonasm as a figure, see Herbert Weir Smyth, *Greek Grammar* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1956) 681–2.

48 In 1.3–7 and 2.1–3. On the device of *tradio* (the frequent employment of the same word, or cognate words, at short intervals), see J. D. Denniston, *Greek Prose Style* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1952) 80–1.

49 E.g., *καὶ γάρ* in 7.5, *ἰδοὺ γάρ* in 7.11. On the use of particles to express emotion, see Demetrius *De Eloc.* 57; cf. Denniston, *Greek Particles*, lxxiii, 109.

50 E.g., *εἰ δέ τις* in 2.5, *εἴ τι* in 2.10. On the caution expressed by means of these clauses, see Heinrici, *Der zweite Brief*, 93–4; Windisch, *Der zweite Korintherbrief*, 84, 90.

51 E.g., the shift from *βούλομαι* to *βουλεύομαι* in 1.15–17; on this substitution, see Anton Halmel, *Der zweite Korintherbrief des Apostels Paulus* (Halle: Niemeyer, 1904) 53–4. Note also the subtle way in which *χάρις* replaces *χαρά* in 1.15; on this substitution, see already Friedrich Bleek, 'Erörterungen in Beziehung auf die Briefe Pauli an die Korinther', *Theologische Studien und Kritiken* 3 (1830) 621–2.

52 To mention only the most important contributions to this growing body of literature: W. W. Fortenbaugh, *Aristotle on Emotions* (London: Duckworth, 1975; 2nd ed. 2002); Martha Nussbaum, *The Therapy of Desire: Theory and Practice in Hellenistic Ethics* (Princeton: Princeton University, 1994); S. Braund and C. Gill, eds., *The Passions in Roman Thought and Literature* (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1997); J. Sihvola and T. Engberg-Pedersen, eds., *The Emotions in Hellenistic Philosophy* (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic, 1998); Richard Sorabji, *Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation*

fragmentary,⁵³ nevertheless makes clear that the philosophers aimed not only to understand the psychological basis of the emotions, but also to develop kinds of therapy to restrain, modify, or even eliminate the emotions.⁵⁴ The Stoics, in particular, elaborated a systematic theory of the emotions, in which certain terms acquired a technical meaning.⁵⁵ Λύπη, for example, which is the object of Paul's concern in his therapeutic epistle, was one of the four generic emotions, according to the Stoic doctrine, alongside 'pleasure' (ἡδονή), 'fear' (φόβος), and 'desire' (ἐπιθυμία).⁵⁶

The Stoic Map of the Emotions

The (Vicious) Passions, πάθη

| | |
|--------------------|---------------|
| ἐπιθυμία desire | φόβος Fear |
| ἡδονή pleasure | λύπη pain |

The therapy of λύπη, that is, the development of a dependable method of consolation, was the goal of the influential fourth book of Chrysippus' *On Affections*, which, with its special title, Θεραπευτικόν (*Therapeutics*), seems to have been read and used separately from the rest.⁵⁷ The results of the philosophers' efforts to restrain or eliminate λύπη held a special attraction for practical

(Oxford: Oxford University, 2000); William V. Harris, *Restraining Rage: The Ideology of Anger Control in Classical Antiquity* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 2001); David Konstan, *The Emotions of the Ancient Greeks: Studies in Aristotle and Classical Literature* (Toronto: University of Toronto, 2006); Margaret R. Graver, *Stoicism and Emotion* (Chicago: University of Chicago, 2007); John T. Fitzgerald, ed., *Passions and Moral Progress in Greco-Roman Thought* (London: Routledge, 2008).

53 The most significant loss is Chrysippus' *On Affections* (Περὶ παθῶν), preserved only in quotations embedded in books 3 and 4 of Cicero's *Tusculan Disputations*, and in Galen's great work *De placitis Hippocratis et Platonis*. See Teun Tieleman, *Chrysippus' On Affections: Reconstruction and Interpretation* (Leiden: Brill, 2003).

54 P. L. Entralgo, *The Therapy of the Word in Classical Antiquity* (New Haven: Yale University, 1970) esp. 97–107; W. D. Furley, 'Antiphon der Athener: Ein Sophist als Psychotherapeut', *Rheinisches Museum für Philologie* 135 (1992) 198–216; Nussbaum, *The Therapy of Desire*; Harris, *Restraining Rage*, esp. Chapter 15; Tieleman, *Chrysippus' On Affections*, 140–97; Graver, *Stoicism and Emotion*, esp. 191–211.

55 J. Sihvola and T. Engberg-Pedersen, 'Introduction', *The Emotions in Hellenistic Philosophy* (ed. Sihvola and Engberg-Pedersen) viii; Graver, *Stoicism and Emotion*, 53–60.

56 Tad Brennan, 'The Old Stoic Theory of Emotions', *The Emotions in Hellenistic Philosophy* (ed. Sihvola and Engberg-Pedersen) 21–70, esp. 30–1; Graver, *Stoicism and Emotion*, 53–6.

57 Galen *De placitis Hippocratis et Platonis* 5.7.52; cf. Tieleman, *Chrysippus' On Affections*, 140–1.

intellectuals, such as Cicero, as one can see from books 3 and 4 of his *Tusculan Disputations*,⁵⁸ as well as for Seneca and Plutarch, who had to cope with the frustrations of life in order to survive in an increasingly dangerous political environment.⁵⁹ It is in the treatises on the emotions by these philosophical ‘amateurs’ that we find the most relevant material for comparison with Paul’s therapeutic epistle.

Reading Paul’s therapeutic epistle in this context reveals the preoccupation with the emotions which Paul shared with his intellectual contemporaries and establishes a basis for discerning the differences in their respective constructions of the emotional life. I should make clear that I do not assume that Paul had read Chrysippus on the emotions (although the possibility cannot be excluded).⁶⁰ But the image of the wise man who had achieved ‘self-mastery’ (ἐγκράτεια) through the control or elimination of his emotions was widespread in the first century and held an attraction for men of affairs such as Seneca and Plutarch.⁶¹ We should not be surprised if the minority of Corinthian Christians who belonged to the upper class and had received an education were informed by values and ideals like those found in works on the emotions by social elites like Seneca. Indeed, close reading of Paul’s therapeutic epistle in the context of his Corinthian correspondence as a whole suggests that the unrestrained display of powerful emotions such as anger and grief in a previous epistle (2 Cor 10–13), which Paul himself describes as a letter written ‘with many tears’ (2.4),⁶² was adduced by his opponents as the clearest proof of Paul’s failure to achieve self-mastery. Such a

58 Margaret Graver, *Cicero on the Emotions: Tusculan Disputations 3 and 4* (Chicago: University of Chicago, 2002) 24, 27, 34–5, 121–3, 191, 205, 219.

59 On the dangers of the political environment, see Paul Veyne, *Seneca: The Life of a Stoic* (New York/London: Routledge, 2003).

60 Chrysippus was such a prolific writer (see the list of his works in Diogenes Laertius 7.189–202), and so influential upon his contemporaries and successors, that acquaintance with his works by Paul cannot be excluded from the realm of probability. Paul’s indebtedness to Hellenistic philosophy has been demonstrated in several areas, e.g., his concept of ‘the inner human being’ (ὁ ἔσω ἄνθρωπος), on which see T. K. Heckel, *Der Innere Mensch: Die paulinische Verarbeitung eines platonischen Motus* (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1993); Hans Dieter Betz, ‘The Concept of the “Inner Human Being” (ὁ ἔσω ἄνθρωπος) in the Anthropology of Paul’, *NTS* 46 (2000) 315–41. See also the demonstration of Paul’s indebtedness to Stoic moral tradition in Rom 7 by Stanley K. Stowers, *A Rereading of Romans: Justice, Jews, and Gentiles* (New Haven: Yale University, 1994) 258–84. On Paul’s familiarity with the deep structure of Stoic thought in general, see Troels Engberg-Pedersen, *Paul and the Stoics* (Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 2000).

61 On the attraction of this aspect of Stoicism for practical intellectuals, see Harris, *Restraining Rage*, 9, 26.

62 For the identification of 2 Cor 10–13 with the ‘letter of tears’ mentioned in 2 Cor 2.4, see Francis Watson, ‘2 Cor x–xiii and Paul’s Painful Letter to the Corinthians’, *JTS* 35.2 (1984) 324–46; L. L. Welborn, ‘The Identification of 2 Corinthians 10–13 with the “Letter of Tears”’, *NovT* 37 (1995) 138–53. The hypothesis goes back to Adolf von Harnack, *Der Vier-Capitel-Brief des Paulus an die Korinther* (Heidelberg: Bassermann, 1870).

loss of emotional control indicates how far Paul falls short of the ideal σώφρων. His 'distress' (λύπη) demonstrates that his 'foolishness' (ἄφροσύνη) is more real than feigned.⁶³ Paul's concern with the emotions in his therapeutic epistle, and especially his reevaluation of λύπη, is calculated to counter the impression produced by his previous, painful epistle (2 Cor 10–13).

It is in respect to the status of λύπη that Paul's view of the emotions differs most surprisingly from the fully developed systems of his intellectual contemporaries. Among the Stoics, and those who, like Cicero and Seneca, sought to combine Stoic teaching with Platonic psychology,⁶⁴ λύπη (Latin *aegritudo*) was the most problematic emotion. Cicero gives expression to this attitude:

Do you suppose then that there is any possibility of the wise man being overwhelmed with distress (*aegritudo*), that is to say, with wretchedness? Indeed, while every passion is wretchedness, distress (*aegritudo*) is actually being put on the rack. Appetite involves eagerness, exuberant joy involves frivolity, fear involves humiliation, but distress (*aegritudo*) involves worse things—decay, torture, torment, repulsiveness. It tears and devours the soul and completely destroys it. Unless we strip it off and cast it aside, we cannot be free from wretchedness.⁶⁵

The problematic nature of λύπη can be seen most clearly in the total absence of a rational counterpart to λύπη from the list of 'good emotions' (εὐπάθειαι) which the Stoics held to characterize the life of the sage.⁶⁶ As is well known, the Stoics advocated the complete elimination of the 'passions' (πάθη) or 'vicious emotions'.⁶⁷ This 'absolutist' position was popular among Greek and Roman thinkers,⁶⁸ and even with Paul's Jewish contemporaries, Philo and the author of *4 Maccabees*.⁶⁹ Yet, the Stoics allowed that the sage might enjoy certain other

63 For the view that the wise man is not subject to 'distress' (λύπη), but rather the 'fool' (ἄφρων), see, e.g., Epictetus *Diss.* 2.22.6–7; Cicero *Tusc. Disp.* 4.6.14.

64 On the combination of the Stoic view of the emotions with Platonic psychology in late Hellenistic and Roman thought, see J. M. Cooper, 'Posidonius on Emotions', *The Emotions in Hellenistic Philosophy* (ed. Sihvola and Engberg-Pedersen) 71–111; Richard Sorabji, 'Chrysippus–Posidonius–Seneca: A High-level Debate on Emotion', *The Emotions in Hellenistic Philosophy* (ed. Sihvola and Engberg-Pedersen) 149–69; Andrew Erskine, 'Cicero and the Expression of Grief' in *The Passions in Roman Thought and Literature* (ed. Braund and Gill) 36–47; Brad Inwood, 'Seneca and Psychological Dualism', *Passions and Perceptions* (ed. J. Brunschwig and M. Nussbaum; Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1993) 150–83.

65 Cicero *Tusc. Disp.* 3.13.27.

66 Cicero *Tusc. Disp.* 4.6.14. Cf. Brennan, 'The Old Stoic Theory of Emotions', 35, 54–7; Graver, *Stoicism and Emotion*, 53–4.

67 Brennan, 'The Old Stoic Theory of Emotions', 34; Graver, *Stoicism and Emotion*, 55–8.

68 Harris, *Restraining Rage*, 26, 104–20.

69 Robert Renehan, 'The Greek Philosophic Background of Fourth Maccabees', *Rheinisches Museum für Philologie* 115 (1972) 221–38; Stanley K. Stowers, 'Fourth Maccabees', *Harper's*

conditions which they called ‘good emotions’ (εὐπάθειαι), which differed from the passions in being ‘accurate, veridical attributions of goodness and badness’ to things.⁷⁰ So, to ‘fear’ (φόβος) there corresponded the rational emotion ‘caution’ (εὐλάβεια), to ‘desire’ (ἐπιθυμία) corresponded ‘volition’ (βούλησις), and to ‘pleasure’ (ἡδονή) corresponded ‘joy’ (χαρά).⁷¹

The Stoic Map of the Emotions

The (Rational) Dispositions, εὐπάθειαι

| | |
|----------------------|---------------------|
| βούλησις volition | εὐλάβεια caution |
| χαρά joy | |

But there was no fourth εὐπάθεια: the sage could have no constructive relationship to λύπη, so destructive was this emotion to moral life, so repulsive to the man who wished to achieve self-mastery.⁷²

This attitude toward λύπη animates Dio Chrysostom’s rhetorical questions in his discourse Περὶ λύπης: ‘What more abject creature is there than a man who is held in thrall to pain? (καίτοι τί μὲν ταπεινότερον ἀνδρὸς λυπουμένου;) What sight is there so shameful?’⁷³ Observing that ‘life is full of painful things’, Dio adopts the Stoic therapy: ‘but one should tear that morbid state out of his soul completely, get a firm hold on the truth that the intelligent man ought not to feel pain about anything whatever (ὅτι μὴ λυπητέον ἐστὶ περὶ μηδενὸς τῶ νοῦν ἔχοντι), and be a free man henceforth’.⁷⁴ The absence of a positive counterpart to λύπη from the Stoic system of the emotions is not accidental, but rather inheres organically in the Stoic construction of emotional life.⁷⁵ Indeed, it might be argued that the aim of the Stoic system was to make the wise man invulnerable to λύπη, however many frustrations and dangers life might hold, and that

Bible Commentary (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1988) 924; David C. Aune, ‘Mastery of the Passions: Philo, 4 Maccabees and Earliest Christianity’, *Hellenization Revisited: Shaping a Christian Response within the Greco-Roman World* (ed. W. E. Helleman; New York: Lanham, 1994) 125–58.

70 Brennan, ‘The Old Stoic Theory of Emotions’, 34, 54–7; Graver, *Stoicism and Emotion*, 51–5, 203–4.

71 Cicero *Tusc. Disp.* 4.6.12–14; cf. Brennan, ‘The Old Stoic Theory of Emotions’, 34–6; Graver, *Stoicism and Emotion*, 51–5, 203–4.

72 Cicero *Tusc. Disp.* 4.6.12–14; cf. Graver, *Stoicism and Emotion*, 51–5, 203–4.

73 Dio Chrysostom *Or.* 16.1.

74 Dio Chrysostom *Or.* 16.4.

75 Brennan, ‘The Old Stoic Theory of Emotions’, 35; Graver, *Stoicism and Emotion*, 53–5, 194, 204.

the promise of this invulnerability constituted the principal attraction of the Stoic theory to the social elites.⁷⁶

What, then, does it mean that Paul not only acknowledges that he and the wrongdoer and, indeed, all of the Corinthians have experienced λύπη, but then goes on to dissect the experience in a detail that Cicero and Seneca might have found humiliating? Paul even asserts, astonishingly, that there is a 'divine distress' (ἡ κατὰ θεὸν λύπη) which leads by certain emotional stages to 'salvation' (7.9–10). What sort of upheaval in the centuries-old preoccupation with emotional self-control among Greek and Roman thinkers does Paul's paradoxical transvaluation of 'pain' signify?

An observation of the historian William Harris permits us to take a few steps down the road toward an understanding of the novelty of Paul's view of pain in Greco-Roman context. Harris notices that the discourse of 'depression' is largely absent from Greek and Roman literature, a lacuna only partly filled by λύπη as 'mental pain' or 'psychological distress'.⁷⁷ Instead, 'anger' discourse bulks large in ancient authors, as evidenced by the substantial monographs on anger by Philodemus, Seneca, and Plutarch.⁷⁸ Harris suggests that 'the frustrations of life, commonly recognized as a major source of modern depression, tended in antiquity to produce emotions akin to anger', and speculates that 'the emotional state we know of as depression may have been less common' in antiquity.⁷⁹ As much as Harris's suggestion may be an accurate reflection of the concerns of the sources, we should not fail to remind ourselves that the surviving literature on the emotions is the product almost entirely of the educated social elites.⁸⁰ It is our hypothesis that

76 See, e.g., Seneca *De Cons. Sap.* 2.1.3; *De Ben.* 2.25.2.

77 Harris, *Restraining Rage*, 16–17.

78 Philodemus' *De Ira*, written between 70 and 40 BC, survives in a partly legible manuscript from Herculaneum; see *Philodemus, De Ira* (ed. G. Indelli; Naples: Bibliopolis, 1988); J. Procopé, 'Epicureans on Anger', *The Emotions in Hellenistic Philosophy* (ed. Sihvola and Engberg-Pedersen) 171–96. Seneca's *De Ira* is the longest of the extant ancient treatises on anger. In addition to Plutarch's *De Cohibenda Ira*, see *De Virtute Morali* and *De Tranquillitate Animi*. See the illuminating discussion of these monographs in Harris, *Restraining Rage*, 102–20. See now the concise and lively sketch of Seneca's theory and therapy in *De Ira* by Robert A. Kaster, *Lucius Annaeus Seneca: Anger, Mercy, Revenge* (Chicago: University of Chicago, 2010).

79 Harris, *Restraining Rage*, 16.

80 To be sure, Harris is fully aware of the social conditions under which ancient literature on the emotions was produced; see esp. *Restraining Rage*, 25. But the point must be emphasized in respect to the relative absence of discourse on λύπη. The authors of the surviving literature on the emotions are members of the highest social class: Seneca, advisor and minister to Nero, held a vast fortune; Plutarch was a descendant of a family long established in Chaeronea, and may have been imperial procurator in Achaia under Hadrian. Both men were sympathetic to their slaves and to the weak in general (e.g. Seneca *Epist. Mor.* 12.3); but neither provides access to the emotional life of the poor, apart from passing reference to the slave's fear of an angry master, e.g., Plutarch *De Cohib. Ira* 13.

outside the upper class, among the working poor, slaves, and beggars, who constituted the majority of the population of the Roman Empire,⁸¹ depression was as widespread in antiquity as it is today,⁸² but found almost no expression,⁸³ because of the social conditions under which the poor lived. We suggest that Paul's therapeutic epistle, with its emphasis upon λύπη, provides privileged access to the mental and psychological world of non-elites in respect to the emotions.⁸⁴

In his therapeutic epistle, Paul not only acknowledges that he and the Corinthian Christians have experienced λύπη, he asserts, provocatively, that the 'distress' had a divine origin (7.9), that 'distress' had produced 'repentance that leads to salvation and brings no regret' (7.10). Comparison with the writings of Paul's philosophical contemporaries makes clear how anomalous, even shocking, this valorization of λύπη must have seemed. Cicero, for example, states unequivocally, that those who are subject to 'distress' (*aegritudo*) are 'fools' (*stulti*).⁸⁵ Dio Chrysostom asserts that 'accepting servitude to pain is altogether irrational and strange (τὸ δὲ λύπη δεδουλωσθαι παντελῶς ἄλογον καὶ θαυμαστόν)'.⁸⁶

To be sure, Paul had one influential predecessor in his strange assertion that λύπη plays a constructive role in moral life: the banausic philosopher, Socrates. According to Plato, Socrates actually took pride in the fact that he had caused

81 Ramsay MacMullen, *Roman Social Relations 50 B.C. to A.D. 284* (New Haven: Yale University, 1974) 88–120.

82 I do not assume that emotions, such as depression, are the same across cultures. On the contrary, the most thorough studies have shown that emotions are 'culture specific'. See A. J. Marsella, 'Depressive Experience and Disorder across Cultures', *Handbook of Cross-Cultural Psychology VI: Psychopathology* (ed. H. C. Triandis and J. G. Draguns; Boston, 1980) 237–89; A. Wierzbicka, 'Emotions, Language, and Cultural Scripts', *Emotion and Culture: Empirical Studies of Mutual Influence* (Washington, DC: American Psychology Society, 1994) 133–96.

83 The assumption that emotions exist even where they are not expressed is a precarious but necessary one. A cautious historian must be alert to evidence that permits a test. Such evidence might seem to be most accessible in the realm of political history. Thus, Alfred Kneppel devotes one section of his study of 'anxiety' in the early Roman Empire (*Metus Temporum: Zur Bedeutung von Angst in Politik und Gesellschaft der römischen Kaiserzeit des 1. und 2. Jhdts. n. Chr.* [Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1994] 329–37) to the anxieties of the lower classes, but acknowledges at the outset that the everyday anxieties of the common people were passed over in silence by authors from the ruling class, whose principal interest lay in the emotions of their social equals, regarded as the true measure of collective feeling.

84 Cf. Perkins, *The Suffering Self*, 7: 'In cultural terms, those belonging to the category of sufferers, the sick, the deformed, the poor, had little existence in cultural representation throughout most of Greco-Roman antiquity before the early empire. That is not to say that humans were not in pain or did not suffer before this period, but that their pain and suffering did not have substantial existence within cultural consciousness'.

85 Cicero *Tusc. Disp.* 4.6.14.

86 Dio Chrysostom *Or.* 16.1.

the Athenians λύπη by means of his philosophical activity,⁸⁷ and understood his ‘plaguing’ (λυπεῖν) of his contemporaries as his ‘service to the god’.⁸⁸ But this aspect of Socrates’ philosophical activity proved puzzling to later thinkers, including those who adopted the psychology of Plato. Cicero relates a story in which Socrates caused ‘distress’ (*aegritudo*) to the young aristocrat Alcibiades by convincing him that he was not the man he ought to have been, and that there was no difference, despite his high birth, between him and any manual laborer. ‘Alcibiades then became very upset, begging Socrates with tears to take away his shameful character and give him a virtuous one’.⁸⁹ Cicero recognizes the conundrum which this tradition poses for the Stoics, whose definition of ‘distress’ he embraces.⁹⁰ But Cicero is not sure what to say about a Socrates who does not regard ‘distress’ as ‘the greatest wretchedness’.⁹¹

In the psychagogic literature of the late first and early second century, one encounters sentiments on the role of pain in moral progress that provide partial parallels to Paul’s conviction about the salvific purpose of λύπη. Thus, Plutarch allows that one may hurt a friend in order to help him: ‘One ought to hurt (λυπεῖν) a friend only to help him, and ought not by hurting him to kill friendship, but to use the stinging word as a medicine which restores and preserves health in that to which it is applied’.⁹² Similarly, Epictetus regards the philosophical classroom as a place for medical treatment: ‘Men, the lecture room of the philosopher is a hospital; you ought not to walk out of it in pleasure, but in pain’.⁹³ In a text representing harsh Cynicism, Democritus is credited with the desire ‘to discover something more painful (λυπηρόν) to use against’ his fellow citizens, in order to bring about moral reform.⁹⁴ But the authors of the psychagogic literature attribute only a utilitarian value to λύπη in the pursuit of moral aims. Moreover, Plutarch takes care to limit the degree of λύπη which the moral philosopher inflicts: ‘The

87 Plato *Apol.* 41e.

88 Plato *Apol.* 23b.

89 Cicero *Tusc. Disp.* 3.32.77; trans. Graver, *Cicero on the Emotions*, 35. See also Plutarch *Alc.* 4; *Adul. Amic.* 69E–F. The anecdote may have its origin in Plato *Symp.* 215e–216c. Compare Lucian’s account of the effect of a certain Platonic philosopher, Nigrinus, upon an inquiring student in *Nigrinus* 4: ‘Then I felt hurt (ἐλπούμην) because he had criticized what was dearest to me—wealth and money and reputation—and I all but cried over their downfall’.

90 Cicero *Tusc. Disp.* 3.31.74–75.

91 Cicero *Tusc. Disp.* 3.32.77; cf. 3.13.27. See the penetrating analysis of the structural problem posed for Stoicism by the ‘tears of Alcibiades’ anecdote by Graver, *Stoicism and Emotion*, 191–211.

92 Plutarch *Adul. amic.* 55C. Glad (*Paul and Philodemus*, 317) cites other relevant texts from Plutarch: *Adul. amic.* 66B; 70D–E; 73D–E; *Virt. mor.* 452C; *Tranq. An.* 476F.

93 Epictetus *Diss.* 3.23.30. But here the verb is ἀλγέω, rather than λυπέω. This text is cited as a parallel to 2 Cor 2.5–11; 7.9–10 by Fredrickson, ‘Paul, Hardships, and Suffering’, 176.

94 Ps.-Hippocrates *Ep.* 17.45. On the probable first-century date of this letter collection, see Wesley D. Smith, *Hippocrates: Pseudepigraphic Writings* (Leiden: Brill, 1990) 21–2, 28–9, 43–4.

smart from philosophy which sinks deep in young men of good character is healed by the very words which inflicted the hurt. For this reason, he who is taken to task must feel and suffer some smart (διὸ δεῖ πάσχειν μὲν τι καὶ δάκνεσθαι), yet he should not be crushed or dispirited'.⁹⁵ Among none of Paul's intellectual contemporaries does one encounter a valorization of 'divine λύπη' which leads by certain emotional stages to 'salvation' or psychic health (7.10–11). Having allowed that a certain kind of pain—namely, that which is suffered in accordance with God's will (κατὰ θεόν)—contributes positively to moral life, indeed, confers the highest good upon existence—σωτηρία—the door is open to a swarm of other emotions which the Stoics strenuously sought to exclude, such as 'indignation' (ἀγανάκτησις), 'fear' (φόβος), 'desire' (ἐπιπόθησις), etc., for which Paul not only makes a place in Christian life, but even declares that their cumulative effect has rendered the Corinthian Christians 'pure', ὄγνοί (7.11), a quality which the Stoics attributed to the wise man who had extirpated his emotions!⁹⁶

What is the source of this revolution in the concept of psychic health that we see unfolding in the pages of Paul's therapeutic epistle? In the proem of his therapeutic epistle (1.3–7), Paul explains that the possibility of a community of affection among the followers of Jesus is grounded in the fact that 'the passions of the Christ overflow into us' (περισσεύει τὰ παθήματα τοῦ Χριστοῦ εἰς ἡμᾶς). Paul alludes here to his fundamental conviction that 'Christ died for us', that Christ 'died on behalf of all' (cf. 2 Cor 5.14–15).⁹⁷ As the author and source of 'the passions of the Christ', Paul makes reference to God as 'the father of pities' (ὁ πατήρ τῶν οἰκτιρμῶν).⁹⁸ David Konstan has argued that pre-Christian Greek literature 'seems to put in question the gods' capacity for pity'.⁹⁹ By placing 'pity' (ἔλεος) under the category of 'pain' (λύπη),¹⁰⁰ Aristotle's definition of this passion seems to exclude the possibility of divine pity.¹⁰¹ The third pseudo-Platonic epistle makes the assumption of divine invulnerability explicit, asserting that 'the divine rests beyond pleasure and pain'.¹⁰² The philosophical schools of the Hellenistic and Roman periods drove an even deeper wedge between divinity

95 Plutarch *Rec. rat. aud.* 47A.

96 Diogenes Laertius 7.119.

97 See the important discussion of this idea by Cilliers Breytenbach, ' "Christus starb für uns". Zur Tradition und paulinischen Rezeption des sogenannten "Sterbeformeln"', *NTS* 29 (2003) 447–75.

98 See the brief discussion of the background of this designation by Furnish, *II Corinthians*, 109.

99 David Konstan, *Pity Transformed* (London: Duckworth, 2001) 107.

100 Aristotle *Rhet.* 2.8.2: 'Let pity (ἔλεος) then be a kind of pain (λύπη) excited by the sight of evil, deadly or painful, which befalls one who does not deserve it; an evil which one might expect to come upon himself or one of his friends, and when it seems near'.

101 Konstan, *Pity Transformed*, 106–7, with the Appendix 'Aristotle on Pity and Pain', 128–36.

102 Ps.-Plato *Ep.* 3, 315c. Cf. Aristotle *Eth. Nic.* 10.8, 1178b8–23.

and human emotions such as pity.¹⁰³ Without doubt, Paul's description of God as 'the father of pities' is rooted in the concept of a merciful deity in the Jewish scriptures.¹⁰⁴ But the logic of Paul's argument in 2 Cor 1.3–7 seems to go beyond the biblical notion of a compassionate God, and to imply that God is subject to psychological suffering, as the author of 'the passions of the Christ'.

In Greek and Latin literature of the late first and second century, especially in the novels, Konstan detects 'a new disposition to invoke, or expect, divine pity'.¹⁰⁵ Among the causes of this change in the representation of emotional life, Konstan posits the spread of Christian ideas of divinity.¹⁰⁶ Konstan asks whether the appeals to pity that surface in the romances, in official petitions, and in the rare inscription 'betray the growing influence of Christian views of pity, and their gradual permeation of Greco-Roman culture?'¹⁰⁷ If this question is well founded, then a crucial moment in the transvaluation of pity into a virtue may be located precisely in Paul's therapeutic epistle. According to Paul, the pity of God (1.3), expressed in the passions of the Christ (1.5), creates a community of shared suffering 'in endurance of the same passions' (ἐν ὑπομονῇ τῶν αὐτῶν παθημάτων, 1.6), ... 'as partners of the passions' (κοινωνοί ἐστε τῶν παθημάτων, 1.7) of the crucified Christ. Here we witness the emergence of a concept of the 'self as sufferer' whose greater cultural visibility Judith Perkins locates in the second century.¹⁰⁸

To Paul's concept of the 'self as sufferer' corresponds a novel emotional therapy. In a clean reversal of the Stoic counsel to 'tear pain out of the soul completely',¹⁰⁹ Paul urges the Corinthians to plunge into a kind of λύπη which is 'according to God' (κατὰ θεόν, 7.9–10). Paul then proceeds to outline the stages in an emotional progress that lead from godly 'pain' (λύπη) to psychic 'health' (σωτηρία): 'For see what sort of thing this being pained according to God works in you—what earnestness (σπουδή), what eagerness to clear oneself (ἀπολογία), what indignation (ἀγανάκτησις), what alarm (φόβος), what yearning desire (ἐπιπόθησις), what zeal (ζήλος), what retribution (ἐκδίκησις)'. That the series of emotions in 7.11 is not casually constructed is indicated by the fact

103 Konstan, *Pity Transformed*, 112–13, referencing Dio Chrysostom *Or.* 16.4; Epictetus *Diss.* 4.6.22; Plutarch *Rec. rat. aud.* 20E.

104 Hélène Pétré, '“Misericordia”: histoire du mot et de l'idée du paganisme au christianisme', *Revue des Etudes Latines* 12 (1934) 376–89; Francis I. Andersen, 'Yahweh, the Kind and Sensitive God', *God Who is Rich in Mercy* (ed. Peter T. O'Brien and David G. Peterson; Homebush West, NSW: Lancer, 1986) 41–87; Konstan, *Pity Transformed*, 120.

105 Konstan, *Pity Transformed*, 118.

106 Konstan, *Pity Transformed*, 119.

107 Konstan, *Pity Transformed*, 119.

108 Perkins, *The Suffering Self*, 1–14.

109 Dio Chrysostom *Or.* 16.4.

that exactly seven terms are chosen, and that each term is highlighted by the anaphoric use of ἄλλά.¹¹⁰

We may well ask ourselves how Paul's new therapy of the emotions would have affected the wealthy few at Corinth, whose values and attitudes may have been formed by popular Stoicism. Would Corinthians of this sort have been surprised that Paul did not adopt the Chrysippean therapy, which Cicero judged 'the most dependable method'?¹¹¹ Chrysippus held that 'the key to consolation is to get rid of the person's belief that mourning is something he *ought* to do, something just and appropriate'.¹¹² Would the educated few at Corinth have been perplexed by Paul's novel idea that λύπη was not merely useful in small doses, but was a thorough-going course of treatment from which one emerged into psychic wholeness? But we should also consider the alternative scenario: perhaps Paul's valorization of λύπη gave meaning to the grief by which the wrongdoer (2.7) and the Corinthians (7.8) were engulfed, by attributing this pain to a divine origin (7.9–10). After all, Cicero acknowledged that the rational consolation of Chrysippus was 'a hard method to apply in time of distress', when a person was generally unwilling to accept that his grief was merely a mistake in judgment.¹¹³

In any case, Paul seems to have taken care to lessen the shock of his novel therapy by the way in which he portrays himself in the arguments of his therapeutic letter. Recall that Paul seeks to prove his sincerity by appealing, first, to his 'volition' (βούλησις) in the formulation of his plan to come to Corinth (1.15–22: ἐβουλόμην, ...βουλόμενος). Then, Paul represents himself as having exercised 'caution' (εὐλάβεια), 'sparing' (φειδόμενος) the Corinthians further grief, by delaying his return to Corinth (1.23–2.4). Finally, Paul dramatizes the transformation of his anxiety into 'joy' (χαρά) through the arrival of Titus with his good report of a change of heart among the Corinthians (7.7, 9, 13, 16). It can hardly be a coincidence that, in a letter so preoccupied with the emotions, and so assiduous in its practice of emotional therapy, Paul should portray himself as having attained the consistencies of the wise man—volition (βούλησις), caution (εὐλάβεια), and joy (χαρά). Indeed, Paul's account of his 'confidence' in prospect of renewed affection with the Corinthians (7.16, ἐν παντὶ θαρρῶ ἐν ὑμῖν) probably also belongs to the portrait of himself as one who has attained the disposition of a wise man. Margaret Graver has argued that in one stream of the Stoic tradition the eupathic response that replaces fear was 'confidence', rather than 'caution', appealing to a statement of Cicero in the *Tusculan Disputations*, and to an extended discussion of 'caution' and

110 As noted by Windisch, *Der zweite Korintherbrief*, 234. A search through the *Thesaurus Linguae Graecae* reveals that this list of emotions is not found before Paul.

111 Cicero *Tusc. Disp.* 3.79.

112 Cicero *Tusc. Disp.* 3.76.

113 Cicero *Tusc. Disp.* 3.79.

‘confidence’ in Epictetus.¹¹⁴ By demonstrating the eupathic quality of his response to the Corinthians, Paul suggests that the ethical consistency of a wise man can be attained by emotional ‘overflow’, as well as by emotional thrift, through participation in ‘the passions of the Christ’ (1.5–7).

We may summarize the results of our investigation. Pain is at the center of Paul’s therapeutic epistle—pain given and pain received. Wounded by the actions of a certain ‘wrongdoer’ (2.5; 7.12), and filled with regret at the pain his own epistle had caused (2.4; 7.8), Paul reflected deeply upon the nature and function of the emotions ‘in Christ’. Paul concluded that the passions of the Christ had established a community of affection in which all might share the same suffering and consolation (1.3–7). The passions of the Christ had partitioned pain.¹¹⁵ The pain of this world remained, and, as always, led through depression to death (7.10). But the suffering of Christ had disclosed a pain that was in accordance with God’s will, a pain that led through repentance to salvation (7.10). This insight prompted Paul to articulate a novel Christophoric therapy that did not seek to banish pain or extirpate the emotions, but which embraced pain and its attendant affections as a strange, new path to psychic wholeness (7.11).

To the long prospect opened up by Paul’s therapeutic epistle belongs an assessment of the impact of Paul’s valorization of ‘pain’ (λύπη) upon what one might call ‘the history of the emotions’. Has humanity been helped by Paul’s embrace of suffering and its attendant passions? Has Paul enriched our lives by making us desire to be ‘partners of the same passions’? Or is the poet right to fault Paul for weakening our fate by preaching ‘an over-human god’ who pities us so much?¹¹⁶ One way to approach an answer to these uncomfortable, but unavoidable, questions might be to reflect upon the several fates of Paul and Seneca. These two therapists of the emotional life—one the counselor of emotional thrift, the other the apostle of emotional excess—both died under Nero. We may assume that they did not endure their final moments unattended by their respective theories and therapies.¹¹⁷ Which of the two should we imagine had the better death?

114 Graver, ‘The Status of Confidence in Stoic Classification’, *Stoicism and Emotion*, 213–20, citing Cicero *Tusc. Disp.* 4.66 (‘And just as confidence [*confidere*] is proper but fear improper, so also joy is proper and gladness improper’) and Epictetus *Diss.* 2.1.1–7.

115 For the concept of a messianic ‘cut’ or ‘partition’ in human experience in the thought of Paul, see Giorgio Agamben, *The Time That Remains: A Commentary on the Letter to the Romans* (Stanford: Stanford University, 2005) 49–53.

116 Wallace Stevens, ‘Esthétique du Mal’, esp. section III, in *The Collected Poems of Wallace Stevens* (New York: Vintage, 1982) 315–16.

117 See the account of Seneca’s death in Tacitus *Ann.* 15.62–64, with the comments of Paul Veyne, *Seneca: The Life of a Stoic* (New York/London: Routledge, 2003).