

Here I would suggest that Marlin should add virtue ethics to the ethical theories he considers. It seems likely that (for example) Sissela Bok's moral evaluation of lying—which holds that lying diminishes social trust and personal integrity—is broadly virtue ethical in its approach.

Regarding marketing ethics, Marlin looks briefly at the issues in advertising, the harms it can cause, and discusses briefly Galbraith's claim about the dependency effect (which Marlin inaccurately equates with the marketing of products like cigarettes that make consumers dependent upon them). He also considers the ethical issues in public relations.

Marlin skillfully surveys major defenses of free speech (by Milton and J.S. Mill) and some objections to them (such as those by Fitzjames Stephen), and nicely shows the discussion was echoed in the late 1950s and early 1960s in Britain and Australia. He then reviews five more recent arguments for unrestricted freedom of speech.

Marlin covers at length the Canadian government's attempts to limit hate propaganda, deceptive advertising, as well as control the news media and information about itself. To non-Canadians this discussion seems a bit parochial; though he does draw some analogies to U.S. law.

The last topic discussed in the book is the internet. Marlin briefly discusses ways to 'democratize' the internet, the ability of the internet to contribute to public journalism, and more skeptical views of the internet's potential.

In sum, despite a few minor flaws, Marlin's book should be on the bookshelf of any serious scholar of propaganda and persuasion.

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Feeling Lonesome: The Philosophy and Psychology of Loneliness

BEN LAZARE MIJUSKOVIC

Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2015; 203 pp.; \$60.00 (hardback)

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Ben Lazare Mijuskovic, PhD., LCSW possesses the rare interdisciplinary pedigree which empowers him to speak to both academic and practical concerns. With advanced degrees in philosophy and literature, Mijuskovic examines numerous aspects of loneliness in his sweeping study, *Feeling Lonesome: The Philosophy and Psychology of Loneliness*. His three decades as a licenced therapist grounds his arguments in practical, clinical experience. Mijuskovic has observed loneliness at play in children, adolescents, and adults in psychiatric hospitals, medical hospitals, state institutions and mental health facilities. *Feeling Lonesome* encapsulates his lifelong study and extends a rich philosophical exploration of rationalism and of phenomenology in order to caution practitioners about the dangers of empirical, behavioural, and cognitive approaches to mental health. Mijuskovic's work serves as a mediator between two academic communities and deserves careful attention from both philosophical and psychological audiences.

Feeling Lonesome opens with a brief chapter on historical and conceptual foundations to assert loneliness is an *a priori* state of existence rooted in the nature of self-reflexivity

which must be transcended through life in community only after it is experienced, recognized and confronted. Loneliness emerges concurrent to the infant's conscious development as her alienation from other objects and from her mother eventuate in self-identification as an isolated being in the world. Mijuskovic's preference for philosophical first principles permits him to correlate metaphysical dualism, subjective idealist consciousness, and loneliness throughout his study. Loneliness resolves both the 'what' of philosophical consciousness and the 'how' of psychological phenomenology. The strict disciplinarian will surely protest this foundational premise, but Mijuskovic challenges readers to step outside conventional disciplinary boundaries to see the practical ramifications of theoretical assertions.

Chapters Two through Four tackle philosophical dimensions of Mijuskovic's theory of loneliness including self-consciousness, reflexivity, intentionality, transcendence, and phenomenology. These chapters present an historical approach to loneliness within a philosophical framework developed over 40 years of academic inquiry and publishing. Mijuskovic examines Plato's perspective on the nature of thought in *Theaetetus* as an essential, self-reflexive, and self-contained activity of an immaterial substance—the Greek soul or the contemporary self (19). Mijuskovic examines cases where this thread emerges and broadens in Aristotle, Plotinus, St. Augustine, Descartes, Leibnitz, Berkeley, Kant, and Husserl. Mijuskovic's philosophical examination argues an immaterial, identifiable, self-conscious, and intentional mind which experiences self-reflexivity as a natural consequence. He claims loneliness is not a disease to be remedied, but an existential reality expounded by a rich philosophical tradition which has been under attack by academicians and mental health practitioners alike. The first half of *Feeling Lonesome* offers a dense yet streamlined survey of the history of rationalism / idealism. Mijuskovic challenges his reader to examine how these philosophical claims hold serious ramifications and possibilities as corrective measures to the overly materialistic, behaviourist paradigm in contemporary psychiatric practices in the second half of the work.

In Chapters Five through Eight, Mijuskovic moves from philosophy to psychology, from the mind to the self. He primarily addresses the practitioner in this half; however, philosophically-inclined readers will better understand the praxis of philosophy of mind in psychiatric and psychological arenas. Mijuskovic appeals frequently to Hegel, Husserl, and Wittgenstein in order to correlate idealist, phenomenological or analytic concepts with psychological parallels, and he always tries to engage both audiences to keep mutual interest and to inform both parties of possible conceptual bridges.

Chapter five features his "umbrella concept" in which loneliness exists as an emotional and cognitive experience akin to Husserl's "free imaginative variation" (123). At this point, Mijuskovic grounds loneliness as a philosophical and psychological state which cannot be remedied but recognized, accepted and appreciated. The practical concerns of how to cope with this realization follow in the closing chapters.

Chapters Six and Seven expose weaknesses in behavioural and cognitive psychological assumptions through discussions of language, the unconscious and the subconscious. Mijuskovic concurs with Husserlian phenomenology of language which follows consciousness: "there is a genuinely private sphere of privileged access within the ego, a hidden entry into one's own thoughts ... the primary residence of loneliness" (136). Identifying disorders in the *Diagnostic Statistical Manual of Psychiatric Disorders* improperly assumes empirical evidence and linguistic certainty, both errors given the

nature of language and our inescapable egoic isolation. Mijuskovic appeals to Kant, Leibnitz, Hegel, Schopenhauer, and Nietzsche in his lengthy discussion on the unconscious to contend, “the individual subconscious will forever remain latent and submerged but active, unrecognized and powerful, while its manifest surface appearances will be familiar, all-too familiar in nightmares and madness” (163). His treatment of literary examples in Joseph Conrad’s *Heart of Darkness* and in William Golding’s *Pincher Martin* rounds out the exploration. Unconscious loneliness is shown to be irrational, ineffable and illogical.

The final chapter addresses several therapeutic practices, drawing out the practical implications of his philosophical explorations. It utilizes cognitive and motivational approaches which he finds a healthier and philosophically justifiable alternative to behavioural and medicinal therapies. Mijuskovic recommends relatively simple, affordable acts, such as establishing friendships, religious practice, and exercise. He sees cultivation of belonging as a natural remedy to existential loneliness. Social bonds enable individuals to empathize, build trust, and turn outward (as opposed to narcissistic obsession with one’s own loneliness). Such alternative measures are preferable to oft abused medicinal treatments.

Feeling Lonesome is a must read for anyone interested in philosophy of mind, philosophical psychology, or loneliness. It touches upon our most private selves, our insularity, and our innermost existence in a uniquely interdisciplinary perspective. Mijuskovic encapsulates a life of rich philosophical investigation while tempering his narrative with therapeutic practicality.

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Why the World Does Not Exist

MARKUS GABRIEL (translated by Gregory S. Moss)

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Markus Gabriel argues that the world does not exist because the world as an ultimate frame of reference must stand outside all the interconnections of ordinary occurrences; however, frames of reference are occurrences that only happen with respect to other frames of reference.

This argument begs at least four questions that Gabriel boldly goes forth in his book to answer: 1. What sort of object is a frame of reference? 2. How and why does anything exist at all? 3. Where are we humans without an ultimate or over-arching frame of reference? 4. How do we humans find or gain meaning in a world of relative frames of reference? I sketch Gabriel’s answers later on.

A Disclaimer: the wording I am using to frame the questions and main argument posed by Gabriel is my wording rather than his own, specialized terminology. One piece of his terminology is important, however, namely his use of ‘fetish.’ In fact, one of the novelties in Gabriel’s book is to use the psychoanalytic concept of *fetish* to dissect the reverence shown towards the natural sciences as opposed to the humanities and arts. A similar fetish is seen in the reverence shown by many philosophers