

there nevertheless emerges in new colours an Augustine who is daring, tenacious, psychologically bold (at times) to the point of blunt insensitivity, and whose worldly ambition and Christian charity are fascinatingly, and ultimately indecipherably, intertwined.

E.'s case is made through descriptive narration, with frequent citation from the letters of Augustine and his correspondents. There is surprisingly little fine-grained literary analysis, despite what the introduction seems to promise (pp. 20–5). In other words, while E. is relatively thorough in her setting out of contemporary epistolary conventions and the way in which Augustine manipulates and flouts these at the macro-level, there is not as much as one would expect by way of detailed attention to the particular words and phrases he uses and to their configurational dynamics. This is perhaps a result of the fact that, as E. judges, Augustine's letters are on the whole 'relatively unadorned, textualized speech acts that aim primarily to communicate and produce action', by contrast with those of Paulinus and Jerome, which serve to '[advertise] their literary talents' (p. 229).

However, the much more prominent dimension lacking from E.'s treatment is the theological – a deliberate bracketing on E.'s part (e.g. pp. 103 n. 7; 137 n. 101; 192). While her literary-historical approach fully justifies itself as a self-contained treatment (which is at the same time non-reductively open to the theological), I wonder, as a theologian, how her argument would be affected by a systematic integration of the theological dimension which is never far from the surface. As E. senses, the subject of mutual, loving rebuke or correction within the Christian community is a vital, although underexplored, *topos* within Augustine's theology. She draws attention to the only treatise of Augustine's with rebuke as its central focus (the late *De correptione et gratia*), but clearly recognises that it is a theme of much more pervasive importance for him, informed in particular by his reading of Paul's rebuke of Peter in Galatians 2:11–14 (pp. 224–5). Thus the potential of a theological analysis – which takes into account both his theoretical reflection on the role of rebuke and his own practice of it in epistolary form – is huge. It is so not only for the specifically theological fruit it could bear in relation to Augustine's doctrinal thinking (e.g. on grace, free will, predestination, the Holy Spirit, etc.), but also for the extra complexity it could bring to the narrative E. tells. What would happen if one were to lend the literary, ambitious and pastoral Augustine a fully theological voice? How would this voice contribute to and transform the already multidimensional Augustine drawn by E.? And more specifically, how would attentiveness to Augustine's theology shed light on his bold manipulation of epistolary norms? Would his strategies emerge in renewed relief? These are questions E.'s exciting monograph invites but does not pursue.

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### DE TRINITATE

BERMON (E.), O'DALY (G.) (edd.) *Le De Trinitate de Saint Augustin. Exégèse, logique et noétique. Actes du colloque internationale de Bordeaux, 16–19 juin 2010*. Préface de Rowan Williams. (Collection des Études Augustiniennes, Série Antiquité 192.) Pp. viii + 372. Paris: Institut d'Études Augustiniennes, 2012. Paper, €33. ISBN: 978-2-85121-250-4.  
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This is a substantial study of one of Augustine's most weighty and innovative works (he once called it *opus tam laboriosum*), and one less well known than *Confessions* and *City of*

*God*. As Rowan Williams says in his short welcoming and contextualising preface, ‘many of the essays here will require some textbook summaries of Augustine as a philosopher to be extensively rewritten’. Indeed it is a veritable Companion, albeit in some places like a companion who insists that one puts on the crampons of logic and bivouacs in the crevices of ancient philosophy as we climb; it is certainly not a walk in the park. But the ‘Introduction: exégèse, logique et noétique’ by B. is a helpful summary of the work, showing where the sixteen essays that follow – nine in English and seven in French – fit in. Here I give details of all the titles, with short comments as dictated by the word-limit and my own limited equipment for such ascents.

In ‘How to Refute an Arian: Ambrose and Augustine’ M. Edwards compares the debates conducted with Arians over the nature of Christ by Ambrose and Augustine in order to find what is new and characteristic of Augustine in his arguments and to note the effect of his rather different circumstances.

In ‘L’exégèse de la théophanie de Mambré dans le *De Trinitate* d’Augustin: enjeux et ruptures’ M.-O. Boulnois examines Augustine’s discussion of the Old Testament theophany to Abraham at Mamre, which Arian opponents had interpreted as a proof of the inferiority of the Son. Augustine is seen to break with traditional exegesis in some significant ways.

In ‘La puissance de Dieu à l’oeuvre dans le monde. Le livre III du *De Trinitate* d’Augustin’ I. Bochet explains the function of this apparently neglected book in the argument of Books 1–4, explores the relation of the argument to Augustine’s discussions of God’s creative power in his commentary *De Genesi ad litteram*, and argues that one point of his polemic against Porphyry in Books 3 and 4 is to distance himself from this writer.

In ‘Augustine’s Use of Aristotle’s *Categories* in *De Trinitate* in Light of the History of the Latin Text of the *Categories* Before Boethius’ J. Lössl presents a thorough study of various Late Antique Latin versions of the *Categories*, based on the terminology used and the order in which various witnesses present the ten categories. In whatever version, Augustine makes more use of it in *De Trinitate* (Book 5) than his words in *Confessions* 4.16.28 might suggest.

In ‘The Semantics of Augustine’s Trinitarian Analysis in *De Trinitate* 5–7’ P. King asserts that Augustine’s crowning achievement in *De Trinitate* is his distinction between substantial and relational predication – an achievement little appreciated because his medieval successors (Boethius among them) chose to concentrate on his metaphysics rather than his semantic approach in these books.

In ‘A Problem in Augustine’s Use of the Category of Relation in *De Trinitate* V and VII’ O’D. expounds difficulties inherent in the question of the relation of the three persons of the Trinity, and considers whether Plotinus should be called to the rescue. Concluding, he declares that ‘perhaps Augustine could not succeed in applying logical categories to Trinitarian mystery: but at least he tried’.

In ‘La divisibilité de l’espèce selon Augustin *De Trinitate* VII’ C. Erismann begins by seeking to clarify what is understood by ‘ontology’ in exegesis of *De Trinitate*, and then reconstructs the Augustinian theory of *species* as applied to the sensible world. This shows Augustine moving away from Aristotle and distinct from ‘realists’ such as Gregory of Nyssa, and taking an original metaphysical position.

In ‘L’image de soi-même, la question du double sujet’ M. Smalbrugge, beginning from the famous phrase from Augustine’s *Soliloquia*, *deum et animam scire cupio*, seeks to show how Augustine aimed to solve the problem by the notion of ‘image’, which Smalbrugge pursues first in the autobiographical works and then in *De Trinitate*.

In 'Qu'il n'y a pas d'amour sans connaissance: étude d'un argument du *De Trinitate*, livres VIII–XV' A.-I. Bouton-Touboulic explores the question of whether it is possible to love something which one does not know. This problem, already apparent to Augustine in his *Soliloquia*, is examined from various angles in this paper, which also refers to earlier philosophers and schools.

In 'Augustine's Theory of Mind and Self-Knowledge: Some Fundamental Problems' C. Horn finds 'serious shortcomings' in Augustine's philosophy of mind as developed in the second half of *De Trinitate*, which result from his strategy of using as his basis Trinitarian dogma as established in the fourth-century councils.

In 'Time, Memory, and Selfhood in *De Trinitate*' J. Brachtendorf discusses Augustine's distinction between *se cogitare* and *se nosse*, and then focuses on one element of the latter, the *memoria sui interior*; this concept in Book 14 is compared with other passages of Augustine, including those in *Confessions* 10 and 11.

In 'Augustine's Cognitive Voluntarism in *De Trinitate* 11' S. MacDonald addresses the problem that Augustine seems to go too far in making an act of will an essential part of every cognitive act. He suggests two strategies for defending Augustine's account, offers a brief objection and then makes a reply to it.

In 'The Background of Augustine's Triadic Epistemology in *De Trinitate* 11–15. A suggestion' C. Tornau inquires into the historical background of Augustine's 'triadic epistemology', as it is presented in Book 11, delving into Aristotle and Plotinus among others. Cross-references to some other papers in this volume might have been useful.

In '*Trinitas Fidei*. Sur les apports de la méthode analogique trinitaire à la définition de la croyance (Augustin, *De Trin.* XIII)' I. Koch examines how Augustine's treatment of the notion of *fides* (in the sense of 'croyance') differs markedly, in the Trinitarian context, from earlier analyses by him. He abandons the approach of listing the conditions of belief for the attempt to describe what happens in the mind of one who believes.

In 'La *mens-imagō* et la "mémoire métaphysique" dans la réflexion trinitaire de saint Augustin' B. Cillerai, working from the studies of memory by Goulven Madec, discusses various questions surrounding Augustine's treatment of the concept, fundamental as it is among the various 'psychological trinities' of the later books. The influence of Plotinus is also examined.

In 'Intellectual Self-Knowledge in Augustine (*De Trinitate* 14.7–14)', a lively paper which rounds off this challenging but illuminating collection, C. Brittain asks 'what exactly does Augustine mean when he says that the *mens* always *remembers* itself, always *knows* itself ...?'

There are indexes of Biblical passages, of passages of Augustine referred to, of references to ancient and medieval writers (but no index of subjects) and an extensive bibliography. The work is produced with the clarity and elegance characteristic of the 'Collection des Études Augustiniennes', though in one section of mild typographical turbulence early on I noticed 'nostril' for *nostris* and 'affect' for *affectus*, and elsewhere (on a single occasion in each case) that Augustine loses an 'i' and the Latin word *intentio* a 't'. About one half of the contributors do not regularly provide the Latin of important passages discussed.

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