outcomes of state failure and human rights/environmental abuses are often committed by other state actors. In fact, Conca points out repeatedly that nation-states are among the primary perpetrators of massive human rights and environmental atrocities. For example, he cites Wolfgang Sachs, who once wrote that "the resource claims of core states collide with the subsistence rights of the periphery" (p. 109). And Conca's discussion of California's outsourcing of environmental and social costs to other nations that make its relative environmental and economic privilege possible also reflect this dynamic.

Those data seem like evidence for taking seriously the problem of democracies (core states) contributing to, if not producing, the instabilities, violence, and precariousness that lead to failed states, rather than viewing the central problem as an absence of democracies in our quest to secure a sustainable, peaceful, secure, and just future. So why do we assume that the best way to address problems that nation-states have caused is by working through and reinforcing the nation-state form? I do not have the answer, but I am certain that we have only begun to scratch the surface of what may be the defining challenge of twenty-first-century environmental politics. And Conca's powerful book offers truly important clues as to why we need to ask this question.

Peace at What Price? Leader Culpability and the Domestic Politics of War Termination. By Sarah E. Croco. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015. 258p. $93.00.
doi:10.1017/S1537592716003935

— Jeff D. Colgan, *Brown University*

Why do some wars drag on for years, while others are quickly resolved after a few battlefield clashes? Sarah Croco's excellent new book explores the conditions under which wars are terminated. She argues that the answer has much to do with domestic politics. Her core insight is the importance of the culpability of leaders, of those individuals who led the state when the war began, regardless of the eventual war outcome (so culpability does not always mean "guilty of a defeat"). She finds that the culpable leaders are far less likely to want to end wars, whereas nonculpable leaders—those who came to power after a war began—are more likely to accept necessary compromises to end them. The argument has an intuitive appeal at a time when America's experience in Iraq, and the different approaches of Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama, are likely to loom large in readers' minds.

The core logic of the argument is straightforward. Voters are more likely to politically punish a culpable leader for a bad war outcome than a nonculpable leader. This gives a culpable leader greater incentive to continue a war in the hopes of achieving a better outcome or even just delaying the inevitable defeat. Consequently, Croco's theory predicts, and her statistical analysis confirms, that culpable leaders tend to have relatively bimodal war outcomes: They either win big (when the gamble pays off) or they lose big (and face the wrath of their domestic audience). Nonculpable leaders, on the other hand, tend to have more mediocre outcomes, with fewer outright wins or losses, and more negotiated settlements. Her argument that this logic applies not just to democracies but also to nondemocracies (though not quite as strongly for the latter) is an interesting one. Although the domestic audience in autocracies cannot punish culpable leaders via elections, Croco argues that elites in autocracies often find other ways to punish culpable leaders who lose wars. In this sense, she builds upon Jessica Weeks's findings on the similarities between democracies and some forms of autocracies (in *Dictators at War and Peace*, 2014).

Peace at What Price? has a conventional structure. After the introduction, there is a theory chapter and three empirical chapters, followed by a conclusion. Each of the empirical chapters focuses primarily on a statistical analysis, though there are some illustrative historical examples sprinkled throughout. The first empirical chapter, Chapter 3, tests and finds support for the book's hypotheses about leader tenure: Culpable leaders are indeed more likely to be punished (compelled to exit office) if they lose a war than are nonculpable leaders. The next chapter tests the implications for war outcomes. As expected, culpable leaders tend to have a relatively high "win" rate, whereas nonculpable leaders are relatively more likely to end a war in a "draw." Chapter 5 then extends the analysis to legislative leaders as opposed to the executive leaders studied in Chapter 3. Chapter 5 focuses only on the U.S. context in contrast to previous chapters. Here, however, the analysis is somewhat less convincing. Her findings (pp. 142–45) suggest that the effects of simple partisanship tend to be far more important than culpability, and she does not conduct any statistical test on whether voters punish culpable legislators as they do culpable executives. Indeed, she finds that voters punished Republicans in 2006 "regardless of the Republican incumbent's position on the war" (p. 148).

Croco's theoretical focus positions her research squarely in a growing body of scholarly work on leaders and elites in international relations. This corpus includes *Leaders at War* by Elizabeth Saunders (2011); *Why Leaders Fight* by Michael Horowitz, Allan Stam, and Cali Ellis (2015); and *Leaders and International Conflict* by Giacomo Chiozza and Hein Goemans (2011), among others. Leaders and elites are more difficult to study in some ways than masses, whose preferences are more amenable to the survey experiments that have come into vogue in IR. Yet the growing body of insightful leader-centric research suggests that the explanatory payoff to studying elites is well worth the effort.

Although Croco is not eager to challenge the rationalist bargaining model of war (p. 48), her book is the latest to point to the shortcomings of using it as the dominant

model for understanding war. Her analysis is essentially monadic, paying little attention to adversaries' strategic reaction to culpability. If her argument is correct, it raises the question why adversaries (who can observe culpability as well as voters, presumably) do not adjust their bargaining demands downward when facing culpable leaders and upward when facing nonculpable leaders. If they did, one would expect convergence in the rate of "wins" and "draws" among culpable and nonculpable leaders, albeit with different substantive settlements to the war. Yet that is not what Croco finds; instead, her findings suggest little strategic adjustment on the part of opponents. She suggests that culpability might even cut in the other direction: "An adversary may not trust a culpable foe to commit to unfavorable terms because he knows the leader will face repercussions from his citizens if he does not win. Given such a scenario, the adversary may feel he has no choice but to continue the war" (pp. 47–48). That logic suggests exactly the opposite: Adversaries will adjust their bargaining demands upwards when facing culpable leaders. Croco might be right, but her work points to an unfortunate indeterminacy in the underlying theoretical framework. As is so frequently the case with the bargaining model, it is possible to construct a rationalist story that fits any possible empirical pattern.

It is not the job of *Peace at What Price?* to defend the bargaining model, however. If one is looking to criticize the book itself, the absence of any attention to the domestic political effects of war victories is more notable. Croco focuses almost entirely on the consequences of war losses. Yet if every war is a calculated gamble, and voters know that, should they not reward victorious leaders for the same reasons they punish culpable defeated leaders? This would seem to follow from the author's logic, but some obvious counterarguments leap to mind: Winston Churchill's electoral defeat after World War II or George H. W. Bush's loss in the 1992 election after victory in the Persian Gulf War. Perhaps Croco's argument is asymmetric and does not apply to war victories, or perhaps these two examples are outliers and the broader trend does support the idea that voters reward incumbent leaders who are victorious in war. The book, however, stays silent on the topic.

All in all, Croco provides a tight, focused argument supported by a robust empirical analysis. The book is a significant contribution to the work on state leaders, one that many instructors will choose to teach in the years to come.

Disease Diplomacy: International Norms and Global Health Security. By Sara E. Davies, Adam Kamradt-Scott, and Simon Rushton. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2015. 192p. $39.95.
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— Christian Enemark, *University of Southampton*

Outbreaks of deadly infectious diseases are a great and growing concern for governments worldwide. Over the course of the last two decades, this concern has provided the political and diplomatic impetus toward having a better system in place for the international management of outbreak risks. This system, organized according to International Health Regulations (IHR) and coordinated by the World Health Organization (WHO), is challenged by ideational factors as well as material ones. As such, it is a worthy subject of attention by scholars working at the intersection of public health and international relations.

In *Disease Diplomacy*, Sara Davies, Adam Kamradt-Scott, and Simon Rushton make a timely and valuable contribution to the store of knowledge about why and how states work collectively to strengthen disease surveillance systems and outbreak response capacity worldwide. Whereas previous analyses of IHR adherence have tended to be oriented primarily toward issues of international law and public health practice, the fresh perspective offered by this book is one that is informed by social constructivist theory. The authors' focus is on the importance of norms in shaping and driving the political behavior of national governments and international institutions. Specifically, the aim is to show how the process of revising the IHR, and the subsequent effort to encourage state compliance, has effectively codified a new set of expectations about how a "responsible state" should behave in the event of an infectious disease outbreak that could spread across borders (p. 3).

The book is built upon a strong foundation of research, and its findings are sure to be devoured eagerly by anyone who has a long-standing interest in the WHO. Newcomers to the field of global health governance might find the subject matter a little dry, but any apparent dryness is amply tempered by the authors' elegant use of language and their careful explanations of concepts and events. The analysis is helpfully structured throughout by reference to the "norm life cycle" framework devised by Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, and there are frequent citations of a 1998 article in *International Organization* (52, 4) by Finnemore and Sikkink entitled "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change," In presenting their arguments in this way, the authors of *Disease Diplomacy* enable the reader to discern and readily comprehend the emergence, socialization, and internalization of norms with particular regard to IHR compliance. The book is thus doubly innovative in the contribution it makes. In shining the light of norm theory upon the politics surrounding the IHR, it refreshes our understanding of global health governance. And the book serves also to demonstrate, in the context of health policy, the value of such theory for the purpose of explaining international political phenomena. Despite the appearance of *Global Health Security* in the subtitle, the book is mainly about international norms. The authors refer to "global health security" as a term of art used in recent global health-governance discourse, and fortunately, the logic of their overall argument does not require a painstaking