

campaign effects in general, and candidate strategy in particular, it is likely that both broad umbrella variables and particularized studies such as this one are necessary. To this end, Buell and Sigelman provide a crucial foundation for future work, as it is rich description of the type presented in this book that allows scholars to derive more general hypotheses.

Opposition and Intimidation: The Abortion Wars and Strategies of Political Harassment. By Alesha E. Doan.

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— Cynthia Burack, *The Ohio State University*

In *Opposition and Intimidation*, Alesha E. Doan focuses on the militant, confrontational, and sometimes violent tactics that constitute part of the repertoire of pro-life activists. Between 1998 and 2004, Doan conducted interviews in Texas with individuals on both sides of abortion clinic-related protests as well as with others, like police officers, who were drawn into protest-related conflict. Supplemented with historical and contemporary data about abortion and anti-abortion activism, the material from the author's interviews reveals the ideology and motivations of those who become involved in pro-life activism, as well as the emotions and motivations of those who find themselves targeted by pro-life activists. The subject matter of the strategies and tactics of the anti-abortion movement is important for many social scientists, not only those who have a specific interest in abortion politics or reproductive rights history.

Doan's key theoretical claim is that conventional concepts in sociology and politics are insufficient to enable us to understand contemporary anti-abortion movement politics, that there is a "gap in our knowledge" that constitutes an impediment to understanding pro-life activism in its complexity and consequences (p. xi). To repair this gap, Doan offers a new concept, "political harassment," but this concept is more difficult to define and operationalize than the author suggests. For Doan, the features of anti-abortion activism that are key dimensions of the new analytic category are that nongovernmental actors are both targets of the movement's direct action and bear its costs (p. 24); that the ultimate goal of the movement is policy change, even though many activists devote themselves to goals that are not immediately political (p. 31–32); and, that the existence of violence in the movement creates a reasonable fear on the part of targets that they will be objects of violence, even when the direct actions they encounter are not violent (p. 108). At times, the author emphasizes the importance of "inflammatory rhetoric" on the part of anti-abortion protesters (p. 28), although the argument as a whole does not seem to require that women seeking abortions or clinic workers actually experience nox-

ious or threatening rhetoric. Rather than clarify the parameters of political harassment, however, the definitions and illustrations expose problems with the concept's scope and application.

One problem associated with political harassment as a new conceptual category becomes plain when Doan pivots between two quite distinct uses of the notion of "reasonable fear." One involves intentionality on the part of anti-abortion actors; political harassment occurs when activists set in motion "collective challenges intended to . . . create a reasonable fear" on the part of those they target (p. 131). The other does not require intentionality on the part of pro-life activists but refers to what clinic employees and women patients report—an "environment of fear"—as a result of knowing that some pro-life activists commit acts of violence (p. 108). Implicitly, throughout the analysis, this second, subjective, use of "reasonable fear" trumps the first.

By drawing attention to this distinction, I do not mean to suggest that what pregnant women and clinic employees actually experience as a result of their locations in the larger struggle over abortion is unimportant. Clearly, we have much to learn about the effects of various forms of political acts on those who become their targets.

However, the unexamined analytical distinction between, on the one hand, what anti-abortion protestors do (or intend to do) and, on the other hand, what vulnerable patients and clinic employees feel or experience does call into question the clarity and usefulness of the concept of political harassment as a way of explicating political formations. Pro-life violence has occurred and is likely to occur again. Given that context, if women who seek abortions feel threatened by the attentions of pro-life activists, we are bound by Doan's theory to judge that these women are being victimized by political harassment *regardless* of the nature of the acts under consideration. It is not obvious that such a move enhances our understanding of either the big picture or the micro-politics of pro-life activism.

The theoretical term that Doan considers and rejects as an alternative to political harassment is unconventional political tactics/participation, a broad analytic category that encompasses violence but also includes a wide range of other forms of direct action such as boycotts, blockades, demonstrations, and sit-ins. Previous scholars of abortion morality politics use this concept to account for pro-life activism, and a telling distinction between it and political harassment is that the concept of unconventional political tactics focuses our attention on the acts in which social movement actors engage. There is no denying that many of the tactics of anti-abortion activists—screaming at women outside clinics, blocking access, acquiring and publicizing personal information about clinic workers and women who seek abortion services, disseminating personalized wanted posters that target health care workers—constitute harassment. Whether they are executed by lone

individuals or carefully choreographed by leaders of groups with an eye to national strategies and political agendas, these acts are consistent with our ordinary understanding of the term.

Setting aside the question of the psychological effects of particular kinds of harassment—a question that Doan's study is not set up to evaluate in spite of the inclusion of brief passages of personal testimony—it is not clear that our current political vocabulary is unable to account for, and help us understand, the evolving tactics of the anti-abortion movement, as well as their wider social context. These theoretical and empirical distinctions do not require a new vocabulary of political action. Instead, they require the kind of careful detective work and analysis in which the author engages in the most fruitful section of her book.

In chapters 4 and 5, Doan's quantitative analyses of the effects of anti-abortion activism demonstrate definitively what other scholars of the abortion wars have long known: that "harassment pays off." Using survey data from the Alan Guttmacher Institute, Doan shows that pro-life picketing outside clinics "exert[s] a consistently negative influence on the abortion rate" (p. 148). A somewhat wider variety of tactics influences the provision of abortion services. For clinic employees, whose contacts with anti-abortion activists are likely to be more frequent and varied, Doan shows that, of the many tactics in the pro-life repertoire, picketing of clinics and residences has the greatest effect on discouraging their participation in the provision of abortion services (p. 146–47). These important findings will no doubt be of interest to scholars as well as to those on both sides of the conflict over abortion rights.

The Craft of Bureaucratic Neutrality: Interests and Influence in Governmental Regulation of Occupational Safety. By Gregory A. Huber. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007. 264p. \$89.00.
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—Graham K. Wilson, *Boston University*

Occupational safety and health has been a major focus of academic analyses of regulation and governance. In part, this reflects the troubling but intellectually fascinating trade-offs involved between important economic goals such as employment and growth, on the one hand, and the health and lives of workers, on the other. These important considerations aside, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) has been "ground zero" for arguments about the problems of securing effective and efficient regulation in the United States.

Some of the controversies about OSHA were purely political and related to the acute anxiety that many American business executives, such as Bryce Harlow, felt about the growth in the regulatory power of federal government. Reflecting the creation not only of OSHA but also the Environmental Protection Agency, Harlow warned that

American business was being "rolled up and thrown in the toilet" by this expansion of federal regulatory power. The field also attracted much academic attention. Starting with Lennart Lundqvist, a series of studies (not all cited by Gregory Huber) compared the development of occupational safety and health policy in the United States with its counterparts in other countries such as Sweden and the United Kingdom (*The Hare and the Tortoise: Clean Air Policies in the United States and Sweden*, 1980). These concluded that OSHA produced more conflict and fewer results, prompting attempts to explain why regulation was particularly problematic. Later Eugene Bardach and Robert Kagan used OSHA to develop a more general explanation of regulatory unreasonableness (*Going by the Book: The Problem of Regulatory Unreasonableness*, 1982). In short, rather like agricultural policy, occupational safety and health has prompted work that attempts to explain much more than how OSHA works—or fails.

Huber continues this tradition of using OSHA to make a more general theoretical argument. He argues that OSHA coped with the political problems it endured—and inflicted on itself—in its early years by adopting a strategy of "strategic neutrality." By this, he means that OSHA moved to implement the Occupational Safety and Health Act as impartially as possible, allocating inspections without regard to local political pressures or circumstances and, instead, relying on analyses of risk, the incidence of violations, and other obviously defensible criteria. This was not a merely a Weberian bureaucracy dutifully following the rules, however. OSHA adopted this approach deliberately because it allowed the agency to maintain its mission in the face of adverse political pressures. Huber supports his argument with careful and thorough quantitative analysis of data on the frequency and nature of OSHA inspections and risk factors. These analyses enable him to establish, for example, that inspections are more common in the Midwest than in the Sun Belt, not because of political considerations but because Midwestern industries are riskier.

The thoroughness of the authors' empirical analyses commands respect. Huber mines a mountain of data to evaluate systematically each and every argument that has been advanced that OSHA is biased in its allocation of its resources for inspections. The book is thus a model of the systematic and careful use of data to evaluate the conduct of an agency. It is most valuable, therefore, for those interested in the detailed analysis of lower-level officials than in the topic of occupational safety and health policy. This comment accords with Huber's own explanation of what drove his research—an interest in discretion in the use of the coercive power of the state. He does not address what we might call the overt policymaking role of OSHA—the development and promulgation of the standards that its inspectors enforce. This gap means that he is necessarily silent on the role of recent Republican administrations in reining in the adoption of new regulations either because