examine discourses of homeland territoriality and identify moderate politicians who, even if rhetorically defending maximalist positions, may also display a willingness to endorse pragmatic deals, which have the effective result of habituating the public toward a new territorial status quo over time.

Perceptive readers will note that the quantitative model predicts a decline in mentions of lost lands for a few decades, but that this is followed by a rise in mentions of such territory over the longer term. This "u"-shaped pattern suggests that irredentist claims do not die but may be resurrected in the long term. This latter possibility is not satisfactorily theorized in the book.

In addition, while the book makes a clear contribution by identifying democratic competition as the process whereby territorial claims may converge with actual geopolitical constraints, this deals only with the supply side process and not ultimate causes. The upstream factors that condition electorates to accept pragmatic peace deals and give up on maximalist claims are mentioned but not fashioned into a clear demand-side argument. Such bottom-up factors include demographic shifts such as the depopulation of co-ethnics from lost lands, habituation to a new dispensation, cohort change as those with direct memory of lost lands decline as a share of the electorate, as well as economic and great power pressure to accede to post-conflict borders.

Finally, the book feeds into a broader discussion as to whether politicians must deploy constructive ambiguity and obfuscation (even lying, as Paul Dixon notes) to produce a settlement that people will accept.

Overall, this is an important book for scholars of nationalism, conflict resolution, and International Relations more broadly. Methodologically and substantively, it is truly innovative and deserves to be read by faculty, policymakers, and students alike.

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**How Corruption and Anti-Corruption Policies Sustain Hybrid Regimes: Strategies of Political Domination Under Ukraine's Presidents in 1994–2014**, by Oksana Huss, ibidem Press, 2020, $45.00 (paperback), ISBN 9783838214306.

Oksana Huss's book is a welcome addition to two important literatures—the politics of anticorruption and Ukrainian political development. It is thoroughly researched, theoretically ambitious, and engagingly written.

The central argument of the book is that corruption and anticorruption are two faces of the same coin. The categories of *the corrupt* and the *non-corrupt* are co-constructed. Anticorruption policy fundamentally legitimizes control and punishment of those who are defined as corrupt. The drivers of anticorruption policy assume a dominant position and by dominating the process of defining corruption and anticorruption, they subordinate those who are construed as corrupt. They create a hierarchy using degree of corruption as the criterion. A second contribution of the book is the proposed *system of corruption* model, which is defined as a cluster of corruption practices and mechanisms, which are interrelated and cannot be conceptualized independent of each other. The model is distinguished from systemic corruption or endemic corruption and conceptualizes corruption as not culturally, but structurally determined. The model is then applied to a rich analytical narrative of the system of corruption, anticorruption measures, and framing strategies under three Ukrainian presidents—Kuchma, Yushchenko and Yanukovych. The book thoroughly documents the changes in both corruption and anticorruption practices, which suggests that the

system is dynamic rather than static as culturally or historically rooted explanations would predict. It also lays out how these Ukrainian presidents talked about corruption and the ways to reduce it. The short answer is: very differently.

The book will be useful both analytically and empirically. It provides a comprehensive overview and a useful synthesis of the literatures on corruption and anticorruption. It masterfully navigates both positivist and constructivist approaches across several disciplines—political science, economics, anthropology, and criminology. Anyone teaching undergraduate or graduate courses on corruption and good governance would benefit from assigning parts of this book. The empirical analysis of the Ukrainian data is also impressive. Anybody interested in the evolution of anticorruption legislation and institutions in Ukraine should read this book. Current analyses of Ukraine's post-Maidan governments' innovations, failures and successes in controlling corruption should use the book as a baseline and starting point.

Dr Huss's work raises important questions for future research. The first one is about the relationship between corruption and anticorruption. As co-constructed as they may be, it seems that the nature of this relationship depends greatly on whether anticorruption is pursued in earnest as an attempt to weaken or dismantle the system of corruption or whether it is pursued as a weaponization tool against political opponents or as diversionary tactic masking other political problems. We know that in Ukraine, under Yanukovych especially, anticorruption was used as a political weapon (Popova, 2013) and more research is needed to understand how anticorruption functioned under Poroshenko and now under Zelensky. However, if anticorruption, by definition, goes hand in hand with subordination and the creation of hierarchy, as Dr Huss argues, then does this model allow for an exit from a system of corruption? There seems to be a "damned if you do and damned if you do not" element at work. If no one is prosecuted and there is no anticorruption, then the system of corruption thrives. If anticorruption is pursued through prosecution, the argument is that this is just a way to dominate your opponents. So how does a country exit a system of corruption altogether?

Another question that the book raises for this reader concerns the relationship between political conditions, public understanding of the meaning of corruption, and the frames that presidents use. The book shows convincingly that Kuchma framed corruption as individual behavior ("corruption perpetrators are criminals"), implying a meaning of corruption based on principal-agent theory. This is the most politically useful frame for any politician who presides over a functional system of corruption. Is it that this is how Kuchma perceived the meaning of corruption or is this how he wanted Ukrainians to understand it? Probably the latter. But do presidents always have agency in choosing the frames? To what extent are the differences in the system of corruption under Kuchma and Yushchenko a function of the broader political conditions (fragmentation, level of popularity, pre-existing connections in some but not other corner of the state, institutional changes, etc.) vs. a function of the President's agency?

What is the role of the electorate and public opinion? The electorate comes off as a bit passive in the book, mostly following the frames provided by the presidents. For example, in the chapter on Yushchenko's presidency, the data on increased perceptions of political corruption and decreasing trust in institutions is interpreted as evidence that the public internalized the message from the president's framing that corruption is rooted in political institutions. But what if the president was responding to popular opinion instead? How would we know the direction of influence?

The broader question is how could we tell whether a President wants to work to dismantle the system of corruption? What kind of combination of framing and anticorruption steps would he/she take to send a credible signal that the goal is to move the country out of a system of corruption quadrant and into a quadrant where everyone competes by the rules? Would we be able to recognize such a move only in hindsight based on the effects?

My final question is about the broader implications of the model for anticorruption campaigns in hybrid regimes and their variation. Do different systems of corruption tend to produce different types of anticorruption campaigns? Is it possible that a politically weaponized anticorruption

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campaign would significantly undermine the foundations of a system of corruption, rather than solidify them? I hope that Dr Huss and others continue researching these important topics that are at the core of our goal of understanding how good, clean governance comes about.

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**Diaspora Entrepreneurs and Contested States**, by Maria Koinova, Oxford University Press, 2021, ISBN-13: 9780198848622.

Groundbreaking for diaspora studies, this book is motivated by a question perennial to the field: why, how, and where do diasporas mobilize? And much of the academic scholarship to this question has been unfolding within purely state-centric frames. Diasporic activity – patterns, goals, and mechanisms of mobilization – has been analyzed predominantly relative to host or home states. Only limited attention has been provided to the global contours of diaspora mobilization, and even less so to explaining how political spaces between home and host states of diasporic communities interconnect.

Maria Koinova reshuffles the cards in complex and insightful ways. In her *Diaspora Entrepreneurs and Contested States,* published by Oxford University in 2021, Koinova offers a multi-layered and multipronged framework of analysis, in a way seeking to offer a metatheory to explain the behavior of diaspora as a political actor. Importantly, this comprehensive framework builds on several midrange theories, which serve as building blocks for the broader narrative. One could argue that perhaps there is too much covered in a single volume. Yet, at the same, the comprehensive nature of this work promises to stimulate and chart new directions in diaspora studies.

The theoretical approach that Koinova introduces is largely relational. She elevates the nature connectivity between diasporic entrepreneurs and transnational fields (as opposed to states only), and she examines the position of such diaspora entrepreneurs in their respective social contexts. In doing so, she offers a complex framework within which to analyze the way the local, global and the national politics intersect, focusing on the specific roles and mechanisms of engagement by diaspora entrepreneurs.

Specifically, she focuses on conflict-generated diasporas while explaining why they pursue contentious, non-contentious, or mixed forms of mobilization, relative to their home countries with contested sovereignty. Koinova challenges and transcends the state-centric frames of diaspora studies by showing how diaspora entrepreneurs work through "transnational social fields." And she defines transnational fields as social networks of linkages and connections between host-states, home states, transnational networks, and international organizations. Significantly, Koinova maintains that it matters how diaspora entrepreneurs are positioned in their social contexts, the level of centrality they possess in their home communities, and the positions they occupy relative to their host governments and political institutions. Koinova offers a typology of diaspora entrepreneurs, distinguished in terms of their position and strength of their connectivity to home, host, or global centers of political power. Broker, Local, Distant, and Reserved are the four ideal types of diaspora entrepreneur who pursue their homeland related goals via contentious, noncontentious, or mixed forms. All in all, nine pathways of engagement by diaspora entrepreneurs are identified,