

from forced labor (Article 8). As Gross points out, all of these rights are also discussed in greater detail in numerous ILO conventions.

A Shameful Business is important for scholarship and teaching in the subfields of American government, government regulation of business, and human rights. Chapter 2, entitled “Justice and Human Rights,” would even be a good chapter to assign in a course on political philosophy. The author’s argument about the long-term lack of respect for basic worker rights in America provides an interesting critique of the simple race-to-the-bottom thesis that many of us already discuss in our classes and in our scholarship. In Gross’ view, repression of worker rights in America is a result of many choices that we and our government representatives have made over more than a century, not the result of recent increases in international economic competition.

Partisan Bonds: Political Reputations and Legislative Accountability. By Jeffrey D. Grynviski. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010. 260p. \$70.00.

Party Position Change in American Politics: Coalition Management. By David Karol. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009. 326p. \$87.00 cloth, \$25.99 paper. doi:10.1017/S153759271100017X

— Matthew M. Schousen, *Franklin & Marshall College*

Cambridge University Press has recently published two books that focus on the way in which parties function within the American political system. In the more innovative of the two, David Karol argues that both major political parties frequently change their ideological positions on issues. Using three different theories, Karol argues that sometimes these changes are slow—even decades in the making—while at other times they can happen within a single electoral cycle. In each case, the primary motivation for the change is electoral need, and perhaps his most startling finding is that, contrary to conventional wisdom, the majority of party issue-position changes, or outright flip-flopping on a particular issue, come from sitting lawmakers rather than from elite replacement. In the second book, Jeffrey Grynviski extends the conditional party government and procedural cartel theories. As the two parties become more ideologically different from each other and also more internally cohesive, Grynviski argues, not only do they reap benefits within the institutions of Congress by passing legislation that is closer to their ideal points but they also benefit electorally by creating a “brand” that voters can both understand and trust.

Both books are carefully researched, develop solid theories, and provide ample empirical evidence to support their arguments, and each has something to offer scholars interested in campaigns and elections, Congress, and parties. Grynviski’s more narrow focus and formal models, however, are less likely to appeal to a wider audience, whereas Karol asks a question that is likely to have broader appeal:

Why would a political party change its position on taxes, abortion, Civil Rights, or a host of other issues? Karol’s work is also written in such a way that it is likely to be more accessible to a general audience.

While both books explore the implications of parties in the electorate, they focus particularly on elite behavior, looking specifically at the behavior of party members serving in or running for congressional office. At the heart of Grynviski’s rational choice model, for example, is the argument that both lawmakers and voters prefer a political environment in which there are two ideologically different parties that are relatively cohesive internally. According to the author, such an environment benefits lawmakers, making it easier for challengers and incumbents to get their message out to a largely uninformed electorate, and it benefits voters because it makes it easier for them to select the candidate who is most likely to represent their ideological preference. Therefore, according to Grynviski, party elites (particularly members of the US House of Representatives) have a strong incentive to create a party “brand” that is both consistent and stable, and that will accurately predict how party members will behave if they are elected.

Karol’s book, on the other hand, suggests that lawmakers are almost always tinkering with party issue positions in an effort to win the next election, and that while some positions remain stable from one election to the next, others are “evolving.” Because the goal of both parties is to maintain their existing coalitions and/or expand their electoral reach, electoral gain is the key to understanding not only why a political party takes a particular issue stand but also why a political party might want to alter its positions or even reverse itself. Thus, Karol develops three different theories to explain how and why parties change political issue positions in order to promote 1) coalition maintenance, 2) coalition group incorporation, and 3) groupless coalition expansion.

Although both books center on the incentives and motives of individual lawmakers, Karol’s work suggests that those lawmakers’ issue positions are often in flux due to their need to appeal to voters in a given election, while Grynviski argues that those same lawmakers have a vested interest in creating a stable, predictable political brand. Can these two conclusions, which seem to be at odds with each other, coexist? At first glance, the answer would seem to be no. If, however, one takes into account that the two books are very different in scope, the answer is yes, sometimes. Karol’s model is much broader than Grynviski’s; it incorporates the House, the Senate, and the presidency, and it applies in a variety of political environments. Grynviski’s book, more limited in its scope, focuses only on the House, and his theory seems to be most useful when considering eras of conditional party government.

Party Position Changes in American Politics begins with the simple question: What explains changing issue positions within a political party? After providing a series of empirical examples in which both parties change their

positions, Karol develops three theories, devoting a chapter to each. The first of these chapters looks at the parties' evolving positions on trade policy and suggests that sometimes parties change positions for reasons of "coalition maintenance"; they want to keep existing coalition members happy. In his next chapter, the author uses the issues of abortion and gun control to explain why a party would adopt a new issue position in order to bring a new partner into its coalition, a circumstance he labels "coalition group incorporation." (In Chapter 4, he explains that some issue-position changes incorporate elements of both coalition maintenance and coalition group incorporation, using the politics of race and Civil Rights to support his case.)

What is particularly noteworthy is that in each of these cases, the parties are changing positions not because of public opinion but rather because party elites are concerned with maintaining or acquiring the support of particular interest groups. According to Karol's model, then, it is the strength and intensity of the interest group that is of particular importance to party elites, rather than the ideological position of rank-and-file party members or the electorate as a whole. In fact, in the case of abortion, the author finds that because of changes in the parties' positions, senators today are actually marginally less responsive to public opinion than they were in the 1970s (pp. 81–2). While it might be disheartening to think that parties are responding more to the desires of specific interest groups than they are to the general public, Karol devotes his final substantive chapter to two "groupless" issues—defense spending and fiscal policy—and suggests that with these types of issues, parties do seek to expand their support on a more general level—what he labels "coalition expansion."

One interesting implication of Karol's work is that while some issues might be presented in a campaign to help win the election, party elites may decline to push those issues once they are in office. For example, in the early 1980s, presidential candidate Ronald Reagan hammered very hard on a series of cultural issues during the election, but after he and the Republicans were in office, those issues seemed to disappear. In future elections, however, the Republicans found that those issues continued to be effective and they continued to push them on the electoral stage, and Karol's theory suggests that this interactive process leads to some elite replacement, some incumbent "evolution" on the issue, more activists joining the party, and more rank-and-file party members identifying with the issue. Over time, then, the electoral issue breaks through the boundaries of the electoral arena and becomes an issue for legislative action.

I wish that Karol had explored some of these potentially unintended consequences in greater detail. If there is a set of issues on which a party changes its position in order to win an election, even though it is not really interested in pushing the issue legislatively, could the party, over time, be almost forced to enact legislation to support

the issue, whether a majority of its members support the issue or not? Could such circumstances, for example, explain the position the Republican Party found itself in when it switched its positions on balanced budgets and tax cuts?

Another interesting implication of Karol's work might be explained by Grynaviski's work. Karol argues that parties change issue positions primarily to maintain or expand their party coalition, but the survey data he relies on for evidence does not show a strong correlation between issue-position change and voter support. Grynaviski's empirical work shows that age influences a party voter's ability to adopt and support new party positions. The longer voters have been part of a political party, the less willing they are to accept a newly stated party position. Newer party members, however, who do not know the history of their party, are able to adapt more quickly. Thus, Karol's finding that party members were less supportive of their party's new position on abortion might be explained by Grynaviski's work on age and party ideological coherence.

Partisan Bonds begins with theoretical models concerning why lawmakers prefer being affiliated with a party to being unaffiliated, and why voters prefer two ideologically cohesive parties that are different from each other to parties that are not so clearly defined. In fact, Grynaviski makes a somewhat controversial argument by claiming that most lawmakers are not successful promoting a "personal" brand because most voters have too little information about incumbents; therefore, they rely on their identification with their party's brand in their efforts to be elected to the House. In the early chapters of the book, this argument is perhaps too strongly stated. While the formal model and empirical support is clear and well presented, the argument is somewhat limited and fails to take into account many cases in which such logic would not fit. For example, moderate Democrats are sometimes elected in conservative districts. Also, television ads, yard signs, and campaign mailers frequently stress the individual candidate's qualities and positions, rather than those of the national party.

In Chapter 6, however, Grynaviski thoughtfully addresses this concern. In "Brand Names and Party Strategy," he explores the tension between creating a coherent national party brand that comes close to meeting the expectations of a responsible party system and a decentralized party system in which candidates can craft their own electoral strategy and promote their own personal brand. It is in this chapter that the author makes his most important scholarly contribution, capturing the complex and competing set of expectations that influences the US political system. Combined with the early chapters, it helps to illuminate the fundamental tensions at work within the political system: Parties are pulled to develop a coherent national brand but are simultaneously prevented from fully realizing this goal.

Do these two books provide us with a better understanding of the American political system? From Grynaviski we learn that party elites have a strong incentive to create a well-regarded national brand name, and from Karol we learn that these same lawmakers sometimes find it is in their own best interest to alter their brand in order to better position themselves within the market. So the answer is that yes, both books increase our understanding of the role that political parties play in our democracy.

Foreclosed: High-Risk Lending, Deregulation and the Undermining of America's Mortgage Market. By Dan Immergluck. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2009. 264p. \$29.95.

Subprime Nation: American Power, Global Capital, and the Housing Bubble. By Herman M. Schwartz. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2009. 280p. \$65.00 cloth, \$24.95 paper. doi:10.1017/S1537592711000181

— Alan White, *Valparaiso University School of Law*

The failure of the US Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission to produce a consensus report exposed the profound and unresolved ideological dispute over narratives of the subprime mortgage crisis that began in 2007. Even naming this world event the “subprime mortgage crisis” is contested. Herman Schwartz and Daniel Immergluck offer two contrasting but complementary and valuable reference works on the recent bubble and blowup of our housing finance system.

Immergluck's meticulous survey retraces the history of our mixed public/private housing finance system. He argues that while the system was broadly successful in democratizing homeownership, it was flawed by racial exclusion and redlining. Before that problem could be solved, a parallel private high-risk finance system emerged from the deregulation of the 1980s, which produced the destructive boom and bust we have recently experienced. *Foreclosed* will serve as an essential sourcebook on the causes and effects of the subprime crisis.

Immergluck begins his history of the US home finance system in the nineteenth century with the emergence and growth of building and loan societies, followed by the entry of insurance companies and commercial banks into home lending. While the federal government began promoting homeownership in the early twentieth century, the real origins of the federal role in housing finance are to be found in the New Deal. The 1930s saw the creation of the Federal Home Loan Bank (FHLB) system, the Federal Housing Administration (FHA), the Home Owners Loan Corporation, and the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae). Those in turn brought us securitization, the thirty-year fixed-rate amortizing loan and mortgage insurance, all products of “a persistent role for government as an innovator, an investor, and a regulator” (p. 17).

The central role of government in the postwar home finance system consisted of two funding circuits: the savings and loans supported by the FHLB, and nondepository mortgage companies making FHA-insured loans and selling them to commercial banks, insurance companies, and Fannie Mae. Thus, prior to the 1980s, the federal government served as regulator, funder, and insurer, at least in part, of both funding circuits.

After detailing the history of the home finance system, Immergluck then turns to the intersection of race and mortgages. Here, in one of his more important contributions, he disentangles the struggles to end racial discrimination in home lending and promote community reinvestment (1970s and 1980s) from the emergence of high-risk subprime lending in the mid-1990s. While these two story arcs often find themselves conflated in crisis narratives that misleadingly equate efforts to promote inclusive home lending with the explosion of unsustainable subprime and alt-A mortgages, Immergluck convincingly debunks this conflation.

He then recounts the emergence and evolution of high-cost subprime lending, beginning with the first subprime refinance boom from 1992 to 1999, followed by the 2002–2007 boom in subprime purchase and equity extraction loans. The collapse of subprime in 2007 is attributed to various market failures, conflicts of interest, and a global capital push, i.e., a glut of savings from Asian economies and oil exporters in search of safe and profitable investments, the latter being the central subject of Schwartz's study. Following this discussion, Immergluck takes on the important and neglected task of assessing the economic and human costs of the foreclosure crisis, the second important contribution of this work. The two concluding chapters catalog the missed opportunities for various regulators to have prevented the crisis, and the author's recommendations for future policy aimed at preventing a recurrence while pursuing the goal of a fair and accessible housing finance system.

Both Schwartz and Immergluck see the subprime crisis as supply driven, in the sense that a glut of capital (identified by Schwartz as the export surpluses of other nations) was continually chasing safe and profitable investments, and found them in US mortgage-backed securities. While Immergluck's attention is focused on government investment, regulation, and subsidy, Schwartz's brief is to link the subprime bubble to its role in funneling world capital to American consumers and sustaining US world economic power.

Despite the title, *Subprime Nation's* primary inquiry is international. It centers around the paradox that US economic growth from 1990 to 2007 outpaced Europe and Japan while trade deficits mounted, but without constraining US growth or access to capital markets. The mortgage market became a transmission belt in the global economy, helping to recycle our trade deficits and sustain consumption-driven economic growth that consistently beat out our