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Capitalism, Jacobinism and International Relations: Re-interpreting the Ottoman path to modernity

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Abstract

Debates over 'modernity' have been central to the development of historical-sociological approaches to International Relations (IR). Within the bourgeoning subfield of International Historical Sociology (IHS), much work has been done to formulate a historically dynamic conception of international relations, which is then used to undermine unilinear conceptions of global modernity. Nevertheless, this article argues that IHS has not proceeded far enough in successfully remedying the problem of unilinearism. The problem remains that historical narratives, informed by IHS, tend to transhistoricise capitalism, which, in turn, obscures the generative nature of international relations, as well as the fundamental heterogeneity of diverging paths to modernity both within and beyond western Europe. Based on the theory of Uneven and Combined Development, Political Marxism, and Robbie Shilliam's discussion of 'Jacobinism', this article first reinterprets the radical multilinearity of modernity within western Europe, and then utilises this reinterpretation to provide a new reading of the Ottoman path to modernity (1839–1918). Such a historical critique and reconstruction will highlight the significance of Jacobinism for a more accurate theorisation of the origin and development of the modern international order, hence contributing to a deeper understanding of the international relations of modernity.

Keywords

International Relations Theory; Modernity; International System; Historical Sociology; Uneven and Combined Development; Marxism; Capitalism; Jacobinism; The Ottoman Empire

The last three decades have witnessed several attempts to advance historical sociology as a critical approach to International Relations (HSIR). Through a sustained engagement with historical sociology, HSIR scholars have not only developed a deeper understanding of the socio-temporally changing character of international processes, thereby going beyond the 'timeless' and 'static' logic of 'anarchy', but have also asserted the relevance of international relations for processes conventionally explained through internal sociological factors such as nationalism, industrialisation, revolution, and democratisation.[1] As such, HSIR has provided new insights into the co-constitution of the social and

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[1] Alexander Anievas and Kerem Nisancioglu, *How The West Came to Rule: The Geopolitical Origins of Capitalism* (London: Pluto, 2015); Gurminder Bhambra, 'Historical sociology, international relations and connected histories', *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 23:1 (2010), pp. 127–43; Frédérick Guillaume Dufour, 'Social-property regimes and the uneven and combined development of nationalist practices', *European Journal of International Relations*, 13:4 (2007), pp. 583–604; Jeremy Green, 'Uneven and combined development and the Anglo-German prelude to World War I', *European Journal of International Relations*, 18:2 (2012), pp. 345–68; Fred Halliday, *Revolution in World Politics* (London: Macmillan, 1999); Steve Hobden and John M. Hobson (eds), *Historical Sociology of International Relations* (Cambridge:

the international, which other critical approaches to IR that are underpinned by a strongly subjectivist epistemology are not able to deliver.[2] Indeed, over the past decade, a new subfield, 'International Historical Sociology' (IHS), has developed as part of such an endeavour to systematically theorise and historicise the social aspect of the international and the international aspect of the social.[3] IHS seeks to formulate a 'unitary' theory of sociology and IR, and as such, it intervenes to both disciplines, contributing to the formation of a 'common denominator for research in both'.[4]

IHS has drawn upon a variety of theoretical schools and contributed to a variety of debates.[5] Despite the theoretical and thematic diversity, however, two recurrent methodological concerns that have guided the IHS scholars in general are the critique of what may be called *methodological presentism* and *methodological internalism*. The former relates to the awareness that much social and international theory is pervaded by a mode of explanation that naturalises and extrapolates back in time the structure and logic of the present international order. The critique of presentism is, in turn, firmly connected to the critique of 'methodological internalism'. For, by assuming the existence of autonomously and endogenously developing societies in history, 'internalist' models of development read back in time the hierarchies that constitute the present international system as well as perpetuate the false image of bounded societies.[6] And indeed it is this combined critique of presentism and internalism that has put IHS in the centre of attempts to overcome stagist, unilinear, and Eurocentric readings of world history. A variety of 'internationalist' readings consequently emerged, emphasising the multi-linear and spatio-temporally interactive character of world historical development.[7]

Given the resurgence of interest in historical sociology, it is no surprise that HSIR/IHS scholars have also become increasingly enmeshed with the question of 'modernity'. The ambiguity of the concept

Cambridge University Press, 2002); Hannes Lacher, *Beyond Globalization: Capitalism, Territoriality and the International Relations of Modernity* (London: Routledge, 2006); Kamran Matin, *Recasting Iranian Modernity: International Relations and Social Change* (London: Routledge, 2013); George Lawson, *Negotiated Revolutions* (London: Routledge, 2004); Adam David Morton, *Unravelling Gramsci: Hegemony and Passive Revolution in the Global Political Economy* (London: Pluto Press, 2007); Justin Rosenberg, *The Empire of Civil Society: A Critique of the Realist Theory of International Relations* (London: Verso, 1994); Benno Teschke, *The Myth of 1648: Class, Geopolitics, and the Making of Modern International Relations* (London: Verso, 2003); Ayse Zarakol, *After Defeat: How the East Learned to Live with the West* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011); Sam Knafo, *The Making of Modern Finance: Liberal Governance and the Gold Standard* (Abington: Routledge, 2013); Hannes Lacher and Julian Germann, 'Before hegemony: Britain, free trade, and nineteenth-century world order revisited', *International Studies Review*, 14:1 (2012), pp. 99–124.

[2] For example: Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

[3] Justin Rosenberg, 'Why is there no International Historical Sociology?', *European Journal of International Relations*, 12:3 (2006), pp. 307–40.

[4] John Hobson, George Lawson, and Justin Rosenberg, 'Historical sociology', *LSE Research Online* (2010), p. 4, available at: {www.eprints.lse.ac.uk/28016/1/Historical_sociology(LSERO.pdf} accessed 1 February 2016.

[5] Ibid.

[6] John M. Hobson, 'What's at stake in "bringing historical sociology back" into International Relations?', in Stephen Hobden and John M. Hobson (eds), *Historical Sociology of International Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2002), pp. 3–41; Justin Rosenberg, 'The "philosophical premises" of uneven and combined development', *Review of International Studies*, 39:3 (2013), pp. 569–97.

[7] Anievas and Nisancioglu, *How The West Came to Rule*; Matin, *Recasting Iranian Modernity*; Barry Buzan and George Lawson, *The Global Transformation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015); Cemal Burak Tansel, 'Defeaning silence?: Marxism, International Historical Sociology and the spectre of Eurocentrism', *European Journal of International Relations*, 21:1 (2015), pp. 76–100.

of modernity is an open secret.[8] Whatever is meant by 'modernity' and whether one chooses to emphasise the 'bright' or 'dark' side of it, IHS scholars have usually used modernity as a blanket concept to refer to an interrelated bundle of historical innovations and transformations emblematic of the transition to the 'modern' world, such as the emergence of exclusive territoriality, citizenship, nationalism, private property, and capitalism.[9] The emphasis on the 'transition to modernity', in turn, has enabled sociologically-informed analyses of IR to uncover the historicity of the modern international system, territoriality and sovereignty, thereby providing alternative explanations to the making of the modern world. For example, given the historical specificity of modernity, the roots and legacies of the modern international order have been reinterpreted, which has resulted in a number of competing narratives on the origin of the modern international order.[10] Equally important, the co-constitution of the modern and the colonial has been powerfully revealed, which has led to new ways of thinking about the problem of 'geo-cultural difference' and 'Western superiority'.[11] Likewise, IHS, seeking to undermine presentist and internalist readings of 'modernisation', has focused on the geo-temporally changing conditions of being modern; and by doing so, it has provided novel perspectives on how to make sense of 'multiple modernities', that is, how to interpret the internationally related, yet sociologically differentiated paths to modernisation.[12]

Thus, probing the question of the *international* via 'modernity' (and vice versa) has been central to historical sociological approaches to IR.[13] In this article, I critically reconsider IHS's capacity to acknowledge, explore, and theorise inter-spatial differences and interconnections in the transition to the modern world. More specifically, I evaluate to what extent IHS has succeeded in realising the task it has set out for itself, namely overcoming unilinear conceptions of modernity on the basis of a non-presentist and non-internalist theorisation of IR. I argue that most proponents of IHS, while successfully revealing the international origins of the modern present, thereby overcoming methodological internalism, fail to advance an effective critique of methodological presentism. This failure stems from the persistence of modes of explanation in IHS that read back the logic and dynamics of the present economic order, that is to say, capitalism. IHS transhistoricises and universalises capitalism, and by doing so, it obscures the generative nature of international relations as well as the heterogeneity of diverging paths to modernity in and beyond Europe.

The argument proceeds as follows. I elaborate in the first section the question of modernity in IHS and critically evaluate the ways in which IHS scholars have approached the question of geo-historical interconnection and multiplicity. The theoretical and methodological points raised in this section are

[8] Christopher Prendergast, 'Codeword modernity', *New Left Review*, 24 (2003), pp. 95–111.

[9] Barry Buzan and George Lawson, 'Capitalism and the emergent world order', *International Affairs*, 90:1 (2014), p. 71; Matin, *Recasting Iranian Modernity*, p. 22. In this article, I will use 'modernity' in a similar way, yet I will also try to concretise it by historicising and problematising its relation to capitalism.

[10] John Gerard Ruggie, 'Territoriality and beyond', *International Organization*, 47:1 (1993), pp. 139–74; Rosenberg, *The Empire of Civil Society*; Teschke, *The Myth of 1648*; Lacher, *Beyond Globalization*.

[11] John M. Hobson, *The Eastern Origins of Western Civilisation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); Naem Inayatullah and David Blaney, *International Relations and the Problem of Difference* (New York: Routledge 2004); Robbie Shilliam, 'The Atlantic as a vector of uneven and combined development', *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 22:1 (2009), pp. 69–88.

[12] Buzan and Lawson, *The Global Transformation*; Matin, *Recasting Iranian Modernity*; Robbie Shilliam, *German Thought and International Relations: The Rise and Fall of a Liberal Project* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009).

[13] Robbie Shilliam, 'Modernity and modernization', in Robert Denemark (ed.), *The International Studies Encyclopedia: Volume VIII* (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), pp. 5214–232.

used in Section II to disturb internalist and presentist readings of 'western European modernity'. I argue that once we combine the critique of internalism with an adequate critique of presentism, modernity, as understood by a majority of internationalist historical sociologists, collapses and is replaced by a narrative that reveals the interactive emergence and development of *qualitatively* different modernities within and outside western Europe. Central to my discussion is Robbie Shilliam's analysis of 'Jacobinism' as a 'substitute' route to modernity, that is, a 'substitution' that generated novel social forms in contestation with and alternative to those engendered by capitalism. Recognising the historical specificity of Jacobinism not only provides a valuable entry point into the radical heterogeneity of 'western European' modernity, but also informs my analysis of the Ottoman path to modernity (Sections III–V). For once we recognise the irreducibility of European modernity to a pan-European conception of 'market civilisation', Ottoman modernisation efforts appear in a totally new light. I contend that Ottoman modernisation did not follow a single project of 'Westernisation', but rather that Ottoman elites selectively appropriated, oscillated between, and recombined with local social resources two inherently contradictory development strategies: capitalism and Jacobinism. Overtime, however, the reactions from 'below' and interventions from 'outside' increasingly forced the Ottoman state to consolidate the Jacobin model at the expense of market society. The cumulative result of the Ottoman experiment with modernity (1839–1918), therefore, was not a 'backward' or 'peripheral' capitalism as often assumed, but a historically specific Jacobinism that bypassed capitalism (and socialism) based on an alternative form of property and sociality. Building from the conclusions of this historical inquiry, this article expounds the potential of Jacobinism as a remedy for the one-dimensional narratives of transitions to modernity. It suggests that Jacobinism enhances our understanding of the origin and development of the modern international order, shedding new light on the co-constitution of modernity and international relations.

'Modernity' in International Historical Sociology: Explaining difference and interconnection in world history

Much effort has been expended in the social sciences to overcome unilinear conceptions of world history. Two approaches are especially noteworthy: 'multiple modernities' and 'post-colonialism'.[14] According to the 'multiple modernities' paradigm, modernisation has been 'shaped in each society by the combined impact of their respective historical traditions and the different ways in which they became incorporated into the new modern world system'.[15] In other words, different historical and international legacies have engendered distinct forms of modernity, hence the inherent plurality of modernisation experiences and the inapplicability of Western modernity as a world-historical yardstick. In a similar vein, postcolonial theory (particularly its 'subaltern' variants that take Marxism as one of their primary interlocutors) rejects 'any universalist narratives of capital' by positing the contested and heterogeneous formation of global capitalist institutions and practices as constitutive of colonial modernity. By registering the spatio-temporally differentiated nature of capitalist social relations, postcolonial theory invokes 'difference' and 'interconnectedness' as ontological conditions, thereby conceptualising capitalist modernity away from cultural particularism and homogenising universalism.[16]

[14] cf. Matin, *Recasting Iranian Modernity*, p. 2.
[15] Samuel Eisenstadt, 'Multiple modernities', *Daedalus*, 129 (2000), p. 15.
[16] Dipesh Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008), pp. 9–21, 70, 85.

In approaching the question of historical difference, both the 'multiple modernities' paradigm and postcolonial theory repudiate developmental linearism, acknowledging the contested and spatially interactive experience of global modernity. In this respect, both approaches share many affinities with HSIR/IHS. Yet two important differences remain. First, HSIR/IHS claims to more systematically and comprehensively engaging with the question of the 'international'. That is, although these approaches are underscored by an internationalist critique, their proponents have not offered an alternative general theoretical framework for investigating international connections and differences.[17] Second, while existing approaches tend to take 'European modernity' at face value, HSIR/IHS problematises it. For example, Alexander Anievas and Kerem Nisancioglu argue that postcolonial theory suffers from 'lack of any substantive engagement with the question of how capitalism emerged and developed in Europe', which, in turn, limits our ability to provide a non-Eurocentric and truly multilinear history of modernity. They insist that 'in order to truly "provincialise" Europe we must dissect European history itself, and there is no more central myth to be dissected than that of narrating European history around the history of capitalism'.[18] This echoes Sandra Halperin's warning that without deconstructing 'fictitious views of Europe's development and history' a mere emphasis on multiplicity and hybridity falls short in overcoming unilinear conceptions of historical development.[19] Likewise, Kamran Matin writes that postcolonial theory successfully reveals the differentiated, hybrid, and ambivalent character of colonial modernity, yet it 'does not account for, or even address, the initial crystallization of … capital in Europe', thereby failing to explain the heterogeneous constitution of the origins of capitalism.[20]

In short, theorisation of a truly internationalist and historically-sensitive account of global modernity is firmly connected to our ability to undermine 'the myth of European modernity'. No doubt, one of the most sophisticated attempts in IHS seeking to challenge the presumed 'pristine-ness' of European modernity is the work of Anievas and Nisancioglu.[21] Anievas and Nisancioglu use the theory of 'uneven and combined development' (UCD) to reconceptualise the origins and development of capitalist modernity in western Europe. The theory of UCD emphasises the plurality and heterogeneity of world historical development through a dynamic conceptualisation of the 'international'. This theoretical framework is predicated on the idea that intersocietal 'unevenness', which is inherent in the condition of societal multiplicity, leads to a continuous process of intersocietal 'combination'. That is, pressures generated by intersocietal 'unevenness' compel 'less developed' societies to learn from and 'combine' with local social resources the best aspects of more 'advanced' societies. As a result, less developed societies, if not become extinct, selectively imitate and possibly surpass more developed societies that are constrained by existing social structures. All this ultimately results in the emergence of an infinite number of 'combinations' of the 'domestic' and the 'foreign', which, in turn, reacts back on the 'international', leading to the transformation of the initial conditions of unevenness. At a conceptual level, then, recovering the uneven and combined character of world historical development accomplishes two things. First, it systematically integrates the 'international' into the explanation of the social (and vice versa), thereby defying internalist conceptions of social change. Second, it activates a historically and sociologically dynamic

[17] Buzan, *The Global Transformation*, pp. 59–60, 330; Matin, *Recasting Iranian Modernity*, p. 2; Anievas and Nisancioglu, *How The West Came to Rule*, pp. 39–42.
[18] Anievas and Nisancioglu, *How The West Came to Rule*, p. 40.
[19] Sandra Halperin, 'International Relations theory and the hegemony of Western conceptions of hegemony', in B. G. Jones (ed.), *Decolonizing International Relations* (Rowman Littlefield: Plymouth, 2006), p. 60.
[20] Matin, 'Redeeming the universal: Postcolonialism and the inner life of Eurocentrism', *European Journal of International Relations*, 19:2 (2013), p. 364.
[21] Anievas and Nisancioglu, *How The West Came to Rule*.

conception of the 'international', which, by definition, enables a multilinear narrative of the transition to modernity. For, by stressing the historically accumulating and sociologically amalgamated character of international relations, UCD uncovers the changing rules of entering modernity, thereby countering one-dimensional and unilinear conceptions of the origin and development of the modern world order.

Anievas and Nisancioglu seeks to fulfil UCD's promise for multilinearity in the context of western European history. The authors pursue a two-tiered explanatory strategy to dismantle 'any kind of "stylized and abstracted" conceptions of western European development'.[22] First, they show how non-Western societies/powers acted as '*preconditions*' and '*determinations*' of the rise capitalism in western Europe from the very outset, that is, how they commercially/technologically/demographically 'contributed' to or geopolitically 'conditioned' the emergence of capitalism in western Europe.[23] For example, the thirteenth-century Mongolian expansion and the resultant unification of the Eurasian landmass under Mongol rule revitalised intercontinental commercial linkages and urban sites. Equally important, the Mongols caused the transmission of 'diseases' from the East to the West, which led to the demographic collapse of western European populations (the 'Black Death'). All this, in turn, engendered, however unwittingly, a new balance of class forces and socio-institutional innovations that would facilitate the end of feudalism and the emergence of capitalist modernity in western Europe.[24] From this angle, the so-called European 'miracle' was not 'European' per se, but the 'combined' outcome of the interaction and 'contribution' of multiple and 'unevenly' developed societies. Second, they argue that any explanation of the consolidation of capitalism in western Europe, just as its origins, has to move beyond the 'internalist' conceptions of capitalist development. For, neither in western Europe nor elsewhere has there ever existed 'any pure or normal model of development'.[25] For example, contrary to the conventional interpretation, in Revolutionary France there was neither a 'revolutionary' bourgeoisie executing its historical 'mission' nor a clear-cut ascendant capitalism. Instead, what produced and what was produced by the French revolution was a 'combined' form. The Revolution marked and was marked by the subterraneous and contradictory development of capitalist social relations inside and propelled by geopolitical struggles from outside, which explains the relative weakness of capitalist agency during the Revolution and the protracted unleashing of capitalist social relations in the post-revolutionary period.[26]

By questioning the 'internalist' conceptions of European history, Anievas and Nisancioglu have come some way in illuminating the spatial multiplicity involved in the origins and development of European modernity. Nevertheless, in my view, their understanding of 'multiplicity' remains inadequate, for the authors fail to combine the critique of internalism with the second pillar of the original IHS project, the critique of presentism. That is, Anievas and Nisancioglu, in their historical exposition, fail to deliver a non-presentist account of the transition to capitalism. Despite their critique of the approaches that presume capitalism from the very outset, their historical narrative tends to extrapolate back in time the logic and imperatives of the present economic order, that is, capitalism, in order to explain its origins and development. This is partly caused by the stretching of the concept of uneven and combined development. As alluded to earlier, there are some concepts

[22] Ibid., p. 55
[23] Ibid., pp. 52, 67, 72, 94, 117, emphasis added.
[24] Ibid., p. 75.
[25] Ibid., p. 55
[26] Ibid., pp. 199–205.

central to the theory of UCD, such as 'the privilege of backwardness', 'the whip of external necessity', and 'substitution'. Less developed societies, 'under the whip of external necessity', attempt to catch up with more advanced societies by selectively adopting the latter's developmental dynamics. If they survive this process, they can turn their historical backwardness into a 'privilege': they are compelled and enabled to adopt 'whatever is ready in advance of any specified date, skipping a whole series of intermediate stages'.[27] Less developed societies mobilise existing institutions to execute novel tasks, and through this process of 'substitution', they attempt to make up for the institutions and relations that, while available to the geopolitical enemy, are missing at home. Substitution (and combined development) thus points to a process in which *a geopolitical enemy becomes a teacher*, showing the kinds of transformations that would facilitate a 'catch-up'.[28] The point is that if UCD is, at least partly, about the transformation of a geopolitical 'foe' into a 'mentor', intersocietal comparison and intersocietal learning constitute the analytical core of 'combined development'. 'Combined development', therefore, is not about international interactivity per se, but possesses an international aspect in so far as it is prompted by the act of intersocietal comparison and intersocietal learning.[29]

UCD, as such, provides a plausible theoretical framework to expound the emergence of substitution projects in competition with capitalism (such as socialism) as well as the (geo)politically driven and sociologically differentiated *expansion* of capitalist social relations. Yet, a serious problem arises when UCD is applied to explain capitalism's *birth*. For, if UCD, by definition, entails a process of intersocietal comparison, learning, and substitution, UCD's application to the question of capitalism's origins presupposes an intentional process of learning, contributing to, and/or inventing capitalism, which, in turn, lets the spectre of transhistoricism back in Anievas's and Nisancioglu's narrative. That is, the theory of UCD presupposes that over time different societies either gradually learned, reshaped, passed on to each other different ingredients (be it demographic, commercial, or geopolitical) necessary for the final emergence of capitalism, or in the course of combining pre-existing and foreign modes of life 'invented' capitalism as a substitute for competing forms of societal organisation, say absolutist or tributary systems. Either way, UCD introduces an overdose of intentionality and transhistoricism to the analysis of capitalism's origins.[30] For example, only through this implicit tranhistoricism, that is, only one assumes a necessary and transhistorical connection between commercial, demographic, and technological factors on the one hand, and capitalism on the other, can Anievas and Nisancioglu deem the incremental, cross-civilisational, and long-range accumulation of these factors as 'contributions' to, 'determinants' of, and 'preconditions' for the birth of capitalism.

What is overlooked by Anievas and Nisancioglu is that capitalism's birth was too unnatural a break in human history to be understood as a learned or invented combination. Capitalism was fundamentally different from past forms of societal organisation; it could not emerge as a result of a mere modification of pre-existent socioeconomic patterns, nor could it be simply invented as a substitute project of rationalisation. Whereas in all non-capitalist societies, whether hierarchically or communally organised, social reproduction was a direct derivation of the relations of dependence

[27] Leon Trotsky, quoted in Matin, *Recasting Iranian Modernity*, p. 18.
[28] See, for example, Matin, *Recasting Iranian Modernity*, p. 19; Anievas and Nisancioglu, *How The West Came to Rule*, p. 50.
[29] Hannes Lacher, 'Polanyian Perspectives on Global History' (unpublished paper, presented at Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology, Halle, Germany, 2015); see also Shilliam, *German Thought and International Relations*, p. 18.
[30] Lacher, 'Polanyian Perspectives on Global History'.

constitutive of the community, capitalism completely broke 'the natural unity of labor with its material presuppositions',[31] that is, it separated human existence from its previous communal/political functions, subjecting social reproduction to a (seemingly) autonomous market mechanism of supply and demand of 'things'. In a 'market society', as distinct from 'societies with markets', social relations are 'embedded' in the market, rather than, as has been the case in a multiplicity of ways for millennia, the market embedded in social relations.[32] In short, capitalism was a fundamentally unanticipated system in human history, whose origins cannot be understood as a cumulative, learned, or invented phenomenon (more on this below). Anievas and Nisancioglu, applying UCD to the question of the origins of capitalism, tend to obscure the unprecedentedness of this qualitative rupture, and by doing so, they risk the transhistoricisation of capitalism. Although they claim to depart from the presentist explanations of capitalism's emergence,[33] Anievas and Nisancioglu's theoretical framework is thus non-congruent with a non-presentist reading of the origins of capitalism.

Unsurprisingly, once capitalism is transhistoricised, a problematic understanding of causality prevails, which runs the risk of turning every past event into a necessary 'precondition' for the rise of capitalism. In other words, presentism, built into this mode of explanation, leads to trans historicisation and 'everything-isation' of the preconditions of capitalism's emergence. If we follow Anievas and Nisancioglu in the literal sense, for example, one wonders if, say, climatic conditions and overgrazing in Central Asia, two factors often said to have spurred Mongol conquests, could also be considered a 'precondition' for the rise of capitalism in western Europe. Surely, this would be a strange argument, yet it is still not clear whether such an argument would necessarily be in conflict with the kind of causality advanced by Anievas and Nisancioglu.

Equally important, in an analytical framework that reads capitalism back in history, Anievas and Nisancioglu, contrary to their self-proclaimed anti-unilinear conception of world history, are able to concede heterogeneity within western Europe only within an all-absorbing conception of capitalism. As such, the authors overlook that even in western Europe 'combined' development can not be reduced to 'capitalist development'. For example, irrespective of the continuing historiographical debate as to whether the French Revolution facilitated the development of capitalism, it is certain that the Revolution also gave birth to novel social forms that were absent in capitalist Britain and that cannot be explained by the dictation of any capitalist rationality, such as the consolidation of small scale peasant-ownership, universal conscription, universal citizenship, and universal equality.[34] Even in western Europe, therefore, alternative social forms were created under geopolitical duress, which, alone or alongside capitalism, attempted to rationalise existing modes of rule and appropriation in historically novel ways.[35] By uncritically equating 'western European modernity' to 'capitalist modernity', Anievas and Nisancioglu eventually obscure spatially interactive and contested nature of modernity, assimilating the emergence of 'multiple modernities' within Europe into an overarching account of the varieties of capitalism.[36]

[31] Karl Marx, *Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy* (London: Penguin, 1993), p. 471.
[32] Karl Polanyi, *The Great Transformation* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1957).
[33] Anievas and Nisancioglu, *How The West Came to Rule*, pp. 224, 249.
[34] Theda Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia and China* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), p. 179
[35] Shilliam, *German Thought and International Relations*, ch. 2.
[36] cf. Shilliam, *German Thought and International Relations*, p. 201; Robbie Shilliam, 'Jacobinism', in Alison J. Ayers (ed.), *Gramsci, Political Economy, and International Relations Theory: Modern Princes and Naked Emperors* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2008), p. 197.

Thus, spatial differences and interconnection involved in the constitution of global modernity must be conceptualised without presuming the necessary arrival of capitalism in the West as well as in the non-West. We need to be able to historicise and internationalise multiple modernities without falling back into presentist conceptualisations of social transformation. International Historical Sociology in general, and the theory of uneven and combined development in particular, can account for the diachronic, mutually conditioning and 'combined' processes of modernisation only if the presentism of its proponents is checked and rehabilitated. Indeed, once we do this, as I will show in the next section, IHS ceases to see multiple modernities as differentiated moments of subterraneously developing capitalisms, but as the multiplicity of attempts at emulating, selectively adapting, or completely 'substituting' capitalism.[37]

The merits and limits of Political Marxism: Jacobinism as a 'substitute' for capitalism

Critical to the reinterpretation of modernity offered here is a definition of capitalism that avoids circular explanations of capitalism's origins and captures the internationally-interactive and historically-changing conditions of the transition to capitalism. In other words, what is needed is a conception of capitalism that is both historically-specific and historically-dynamic. In this respect, Political Marxism (PM) can provide us with some assistance. According to PM, the transition to capitalism cannot be explained through the mere existence of commerce, wage labour, or private property; not only because all these phenomena can be dated back to ancient societies, but also because they are far too general, telling us little about the 'relational' content and societal context of productive activity. Of course, capitalism increases the volume of production, commerce, and the size of a commodifiable workforce, yet, from a political Marxist angle, taking these as necessary and transhistorical indicators of the beginning of capitalism would simply collapse capitalism's consequences into its causes.[38] In this regard, according to PM, the transitions to capitalism cannot be understood as the quantitative extension of any 'economic' phenomena, but are best understood in terms of socially- and temporally-varying ways of organising human relations and the institutions that produce the historically specific impact of 'market dependence'.[39] Put differently, the transitions to capitalism did not follow a universal pattern, but all transitions, in principle, presuppose a strategic political intervention into the conditions of access to land and the elimination of non-market survival strategies.[40]

By focusing on the political/legal/institutional moment of the origin of capitalism, PM diverts our attention from transhistorical phenomena usually considered as 'preconditions' to the birth of capitalism such as commerce, wealth, or wage-labour. It argues that only when people are enabled/compelled to depend on the market for their means of subsistence, wealth begins to invade the

[37] Shilliam, *German Thought and International Relations*; Matin, *Recasting Iranian Modernity*; Lacher, 'Polanyian Perspectives on Global History'.

[38] Ellen Meiksins Wood, *The Origin of Capitalism* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1999), pp. 176–7.

[39] Ellen Meiksins Wood, 'The question of market dependence', *Journal of Agrarian Change*, 2:1 (2002), pp. 50–87.

[40] Robert Brenner, 'Agrarian class structures and economic development', in T. Aston and C. H. E. Philpin (eds), *The Brenner Debate* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1985a), p. 20. This is not to deny that states under capitalism continue to intervene into markets and implement policies to 'protect' their subjects as well as capital from the disruptive effects of markets, yet it should be kept in mind that even the most interventionist regimes do not aim 'the complete eradication of labor as a commodity' (Esping-Anderson, quoted in Lacher, *Beyond Globalization,* p. 143).

productive process and *systematically* alter the conditions of production. Only when social existence is legally/institutionally subjected to competitive reproduction, people are *systematically* forced and enabled to increase 'the ratio of unpaid labor to paid' and to shape the space and scale of production according to nothing else, but the requirements of profitability and competitiveness. As such, capitalism as market-dependence decisively departs from a 'continuist' (evolutionary) interpretation to a 'discontinuist' one, that is, from a transhistorically cumulating capitalism towards a historically-specific conception of capitalism as a qualitative break in human history founded upon a previously inexperienced mode of organising human relations and social power.

What is more, PM emphasises the 'international' of the transition to capitalism, thereby able to accommodate the socio-temporally changing and internationally-determined conditions of capitalist transitions. That is, PM insists that there can be no 'transhistorical laws' governing the path to capitalism, because of the changing intersocietal context of capitalist transformation as well as the variations in social reactions from 'below'. For 'once breakthroughs to ongoing capitalist economic development took place in various regions these irrevocably transformed the conditions and the character of the analogous processes, which were to occur subsequently elsewhere'.[41] Thus, by recognising the cumulatively changing character of international relations, PM defies transhistorical interpretations of 'market dependence'. This implies that while market dependence signifies the minimum socio-legal prerequisites to the existence of capitalist social relations, its focus cannot be on any static phenomena/policy. Depending on past socio-institutional legacies and the timing and international context of capitalist transition, the mechanisms that ensure market dependence take different forms. The socio-institutional content of market dependence is not fixed, but cumulatively changes. As a consequence, PM neither sets up pregiven norms for the transition to capitalism, nor does it treat subsequent transitions as counter models to privileged ideal types.

All this hints at PM's potential to incorporate the international into the explanation of the social. That said, however, it is important to note that even if the international dimension of social transformation is present in Brenner and Wood's work, neither Wood nor Brenner were IR scholars, therefore they did not address the question of the 'international' in a systematic way that would fulfill IR's own disciplinary considerations. In other words, they both remained 'comparativists', for whom the question of 'difference' was more important than the question of 'interconnection'. Indeed, this has been the lacuna that Political Marxists who work in the field of International Relations have acknowledged and sought to fill.[42] PM in IR has moved beyond Brenner's and Wood's 'comparativist' focus by highlighting the constitutive impact of the 'international' on the processes of early modern state formation. Benno Teschke, for example, argues that PM in IR needs to move beyond the comparative approach by 'combining the theory of social-property relations with the theorem of socially uneven and geopolitically combined development'.[43] Phrased differently, PM in IR is reoriented in a way that 'comes to terms with the nationally specific and diachronic, yet cumulatively connected and internationally mediated nature of "capitalist transitions" within the framework of socially uneven and geopolitically combined development'.[44]

[41] Robert Brenner, 'The agrarian roots of European capitalism', in Aston and Philpin (eds), *The Brenner Debate*, p. 322. See also Robert Brenner, 'The social bases of economic development', in John Roemer (ed.), *Analytical Marxism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), p. 29.
[42] Teschke, *The Myth of 1648*; Lacher, *Beyond Globalization*.
[43] Benno Teschke, 'Bourgeois revolution, state formation and the absence of the international', *Historical Materialism*, 13:2 (2005), p. 21.
[44] Ibid., p. 13.

Of course, this disciplinary reorientation via uneven and combined development intends to clarify PM's relevance for IR. Yet, the opposite is also true. For, Teschke's endeavour to re-read PM through the international is based on the precondition that the international or UCD itself is sterilised from teleological assumptions about capitalist development.[45]

From this brief exposition can be derived an important conclusion. That is, the common critique that PM suffers from methodological 'internalism' is of the mark.[46] The difference between PM and some other approaches to IHS[47] rests not so much in PM's 'internalism' but in the way PM operationalises the 'international'. PM uses the 'international' (and uneven and combined development) in a way that does not transhistoricise and everything-ise the precursors and preconditions of capitalism. PM, therefore, has a potential to provide an 'internationalist' narrative of multiple modernities that does not presume capitalism from the very outset.

All that said, however, PM's comprehensiveness as a research programme has so far remained limited in one important respect. That is, although PM has forcefully debated what is (not) capitalism, its relevance for the broader debate on the interactive emergence of multiple modernities has remained limited due to PM's lack of systematic engagement with non-capitalist (and non-European) societies. For example, PM's insistence that the French Revolution did not lead to capitalism (irrespective of whether or not this is empirically valid)[48] does not take us far in understanding what the process of post-revolutionary French 'modernisation' was actually about. This represents a considerable lacuna, not only because revolutionary France, regardless of the *overall* socioeconomic outcome of the Revolution, generated forms of rationalisation and mobilisation absent in and alternative to capitalist Britain, but also because the social forms created by the revolution became the model (alone or alongside capitalist England) for subsequent modernisation projects within and outside western Europe.[49] As such, PM can give us a fuller picture of the 'generative' and 'liminal' character of the 'international' only if it moves beyond its traditional focus on the conditions of the transition to capitalism and systematically engages with other contributions to the IHS of multiple modernities.

In this regard, Robbie Shilliam's discussion of French Jacobinism[50] is an important contribution to attempts seeking to further dissect the question of intersocietal interconnection and heterogeneity. According to Shilliam, the 'enclosure' of the English countryside during the early modern period led to the generalisation of the market as the main locus of social reproduction, stripping the peasantry of communal rights/obligations that used to bind them to land. The 'modern individual', unencumbered from 'custom', was rediscliplined on grounds conducive to the 'improvement' of property, which led to exponential increases in labour productivity in English agriculture. Furthermore, as the

[45] Benno Teschke, 'IR theory, historical materialism and the false promise of international historical sociology', *Spectrum: Journal of Global Studies*, 6:1 (2015), pp. 34–6.
[46] See, for example, Matin, *Recasting Iranian Modernity*, p. 53; Anievas and Nisancioglu, *How The West Came to Rule*, p. 14.
[47] See, for example, Anievas and Nisancioglu, *How The West Came to Rule*.
[48] The specific problem of the socioeconomic character of the French Revolution is debated in IR especially among Marxist scholars. For views that (explicitly or otherwise) emphasise the non-capitalist character of the revolution, see Lacher, *Beyond Globalization*; Teschke, *The Myth of 1648*; Shilliam, *German Thought and International Relations*; and Matin, *Recasting Iranian Modernity*. For a contrasting view, see Anievas and Nisancioglu, *How The West Came to Rule*.
[49] Shilliam, *German Thought and International Relations*.
[50] Ibid.

market became the primary institution responsible for social reproduction, property relations in England were no longer necessarily implicated in the relations of political inequality. Property was no longer primarily a source of service, or followers, or royalty, but was turned into a 'thing', totally alienable and with no consideration for mutual obligation or general good. As property was separated from the past networks of sociopolitical relations, property ownership per se, rather than a politically given communal duty, could be considered for a long time as the *only* criterion for citizenship, political equality, and membership in the 'nation'. Indeed, already in the eighteenth century, English rights and freedoms had become the reference point for attempts at reform in pre-revolutionary France. Due to the geopolitical pressures generated by English capitalism, and especially after the humiliating defeat of the Seven Years' War, the rights of the propertied individual secured by British common law and a constitution similar to that of the British was increasingly perceived by the French ruling elite as the key to geopolitical regeneration.[51] Eventually, however, in France it was not capitalist transformation but the Revolution that introduced modern rights into the French social fabric. The revolutionary elite, partly guided by a historically accumulating sense of geopolitical 'backwardness' (especially in relation to Britain) and partly due to the lower-class energies unleashed by the revolution, imported 'modern' rights in the absence of capitalist social relations.[52] In the absence of the relations of market society, the enjoyment of property and equality could not be conditioned on successful commodity production and its productive utilisation. The revolutionary 'Terror', not less violent and radical than the English enclosures, provided a historically-specific solution to this uneasy modus vivendi. The 'Terror' neither expropriated nor slavishly accepted the rights of the propertied individual. Instead, it 'freed' modern rights from those who 'abuse' it and turned them into a political entitlement for those who are socially and geopolitically useful to the 'nation'. The most immediate result of conditioning social reproduction to patriotism was *levée en masse*, that is, mass conscription. That is, the revolutionary elite linked the enjoyment of citizens' right to property and equality to their service in the newly formed 'citizen-army'.[53] By conditioning representation and social reproduction to compulsory military service, France not only substituted the logic of British participation in the public sphere – the propertied citizenship –, but also led to the universalisation and institutionalisation of a set of new extra-market mechanisms of acquiring income and status. Service to the 'nation', rather than successful commodity production, gave access to land and provided the ultimate form of civic participation. In other words, the condition of entrance to civil society and modern economy was universalised and militarised in a way that reinforced the decommodified character of land and labour. Property and representation was extended to an army of peasant proprietors, that is, *citizen-soldiers*, with the condition of protecting the 'nation'.

Shilliam's analysis, therefore, reveals with greater precision the generative potential of geopolitical contestation and interactivity. In particular, he shows that the combination of British and French social forms did not lead to a concentric extension of a more-or-less similar market project, but 'set in motion a specific multi-linear character of modern world development'.[54] The result of this amalgamation, that is, Jacobinism, instituted a set of new rules of social and geopolitical

[51] George Comninel, *Rethinking the French Revolution: Marxism and the Revisionist Challenge* (London: Verso, 1987), p. 107.

[52] See also Matin, *Recasting Iranian Modernity*, pp. 52–4.

[53] In contrast to France, Britain, with its capitalist economy and dispossessed 'surplus' population, could afford to 'buy' soldiers and improve its naval power without creating citizens. 'More fundamental reforms were neither necessary nor desirable' until 1914, see Lars Mjøset and Stephen Van Holde, 'Killing for the state, dying for the nation', in Lars Mjøset and Stephen Van Holde (eds), *The Comparative Study of Conscription in the Armed Forces* (New York: JAI Press, 2002), p. 34.

[54] Shilliam, *German Thought and International Relations*, p. 21.

reproduction that reinforced the decommodified character of land and labour. In other words, Jacobinism did not 'act merely as an appendix to the rights of property' (as was the case with the English poor law).[55] Instead, by linking social reproduction to patriotism, Jacobinism instituted a form of property with totally new sociopolitical embellishments. As such, Jacobinism in France developed as a geo-institutional response to and substitute for the 'market' in Britain. The French invention of the citizen-army was not simply the political/military component of an emergent capitalism; rather, it constituted a regime of political-economy and property relations geopolitically related to, yet radically different from capitalism. Furthermore, the results of the French adaptation of British civil society provided a blueprint for other modernisation projects. For, if the citizen-soldier marked a fundamental transformation in the contours of political life, its collective expression, the 'citizen-army', virtually unstoppable until 1815, demonstrated to the *ancien regimes* the geopolitical viability of an alternative mode of rationalisation that 'did not invoke the idiosyncrasies of British history as a prerequisite'.[56] By revolutionising the social basis of the army (rather than production), the Jacobin model of modernisation 'informed a new comparative standard against which other political authorities would be judged, and judge themselves, as "backward"'.[57] Given its world historical impact, Jacobinism, alongside capitalism, set in train novel social and geopolitical dynamics that deeply influenced the social content and developmental dynamics of the modern international order. In other words, the political-economic landscape in Europe was fundamentally marked by the uneven and combined development of Jacobinism as well as that of capitalism.

Indeed, the economic and geopolitical challenges generated by capitalism and conscript armies compelled most European states to pursue a combined 'capitalist-Jacobin project'. For example, Prussian elites, traumatised by their defeat by the Napoleonic armies (1806), set in train both projects concurrently: they took steps towards commodifying labour and land while invoking popular sovereignty by introducing the citizen-soldier as the new engine of the military machine. However, the long-term result of this mutually conditioning course of development in the Prussian/German context was the gradual subordination of the Jacobin forms to the emerging capitalist market in the course of the nineteenth century.[58] That said, however, it is also true that Jaconibism, even if short-lived and ultimately defeated, was not merely a passive bystander to capitalism. Jacobinism, under certain spatio-temporal and international circumstances, could serve as a substitute for capitalism. In the remainder of this article, I will operationalise this theoretical and historical insight in the context of the late Ottoman Empire. I will identify the precise nature and concrete outcome of the 'combined' character of Ottoman modernisation. I will question whether or not the Ottoman combined project eventually neutralised its own Jacobin aspect, boiling down to merely another form of capitalism. Before I begin to examine the Ottoman modernisation, however, I have to briefly document the historical and geopolitical background of Ottoman centralisation efforts prior to modernisation. This is what I will discuss in the next section.

Between the Ayan and the peasantry: the (geo)politics of Ottoman centralisation attempts

Approaching the nineteenth century, the Ottoman economy was for the most part centred on an empire-wide network of tax farming. The '*timar*' system that marked the 'classical' period of the

[55] Ibid., p. 46.
[56] Ibid., p. 54.
[57] Ibid., p. 55.
[58] Ibid.

Empire (a system of non-hereditary land grants transferred to individuals in exchange for military and administrative service) had long been eroded under the pressure of centralising absolutist powers in Europe, especially Austria and Russia. Faced by territorial losses and chronic monetary shortages, the Ottoman state, from the eighteenth century onwards, began to farm out the lands and fiscal resources formerly absorbed by timar holders. A variety of tax farming contracts (for example, *ciftlik* and *malikane*) were eventually introduced, which, in turn, fundamentally transformed the balance of power between the Ottoman centre and provinces. For, tax-farmers, most of whom were high-ranking military/religious bureaucrats and business elites based in Istanbul, had to systematically empower and rely on provincial notables (*ayans*) for the collection of tax revenues.[59] The ayans not only assumed important administrative/military functions in their own localities but also exercised substantial autonomy, raised military troops, and were involved in commercial agriculture, all which point to a strong tendency throughout the empire towards the reinforcement of centrifugal forces and quasi-privatisation of land (though nominally all ownership of land still lay with the sultan).[60]

Thus, the ayan were both the product and potential enemy of the Ottoman centralisation efforts. Indeed, various ayan rebellions broke out in the latter half of the eighteenth century, which were the mirror image of the Ottomans' repeated failure to integrate provincial notables into a single regulative framework of appropriation. Given the lack of ruling class coherence, it is hardly surprising that attempts at reforming the military and fiscal organisation bore little fruit until the 1820s; the old military personnel, most notably the janissaries, successfully frustrated these efforts and often removed 'too reformist' Sultans and their allies from power. Clearly, besides the ayan, the most immediate factor conditioning imperial centralisation attempts was war. The southward contraction of Ottoman territories in the last quarter of the eighteenth century substantially reduced sources of revenue otherwise available for reform.[61] More importantly, the military defeats and diplomatic negotiations resulted in the yielding of extra-territorial privileges to major European states. European powers, in competition with one another, not only gained commercial privileges that would considerably limit the Ottomans' ability to pursue an autonomous tariff policy, but also obtained protectorate rights over non-Muslim Ottoman subjects, which would lead to the 'internationalization of the empire's inner tensions and confessional lines'.[62] In short, in addition to loss of economic autonomy and tax revenues, the Ottoman reform attempts became further complicated by the fact that the interests of non-Muslim Ottoman minorities became increasingly tied to the ability of foreign powers to claim representation and jurisdiction within the Ottoman state.[63]

The first sultan who made definitive inroads into political centralisation and military reform was Mahmud II (1808–39). The Sultan managed to integrate many lesser notables in Anatolia and the Lower Balkans into a relatively centralised structure of rule and appropriation. And indeed, it was this remaking of state power in the provinces that enabled Mahmud to muster resources to finally abolish the Janissary corps in 1826. Despite these 'successes', however, suppression of notables in other parts of the empire, especially in Serbia, Greece and Egypt, proved impossible. In both Serbia

[59] Ariel Salzmann, *Tocqueville in the Ottoman Empire: Rival Paths to the Modern State* (Leiden: Brill, 2004).
[60] Clemens Hoffman, 'The Balkanization of Ottoman rule: Premodern origins of the modern international system in southeastern Europe', *Cooperation and Conflict*, 43:4 (2008), p. 384.
[61] Şükrü Hanioğlu, *A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire* (Princeton, NY: Princeton University Press, 2010), p. 22.
[62] Cemal Kafadar, 'The question of Ottoman decline', *Harvard Middle East and Islamic Review*, 4:1–2 (1997), p. 46.
[63] Fatma Müge Göçek, *Rise of the Bourgeoisie, Demise of Empire: Ottoman Westernization and Social Change* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), pp. 93–7.

and Greece, the struggle between the centralising state and provincial notables turned into a mutually destructive process that caused massive peasant flight, brigandage, and rebellion.[64] The result was the wide opening of both regions to the exercise of Russian protectorate rights over non-Muslim Ottoman subjects, which not only led to the (formal or informal) secession of Serbia and Greece from the empire, but also brought the Ottomans to the verge of virtual collapse. By 1829, Russian troops advanced into northern Anatolia and the southern Balkans, ultimately reaching the outskirts of Istanbul. The Sultan was to save Istanbul from invasion only when Britain forced the Russians to sign a peace treaty and retreat to the Danube.

The lesson to be drawn from this experiment with centralisation in the Balkans was clear: the threat of internal disorder strongly correlated with the threat of partition from outside.[65] The process of centralisation was strongly mediated by geopolitical struggles and could be achieved only by maintaining a delicate balance of class forces. Under geopolitical pressures, the Sultan had no option but to set in motion a pattern of vertical reorganisation that regularized and backed the appropriative privileges of the ayan, yet at the same time prevented their exploitation of the peasantry from destabilising imperial rule. In other words, the success of Ottoman centralisation was strongly dependent on stepping up and stabilising the conditions of peasant exploitation, while simultaneously checking the geopolitically risky consequences of this new framework of ruling-class cooperation. Peasant surpluses had to be extracted without leading to peasant revolts that could undermine the empire's geopolitical position.

These considerations would be further compounded in the face of Egypt's rebellious governor, Muhammed Ali. For, if the Ottoman centralisation efforts in the Balkans showed that the state's external reproduction was dependent on its ability to mediate the relation between the peasantry and landholding classes, this became even more crucial in the face of Egypt's new conscript army. That is, Muhammed Ali, aided by France, had launched an ambitious project of military and fiscal centralisation almost twenty years before Mahmud II dared to destroy the janissaries. Among Muhammed Ali's reforms the most ambitious one, which would generate grave consequences for his overlord in Istanbul, was mass conscription.[66] Based on brutal measures aimed at breaking peasant resistance and preventing peasant flight, mass conscription in Egypt produced a large and well-trained army, which during the 1830s enabled Muhammed Ali to chase the Sultanic armies to within a few days march of Istanbul.

Cairo thus set a new standard of geopolitical competition for the Ottomans (almost three decades before the Russians began to 'free' and 'modernise' their serf-based army). Muhammed Ali's peasant soldiers became a source of inspiration and envy for the Ottoman elite, which hinted at the complication of agrarian relations in the Ottoman Empire.[67] For the question of how to 'save' the empire was becoming increasingly complicated by the fact that the peasants' geopolitical role as soldiers became as equally important as their fiscal role as taxpayers. The implication being that the increasing geopolitical exploitation of peasant bodies would force the state to further mediate their

[64] Hoffman, 'The Balkanization of Ottoman rule', p. 386; Virginia Aksan, *Ottoman Wars 1700–1870* (London: Longman/Pearson 2007), pp. 282–94.
[65] Hanioğlu, *A Brief History*, p. 69.
[66] Khaled Fahmy, 'The era of Muhammad Ali Pasha', in M. W. Daly and Carl F. Petry (eds), *The Cambridge History of Egypt, Volume II* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 163.
[67] Erik J. Zurcher, 'The Ottoman conscription system in theory and practice', in Erik Jan Zurcher (ed.), *Arming the State: Military Conscription in the Middle East and Central Asia 1775–1925* (London: I. B. Tauris, 1999), pp. 80–1.

economic and fiscal exploitation. The state's acute lack of manpower for a mass army was to entangle its reliance on and check of landholding class power over the peasantry. The geopolitical reproduction of the Ottoman state was therefore becoming increasingly dependent on the constitution of historically specific agrarian property relations. It was indeed this geo(political) context in which the sultan was to resort to 'untraditional' ways of rejuvenating the empire and establish 'modern' conceptions of property and subjecthood.

The *Tanzimat* as a combined project: Between Jacobinism and capitalism (1839–76)

The social and geopolitical considerations documented above were central to the way in which the first phase of Ottoman modernisation (*Tanzimat*) unfolded. The conventional Marxian interpretation of Ottoman modernisation, informed by the World System Theory, sees the Tanzimat as the political-legal corollary of the beginning of Ottomans' 'integration' into the capitalist world economy. By attempting to institute equality and private property, so goes the argument, the Tanzimat sought to facilitate the development of capitalist social relations, thereby marking the onset of 'peripheral' capitalist modernity in the Ottoman Empire.[68] Indeed, there is a grain of truth in this interpretation; the Ottomans made several attempts to establish the political-legal foundations of capitalism during the Tanzimat. To start with, they signed a series of free trade agreements with Britain (1838–41), which led to an exponential growth of commercial agriculture. By lifting state monopolies in foreign trade and reducing custom duties on exports, they gained British support against Muhammed Ali, increased their control over contraband trade, and induced production in the countryside.[69] Likewise, the Imperial Edict of 1839, which officially launched the Tanzimat project, promised to introduce laws guaranteeing life, equality and the property of *all* subjects, and by doing so, it sought to both pre-empt European claims over Ottoman minorities and to institutionalise the 'free' and 'productive' individuals of a capitalist order. In a similar vein, the land laws of 1856 and 1867 ruled out traditional revenue claims on and collective/village rights to land, thereby taking an important step towards the legal privatisation and individualisation of landed property.[70]

That said, approaches that equate the Tanzimat to capitalism tend to obscure the 'combined' and complex character of the Ottoman modernisation attempts. For a closer look at the reform period reveals that the Ottomans not only took measures to institute capitalism, but also took the critical Jacobin step towards creating the citizen-soldier. Indeed, from the imperial edict of 1839 until the end of the First World War, every major legal text attempted to introduce military service as a 'universal' and 'individual' duty. True, mass conscription grew as a protracted process; draft evasion was common and there were many exemptions from 'universal' levy, including non-Muslims and the members of the central elite.[71] Yet, what is remarkable is that with the Tanzimat, peasants, for the

[68] See, for example, Çağlar Keyder, *State and Class in Turkey* (London: Verso, 1987); Şevket Pamuk, *The Ottoman Empire and European Capitalism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987).

[69] Pamuk, *The Ottoman Empire*, p. 20; Ilber Ortaylı, *İmparatorluğun En Uzun Yüzyılı* (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınevi, 1998), pp. 99, 106–8.

[70] Huricihan İslamoğlu, 'A revaluation of the Ottoman land code of 1858', in Roger Owen (ed.), *New Perspectives on Property and Land in the Middle East* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 2000), p. 29.

[71] After four decades of enforcing conscription, the number of military troops increased from 24,000 regular soldiers in 1837 to 120,000 in 1849 and up to 206,000 in 1877, with a reserve army of 500,000 soldiers (Donald Quataert, 'Main problems of the economy during the Tanzimat period', in Hakkı Dursun Yıldız (ed.), *150. Yılında Tanzimat* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1992), p. 218; Kemal Karpat, 'The transformation of the Ottoman state, 1789–1908', *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 3:3 (1972), p. 278.

first time in Ottoman history, began to enter the body politic in an unmediated fashion, that is, without the mediating role of semi-corporate bodies such as the timar holders or the ayan.[72] The mobilisation of the lowest stratum was no longer based on the relations of a localised and personalised political community, but began to be understood within the framework of the universal rights and duties of a new political subject. Geopolitical reproduction of the ruling elite was therefore becoming dependent on the creation of a new political subject from the ranks of the rural poor, which would, in turn, qualitatively redefine the space of bargaining between the ruler and the ruled.

The Ottoman reformers injected into the domestic social fabric the logic of capitalism and Jacobinism concurrently. Both projects aimed to create a universal political subject with equal rights and obligations, thereby requiring the dissolution of existing politico-cultural privileges and obligations that constituted the Ottoman moral economy. Yet, they were also contradictory: they sought to empower two contradictory subjects, the propertied individual and the citizen-soldier, whose 'equality' and contradictory interests on land would complicate the unfolding of modernity. The Ottoman ruling classes had to continuously negotiate the rights of the propertied individual and the rights of the peasant-soldier. Reconciling the inherent tensions between property and subsistence emerged as a task of pivotal importance and constituted the underlying logic of the first period of Ottoman reforms.

Indeed, from the very beginning, this internally-contradictory and internationally-conditioned character of Ottoman modernisation was reflected in the manner in which the Tanzimat principles were implemented. To begin with, the universalisation of the right to property and equality ushered in competing claims on land. On the one hand, many provincial notables claimed to own the villages that fell under the areas in which they had been authorised to collect taxes. In other words, tax-farmers attempted to subsume peasant lands into their private estates by using the Tanzimat principles that secured private ownership. Likewise, the tax-farmers' utilisation of the Tanzimat for their own benefit was countered by peasants, who rebelled in many parts of the Empire by radicalising the Tanzimat principles concerning equality.[73] Peasants construed the Tanzimat as giving them land, relaxing tax demands, saving them from tax-farmers' 'oppression' and so on.[74]

Eventually, the competing claims to land ownership, combined with the conscription demands of the state (enacted through the conscription law of 1846), caused large-scale and long-lasting peasant unrest in many parts of the empire, most notably in Bulgaria (1841–50, 1875–6), northern Anatolia (1840s–60s), Lebanon (1858–61), Palestine and Syria (1852–64), and Bosnia (1850, 1874–5).[75] Moreover, without the support and assistance of the provincial notables, tax collection utterly collapsed in the countryside.[76] Attempts at simultaneously creating the propertied-individual and the

[72] Tobias Heinzelmann, *Cihaddan Vatan Savunmasına: Osmanlı Imparatorluğu'nda Genel Askerlik Yükümlülüğü* (Istanbul: Kitap Yayınevi, 2009), pp. 108, 263–4; Gültekin Yıldız, *Neferin adı yok: zorunlu askerliğe geçiş sürecinde Osmanlı Devleti'nde siyaset, ordu ve toplum* (Istanbul: Kitabevi, 2009), p. 150.

[73] Attila Aytekin, 'Peasant protest in the late Ottoman Empire', *International Review of Social History*, 57:2 (2012), pp. 191–228; Attila Aytekin, 'Tax revolts during the Tanzimat period and before the Young Turk Revolution', *Journal of Policy History*, 25:3 (2013), pp. 315–18.

[74] Ortaylı, *İmparatorluğun*, p. 120.

[75] Aksan, *Ottoman Wars*, pp. 416–31; Aytekin, 'Peasant protest'; Quataert, 'The age of reforms', in Suraiya Faroqhi (ed.), *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, Volume II* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), p. 877.

[76] Stanford Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), p. 96.

Jacobin-like political subject, both defined with universal freedom and equality, ended up corrupting the developmental and geopolitical promises of modern subjecthood. The state could neither afford to alienate tax-farmers' right to property, nor could it give them full support against the peasants' demands for equality.

As stated earlier, such a combination of Jacobinism and capitalism was hardly an exclusively Ottoman phenomenon, that is, most western European states pursued a combined 'capitalist-Jacobin project'. Yet, as Shilliam has shown in the case of Prussia, they were also able to water down the economic impact of popular conceptions of nationhood and citizenship, thereby effectively subordinating Jacobinism to capitalism. How successful or willing was the Ottoman state in initiating and sustaining a capitalist restructuring of social relations and institutions? The period from the encoding of the Ottoman Land Law of 1858 to the promulgation of the first Ottoman Constitution (1876) is particularly decisive in tracing the trajectory and determining the outcome of the Ottoman combined project. For this period not only witnessed a two decades-long agricultural boom, but also the Land Code and two subsequent decrees issued in 1860 and 1869 reaffirmed the security of property. More specifically, the Code allowed mortgage of land for payment of taxes and payment of debt to individuals, thereby officially lifting restraints on the alienation of land in case of indebtedness and dispossession of the peasantry.[77] In this respect, several scholars have interpreted the Code as a milestone in transforming the rules of access to land, hence a decisive attempt to turn the market into the main means of reproduction.[78]

Yet, what is overlooked by these scholars is that the same period also witnessed the deepening of the Jacobin project under new geopolitical imperatives, that is, the Ottomans took new initiatives to institute citizen-soldier and equalise all subjects based on equal rights and obligations to the state. The geopolitical landscape was rapidly changing in the latter half of the nineteenth century. Especially, Russia, traumatised by its failure in Crimea, had embarked on a complete overhaul of its military-agrarian system from 1861 onwards based on the elimination of serfdom and the introduction of universal conscription.[79] The success of Prussia's popular conscription against Austrian armies in 1866 also deeply impacted on the Ottoman perception of military reform.[80] Taken together, these forced the Ottomans to reconsider the social basis of their geopolitical reproduction, which ultimately led to two new initiatives: the Conscription Law and the Nationality Law, both promulgated in 1869. The Nationality Law aimed to connect all Ottoman subjects in a way unmediated by special community privileges, and to avoid interference from European states on the pretext of protecting Ottoman non-Muslim subjects.[81] And while the Law was another milestone in decorporating Ottoman political life based on a common and equal Ottoman citizenship, the military reform reaffirmed the duty of all equal citizens to serve in the army. Although the conscription law continued to allow the obligation to be transmuted into cash, and the non-Muslim reaction to it eventually remained insuperable due to the threat of foreign intervention, the military reform of 1869 marked a decisive expansion of popular conscription, especially among Anatolian Muslim peasants.[82]

[77] Tevfik Güran, *Osmanlı Tarımı* (Istanbul: Eren Yayıncılık,1998), pp. 141–2.
[78] See, for example, Attila Aytekin, 'Agrarian relations, property and law', *Middle Eastern Studies*, 45:6 (2009), pp. 935–51.
[79] Aksan, *Ottoman Wars*, p. 437.
[80] Ibid., p. 478.
[81] Füsun Üstel, *Makbul Vatandaşın peşinde* (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınevi), pp. 26–7.
[82] Odile Moreau, *Reformlar Çağında Osmanlı İmparatorluğu: Yeni Düzen'in İnsanları ve Fikirleri 1826–1914* (Istanbul: Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayinlari, 2010), p. 17.

What was the overall outcome of this combined project? The Tanzimat could hardly initiate a capitalist growth dynamic. For one thing, the prospect of dispossession and landlessness, combined with the threat of European intervention, provoked peasant revolt, thereby rendering impossible the full implementation of the Land Code.[83] Equally important, given that the state's geopolitical reproduction was becoming more and more dependent on the peasantry, the state remained reluctant to transform agrarian property relations along capitalist lines;[84] it 'engaged in a continuous balancing act between the exigencies of a rule of "justice" (read absence of social strife) and a rule of property'.[85] For example, although most peasants were extremely vulnerable to unfavourable weather conditions and taxation, which also rendered usury, peasant indebtedness, and share-cropping widespread and chronic phenomena, the state took no measure to close the 'land frontier', that is, the peasantry always had the option of accessing marginal lands owned by the state in exchange for nominal taxes.[86] As a result, no landlord/merchant monopoly on land developed, which otherwise might have facilitated the subsumption of peasants to the market imperatives.[87] Peasants, already distressed by the conditions of their subsistence and considering their relatively uninhibited access to marginal lands, chose not to subject their generational security to the uncertainties of the market. Instead of devoting most of their labour time to commodity production, they exerted and were content with 'very low levels of consumption which made it easier for them to retain their holdings' in the face of the tax collector and the usurer.[88] Even when some peasants were encouraged by high cash-crop prices, their involvement in the market was sporadic. Tobacco production, for example, which became especially popular among small producers, was carried out by peasants who were 'only marginally' involved in and 'were able to withdraw from the market'.[89] Large estates, producing mainly cotton and cultivated almost exclusively by sharecropping peasants, experienced no systematic improvements in the means of production (which would otherwise help sharecroppers pay off their debts, thereby causing the landlord to lose their only source of labour supply). Sharecropping peasants were overburdened by taxes, rents, debt, and even labour

[83] Quataert, 'Main problems of the economy during the Tanzimat period', pp. 214–15; Quataert, 'The age of reforms', pp. 878–9.

[84] Pamuk, *The Ottoman Empire*, pp. 39, 68.

[85] İslamoğlu, 'A revaluation of the Ottoman Land Code', pp. 33–4.

[86] Çağlar Keyder, 'The cycle of sharecropping and the consolidation of small peasant ownership in Turkey', *Journal of Peasant Studies*, 10:2 (1983), p. 132.

[87] One indicator of this is that although there were massive inflows of foreign direct investment into land in western Anatolia following the Land Code of 1867 – according to an estimate one third of cultivable land belonged to the British in 1868 – foreign investment totally retreated in the subsequent decades because of labour power shortages, low effective demand, high wages and, above all, the reluctance of the Ottoman state to transform agrarian relations (Pamuk *The Ottoman Empire*, pp. 39, 68). Relatedly, almost all foreign investment funds went into infrastructure projects, which gave 'quick, high or at least secure returns', rather than flowing to production. Zvi Yehuda Hershlag, *Turkey: The Challenge of Growth* (Leiden: Brill, 1968), p. 33.

[88] Pamuk, *The Ottoman Empire*, p. 101; Ortaylı, *İmparatorluğun*, pp. 226–7. Given peasants' control over the labour process and ability to obtain and maintain land without having to systematically increase commodity production, productive forces remained primitive and domestic investment scarce. Quataert, 'The age of reforms', p. 853.

[89] Mustafa Koç, 'Persistence of Small Commodity Production in Agriculture: The Case of Tobacco Producers in Aegean Turkey' (unpublished PhD thesis, University of Toronto 1988), pp. 65–71. Relatedly, the Ottoman commercial boom was generated not by an 'intensive' growth underlined by a qualitative transformation of the peasants' labour process and increasing dependence on the market, but by an 'extensive' growth based on peasant-squeezing on large estates, land-clearance and the expansion of the peasants' traditional survival strategies alongside their limited and occasional engagement with the market. Quataert, 'The age of reforms', pp. 843, 864.

services in some parts of the empire, yet, regardless of the size of the landholding, they began and completed the production cycle themselves.[90] In the absence of a transformation of social relations and institutions that would set free alternate sources of credit and food supply, sharecropping peasants were inherently unwilling/unable to avoid subsistence farming, respond to fluctuating market conditions, transform the conditions of production, and incapable of becoming dependent on the market and reinvesting in land. Consequently, the engrossment of commercial landholdings, which occurred partly as a response to rising world market prices (especially of cotton) and often to the detriment of small peasant holdings, did not lead to a *qualitative* transformation in the prevalent forms of exploitation.

Overall, approaching the 1870s, private property began to be instituted in many parts of the Ottoman Empire without overriding peasants' customary right to subsistence. The Ottoman state found it impossible to maintain social and geopolitical order without protecting from forced sale 'the roof over the cultivator's head and a basic amount of land required for survival'.[91] The ambiguity of the Ottoman state's relation to property and subsistence indicates that during the Tanzimat two contradictory projects with different stakes for peasant bodies were continuously played out; yet neither capitalism undermined Jacobinism, nor did Jacobinism prevail over capitalism. The state's experimentation with capitalism and Jacobinism was to take a more decisive turn only in the following period.

From the constitution to the revolution: the rise of Jacobinism (1876–1908)

> Property of lawful title is guaranteed. There can be no dispossession.
>
> Article 21, The Ottoman constitution of 1876

Three decade-long attempts at reconciling the rights of the propertied individual and the rights of the citizen-soldier ended by producing a form of property that allowed neither a rate of productivity nor a system of taxation characteristic of market society. Approaching the 1880s, the Ottoman state was thus at the brink of financial collapse. In order to finance its skyrocketing military expenses, the Ottoman state increasingly turned to foreign borrowing in the aftermath of the Crimean War, ultimately defaulting on international debt in 1875.[92] In this context, the project of strengthening the Ottoman fiscal/geopolitical base by way of an Ottoman capitalism reached a deadlock and the Ottoman combined project took a decisive turn towards Jacobinism, the first step of which was the Ottoman constitution of 1876.

The constitution took three critical Jacobin steps. First, it foresaw the universalisation of conscription regardless of ethno-religious and income differences. Second, the constitution introduced popular elections; yet it did not confine political representation to the propertied classes. Based on the French election law of 1789, it expanded the scope of popular representation to 'primary' voters, that is, all males above the age of 25 who fulfilled a 'vague' taxation requirement were allowed to vote for electors who then chose the actual deputies. Therefore, notwithstanding several problems involved in the actual elections, the constitution, in principle, created a system of 'popular elections with relatively few suffrage restrictions', which compared favourably even with

[90] Çağlar Keyder, 'Introduction: Large scale commercial agriculture in the Ottoman Empire?', in Çağlar Keyder and Faruk Tabak (eds), *Landholding and Commercial Agriculture in the Middle East* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1991), p. 12; Şevket Pamuk, 'Agriculture and economic development in Turkey, 1870–2000', in Pedro Lains and Vicente Pinilla (eds), *Agriculture and Economic Development in Europe since 1870* (London: Routledge, 2008), p. 389; Quataert, 'The age of reforms', p. 864.

[91] Martha Mundy and Richard Smith, *Governing Property: Making the Modern State in Ottoman Syria* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2007), p. 471; İslamoğlu, 'A revaluation of the Ottoman Land Code', pp. 33–9.

[92] Shaw and Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire*, pp. 155–6.

contemporary western European countries.[93] Third, besides guaranteeing the right to property, the constitution (Article 21) ensured the security of possessors by prohibiting dispossession. The article stated that 'property that was possessed could not be taken away from its possessors'; thereby turning (minimum) subsistence into a constitutional right.[94]

The implication is that, by universalising the political space and conditioning the freedom of the propertied-individual to the maintenance of citizen subsistence, the Ottoman ruling class officially introduced of the logic of Jacobin representation and property into the Ottoman body politic. The constitution, in this respect, reset the conditions for Ottoman entry into modernity. It suspended the option of market society, while providing the blueprint for a substitute route to modernity. Thereafter, equality and property would cease to be understood as the basis for universalising the relations of the capitalist contract, but increasingly construed as the means to implementing Jacobin methods of appropriation and mobilisation. The constitution would not only generate new spaces for political integration and mobilisation, but also presupposes the formulation of new rules of access to property.

All that said, however, the constitution remained as a stillborn text. When the Russian armies appeared once again at the gates of Istanbul, Sultan Abdulhamid II (1876–1908) dissolved the parliament and shelved the constitution in 1878. The result of war was utterly disastrous for the empire. In spite of the ultimate Western diplomatic intervention in favour of the Ottomans at the Congress of Berlin, the empire was forced to pay a huge war indemnity and to surrender two fifths of its entire territory and one fifth of its population. In addition to the loss of vital sources of taxation and manpower, the war accelerated the influx of Muslim refugees into the remaining Ottoman territories, which caused a massive strain on Ottoman finances.[95]

The irony is that under these dire fiscal and geopolitical challenges, Abdulhamid II, having killed the constitution, also had to revive the constitution's spirit of reform, especially in terms of its emphasis on linking equality and subsistence to conscription. The new conscription law of 1886 was a case in point. In many ways the new law still fell well short of universal conscription. The fear of revolt and foreign intervention, as well as fiscal concerns, prevented the suspension of military exemption fees, from which mainly non-Muslims and propertied Muslim subjects were eligible to benefit.[96] Despite the persistence of immunities, however, the law took an important step towards generalising conscription among the Anatolian Muslim population: it conditioned the payment of exemption tax to the prior execution of three months of military service.[97] The significance of this legal detail lies in the fact that the law of 1886 put in practice, for the first time, the principle of equality between the propertied and the property-less. The rich and the poor were equalised not through the relations of the capitalist contract, but in terms of their responsibility for the geopolitical reproduction of the Ottoman polity. Regardless of income differentials, therefore, military duty tended to become the indirect precondition for accessing property and to acquiring the status of modern subjecthood among the Anatolian Muslim populations (except in Kurdistan).

[93] Hasan Kayalı, 'Elections and the electoral process in the Ottoman Empire', *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 27:3 (1995), pp. 268–70.
[94] İslamoğlu, 'A revaluation of the Ottoman Land Code', p. 40.
[95] Shaw and Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire*, pp. 191–5.
[96] Moreau, *Reformlar Çağında Osmanlı İmparatorluğu*, pp. 26–7.
[97] Shaw and Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire*, pp. 100, 245–6.

The intertwining of equality and property with conscription became even more pronounced among the lower classes, especially the refugees. The immigration of Muslim refugees from the lost Ottoman provinces, while initially disruptive, offered some relief to the problem of the scarcity of military manpower. In the wake of the Crimean War the Ottomans had already issued relatively favourable refugee laws that gave plots of state land to immigrant families 'with only a minimum amount of capital'.[98] Yet, under Abdulhamid II, an additional condition was set that newly arrived populations had to 'fulfill the requirements of the Ottoman conscription system to acquire full Ottoman citizenship status'. Thus at a time when the state encountered several difficulties in tapping manpower from native populations, a growing pool of a derooted and revanchist reserve army emerged, whose right to new lands was conditioned to fighting those who caused their displacement. Muslim immigrants thus began to substantially contribute to the Ottoman military power as 'volunteers', as 'volunteerism would confirm their rights to be granted land and status … and further establish their legitimate residency in the Ottoman Empire'.[99]

Linking geopolitical survival to peasant subsistence forced the Hamidian state to continue to be attentive to the precarious structures of social reproduction in the Ottoman countryside. On the one hand, taxation and usury, combined with the low productivity of peasant-based agriculture, left many cultivators in a state of permanent struggle for subsistence. On the other, the crisis of subsistence did not lead to a *systematic* process of dispossession either. It is remarkable that when the very subsistence of the peasantry was in jeopardy, the state was not willing to initiate a transformation of the conditions of access to land. Evictions were rare.[100] Just like the Tanzimat period, 'uncultivated marginal lands were always available for purchase from the state at nominal prices or in return for regular payments of tithe for ten years' even in the most market-oriented areas, such as Western Anatolia.[101] Furthermore, although some significant attempts were made by the state to extend low-interest credit to induce market production, these were far from satisfactory, as most of the agricultural support targeting the land-hungry and technologically-backward peasantry, and was siphoned off by bureaucrats, local notables, and important landlords.[102] Considering their relatively uninhibited access to marginal lands and lack of credit, peasants were neither under compulsion nor able to devote the majority of their labour time to commodity production (despite their occasional participation in the market). Moreover, in urban centres, the state 'compromised endlessly on the issue of guilds' position in the Ottoman economy'.[103] Although general price ceilings were lifted (except on important subsistence goods such as bread and meat), which was an important step towards undermining artisan solidarity, the state, afraid of social unrest, continued to recognise the monopolistic privileges of many artisan guilds throughout the nineteenth century.[104] Given the

[98] Shaw and Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire*, p. 115; Pamuk, *The Ottoman Empire*, p. 105.

[99] Mehmet Beşikçi, *The Ottoman Mobilization of Manpower in the First World War* (Leiden: Brill, 2012), pp. 172–5; Shaw and Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire*, p. 246. The non-Muslim and at least one fourth of the Muslim population remained exempt in the second half of the nineteenth century, leaving some estimated twelve million Muslims available for conscription. And while in Bosnia, Albania, Syria and Iraq conscription attempts foundered due to rebellious populations, the heaviest burden of conscription fell on the population of Turkic Anatolia, which grew by more than two million refugees from 1850 to 1900 (Aksan *Ottoman Wars*, p. 479).

[100] Pamuk, *The Ottoman Empire*, p. 90.

[101] Ibid.

[102] Quataert, 'The age of reforms', pp. 871–2.

[103] Quataert, 'Main problems', pp. 215–16.

[104] Ortaylı, *İmparatorluğun*, pp. 208–9; Ilber Ortaylı, 'Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda sanayileşme anlayışına bir örnek: Islah–ı Sanayi Komisyonu olayı', *METU Studies in Development* (1978), p. 125.

persistence of peasants' and artisans' customary rights, it is scarcely surprising that Ottoman factories, few in number and despite considerable efforts to fund and sustain them, faced chronic labour shortages and extremely high turnover rates, which eventually frustrated the appetite for public and private investment in manufacturing.[105]

One implication of the persistence of non-capitalist social relations and the continuity of the centrality of the state in accessing peasant surpluses was that even the limited introduction of different manifestations of popular sovereignty, such as universal and merit-based access to the state, bore grave consequences for the social reproduction of the Sultan and his entourage. This became especially important from the 1880s onwards, as students who were educated in provincial public schools and came from relatively modest families, began to enter the ranks of the military and civil bureaucracy. Against the appropriation of higher bureaucratic posts by the Sultan's associates, these lower-ranked officers, commonly known as the Young Turks, would become one of the main agents of social change as they struggled to open state careers to talent.

That said, what would turn the Young Turks from mere reformers into revolutionaries was the rapidly and unexpectedly changing international context at the onset of the twentieth century. Until 1905, the Young Turks, organised mainly in the Committee of Union and Progress, came to propagate what they believed to be a 'scientific' transition to constitutionalism, that is, a transition without a revolution. In the Young Turk mind, mass action could easily veer off course: masses of the *sans-culotte* type could instigate a process of 'Terror' and furthermore, 'any appearance of chaos [in the past] had served as an excuse for [foreign] intervention, the return of despotism, or both'. From 1905, however, under the impact of new (geo)political exigencies and world-historical events, the Young Turk vision of social change began to drastically alter. The constitutional revolutions in neighbouring Russia (1905–6) and Iran (1906) and the imminent threat of foreign partition of Ottoman Macedonia (1903–8), combined with the tax revolts in Anatolia (1906–7), forced and enabled the Young Turks to develop a new repertoire of social mobilisation. In the Young Turks' consciousness, especially the Russian and Iranian revolutions put in train a new process for intersocietal comparison and learning. While the Russian revolution showed the Young Turks that they could well use and tame the revolutionary potential of the peasantry and urban poor for transformative action, Iran proved that constitutional and transformative action could take place even in a more 'backward' and Islamic setting. Drawing lessons drawn from the initial success and eventual failure of the Russian and Iranian revolutions, the Young Turks eventually shifted from the 'scientific' methods of regime-change towards revolutionary activism, adapting foreign revolutionary ideas and practices to new ends in the social ferment developing in the Ottoman lands.[106]

The Young Turk Revolution, war, and the Jacobin 'Terror' (1908–18)

> Everyone is a soldier now.
>
> Enver Pasha, 1914

Given the uneven and combined development of Ottoman revolutionary consciousness, it is perhaps hardly surprising that the 1908 Revolution would unfold as much a revolution from 'above' as a

[105] Edward Clark, 'Osmanlı'da Sanayi Devrimi', in Halil İnalcık and Mehmet Seyitdanlıoğlu (eds), *Tanzimat* (Istanbul: İş Bankası Yayınları, 2012), p. 769.

[106] Nader Sohrabi, *Revolution and Constitutionalism in the Ottoman Empire and Iran* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2011), pp. 62, 72–5, 77, 80–1, 90.

revolution from 'below'. That is, the dissident bureaucrats could contest the Sultan and seize the state only by mobilising and increasing their appeal to commercial and lower-class grievances caused by taxation, usury, and conscription.[107] This fact, combined with new geopolitical challenges, explain the specific trajectory of the development of property relations in the post-revolutionary period as well as the Young Turks' ambiguity in articulating the economic objectives of the revolution. On the one hand, 'free enterprise' (*teşebbüs-i şahsi*) became one of the main code words of the Revolution, which, according to many influential Young Turks and their commercial allies, could flourish only in a society wherein the rules of free contract (*serbest-i mübadelat*) and free competition (*serbest-i rekabet*) were instituted. 'Capital' was considered as the key to bringing 'civilisation' to the country, which, first and foremost, required that the 'individual' be allowed to pursue his 'selfish' interest.[108] Yet, the fact that the new state elites were able to put capitalist demands into the revolutionary agenda thanks to the mobilisation of lower classes put definitive limits to the regeneration of the capitalist project. For one thing, peasants and the urban poor, empowered by the revolution, consistently 'misinterpreted' liberty in ways conducive to their own interests: 'liberty of property' in their hands turned into liberty from tax, liberty from debt, liberty from conscription, liberty from fares and liberty from penalties, all which brought the business of government to a standstill in the first six months following the revolution.[109] Furthermore, the states's attempt to establish the rule of capital and 'rationalise' state spending fueled a major rebellion in 1909. The masses, led by disfavoured state officials, attacked property, and propertied classes, which resulted in large-scale massacres of (mainly non-Muslim) imperial subjects that resided in commercially-advanced provincial towns.[110] Likewise, state's abolishing of guilds (1910) did not bear much fruit, for the workers and the urban poor developed new mobilisation methods (such as the *boycott* movement) to increase their demands and widen their participation in the post-revolutionary public space.[111]

Undoubtedly, the impact of these domestic struggles would be amplified under worsening geopolitical circumstances. In the midst of a never-ending cycle of rebellion and war (annexation of Crete by Greece [1909–11], Albanian rebellion and independence (1910–12), Italian invasion of Tripoli (1911), British-Russian partition of Iran (1911), and finally the Balkan Wars (1912–13) and the First World War), it is little wonder that the Revolution re-introduced the electoral law and the constitution of 1876 with the infamous Article 21. Private property was accepted, so was one's right to subsistence. Subsistence and property concurrently became constitutional rights, the exercise of which was linked to military duty in 1909. The Conscription Law of 1909, once again, made military service compulsory for all Ottoman subjects, regardless of income and ethno-religious differences. Until 1914 all fees for exemption from military service were progressively abolished. It was declared that universal conscription would enable 'the most refined and the wealthiest' to enjoy the 'honour' of actively 'defending their motherland in the same way as the poor peasant little

[107] Aykut Kansu, *1908 Devrimi* (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınevi, 1998).

[108] Zafer Toprak, *Türkiye'de 'Millî Iktisat'* (Istanbul: Yurt Yayınları 1982), pp. 23–4.

[109] Sohrabi, *Revolution and Constitutionalism*, pp. 175–88; Hasan Kayalı, *Arabs and Young Turks: Ottomanism, Arabism, and Islamism in the Ottoman Empire, 1908–1918* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), p. 59.

[110] Stephan Astourian, 'The silence of the land', in Ronald Grigor Suny, Fatma Müge Göçek, and Norman Naimark (eds), *A Question of Genocide: Armenians and Turks at the End of the Ottoman Empire* (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2011), pp. 77–8.

[111] Doğan Çetinkaya, *The Young Turks and the Boycott Movement: Nationalism, Protest and the Working Classes in the Formation of Modern Turkey* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2014), pp. 63, 73; Sohrabi, *Revolution and Constitutionalism*, p. 187.

Mehmeds' while the property-less, that is, immigrants and refugees, would 'accept conscription into the Ottoman army in return for their right to be … settled on Ottoman lands'. Ultimately, everyone, 'the rich and the poor, the educated and the illiterate' were brought 'under the same banner' for the protection of the nation.[112] Therefore, at a time when the 'sanctity' of property was endangered by the agitated masses and 'liberty' had no stable meaning, military service, not the market, became the common denominator securing the equality, subsistence, and property of all citizens.

That said, however, the problem of conscription of non-Turkish elements could not be overcome until 1913 (and only partially thereafter). Many non-Muslim subjects of the Ottoman Empire continued to successfully resist conscription by either leaving the country or obtaining a foreign passport.[113] Even when conscription efforts took off relatively well during the Balkan Wars, non-Muslim resistance to conscription continued within the army, which then made the non-Muslim conscripts the scapegoat for the ultimate defeat of the Ottoman armies.[114] Ultimately, the Young Turks grew increasingly suspicious of and reluctant to conscript non-Muslim subjects. Non-Muslims were seen as the collaborators of foreign enemies and a source of threat of partition. The result is that while the implementation of Jacobin forms of property and equality facilitated the establishment of new bonds between the state and the Anatolian Muslim population, it also led to the further marginalisation of non-Muslim groups in the newly emerging public space. Ultimately, in the post-revolutionary period, the Young Turks subjected non-Muslims' property and existence to a period of 'Terror' for not fitting the new standards of civilisation characterised by the Jacobin model.[115]

Entailed by this entanglement of interests was the progressive nationalisation/militarisation of the rules of reproduction in Ottoman civil society. The creation of a 'patriotic' Turkish bourgeoisie was the top priority of the Young Turks, so was the construction of forms of 'private' property with new communitarian embellishments. This was a bourgeoisie that would not seek its 'selfish' interest only, but serve the 'nation' by funding the state in its war endeavour and providing a 'national' space of accumulation, that is, accumulation without dispossession, or better put, accumulation without infringing on the minimum subsistence reserved for 'patriotic', hence 'equal' citizens. No doubt, the redistributive impact of this 'national economics' (as it came to be labelled) remained very lopsided. The Young Turks unleashed propertied interests as much as it could. They outlawed strikes, allowed Turkish merchants to massively profit from skyrocketing wartime prices without imposing extra taxes on them and permitted landowners to accumulate land to the detriment of the peasantry.[116] Yet, despite all this, by leaving Article 21 intact, it also recognised minimum subsistence as a constitutional right and tried to uphold it as a public duty. Marginal lands remained expendable and divisible by the peasantry. Furthermore, by providing higher agricultural prices and credit opportunities specially designed for small producers, the state (however imperfectly) attempted to protect the peasantry from the relations of usury, thereby connecting once again the social

[112] Beşikçi, *The Ottoman Mobilization*, pp. 139–41, 172–3.
[113] Zurcher, 'The Ottoman conscription system', p. 89.
[114] Fikret Adanır, 'Non-Muslims in the Ottoman army', in Suny, Göçek, and Naimark (eds), *A Question of Genocide*, pp. 120–3.
[115] Greeks and Armenians were the primary victims of the Young Turk 'Terror'. Estimates for the number of Greeks who were forced to leave the Aegean Region from 1913 to 1918 run between 200,000 to one million. Indeed, the 'success' of this initial deportation encouraged the Young Turks to implement the same policy on the Armenian community during the First World War, resulting in massive expulsions, massacres, and the almost complete annihilation of the Armenian presence in Anatolia. See Taner Akçam, *From Empire to Republic* (New York: Zed Books, 2004), pp. 141–50.
[116] Feroz Ahmad, *İttihatçılıktan Kemalizme* (Istanbul: Kaynak, 2009), pp. 78–80.

reproduction of the poor to their geopolitical usefulness.[117] Furthermore, balancing subsistence and property became an even more alarming duty in the wake of the October Revolution, which reinforced the Young Turks' fear that 'untrammeled liberalism' may end with the revolutionary annihilation of property, civil war, and foreign invasion.[118]

All in all, by conditioning social reproduction to serving the 'nation', the Young Turks not only vindicated the propertied individual in the eyes of the have-nots, but also formulated and generalised a set of non-market means to accessing sources of subsistence. 'Property' was much less an 'economic' right conditioned on successful commodity production and its productive utilisation, and much more a political privilege for those who served the 'nation'. Property was freed from those who 'abuse' it and turned into a political entitlement for those who are socially and geopolitically useful to the 'nation'. In this respect, the 'nation' was not a derivation of property but vice versa. As such, 'national economics' reinvented and consolidated the 'Turkish nation' as a new impersonalised socioeconomic unit, a substitute abstraction between the market and the state, an alternative frame of reference according to which social reproduction would be organised.

Ultimately, a historically specific Jacobinism prevailed on Turkish lands, whose contradictory legacy was not only to continue to guide and trouble the early Republican elite,[119] but also deeply impacted on the mindset of the post-Ottoman (and Iranian) reformers throughout the Middle East.[120] The late Ottoman reformers and revolutionaries, albeit unable to arrest the dissolution of the Empire, set a blueprint for modernisation and mobilisation that did not require the commodification of the means of life. Thus, the late Ottoman modernisation constituted a spatio-temporal force through which to explore the quality of international sociality in the making of the modern Middle East (an analysis of which is beyond the scope of the present article).

Conclusion

An important implication for a truly 'historical' IHS transpires from this discussion.[121] A fuller understanding of the internationally conditioned and multi-linear character of world historical development depends firmly on our ability to overcome methodological presentism as well as methodological internalism. The failure to do so not only reads capitalism back into history, but also impoverishes our conception of international interactivity and heterogeneity. The 'international', without overcoming presentism, imprisons our imagination of international hybridity and multiplicity in an all-absorbing conception of capitalism. A deeper understanding of the 'generative' and contested nature of the international is occluded by an ever-present capitalism.

IHS thus fails to deliver a non-unilinear narrative of modernity, precisely because it does not sufficiently abide by the methodological underpinnings of the original IHS project. Indeed, once we depart from presentist readings of world history, even western European history appears in a new

[117] Zafer Toprak, *İttihat Terakki ve Devletçilik* (Istanbul: Tarih Vakfı, 1995), pp. 73, 139–42; Ahmad, *İttihatçılıktan Kemalizme*, p. 68.

[118] Zafer Toprak, *Türkiye'de Popülizm* (Istanbul: Doğan Kitap, 2013), pp. 301–3.

[119] Eren Duzgun, 'The international relations of "Bourgeois Revolution"': Disputing the Turkish Revolution', *European Journal of International Relations*, pre-published 7 April 2017 {doi. 10.1177/1354066117714527}.

[120] Fred Halliday, *The Middle East in International Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 7.

[121] See also George Lawson and John Hobson, 'What is history in international relations?', *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 37:2 (2008), pp. 415–35.

light, as a site wherein qualitatively different social forms emerged in geopolitical contestation with, but not as mere derivations of, capitalism. For, the prior development of capitalism in Britain not only generated unprecedented geopolitical pressures on the European continent for emulation, but at the same time led to the emergence of 'substitution projects' that fostered qualitatively different forms of rationalisation, mobilisation, and appropriation as alternatives to market society. In particular, the 'substitution' associated with Revolutionary and Napoleonic France was characterised by the innovation of one of the most radical ways of competing with capitalism, that is, the subjection of the peasantry to 'universal conscription' and the concomitant birth of the 'citizen-soldier' endowed with land and equality. By establishing a citizen-army, France not only proved (at least for a while) the viability of an alternative path to modernisation that did not require the commodification of the means of life, but also became a model itself to be emulated and selectively adapted by others in and beyond Europe.

In the case of the Ottoman Empire, the citizen-soldier, endowed with land and equality, was appropriated for the reconstruction of its military and agricultural foundations. As elements of market society were imposed into this framework, the reactions from below and interventions from outside forced Ottoman elites to continuously negotiate the rights of the propertied individual and the rights of the citizen-soldier. The (geo)political risks associated with the capitalist transformation of the Ottoman fiscal base proved particularly formidable, which compelled the Ottoman elite, from the 1870s on, to implement more vigorously the Jacobin project. Significant steps were taken to define human existence away from the market, with participation in mass army, rather than competition in the market place, began to be understood as the basis of subsistence and equality of imperial subjects. As such, we would be amiss to understand the period from 1839 to 1918 as but a period of transition to (peripheral) capitalism in the Ottoman Empire; instead, it was the site of far-reaching efforts to develop non-capitalist (and non-socialist) forms of modernity.

The overall implication is that Jacobinism provides an important key to recovering the historical roots and legacies of the modern international system. Jacobinism, sometimes in competition and sometimes in collaboration with capitalism, put its stamp on the formation of the modern international order in and beyond Europe. Admittedly, a more complete study of the impact of Jacobinism on world historical development in general and the Ottoman Empire in particular would require a more detailed investigation of the specificities of Jacobin-domestic interactions, that is, specificities that emerged from the combination of Jacobin forms with domestic social and intellectual resources. Yet I hope this article has served its purpose, if it has disturbed, at least to some extent, the internalist and presentist conceptions of modernity, thereby putting another brick in the bridge between historical sociology and International Relations.

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