

Adversaries or Allies? Donald Trump's Republican Support in Congress

Karyn Amira, Lauren Johnson, Deon McCray, and Jordan Ragusa

Donald Trump's first year in office received unprecedented media coverage, with many wondering whether congressional Republicans were "adversaries" or "allies" of the president's legislative positions. We explore this issue from two vantage points. First, we place Trump's presidency in historical context by forecasting his Republican support with data from 1969 to 2016. We find that Republicans supported Trump's legislative positions in 2017 at levels consistent with expectations, contrary to the views of some. Second, we explore the factors that explain why Republican lawmakers supported or opposed their party's president. We find that conservative and establishment Republicans were more likely to support Trump, contrary to some claims, while female Republicans and those representing affluent, non-white districts were more likely to oppose Trump. We conclude by discussing the broader implications of these results, including the role of identity in contemporary American politics and the possible realignment of the GOP.

In the middle of the night on July 28, 2017, political observers tuned in to CSPAN for the highly anticipated vote on the GOP's "skinny repeal" of the Affordable Care Act. As he did on the campaign trail in 2016, President Donald Trump urged his Republican co-partisans to vote for the bill. In a tweet directed at a handful of recalcitrant lawmakers, Trump said his GOP colleagues needed to "step up to the plate and, after 7 years, vote to Repeal and Replace." After hours of dramatic anticipation,

Senator John McCain joined his colleagues Susan Collins and Lisa Murkowski in voting "no," thus ensuring blockage of the seven-year Republican repeal effort. Democrats in the chamber, and those watching at home, cheered in unison at 1:30 a.m. From the chamber floor, Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell put it mildly, saying the legislative failure was "clearly a disappointing moment" (CSPAN 2017).


Media coverage of a few failed legislative efforts in 2017, such as the ACA repeal, coupled with attention to

**Data replication sets are available in Harvard Dataverse at <https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/CVCF75>.*

Karyn Amira received her Ph.D. in American Politics and Political Psychology from Stony Brook University in 2015 and is Assistant Professor at the College of Charleston (amiraka@cofc.edu). Her research focuses on political identity, affective polarization, candidate perception and voting behavior. She also has published in The Journal of Politics, American Politics Research, Journal of Experimental Political Science, Social Science Quarterly, Journal of Political Science Education, and International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society.

Lauren Johnson earned her B.A. in both Political Science and Music from the College of Charleston in 2018 (laurenrayej@gmail.com). Her undergraduate research focused on the presidency, congressional behavior, and the 2016 election. She now works with community organizations on local and state housing policy in Des Moines, Iowa.

Deon McCray earned his B.A. in Political Science from the College of Charleston in 2018 (deonsju@gmail.com). McCray's undergraduate research examined the presidency and congressional behavior. He now lives in Philadelphia and plans to attend law school.

Jordan Ragusa  received his Ph.D. in American Politics and Political Methodology from the University of Florida in 2011 and is currently Associate Professor at the College of Charleston (ragusajm@cofc.edu). His research focuses on the U.S. Congress, with specific interests in political parties, polarization, legislative organization, roll-call behavior and the policymaking process. He has published in Political Research Quarterly, American Politics Research, Political Science Quarterly, Journal of Political Science, Research & Politics, and the Journal of Elections, Public Opinion, and Parties.

Republican opposition to Trump's controversial statements, may have contributed to a perception that Trump lacked the support of his own party, including support for the president's policy agenda. However, many Trump policy priorities did pass in this first year, the most prominent of which included the Republican tax bill and confirmation of Neil Gorsuch to the Supreme Court. We believe this prompts two questions: First, just how often did Republican lawmakers vote against Donald Trump in 2017, and was his party's opposition uncommon in historical perspective? Second, why did some Republicans vote against Trump's preferred policies while others were loyal supporters of the president?

We contribute to *Perspectives on Politics's* special edition on the causes and consequences of Trump's presidency in a number of ways. By examining past support from the president's own party, we are able to address a fundamental question about whether the GOP's response to Trump is abnormal or, in fact, fairly typical. We believe this is a necessary first step in addressing broader questions about Trump's relationship to the Republican Party. Our analysis finds that Trump's Republican support is in line with scholarly expectations, contrary to some claims. We also examine explanations for why Republicans supported or opposed Trump's legislative positions. Our findings suggest that President Trump's opposition from the GOP hinges on identity politics and district wealth.¹ We also find that establishment lawmakers, and especially conservative Republicans, were more likely to embrace the president's positions.

Research on Presidential Support

A lengthy literature examines presidential power—the ability to influence and persuade (Neustadt 1960). In this body of work, one way to view power is to assess the president's ability to get his legislative priorities through Congress (Lebo and O'Geen 2011). We follow this line of work, with the exception that we focus on the president's support from his *own* party. In contrast to the substantial volume of research on presidential power, research on co-party presidential support is thin at best and in need of greater development. We are aware of just one study that models support from the president's party in isolation (Prins and Shull 2006). We briefly review the relevant findings on the president's legislative support, focusing on honeymoons and mandates, public opinion, and the distribution of legislator preferences. We then draw on this body of work to assess Trump's legislative support in 2017.

Honeymoons and Mandates

Scholarship has found that lawmakers tend to vote with the president more in his first year in office than in subsequent years (Edwards 1989; Bond and Fleisher 1990; Lockerbie, Borrelli, and Hedger 1998; Peterson

et al. 2003; Grossback, Peterson, and Stimson 2005). Researchers attribute this phenomenon to either a “honeymoon period” or a “presidential mandate.” The existence of presidential honeymoons—favorable treatment by lawmakers, the public, the media, etc. in the president's first 100 days or first year—has modest backing in the literature (Frendreis, Tatalovich, and Schaff 2001; Dominguez 2005; Beckman and Godfrey 2007). In one of the more recent analyses, Beckman and Godfrey (2007) find that policy-making prospects do improve during the honeymoon period, but they are dependent on a host of other variables. Less scholarly consensus exists on the topic of presidential mandates—the notion that the president's victory grants him or her the authority to push his agenda. Whether mandates exist (Wolfinger 1985; Dahl 1990) and what drives them have been topics of controversy. Weinbaum and Judd (1970) found that mandate voting has more to do with the new makeup of Congress rather than a more comprehensive shift in lawmakers' policy preferences. Grossback, Peterson, and Stimson's (2005) analysis shows that mandates are fueled by legislators' perceptions of preference changes in the public rather than the presidents' declaration of a mandate himself (Conley 2001).

Public Opinion

The notion that the public has some influence in the president's legislative success dates back to Neustadt's (1960) work on the presidential power. In brief, Neustadt argues that the president's public support operates “mostly in the background as a conditioner” (1960, 87), helping the president persuade Congress to act on his or her legislative priorities when the president enjoys popular support. Ultimately, this view guided the next few decades of research on presidential success, leading to empirical tests of Neustadt's thesis with varying results. Some have questioned the relationship between approval and success entirely (Bond and Fleischer 1990; Collier and Sullivan 1995; Cohen et al. 2000; Edwards 1980; Rudalevige 2002). Others have replicated the thesis while calling attention to qualifier variables such as issue salience at the bill level (Canes-Wrone and de Marchi 2002) and the chamber of Congress (Edwards 1980). Recent analyses have found that public opinion of the president's co-partisans in the public is what matters most (Lebo and O'Geen 2011).

Congressional Preferences

A more recent line of scholarship finds that presidential support can be understood by examining the partisan and ideological makeup of Congress (Cooper and Brady 1981; Bond and Fleischer 1990; Peterson 1990; Rudalevige 2002; Conley 2001). For example, Peterson (1990) suggests that support for the president's agenda hinges on Congress's partisan breakdown. Likewise, Prins and Shull

(2006) find that a partisan margin variable exerts a larger effect on presidential success and support than any other predictor in their model. In their analysis, going from the lowest percentage of co-partisans in the House (33%) to the highest percentage (68%) increases the probability of presidential legislative success by 50% and the vote margin on the president's preferred legislation by 15%. Additional studies have pointed to the role of legislator ideology and ideological cohesion (Lebo and O'Green 2011; Rudalevige 2002), ideological distance between the president and party leaders (Lebo and O'Green 2011), and the exercise of stronger agenda control (Aldrich and Rohde 2001; Curry 2015; Lee 2016; Rohde 1991).

Republican Opposition to Trump's Legislative Positions In the Aggregate

Our first empirical question is whether Trump's own party is opposing his legislative priorities at a notable level. We begin by acknowledging that there is nothing unusual about members of the president's own party being at odds with his priorities. Conservative-leaning "blue dog" Democrats voted against the Affordable Care Act en masse. Likewise, Obama suffered a stinging defeat when Democrats joined with Republicans to override his veto of a bill allowing 9/11 victims' families to sue Saudi Arabia. George W. Bush faced opposition from his own party on a number of significant policy items: a bill to reform social security, which never even came to the floor for a vote; an immigration reform bill, where on multiple votes a majority of Republicans opposed Bush's position; and an override of a Medicare funding bill veto, which was thwarted with the support of about half of Republican members of Congress.

What did Trump's support in his first year look like? Aggregate data on the president's support in Congress is compiled every year by CQ Roll Call. Utilized in dozens of published studies as a dependent variable (for example in Bond and Fleisher 1980; Prins and Shull 2006; Mack, DeRouen, and Lanoue 2011), CQRC's presidential "support score" measures how each lawmaker voted on dozens of recorded votes where the president (or an authorized spokesperson) took a clear position. In this section, CQRC's data serve as our dependent variable. The data are restricted to the president's own party, where higher values indicate greater support for the president's positions and lower values indicate less support.

In 2017, CQRC coded 35 House votes and 115 Senate votes. According to these data, Trump received the support of 95.9% of his Republican co-partisans in the House and the support of 98.9% of his Republican co-partisans in the Senate. Both the greater number of votes and higher support in the Senate is due to CQRC's inclusion of presidential appointments. If we remove nomination votes from the calculation in the upper chamber, Trump's support in the Senate drops to


95.7%, almost exactly the same as in the House. Trump's high level of support in both chambers contrasts with statements such as "His inability to get anything through a Congress run by his own party is becoming an unprecedented failure" (Slate 2017) and "GOP senators are willing to tell Trump to take a hike" (Politico 2017).

Having determined that Trump enjoyed a great deal of legislative support during his first year in office, we look at whether this level of agreement is historically anomalous. One way to answer this question is to compare Trump's support to that of recent presidents. Figure 1 presents CQRC's yearly presidential support scores for a president's party since 1969 with a polynomial trend.² We can see that since Richard Nixon's first year in office, the president has enjoyed increasing support from his co-partisans. In recent Congresses, the president's support has hovered around 90%. For example, in 2016 Obama received the support of 90% of House Democrats and 87% of Senate Democrats. If we extend the trend forward one year, Trump's legislative support appears roughly in line with expectations, albeit still high.

Perhaps a better way to answer this question is to model presidential support from 1969 to 2016 and simply forecast Trump's support in 2017. Our dependent variable is the measure in Figure 1: the president's aggregate yearly support score among his co-partisans. In the model, we include nine predictors of presidential support, suggested by the literature reviewed earlier. Four of our predictors capture variation in the policy preferences of lawmakers as measured by Poole's DW-NOMINATE scores. CHAMBER POLARIZATION is the distance between the median Democrat and median Republican in the specific chamber.³ Consistent with the literature, we hypothesize that inter-party polarization leads parties to support their president. We also include an interaction effect that captures the ideological divide between southern and non-southern Democrats in the first half of the time series. IDEOLOGICAL COHESION (2ND DIM.) is derived from Poole's second-dimension scores and captures ideological variation on racial issues, where higher values indicate more variation and thus less cohesion, while the variable DEMOCRATIC PRESIDENT is an indicator for Democratic presidents. We hypothesize a negative effect on the interaction term, indicating that high variation on the second-dimension decreases the support of Democratic presidents.

We also include five contextual variables. CHAMBER MAJORITY records whether the president's party is the majority in their respective chamber. We believe that majority status—and the greater chance of enacting legislation—will unite the president and his co-partisans around a common agenda. PRESIDENTIAL APPROVAL is the president's approval rating averaged over the year, according to Gallup. When the president is popular, we believe legislative support will increase. SEATS GAINED is a continuous variable for the

Figure 1
Aggregate presidential copartisan support (1969–2017)



number of seats the president’s party gained (or lost) in the most recent election. When the president’s party loses seats—especially in a midterm—we expect legislative support to decrease. *MILITARY CASUALTIES* is the number of soldiers killed in action. Given the president’s unique role as the Commander in Chief, a high number of fatalities will perhaps yield less support. Lastly, *YEAR IN OFFICE* records the president’s tenure.⁴ Consistent with the notion of honeymoons and mandates, we predict that presidents will enjoy greater support from their co-partisans early in their tenure.

Table 1 presents our results. Because the dependent variable is continuous, we use OLS to estimate the model. We also estimated a fractional model given that the response is bound between zero and one. We found that the information criterion (AIC/BIC) vastly favors OLS. Further, a fractional model produces nearly identical results. In order to compare the effect of each covariate, the continuous covariates in table 1 were standardized to have a common scale.⁵ With just 48 observations, our main goal is predictive accuracy, not significant covariates. By that standard, our models perform fairly well, explaining 88% of the variation in presidential support in both chambers.⁶

A few factors are worth highlighting.⁷ First, the polarization variable is significant in both chambers and has the largest effect size, indicating that party dynamics within Congress are key to the broader increase in presidential support since 1973. In this respect, we would expect Trump to receive a high level of support from his Republican counterparts given continued polarization in 2017 according to Keith Poole’s data. Second, *CHAMBER MAJORITY* is significant in both chambers as well. Because the coefficients are positive they indicate that majority status is worth an extra 7.12% co-partisan support in the House and 4.50% co-partisan support in the Senate. And third, while one would think Trump’s low approval rating would cause his Republican counterparts to abandon him, the effect of *PRESIDENTIAL APPROVAL* is either insignificant and small in magnitude, as in the House model, or significant but smaller in size compared to other factors, as in the Senate model. Notably, this relatively small effect is plainly evident in figure 1, where we can see that even the most popular presidents in the 1970s and 1980s had less support than the least popular presidents in the polarized 2000s and 2010s. For example, George W. Bush enjoyed greater Republican support in 2007 and

Table 1
Legislative support in the president's party

Predictors	Model 1 (House)		Model 2 (Senate)	
	Coefficient	SE	Coefficient	SE
Chamber polarization	7.95***	(1.40)	14.23***	(1.98)
Ideological cohesion (2 nd dim.)	6.21	(4.74)	0.61	(1.76)
Democratic president	-2.29	(3.84)	-3.23	(2.36)
Dem. Pres. * cohesion (2 nd dim.)	-9.00**	(4.25)	1.41	(1.43)
Chamber majority	7.12***	(1.58)	4.50***	(1.43)
Seats gained	0.51	(0.62)	1.39*	(0.78)
Year in office	-1.35**	(0.59)	-1.07	(0.78)
Presidential approval	0.36	(0.63)	3.52***	(0.60)
Military casualties	-1.58	(2.38)	-1.95	(1.49)
Constant	70.59***	(2.60)	73.13***	(0.88)
Observations	48		48	
R-squared	0.88		0.88	

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$; robust standard errors in parentheses

2008—as one of the least popular presidents—than Ronald Reagan in 1985 and 1986—as one of the most popular presidents. We believe these effects would be significant or larger in magnitude if we had used approval scores over the entire series from the president's copartisans only (Lebo and O'Geen 2011).

In the analysis, a few factors are significant in one chamber but insignificant in the other. We find that the ideological divide among Democrats on racial issues decreases the president's support score, but only on the House side. Likewise, presidents receive less support from their copartisans later in their tenure in the House but not the Senate. In the Senate model, though not on the House side, we find that as presidential approval increases, so does presidential support, and that presidents who preside over seat gains by their party enjoy greater support. Although there are notable differences in the behavior of senators and representatives (Baker 2008), we believe the most likely explanation for these disparate results is that our sample size is limited in its scope. As noted earlier, with just 48 observations our goal is predictive accuracy, not statistically significant covariates. In support of our claim about the sample size, it is worth noting that each insignificant effect is *always* in the same direction as its significant counterpart in the other chamber.

Table 1 forecasts Trump's support in 2017, which allows us to see whether his GOP support is in line with expectations. We do so by simply computing the linear prediction for Trump's first year—with the requisite data for 2017—along with a 95% confidence interval. Figures 2 and 3 present the results for the House and Senate, respectively. In both figures, Trump's actual support in 2017 is denoted by a circle. Simply put, figures 2 and 3 reveal that Trump's Republican support is *in line with expectations* given that the president's support score in 2017 is within the confidence intervals. Although it is true

that Trump's legislative support set a record in 2017—despite the impression given by some headlines—our main conclusion in this section is that his support is not unusual given the features of the 115th Congress.

Republican Opposition to Trump's Legislative Positions by Member

Although Trump enjoys a great deal of support from his party in the aggregate, it is also clear that he does receive occasional pushback. For example, in June of 2017, 50 of 52 Senate Republicans voted to limit Trump's ability of lift sanctions on Russia for meddling in U.S. elections. Perhaps most notable was the repeated failure of the GOP's Obamacare repeal efforts. Given that there has been at least *some* legislative resistance from Republicans, we now ask: "What member level variables predict opposition and support for Trump's agenda?" As we note in our conclusion, answering this question provides insights into emerging dynamics within the Republican Party.


Scholarly Explanations

In order to generate a model of Trump's support among lawmakers, we draw on four general categories of variables that are important to individual-level congressional behavior: electoral motivations, policy preferences, identity, and establishment dynamics. We begin by acknowledging that some factors we test could fit into multiple categories. In particular, many variables could relate back to electoral motivations. We use the four categories because the literature tends to speak about them separately (but see further commentary in the conclusion). We also recognize that this framework may not be generalizable to all presidents.

Electoral Motivations

In David Mayhew's (1974) seminal work, he suggested that legislative behavior can be explained in large part by

Figure 2
Aggregate presidential copartisan support forecast (House)



thinking of lawmakers as rational actors who seek reelection above all else and are therefore reactive to their constituent wants. While there are surely other motivations and pressures at play (Fenno 1978), Mayhew's thesis has inspired countless studies that use district/state characteristics and opinions as independent variables to explain the actions of congressmen and women. Evidence of this "electoral connection" has been found to affect a range of legislator behaviors (Herrick, Moore, and Hibbing 1994), including support for the president (Lebo and O'Geen 2011).⁸ Electoral motivations are also reflected in media explanations of Trump's Republican support or opposition. For example, Alexander Burns (2017) of the *New York Times* implies that constituents may electorally punish their legislators for voting a certain direction on tax reform by stating that "key blue-state Republicans face an agonizing balancing act, weighing their ambition to deliver broad tax cuts with the narrower interests of their districts".

Policy Preferences


A lawmaker's ideology, usually conceived as a left/right orientation to economic issues (Poole and Rosenthal 1997), has become an important factor in the modern,

polarized era and has been shown to have considerable predictive power in legislator behavior (Poole 2007). Davis and Porter (1989) put it bluntly: "A politician's preferences do matter. He is not strictly a captured agent speaking only for his constituents' interests." Most important for our purposes is the research showing that a member's ideological leanings shape their general roll-call behavior (Poole 2007). We therefore expect to see legislators' personal preferences affecting their roll call votes during Trump's first year, though the precise direction of this effect is uncertain. In particular, questions about the dynamic between Trump and conservative Republicans made its way into popular discourse. For example, Senator Jeff Flake's (2017) book *Conscience of a Conservative* asks whether fellow conservatives are likely to go along with the Trump agenda.

Identity

While it is tempting to assume that electoral motivations, ideology and partisanship drive much of Congressional roll call behavior, a substantial body of evidence has accumulated in support of descriptive representation, which states that legislators do a better job representing

Figure 3
Aggregate presidential copartisan support forecast (Senate)



citizens who share their demographic features and lifestyle (Burden 2007). Evidence indicates that lawmakers engage in a range of behaviors that stem from demographic factors such as their race (Canon 1999; Butler and Broockman 2011), gender (Swers 2002), socioeconomic class (Carnes 2013), and religion (Burden 2007). Research in the Congress literature also theorizes that legislative behavior reflects a kind of group identity (Loomis 1984; Garand and Clayton 1986; Ragusa 2016). Given these findings, coupled with popular discussion about the growing role of identity in American politics, it is reasonable to expect members of Congress to express their personal characteristics through their roll-call votes and, perhaps, support or oppose Trump for reasons that can be explained as a function of their identity. Although these effects likely depend on the issue content or vote in question, we believe they may show up in aggregate support scores.

Establishment Dynamics

Although the term “the establishment” only gained traction recently, and has therefore been subject to less empirical testing, recent evidence does indicate that an

establishment/anti-establishment rift exists in the GOP (Ragusa and Gaspar 2016). One might expect establishment Republicans to oppose an “unorthodox” president like Trump. However, the evidence guides us towards the opposite expectation. First, the nature of polarization in the contemporary era (McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 2001) leads one to expect ideologically cohesive parties to vote in unison on policy matters. At the same time, we might expect establishment Republicans to vote together even when they disagree on ideological grounds (Lee 2009) in an effort to magnify differences with Democrats and thus help win election (Lee 2016). Second, because the establishment’s fate is most closely tied to the success (or failure) of their party’s standard-bearer (Cohen et al. 2008), it stands to reason that those at the “core” of the party would support the president the most given that their fate is tied to his fate (Stonecash 2013). And third, a recent paper by Johnson, McCray, and Ragusa (2018) found that establishment Republicans were more likely to endorse Trump in the 2016 election. Due to this emerging evidence, we believe the establishment is more—not less—likely to back Trump’s legislative positions. We

consider this category to be particularly intriguing given its prominence in everyday discourse, where journalists and pundits see Trump's presidency as representing an existential conflict between establishment and anti-establishment factions in the party.

Member Level Data and Method

Dependent Variable

Our dependent variable is constructed using the same data as earlier: CQ Roll Call's presidential support scores in 2017. However, unlike our earlier analysis, which used an aggregate percentage, here we conduct a member-vote level analysis. A value of "1" in the dependent variable indicates that a Republican lawmaker cast a vote in line with Trump's position on a given bill and a value of "0" indicates that the member cast a vote against Trump's position on that bill. Because CQRC's senate data include presidential nominations, where such votes do not exist in the House, we estimate models with and without these votes as a robustness check.⁹

We follow Edwards (2009a), Bond and Fleisher (1990), Prins and Shull (2006), and others in how we analyze and interpret CQRC's data. We note that these scores do *not* reflect the president's effect on how members vote, but instead represent shared preferences between the two actors (Prins and Shull 2006, 24). Therefore, we refer to our results as reflecting presidential "support" or "agreement" rather than presidential "success" or "influence." In the analysis, we exclude lopsided votes, defined as any vote that received greater than 80% support, following Edwards' (2009a) recommendations (see also Bond and Fleisher 1990). Given our interest in non-routine votes, we believe this threshold is justified, even though alternative cutoffs are used in other roll-call analyses (for example NOMINATE scores use a 95% threshold).

Although widely used, presidential support scores suffer from three limitations. First, because party leaders only bring a bill to the floor if it has the support of a majority of their caucus, these scores reflect a mix of support for the president's agenda *and* the agenda of party leaders. Researchers must therefore disentangle these two forces and capture support for the president's positions *beyond* the usual forces of party loyalty. Second, the scores exhibit two kinds of selection bias. On the one hand, because the president doesn't take a position on *every* legislative matter, the kinds of bills that garner presidential attention no doubt differ from those the president chooses to ignore. As just one example, the president may take a position only when a bill has a high chance of passing, as indicated by the number of bill co-sponsors or its ideological orthodoxy. On the other hand, because the president can't *force* Congress to hold a vote, an unavoidable issue is that we lack information on a lawmaker's support for presidential priorities that never receive a vote.

In the analysis that follows, we take steps to address the first two items. First, in the model, we control for a lawmaker's baseline party unity with a variable that records the percentage of non-unanimous votes a member cast with his or her co-partisans in the first-session of the 115th Congress. Needless to say, this variable explains the greatest share of variation in the models and creates a high hurdle for other effects to overcome.¹⁰ At issue in our analysis is whether a member votes with the president in a way that differs from how they typically vote on what party leaders bring to the floor. Second, we account for selection bias in the issues the president takes a position on by estimating a selection model. A model such as ours "corrects" for selection bias in the outcome equation, which in our case is the main model of Republican support for Trump's agenda. We cannot address the third limitation—presidential agenda items that do not come up for a vote.

Independent Variables

In the analysis, we test multiple electoral variables. GOP VOTE PERCENT is the percentage of the two-party vote for the Republican president averaged over the last two elections while MARGIN OF VICTORY is the difference between the member's vote percentage and the second-place finisher. Both are measured at the district level for representatives and state level for senators. We hypothesize that lawmakers from strong Republican districts/states and those who won by narrow margins have electoral incentives to support their party's president. ELECTORAL THREAT accounts for members who announced they wouldn't seek reelection in 2018 and were therefore "free" to oppose the president.¹¹ For members seeking reelection, the variable assumes the value "360," which is the number of days between the first day in session (January 3, 2017) and the last day in session (December 29, 2017). For members who announced they would not seek reelection, the variable is the number of days from the member's announcement to the last day in session.¹² Lastly, we test various demographic features of a lawmaker's district/state: HISPANIC POPULATION, BLACK POPULATION, MUSLIM POPULATION, COLLEGE EDUCATED POPULATION, PER CAPITA INCOME, and MANUFACTURING POPULATION.¹³ We suspect that Republicans in districts and states that are disproportionately white, with fewer college graduates, have lower incomes, and have a large manufacturing population will be more likely to support Trump's legislative agenda. While all six tap into electoral motivations, they also capture two facets of identity politics: race and socioeconomic class.

We also include five electoral variables that measure constituents' attitudes on a host of issues. All five came from the Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES) and are available at the state and district levels. RACIAL PROBLEMS asks the respondent their views on the

frequency of racial problems in the United States. Higher values indicate that the respondents believe there are more racial issues facing the nation. *ECONOMIC ANXIETY* asks respondents whether the nation's economy has gotten better or worse over the past year. Higher values indicate the respondent believes the economy has gotten worse, and thus has greater economic anxiety. We also include policy questions that ask whether the respondent favors banning Muslims from the United States, whether they want the government to hire more border agents along the Mexican border, and if they want to increase the number of police on the streets. For each variable—*MUSLIM BAN*, *MORE BORDER AGENTS*, *MORE POLICE*—higher values indicate a greater percentage of respondents supporting the respective policy proposal. Consistent with the discussion about identity, we suspect that concerns about racial problems will be associated with less agreement with Trump's legislative agenda while economic anxiety and constituent support for the three policy proposals will be associated with greater agreement.

A lawmaker's ideology, measured with a single variable, *CONSERVATISM*, is our lone measure of a Republican member's preferences. Following conventions in the literature, this variable is a lawmaker's first-dimension *DW-NOMINATE* score.¹⁴ Generally speaking, this variable captures a lawmaker's preferences concerning government involvement in the economy, where higher values indicate greater conservatism and lower values indicate an ideologically moderate. For example, Senator Marco Rubio has a score of 0.59, making him one of the more conservative members of the Senate, while Lisa Murkowski has a score of 0.21, making her one of the most moderate Republicans in the upper chamber. It is unclear whether conservatives have been more supportive or less supportive of Trump's agenda compared to relative moderates.

In the analysis, we have three demographic variables that record relevant features of a lawmaker's identity. We include 1/0 variables for whether the lawmaker is *HISPANIC*, *FEMALE*, or *MORMON*. We obtained these data from a combination of sources including the Congressional Biographical Directory and the member's website. We hypothesize that, as a result of Trump's statements about women and racial and religious minorities, lawmakers with these characteristics may be more likely to oppose Trump's legislative agenda.

Lastly, we examine establishment dynamics with three measures. Because the "establishment" is a multifaceted concept, we do not believe there is one single best measure. First, we include a lawmaker's second dimension *DW-NOMINATE* score. We label this covariate *ESTABLISHMENT RECORD* since it stems from a lawmaker's roll-call record. Keith Poole has noted¹⁵ that in the recent Congresses the second dimension no longer represents regional patterns, but instead taps into "intra-party divi-

sions," namely what he calls an "insider vs. outsider cleavage." Lower values indicate members of the anti-establishment. For example, with scores of -0.57 and -0.49, respectively, both Susan Collins and Rand Paul have anti-establishment voting records (even though Collins is a moderate in the first dimension while Paul extremely conservative). *CONGRESSIONAL LEADER* records if the legislator is a party leader or chairs a standing committee in the 115th Congress. Conceivably, party leaders and committee chairs are part of the establishment owing to their greater institutional resources and power. Finally, the variable *TEA PARTY/FREEDOM CAUCUS* records if a lawmaker ever belonged to either intra-party group.¹⁶ We posit that members of these two groups represent an anti-establishment faction of the GOP.

Member-Level Findings

Our results are presented in table 2.¹⁷ Model 3 excludes presidential nomination votes (which are only possible in the senate) while Model 4 includes them. Both are bivariate probit selection models where the unit of analysis in both equations is how a member voted on a bill. In the selection equation, the dependent variable¹⁸ is an indicator that records whether Trump took a position on the vote in question (coded "1") or not (coded "0"). Our sample in the selection equation consists of votes at final passage and any procedural or amendment votes classified by CQ Roll Call.¹⁹ In the selection equation, we include variables for the ideological location of the bill, its chamber of origin, the number of cosponsors, and the committee of referral (which serves as a proxy for the bill's policy content). We do not report the selection equation results due to space constraints but are happy to provide them upon request. Finally, in the outcome equation, our sample consists of votes on items where Trump took a position.

Looking at the covariates in the outcome equation, the model uncovers some evidence for all four theoretical categories. In both models, our lone measure of a lawmaker's policy preferences, *CONSERVATISM*, is positive and significant, indicating that conservative Republicans were more likely to vote with Trump in 2017. In contrast, ideologically moderate Republicans were more likely to vote against the president. As a substantive matter, this validates Jeff Flake's concerns that his conservative colleagues are supporting, rather than opposing, the president. Second, the positive and significant effect of *ESTABLISHMENT VOTING RECORD* in both models reveals that Republicans with establishment roll-call records were more likely to vote with Trump in 2017. Conversely, anti-establishment Republicans were more likely to oppose the president. Notably, this contradicts the suggestion from some in the media that Trump's presidency represents a war on the party's establishment (CNN 2017; Washington Post 2017). Both results are consistent with the finding that conservative and establishment Republicans

Table 2
Determinants of GOP agreement with Trump's legislative positions

Predictors	Model 3 (Nominations Excluded)		Model 4 (Nominations Included)	
	Coefficient	SE	Coefficient	SE
Policy preferences				
Conservatism	0.74**	(0.29)	0.71**	(0.28)
Identity				
Female	-0.22**	(0.09)	-0.24***	(0.09)
Hispanic	-0.16	(0.13)	-0.11	(0.12)
Mormon	-0.07	(0.18)	-0.02	(0.16)
Electoral Motivations				
GOP vote percent	-1.20*	(0.71)	-1.31*	(0.72)
Margin of victory	0.12	(0.16)	0.14	(0.17)
Electoral threat	0.08	(0.06)	0.07	(0.06)
College educated population	-0.01	(0.01)	-0.01	(0.01)
Per capita income	-0.52**	(0.25)	-0.53**	(0.25)
Manufacturing population	0.00	(0.01)	0.00	(0.01)
Economic anxiety	-0.17	(0.25)	-0.22	(0.25)
Hispanic population	-0.55**	(0.27)	-0.57**	(0.28)
Black population	-0.89**	(0.42)	-0.86**	(0.42)
Muslim population	-0.04	(0.04)	-0.03	(0.04)
Racial problems	-0.40*	(0.23)	-0.39	(0.24)
Muslim Ban	-0.31	(0.33)	-0.31	(0.35)
More border agents	-0.47	(0.64)	-0.28	(0.67)
More police	-0.57	(0.56)	-0.62	(0.59)
Establishment Dynamics				
Establishment voting record	1.14***	(0.14)	1.16***	(0.14)
Tea Party/Freedom Caucus	0.04	(0.07)	0.01	(0.07)
Congressional leader	0.15	(0.11)	0.15	(0.11)
Controls				
Party unity	3.59***	(0.58)	4.00***	(0.59)
Senator	0.23**	(0.10)	0.64***	(0.10)
Number of terms	0.04	(0.06)	0.02	(0.06)
Constant	6.19**	(2.84)	6.52**	(2.96)
Observations	8,360		11,096	
Selection equation (estimated but not reported)				

***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10; robust standard errors in parentheses

were more likely to endorse Trump in the 2016 campaign (Johnson, McCray, and Ragusa 2018).

All of the identity variables are negative in table 2, as expected, yet only the FEMALE variable is significant, revealing that female Republicans were less likely to vote with Trump's legislative positions. In contrast, Male Republicans represent some of Trump's strongest supporters. Because the model controls for a range of factors, gender seems to be a salient dimension vis-à-vis Trump's presidency. We note that this effect is consistent with the finding that female Republicans were more likely to join the #NeverTrump movement in the 2016 campaign (Johnson, McCray, and Ragusa 2018). We do not find a significant effect on the Mormon variable, however. We think this is due to the fact that religious bans were not linked—either directly or indirectly—to any of Trump's legislative positions in 2017. Finally, while the null effect on the variable for Hispanic Republicans is perhaps

surprising, we do find an effect in the electoral motivations category.

We find a consistent effect on three electoral variables in the analysis. First, the coefficients on HISPANIC POPULATION and BLACK POPULATION are negative, meaning the greater the percentage of Hispanic and black constituents, the less likely a Republican member is to vote with the president. Conversely, the greater the white population, the more likely a member was to vote with the president. We also find a negative and significant effect on PERCAPITA INCOME, revealing that lawmakers from more affluent districts and states were less likely to vote with Trump while Republicans from poorer districts and states were more likely to. All three effects indicate an important role of electoral motivations in the decision to support Donald Trump, particularly in the form of identity politics.

In table 2, we find two control variables that are significant in each model. First, PARTY UNITY indicates that


lawmakers who typically vote with their party were more likely to support the president’s positions. As noted earlier, this variable creates a high hurdle for other factors to overcome and helps ensure that the effects reported above reflect how a lawmaker voted on Trump’s positions in a way that differs from how they voted on what party leaders typically brought to the floor. Second, SENATOR indicates that senators are more likely to support the president’s position. Although we are not surprised by this result in Model 4, as it includes nomination votes that drive up presidential support, we can only speculate about the cause of this effect in Model 3. One possibility is because there are more total roll-call votes in the House, including more votes on which the president took a position, there may be a greater number of times a lawmaker could vote against the president in the lower chamber.

As a final matter, we find a marginally significant effect ($p < .10$) of GOP VOTE PERCENT in both models. Because the effect is negative, the coefficient indicates that lawmakers from deep red districts and states were *less* likely to vote with the president in 2017, which is the opposite of expectations. Upon closer inspection, we discovered that this marginally significant effect is due to the variable’s correlation with other electoral variables in the analysis. Diagnostics do not indicate problematic collinearity, however, so we kept this variable in the model as a control.

We also examined the effect sizes of the significant non-control variables in models: conservatism, establishment record, sex, district/state racial composition, and per-capita income.²⁰ We did this by standardizing the continuous covariates—so that they have the same scale—and by computing the absolute marginal effect of each factor. In figure 4, a positive sign indicates a variable with a positive effect (it increases Trump’s legislative support) while a negative sign represents a variable with a negative effect (it decreases Trump’s legislative support). Because the continuous covariates were standardized, a one-unit change indicates a standard deviation increase above the variable’s mean.

According to figure 4, Republicans with voting records one standard deviation in the establishment direction were 4.3% more likely to vote with the president on the floor. In the Senate, there were just over 100 presidential support votes in 2017, so every 1% increase in the likelihood of voting with the president translates into roughly one extra vote with Trump’s position per senator per year. Given the narrow margin on a number of key votes in the Senate—such as the ACA repeal vote—one additional vote in either direction could mean the difference between success and failure on the floor. Next, female Republicans were 3.0% less likely to support the president’s position in 2017 whereas one standard deviation increase in a Republican’s conservatism was associated with a 1.5% increase in their likelihood of voting with the president on the floor.

Figure 4
Significant covariate effect size



Finally, lawmakers from affluent districts and states—those one standard deviation above the mean—were 1.4% less likely to vote with the president, as indicated by the effect of district/state per-capita income, while members representing a large percentage of African American or Hispanic constituents are 1.0% less likely vote with the president.

We find it interesting that the three factors with larger effect sizes are all non-electoral, insofar as they aren’t direct measurements of constituents themselves. While electoral motivations certainly matter when it comes to explaining a Republican lawmaker’s roll-call behavior on Trump’s legislative priorities, the results indicate they are not the entirety of the story. Simply put, lawmakers do not seem to be “single minded” in their pursuit of re-election when it comes to Trump. Rather, they seem to be making primarily personal decisions based on their policy preferences and identity.

Conclusions and Implications

Our findings shed light on the dynamics of Donald Trump’s Republican support in his first year in office. Our first analysis reaches an unexpected conclusion: although the extent of Republican agreement with Trump’s positions is the highest on record, it is not unexpected given the features of the 115th Congress. Our second analysis provides a host of both intuitive and counterintuitive conclusions about the dynamics of Trump’s legislative support. First, it is not surprising that the demographic features of legislators and their districts are driving factors among Trump’s copartisans, with female lawmakers and those representing non-white districts and states among those most opposed to the president’s positions. Male Republicans representing overwhelmingly white districts

and states are Trump's strongest supporters, by comparison. However, it is perhaps counter-intuitive that both conservative and establishment Republicans represent Trump's strongest *supporters*. As noted earlier, the direction of these effects runs counter to the conventional wisdom that portrays Trump as a heterodox, anti-establishment figure seeking to remake the GOP from within.

Given these findings, we conclude by addressing the question: what broader implications do our findings have for the Republican Party? In the paragraphs below, we provide tentative answers to this question. We urge readers to keep in mind that our findings are preliminary and raise just as many questions as definitive answers. As is often the case with emerging literature, further research is needed.

For starters, it is worth noting that our significant predictors do not fit into only one of the four categories outlined in the fourth section, as some categories have natural overlaps. Despite this, some patterns do emerge. First, it appears that Trump's Republican allies and adversaries are motivated, in large part, by identity politics. As noted, our results indicate that being a woman is a key driver of Trump's opposition, with male lawmakers representing Trump's strongest supporters, and that this effect exists independent of a lawmaker's policy-preferences and electoral motivations. In addition, the non-white composition of a member's district compels Republican lawmakers to oppose Trump while the white population drives support for the president's positions. Although the demographics of one's constituents are categorized as electoral motivations in our theoretical framework, the fact that two of the significant district/state variables are racial in nature—rather than tapping into the raw partisan composition of a lawmaker's constituents—indicates that something important is occurring with identity features. The combination of all three findings suggest that scholars should continue to analyze the Trump presidency using identity-related theories and variables.

In contemporary political discourse, the phrase “identity politics” has become a something of a buzzword and is often used as an expression leveraged against the Democratic Party for appealing to race and gender (Lilla 2017). Our findings suggest that identity politics—to some degree—also lives at the elite level of the Republican Party. Trump's identity-centric remarks, behaviors, and policy priorities may be causing female legislators to look inward, thus activating a kind of descriptive representation (Burden 2007). Although we are not the first to note that gender is a predictor of legislative roll-call behavior, prior studies typically examine this pattern with a focus on gendered policies (Thomas 1991; MacDonald and O'Brien 2011). We believe the current climate requires us to pay attention to this variable writ large, especially

given that Republican female legislators were also less likely to endorse Trump during the 2016 election (Johnson, McCray, and Ragusa 2018). However, we once again urge caution when considering these results and reiterate that further research is needed.

An important question in the wake of Trump's election is whether the GOP is in the midst of realignment away from its conservative roots (free markets, free trade, limited government, moral absolutism, etc.) and thus resembling the president's heterodox policies and personality. With just one year's worth of data, it is hard for us to answer this question definitively but our findings provide hints at this possibility. In addition to the identity-related effects we described, which mirror a range of studies on realigning dynamics among *voters* (Mutz 2018; Valentino, Wayne, and Oceno 2018), the fact that conservative and establishment Republicans represent the president's strongest supporters lends indirect evidence of a realignment from within the party. Although there are causality questions, which we address next, we think these results suggest at least *some* movement of the GOP from its conservative roots in the Trump direction. Future work should continue to study the behavior of the Republican establishment and especially the behavior of conservative elites. Our interpretation of events is certainly not the only way to view the behavior of Republican lawmakers in the age of Trump. For example, a logical alternative to the realignment hypothesis is that these results reflect strategic electoral behavior in a period of ideologically sorted parties. Research has shown that competitive elections in the modern era incentivize the parties to unify in opposition to one another (Lee 2016). In this respect, it is no surprise that ideology has the largest effect in our analysis and that conservatives represent Trump's strongest supporters.

On the question of which direction these effects run, it is important consider whether Trump is changing the Republican Party, or whether the Republican Party is changing Trump. The answer is likely somewhere in the middle. First, it is undeniable that party leaders and committee chairpersons set the legislative agenda, not the president, and thus congressional Republicans are surely causing Trump to take stances on some bills he may not champion voluntarily. However, the relationship is surely more complicated than that, and the direction of causality might depend on the issue area. Given our findings, we think Trump's greatest effect on the GOP agenda may be occurring on issues tied to identity. For example, there were a number of votes in Congress that hinged on identity politics such as penalizing sanctuary cities, stricter immigration laws, and deporting immigrants suspected of being in gangs. While these are certainly right-wing policies, they are a clear abandonment of the Rove/Bush view that the GOP needs to appeal to

Hispanics and Latinos. The Republican Party is a long way from the organization that tried to pass the Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2006, which included an increase in the number of guest workers and a path to legalization for illegal immigrants. On domestic economic issues, however, we think Trump has embraced orthodox Republican positions. The tax reform bill would undoubtedly have passed no matter which Republican won the party's nomination. While the GOP establishment may be changing Trump on some issues, it is possible that the effect runs the other way on others issues. Future researchers—armed with more votes across a range of issue domains—can help resolve this issue.

Our findings can and should be retested as roll-call votes continue to compile throughout the Trump presidency. There are a host of ways to explore how Trump is shaping the attitudes and behavior of GOP elites. In this respect, our results are the first to address what is likely to a long line of scholarship into Trump's relationship with Congress and his own party. Party realignments can take some time to develop, and given the long-term implications of Trump's presidency for separation of powers and legislative-executive interaction, we urge scholars to replicate these findings and continue using identity, ideology, and establishment measures as important indicators of Congressional behavior—particularly voting behavior.

Notes

- 1 Although see the note in section IV and the conclusion about how constituent identity can overlap with electoral motivations.
- 2 We computed the trend using Stata's *fppfit* command, which fits a fractional polynomial line. Alternative fit lines, including a moving average, produce similar patterns. We began with Nixon's first year in office for two reasons. First, Nixon's presidency is often cited as a turning point in legislative/executive relations. Second, the early 1970s were a period of notable legislative reforms that altered the functioning of Congress and began a steady increase in polarization.
- 3 We use Jeff Lewis' (previously Keith Poole) DW-NOMINATE scores for the measures of chamber polarization and ideological cohesion. Data are available at the site www.voteview.com.
- 4 We reset the count at "1" in their first full year for Johnson (1964) and Ford (1975).
- 5 We do so by subtracting the mean from each continuous variable and then dividing it by its standard deviation. In this respect, each variable has the same scale, where the coefficients in Table 1 indicate the effect of a standard deviation increase above the variable's mean.
- 6 With forty-eight observations and ten predictors, we have high collinearity. Because our goal in this model is predictive accuracy rather than hypothesis testing, this is not a significant limitation. Collinearity does not affect the equation's overall fit and therefore does not affect its predictive abilities.
- 7 We tested a divided government variable as well. However, we found that it was insignificant in both models and added high collinearity. We therefore omit that variable in the results reported here.
- 8 We recognize that Lebo and O'Geen's analysis was at the aggregate level.
- 9 We pool the chambers for two main reasons. First, our model includes variables that account for a range of interchamber differences in roll-call behavior, and we do not have a theoretical reason why coefficients would be different across chambers. Furthermore, it is important to keep in mind that we do estimate split samples that include/exclude the nomination votes, which is perhaps the main interchamber difference in our analysis. Second, we pool the chambers to obtain critical variation in both the independent and dependent variables and increase the sample size. We believe this is critically important given that our analysis is based on one year's worth of data.
- 10 We note that the extent of party unity in the 115th Congress most resembles other congresses in proximity to the 115th (i.e. the 114th, 113th, 112th, etc.). For this reason, our findings may be more generalizable to the modern period rather than congresses in other periods.
- 11 We did not include members who resigned or filled a vacant seat due to a resignation.
- 12 For example, the variable assumes the value "331" for Joe Barton, given his retirement announcement at the very end of the first session on November 11, 2017, while it assumes the value "3" for Sam Johnson, who announced his retirement three days into the first session on January 6, 2017. Conceptually, this accounts for how long a retiring member was free from the constraints of having to win reelection.
- 13 Each demographic variable was obtained from the Census Bureau's website.
- 14 Data are available at www.voteview.com.
- 15 Refer to a March 6, 2015, post on Poole's *VoteView Blog* titled "House: Vote on Clean DHS Funding Bill."
- 16 For data on the Tea Party Caucus, see Ragusa and Gapsar 2016. Freedom Caucus membership data was provided by Connor Phillips and David Rohde through personal communication.
- 17 Because our model has a large number of covariates, including some that correlate with one another, we tested the model for high collinearity. We found that

variance inflation is well within acceptable ranges for each variable.

- 18 We do not examine the direction of the president's position for two reasons. First, we are most concerned with correcting for selection bias in the items on which the president chooses to take a stance. Because the president ignores a large percentage of the bills, we believe this is a potentially large source of bias. And second, the president almost always encourages his copartisans to vote for a bill. In that sense, the direction of the president's position is captured to a large extent by the selection equation that we estimate.
- 19 For example, the failed vote that killed the GOP's "skinny" repeal on July 28 was technically an amendment to strike and replace that would have set up a final passage vote on the repeal bill.
- 20 We conducted this analysis using Model 3, as the inclusion of nomination votes artificially increases a lawmaker's presidential support.

References

- Aldrich, John H. and David W. Rohde. 2001. "The Logic of Conditional Party Government: Revisiting the Electoral Connection." In *Congress Reconsidered*, ed. Lawrence C. Dodd and Bruce I. Oppenheimer, 269–92, Washington, DC: CQ Press
- Baker, Ross. 2008. *House and Senate*. New York: W.W. Norton & Company.
- Beckmann, Matthew N. and Joseph Godfrey. 2007. "The Policy Opportunities in Presidential Honeymoons." *Political Research Quarterly* 60(2): 250–62.
- Bond, Jon R. and Richard Fleischer. 1990. *The President in the Legislative Arena*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press
- Burden, Barry C. 2007. *Personal Roots of Representation*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press
- Butler, Daniel M. and David E. Broockman. 2011. "Do Politicians Racially Discriminate Against Constituents? A Field Experiment on State Legislators." *American Journal of Political Science* 55(3): 463–77
- Canes-Wrone, Brandice and Scott de Marchi. 2002. "Presidential Approval and Legislative Success." *The Journal of Politics* 64(2): 491–509
- Canon, David T. 1999. *Race, Redistricting, and Representation: The Unintended Consequences of Black Majority Districts*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Carnes, Nicholas. 2013. *White-Collar Government: The Hidden Role of Class in Economic Policy Making*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- CNN. 2017. "The Republican Party Is in the Midst of a Civil War and Donald Trump Is Winning." Retrieved May 6, 2019. <https://www.cnn.com/2017/10/26/politics/trump-mccconnell-bannon-war/index.html>.
- Cohen, Jeffrey E., Jon R. Bond, Richard Fleisher, and John A. Hamman. 2000. "State-Level Presidential Approval and Senatorial Support." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 25: 577–90
- Cohen, Marty, David Karol, Hans Noel, and John Zaller. 2008. *The Party Decides: Presidential Nominations before and after Reform*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Collier, Kenneth and Terry Sullivan. 1995. "New Evidence Undercutting the Linkage of Approval with Presidential Support and Influence." *Journal of Politics* 57: 197–209.
- Conely, Patricia Heidotting. 2001. *Presidential Mandates: How Elections Shape the National Agenda*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press
- Cooper, Joseph and David W. Brady. 1981. "Institutional Context and Leadership Style: The House from Cannon to Rayburn." *American Political Science Review* 75(2): 411–25
- C-SPAN. 2017. "Senator McCain Votes against Health Care Repeal." <https://www.c-span.org/video/?431873-13/senator-mccain-votes-health-care-repeal>.
- Curry, J. M. 2015. *Legislating in the Dark: Information and Power in the House of Representatives*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Dahl, Robert A. 1990. "Myth of the Presidential Mandate." *Political Science Quarterly* 105(3): 355–72
- Davis, Michael L. and Philip K. Porter. 1989. "A Test for Pure or Apparent Ideology in Congressional Voting." *Public Choice* 60(2): 101–11
- Dominguez, Casey Byrne Knudsen. 2005. "Is It a Honeymoon? An Empirical Investigation of the President's First Hundred Days." *Congress & the Presidency* 32(1): 63–78
- Edwards, George C. 1980. *Presidential Influence in Congress*. San Francisco: W.H. Freeman.
- . 1989. *At the Margins: Presidential Leadership of Congress*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- . 2009. "Presidential Approval and Congressional Support." In *The Oxford Handbook of the American Presidency*, ed. George C. Edwards and William G. Howell, 338–361. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
- Fenno, Richard. 1978. *Home Style: House Members in their Districts*. Boston: Little, Brown.
- Flake, Jeff. 2017. *Conscience of a Conservative: A Rejection of Destructive Politics and a Return to Principle*. New York: Random House
- Frendreis, John, Raymond Tatalovich, and Jon Schaff. 2001. "Predicting Legislative Output in the First One-Hundred Days, 1897–1995." *Political Research Quarterly*. 54(4)
- Garand, James and Kathleen Clayton. 1986. "Socialization to Partisanship in the U.S. House: The Speaker's Task Force." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 3(3): 409–28
- Grossback, Lawrence J. David A. M. Peterson and James A. Stimson. 2005. "Comparing Competing Theories

- on the Causes of Mandate Perceptions." *American Journal of Political Science* 49(2): 406–19.
- Herrick, Rebekah, Michael K. Moore, and John R. Hibbing. 1994. "Unfastening the Electoral Connection: The Behavior of Representatives when Reelection Is No Longer a Factor." *Journal of Politics* 56(1): 214–27.
- Jacobson, Gary C. 2018. "The Effects of the Early Trump Presidency on Public Attitudes toward the Republican Party." *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 48(3): 404–35.
- Johnson, Lauren R., Deon McCray, and Jordan M. Ragusa. 2018. "#NeverTrump: Why Republican Members of Congress Refused to Support Their Party's Nominee in the 2016 Presidential Election." *Research & Politics* 5(1): 1–10.
- Lebo, Matthew J. and Andrew O'Geen. 2011. "The President's Role in the Partisan Congressional Arena." *Journal of Politics* 73: 718734
- Lee, Frances E. 2009. *Beyond Ideology: Politics, Principles, and Partisanship in the US Senate*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- . 2016. *Insecure Majorities: Congress and the Perpetual Campaign*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Lilla, Mark. 2017. *The Once and Future Liberal: After Identity Politics*. New York: Harper Collins.
- Lockerbie, Brad, Stephen Borrelli, and Scott Hedger. 1998. "An Integrative Approach to Modeling Presidential Success in Congress." *Political Research Quarterly* 51(1): 155–72
- Loomis, Burdette. 1984. "Congressional Careers and Party Leadership in the Contemporary House of Representatives." *American Journal of Political Science* 28(2): 180–202.
- MacDonald, Jason. A. and Erin E. O'Brien. 2011. Quasi-Experimental Design, Constituency, and Advancing Women's Interests: Reexamining the Influence of Gender on Substantive Representation. *Political Research Quarterly* 64(2): 472–86.
- Mack, W. R., Karl DeRouen Jr., and David Lanoue. 2011. "Foreign Policy Votes and Presidential Support in Congress." *Foreign Policy Analysis* 9(1): 79–102.
- Mayhew, David R. 1974. *Congress: The Electoral Connection*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press
- McCarty, Nolan, Keith Poole, and Howard Rosenthal. 2001. "The Hunt for Party Discipline in Congress." *American Political Science Review* 95(3): 673–688.
- Mutz, Diana C. 2018. "Status Threat, Not Economic Hardship, Explains the 2016 Presidential Vote." *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences*. 115(19): E4330–E4339. DOI: 10.1073/pnas.1718155115.
- Neustadt, Richard. 1960. *Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents: The Politics of Leadership from Roosevelt to Reagan*. New York: Free Press
- New York Times*. 2017a. "Jeff Flake Plants a Flag." Retrieved March 14, 2018. <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/28/opinion/columnists/jeff-flake-plants-a-flag.html>.
- . 2017b. "Tax Plan Burdens Blue State Republicans and Their District." Retrieved May 6, 2019. <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/05/us/tax-bill-blue-state.html>
- Peterson, David A. M., Lawrence J. Grossback, James A. Stimson, and Amy Gangl. 2003. "Congressional Response to Mandate Elections." *American Journal of Political Science* 47: 411–26.
- Peterson, Mark. 1990. *Legislating Together: The White House and Capitol Hill from Eisenhower to Reagan*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Prins, Brandon C. and Steven A. Shull. 2006. "Enduring Rivals: Presidential Success and Support in the House of Representatives." *Congress & the Presidency* 33: 21–46
- Politico*. 2017. "More GOP Senators Willing to Tell Trump to Take a Hike." <https://www.politico.com/story/2017/10/04/trump-republican-senate-mcconnell-243421>.
- Poole, Keith. 2007. "Changing Minds? Not in Congress." *Public Choice* 131(3): 435–51.
- Poole, Keith and Howard Rosenthal. 1997. *Congress: A Political Economic History of Roll Call Voting*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Ragusa, J. M. 2016. Partisan Cohorts, Polarization, and the Gingrich Senators. *American Politics Research* 44(2): 296–325.
- Ragusa, Jordan M. and Anthony Gaspar. 2016. "Where's the Tea Party? An Examination of the Tea Party's Voting Behavior in the House of Representatives." *Political Research Quarterly* 69(2): 361–72.
- Rohde, David W. 1991. *Parties and Leaders in the Postreform House*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press
- Rudalevige, Andrew. 2002. *Managing the President's Program: Presidential Leadership and Legislative Policy Formulation*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press
- Slate*. 2017. "Trump Can't Score a Win." <http://www.slate.com/news-and-politics/2018/03/trump-rewards-americas-enemies-and-punishes-its-allies.html>.
- Stonewall, Jeffrey M. 2013. *Party Pursuits and the Presidential-House Election Connection, 1900–2008*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Swers, Michele L. 2002. *The Difference Women Make: The Policy Impact of Women in Congress*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Thomas, Susan. 1991. "The Impact of Women on State Legislative Policies." *Journal of Politics*, 53(4): 958–76.
- Valentino, N. A., C. Wayne, and M. Oceno. 2018. Mobilizing Sexism: The Interaction of emotion and gender attitudes in the 2016 US presidential election. *Public Opinion Quarterly* 82(S1): 799–821.

Washington Post. 2017. "McConnell Allies Declare Open Warfare on Bannon". Retrieved May 6, 2019. https://www.washingtonpost.com/powerpost/gops-insurgents-step-up-campaign-against-mcconnell/2017/10/25/ec3a5af4-b9a0-11e7-9e58-e6288544af98_story.html?hpid=hp_hp-top-table-main_gopfallout-340pm%3Ahomepage%2Fstory&utm_term=.4811dee824e0&noredirect=on

Weinbaum, M. G. and Judd D. R. 1970. In Search of a Mandated Congress. *Midwest Journal of Political Science* 14(2): 276–302.

Wolfinger, Raymond E. 1985. "Dealignment, Realignment, and Mandates in the 1984 Election." In *The American Elections of 1984*, ed. Austin Ranney, 277–96. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.