

Diversity of a Different Kind: Gentrification and Its Impact on Social Capital and Political Participation in Black Communities

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Abstract: The literature examining the effect of residential integration on political behavior primarily focuses on how whites react to the entrance of non-whites into their communities. Over the past few decades however, the process of “white return” to urban centers throughout the nation has created the opportunity to invert the standard approach to studying racial context by exploring how minorities react to the entrance of whites into their communities. We adapt realistic conflict theories to the case of gentrification, and offer a model of the effect of white in-migration on social capital (SC) and political engagement in black communities. We demonstrate that white population growth erodes SC in black neighborhoods only where the larger surrounding community is majority black, and where such growth is accompanied by rising housing costs. Further, we find that residing in a gentrifying context, by eroding social capital, ultimately results in the political demobilization of black citizens.

Keywords: Gentrification, social capital, participation, political behavior.

Here’s what I see: long-term Black American residents leaving the city, and not by choice. Their old neighborhoods are being taken over by young, white

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professionals who are the beneficiaries of educational and social opportunities that this African American population never had. Many of these African Americans raised families in the old brownstones in my neighborhood, but they rented from absentee landlords who now have been more than happy to sell out to developers. A historically disadvantaged people has been disadvantaged once again. — Carl Foster, *The Washington Post*, February 03, 2012

According to the U.S. Census Bureau, between 2000 and 2010 the black population of Washington, DC declined by about 40,000 residents; at the same time, its overall population had increased by 16,000. In a city of just 650,000, over 55,000 residents were of a different color than they had been just ten short years before. As a result, “chocolate city” was no longer majority black by 2010, and many neighborhoods that as of the 1990s were over 90% black, were majority white by 2010. DC, however, was not alone in this rapid change; urban areas across the country have experienced a rapid process of “white return” marked by the displacement of long-time minority residents with new, financially more secure, young, educated, and importantly, white residents. City officials are generally thrilled with this type of demographic turnover, as it brings in residents who contribute larger sums to the tax base and the businesses that cater to them. Likewise, commentators have viewed this process as a renewed hope for diverse, revitalized, and de-segregated cities (Morello and Keating 2011). However, while fast-paced white in-migration into minority neighborhoods increases (at least short-term) local racial and economic diversity, it can also displace marginalized groups from the very neighborhoods that grant them social and political power. This observation has resulted in the use of a term that does not allude to the positive qualities of diversity and desegregation often imparted by white return: gentrification.¹

What are the effects of gentrification on black communities?² More specifically, what are the effects of residing in a gentrifying context, characterized principally by the simultaneous or sequential occurrence of white in-migration and increasing housing costs? At present, despite its relevance and importance to the study of racial and urban politics, we know of no published quantitative work in political science addressing the topic of gentrification.³ The most direct answer to these questions comes from the developing literature on gentrification emerging from urban planning and sociology. While this literature offers valuable insights, two distinct characteristics limit its usefulness in providing a definitive answer to our research question: (1) the literature is largely qualitative and based upon many single city/community case studies, and (2)

mixed findings have emerged concerning residential displacement and the reactions of minority residents. For example, while an analysis of gentrification in seven metropolitan statistical areas presents evidence of the displacement of younger and lower SES minority households (Glick 2008), other work has failed to replicate these findings (Freeman and Braconi 2004; Freeman 2005; Vigdor 2002). Moreover, a recent case study tracing the evolution of gentrification in Chicago found that neighborhoods evincing early signs of gentrification in the 1990s only continued to gentrify in the following decades if at least 35% of the residents were white—in other words, gentrification in Chicago *avoided* majority minority low income neighborhoods (Hwang and Sampson 2014). Studies on reactions to gentrification among citizens in urban centers also yield mixed results. A handful of studies document conflict between newcomers and longtime residents in gentrifying contexts (Betancur 2002; Goldfield 1980; Levy and Cybriwsky 1980), while others document reactions ranging from ambivalence to positive reception of neighborhood changes (Boyd 2005; Freeman 2006). Despite the plethora of case studies, the developing gentrification literature lacks a *national-scope* study relying upon a large sample of minority respondents across multiple cities in which we can compare minority attitudes in gentrifying and non-gentrifying areas. The value of such a study would lie in its potential to clarify previous results and offer findings that are not case-driven. In addition, a large-scale national study would also aid in the construction of theories that explain the *general* impact of gentrification on social and political life in communities of color.

In this paper, we attempt to break ground by analyzing the consequences of gentrification on social capital (SC) and political engagement in black communities. We offer a theory of *gentrifying contexts* that draws upon the black empowerment and qualitative gentrification literatures to guide an adaptation of a dominant theory of intergroup relations—realistic group conflict (RGC) theory—to a context where the configuration of key elements have been inverted; namely, where the focus is on black communities and the entrance of whites, and the in-migrating group is both the dominant majority group in the larger society and of higher socioeconomic status than many of the residents in the communities of entry. Our theory argues that for black Americans, residing in a predominantly black context experiencing white growth (i.e., gentrifying context) should evoke the threats of residential and political displacement and erode trust in one's neighbors. Through this, our theory contends that gentrification should ultimately negate the politically empowering and

mobilizing aspects of residing in a predominantly black context. We test our theory using the 2000 Social Capital Benchmark Survey (2000 SCBS), and replicate some of our key findings using the 2006 Social Capital Community Survey (2006 SCCS). The findings from our analyses support our theory by demonstrating that gentrification has negative consequences for civic society and political representation in black communities. Our results constitute unprecedented and robust empirical support for Washington, DC resident Carl Foster's (2012) claim that "A historically disadvantaged people has been disadvantaged once again."

WHITE-LED DIVERSITY: INVERTED DYNAMICS AND THE CHALLENGE TO EXISTING THEORIES

One starting point for theorizing about the consequences of gentrification in black communities is to focus on its most immediate impact: diversification. This in turn leads to the question: what are the political consequences of diversity? Two bodies of literature are useful in answering this question: the SC and the RGC literatures. A common finding in the SC literature is that greater diversity is associated with lower levels of interpersonal trust, social cohesion, and investment in public goods (e.g., Alesina and La Ferrara 2000; Costa and Kahn 2003; Hopkins 2009; Masuoka 2006; Putnam 2007).⁴ SC scholars explain these findings by arguing that the connection to neighbors like yourself (i.e., "bonding social capital") is important for the development and transfer of shared norms of reciprocity and civic institutions, and that ethnic change in the short to medium-run hampers the communication of these norms, alters expectations concerning the future, and causes neighborhood trust to breakdown. Complimenting the SC literature, RGC theory (e.g., Taylor and Moghaddam 1994) and associated racial and power threat hypotheses (Blalock 1967; Key 1949) hold that diversity activates intergroup competition over finite economic and political resources, which in turn spurs feelings of prejudice and racial hostility. From a RGC perspective, declines in SC associated with racial diversity result from the undermining of relations of trust and reciprocity by mounting perceptions of threat and resource competition.

Despite generating many valuable insights, we find these two bodies of literature limited in their applicability to the study of gentrification. The predominant orientation of these theories, and their corresponding empirical literatures, is toward assessing "majority-minority" and "white-

nonwhite” intergroup dynamics. In the SC literature, the interest in studying the implications of the “transition to a multicultural society for ‘social capital’” (Putnam 2007, 137) primarily focuses on the effect of minority-led diversification of white communities.⁵ Similarly, in the RGC literature the dominant work on racial and power threat (e.g., Blalock 1967; Key 1949) in the American context is primarily oriented toward explaining the reaction of whites to nearby minority populations. When shifting our focus from minority-led diversity to white-led diversity and gentrification, we find that the majority–minority/white–nonwhite intergroup terrain serving as the backdrop for these two literatures is upended. In contrast to whites in diversifying majority-white communities, minorities in majority–minority communities undergoing gentrification are only a majority locally, have lower levels of political power relative to whites at the state and national level, and have historically experienced discrimination at the hands of the very group that now seeks to establish residence in their communities. Further, in contrast to minority-led diversification of white communities, in the case of gentrification, members of the entering group are typically of higher socioeconomic status.

These facts suggest an inversion of the traditional dynamics of race and group status present in the bulk of the SC and RGC literature, which in turns limits their applicability to the study of gentrification. Thus, the study of gentrification requires a new theoretical framework. In response, we offer a theory of *gentrifying contexts*. Our theory uses the qualitative literature on gentrification, as well as the literature on black empowerment, to inform a revision in our thinking about the economic and political threats explicated by core “threat” theories of political behavior when analyzing the case of white-led gentrification of black communities. In this paper, we do not seek to reinvent the wheel but instead use the unique qualities of gentrification to refine existing theories of intergroup dynamics. Our synthesis of existing theories to study gentrification produces a new framework through which we can understand the social and political impacts of gentrification on black communities.

GENTRIFYING CONTEXTS: THE REALISTIC THREATS OF APPROPRIATION AND DISPLACEMENT

The RGC literature assumes that the presence of a new minority group will *undermine* housing values and increase competition over finite economic resources (e.g., jobs). These concerns do not apply to

gentrification. First, the introduction of new wealthier white residents typically *increases* real estate values and the costs of retail goods. Second, immigrating whites are typically not in direct competition with extant minority residents for jobs in the local community, as they typically work in higher-skill professions outside of the neighborhoods they enter (Freeman and Braconi 2004). These facts suggest the operation of a different set of economic threats. First, as whites enter minority communities, minority residents may feel threatened, not because their property values go down, but because property values go *up*. As housing becomes more expensive and rents inflate, minority renters may get “priced out” of the neighborhoods they call home and aspiring minority homeowners may no longer be able to afford to buy into the neighborhood in which they were raised (e.g., Freeman 2005; Glick 2008; Houston 1976; Levy and Cybriwsky 1980). Second, as businesses develop that cater to the new residents, older residents may feel excluded from the new establishments, as they may be too expensive or may not sell goods the established residents wish to purchase (Patch 2008; Shaw and Sullivan 2011; Zukin 2008; Zukin et al. 2009). Third, in contrast to “white flight,” where whites choose to exit their community and have ample options for relocation to white dominated communities, rising housing costs do not give long-time minority residents in gentrifying contexts the same element of choice in exiting their community nor the same breadth of options for relocation to minority-dominated communities. In short, the ability of the contemporary “white gentry” to enter minority communities and alter the residential and retail landscape arguably escalates the situation in gentrification from one of resource competition to one threatening resource appropriation and residential and commercial displacement.

The political threat posed by gentrification may far surpass that theorized to be experienced by whites in the face of entering minorities. Within historically segregated black neighborhoods, black Americans often hold power that is otherwise inaccessible (Laveist 1993; Vedlitz and Johnson 1982). In gentrifying contexts, entering whites can challenge the current political structure of the neighborhood, and threaten to displace minorities in the sociopolitical hierarchy. For example, establishing white populations in majority–minority areas may begin running for local offices, voting for candidates challenging entrenched incumbents, and forming their own organizations, all of which may work to upend minority-dominated local political structures (Auger 1979; Fraser 2004; Levy and Cybriwsky 1980). In contrast to minority-led diversification, in gentrifying contexts, those who are likely to lose political position and

who fear (for good reason) being on the losing side of development and resource allocation debates are the longtime minority residents (Betancur 2002; Smith 1996). The consequence of this process is that longtime minority residents may lose leadership and authority positions and feel that they no longer “have a say” in the community (Chernoff 1980; Martin 2007). In short, white entry to majority-minority communities imparts the realistic threat of political displacement.

Gentrification Threat and Neighborhood Social Trust

The preceding section documents how the entrance and growth of white populations in historically black neighborhoods should arouse the threat of the usurpation of space and place held by minorities. Here, we connect this process to community social capital, and argue that this “diversification” should undermine SC in black communities by eroding black residents’ feelings of neighborhood trust and expectations of reciprocity. Since trust is an indicator of comfort with interpersonal relations and expectations of reciprocity (Putnam 1995), and SC among blacks is theorized to be very sensitive to social and market exclusion by whites (Orr 1999), we expect that as a result of the economic and political threats felt from white in-migration, black residents will experience a substantial diminution of neighborhood trust in gentrifying contexts.⁶ We argue that trust in one’s neighbors should experience the strongest decline among blacks residing in neighborhoods where (1) there has been high growth in the white population, and (2) where the surrounding community is predominantly black (i.e., gentrifying contexts). In line with existing research on ethnic change (Horton and Calderon 1995; Reider 1985; Suttles 1972; see also Green, Strolovitch, and Wong 1998 and Hopkins 2009), we argue that neighborhood social trust should decline the most under these joint conditions because it is the *initial* entry of whites that challenges black homogeneity, evokes the threats of appropriation and displacement, instigates uncertainty about the future of one’s community, and weakens relations of trust and reciprocity. We label this prediction the ***Gentrification Threat Hypothesis (H1)***.

Building upon this initial hypothesis, we expect that the hypothesized dynamic between white population growth and black population percentage should be conditioned upon over-time changes in the cost of housing. Indeed, threatened and actual displacement (versus voluntary out-migration) is one of the key features that differentiate minority-led

diversification from white-led gentrification. Therefore, in keeping with past research (Freeman and Braconi 2004), we focus on over-time changes in housing costs (i.e., price inflation) and expect that the erosion of neighborhood trust predicted among blacks residing in black dominated communities should be most pronounced where white growth coincides with increases in property values and rents. Further, it stands to reason that those most at risk of displacement as a result of rising housing costs, and thus those experiencing the largest loss in neighborhood trust, will be those who rent. We refer to this prediction as the *Displacement Threat Hypothesis (H2)*.

From Empowerment to Disempowerment: Gentrification, Trust, and Demobilization

Having established these core predictions concerning the impact of gentrification on neighborhood trust, we now address its possible ultimate political consequences. A key finding in the black political behavior literature is that residing in contexts where black Americans are numerically dominant is symbolically and substantively empowering (e.g., Spence and McClerking 2010) and promotes political engagement, at least partially, by creating a more trusting and efficacious orientation toward politics (Bobo and Gilliam 1990). We argue that when whites enter predominantly black neighborhoods, alter the “face” of the neighborhood, and evoke the threats of appropriation and displacement, the symbols and substance of black empowerment are greatly compromised. In predominantly black contexts, the entrance and incremental ascendancy of whites represents in symbol and substance a re-assertion of white group dominance. Given this, we expect that white in-migration into black communities should ultimately result in disempowerment and political demobilization among black Americans. Further, we expect that these effects should occur through the mechanism of eroded neighborhood social trust.

With respect to empowerment, we expect that Chernoff (1980) is correct in his assessment that in gentrifying contexts, “the loss of political control in an area can lead to demoralization,” and as a result, residents may feel compelled to leave the neighborhood. Consistent with Chernoff, we argue that residing in a gentrifying context should lead blacks to feel stripped of their political power and more tenuous about their tenure in their community. Importantly, we expect that these

subjective outcomes should be effectuated by gentrification indirectly, through the mechanism of eroded neighborhood trust. As the entry of whites into predominantly black communities erodes black homogeneity and generates uncertainty about the future of the “black community,” this uncertainty—captured by eroded neighborhood trust—should feed into heightened uncertainty about one’s *own* future in the community and feelings of political marginalization. With respect to political behavior, given that neighborhood trust is an established source of civic and political engagement (e.g., Putnam 1995), residing in a gentrifying context should indirectly dampen such engagement via the predicted erosion of neighborhood trust. SC scholars argue that trust in one’s neighbors serves as a “social lubricant” facilitating collective action because it fosters expectations of reciprocity and heightens anticipated returns for time and effort invested in civic life (Campbell 2006; Putnam 2001). To the extent that residing in a gentrifying context supplants expectations of reciprocity with the threat of residential and political displacement, then gentrification should undermine this lubricant by increasing the costs of participation while decreasing the expected payoff.

Succinctly put, in gentrifying contexts, we predict that black residents will lose trust in their neighbors, and through this, we should see gentrification indirectly producing a “hunkering down,” where black residents report a higher likelihood of leaving their neighborhood, feel disempowered politically, and stop participating in local governance and engaging in the broader political arena. We label this the *Disempowerment and Demobilization Hypothesis (H3)*.

DATA AND METHODS

To test our hypotheses, we draw upon the 2000 Social Capital Community Benchmark Survey (SCBS) conducted by the Saguro Seminar at the John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University.⁷ The 2000 SCBS includes a very large total sample ($N = 29,233$) and contains a large sample of black respondents ($N = 3,663$). For the purposes of our analysis, we focus on the responses of black respondents only. In addition to containing an array of relevant survey items and a large sample of black Americans, the SCBS includes the census tract and zip code of residence for each respondent, which is key given our hypotheses pertain to neighborhood and community-level processes.⁸

The main independent variable in our theory is over-time growth in the white population. To measure white growth in each respondent's neighborhood, we rely upon the 1990 and 2000 Decennial Censuses to obtain census tract level data on the size and growth of white populations. We constructed a percentage point change variable, labeled $\Delta White$. $\bar{x} = -9.2$, $sd = 11.3$, $range = -68.4, 35.9$), by subtracting the percent non-Hispanic white in 1990 from the percent white in 2000.⁹ The distribution of this variable indicates that the average black respondent in the 2000 SCBS resided in a context experiencing "white flight," however, roughly 15% resided in tracts experiencing white growth. Given that our hypotheses specify effects for white growth conditional upon the black composition of the community in which one's immediate neighborhood is situated, we rely upon the % *Black* ($\bar{x} = 43.2$, $sd = 28.1$, $range = 0, 97.8$) measured at the zip code level in 2000 as the key measure of the degree to which respondents are residing in a "black" community, and thus as the key moderator in our analyses. Last, as **H2** identifies changes in housing costs as an additional factor conditioning black Americans' reaction to growth in white populations in their immediate neighborhood; we include two alternative measures of changes in housing costs. Drawing upon the 1990 and 2000 Censuses, we created variables labeled $\Delta Value$ ($\bar{x} = \$34,472$, $sd = \$51,286$, $range = -\$500,000, \$659,101$) and $\Delta Rents$ ($\bar{x} = \$144$, $sd = \$97$, $range = -\$338, \$1,000$) that measure the change in median home values and median gross rents between 1990 and 2000 in respondents' census tract.

To measure neighborhood-level social trust, we rely upon a standard item asking respondents: "We'd like to know how much you trust different groups of people. Thinking about the *people in your neighborhood*, would you say you can trust them a lot, some, only a little, or not at all?" From this item we created a variable, labeled *Trust in Neighbors*, that was coded to range from (1)-"trust them not at all" [12.6%] to (4)-"trust neighbors a lot" [21%]. To measure social and political disempowerment, we rely upon two measures. The first item, labeled *Leave Community*, asks: "Do you expect to be living in your community 5 years from now?" This item is dichotomous, and coded "0" for "Yes" and "1" for those stating "No." [38.2%]. To measure political disempowerment, we rely upon an item asking respondents to report their level of agreement with the statement: "The people running my community don't really care much what happens to me." From this item, we created a variable labeled *Political Marginalization*, with five ordered categories, ranging from (1)-"Strongly Disagree" [25.3%] to (5)-"Strongly Agree" [15.9%]. To

measure respondents' level of local civic participation, we rely upon items asking whether or not "in the past 12 months" respondents have participated in "a neighborhood association, like a block association, a homeowner or tenant association, or a crime watch group?" and whether they had "worked on a community project?" Both items are dichotomous, with the former labeled *Neighborhood Association* and the latter *Community Project*, and coded "1" to indicate having participated in the civic activity [29.9% and 36.3%]. We analyze respondents' attitudinal engagement with political life with a standard item asking: "How interested are you in politics and national affairs?" This item, labeled *Political Interest*, has four ordered categories, ranging from (1)-"Not at all interested" [13.6%] to (4)-"Very interested" [30.7%]. Finally, to measure behavioral *Political Participation*, we rely upon a composite measure comprised of respondents' answers to questions tapping whether or not they are registered to vote, voted in the 1996 Presidential election, attended a political meeting, attended a march/rally, attended a demonstration/protest, signed a petition, or participated in a group that took action for reform.¹⁰ The combination of these types of items into a single overall measure of political participation is in-line with past research (e.g., Brady et al. 1995), and we recoded this measure to range from 0 to 1 ($\bar{x} = .35$, $sd = .22$).

Our analyses included a series of relevant contextual and individual-level controls. First, we control for economic context by including the median household income in each respondent's census tract in 2000. The inclusion of this control is essential, as it ensures that the effects we observe for white growth are not simply capturing variation in the affluence or poverty of neighborhoods.¹¹ In addition, we control for the total population in each respondents' tract to hold constant variation in the size and density of neighborhoods. Turning to the individual level, we include a set of standard demographic controls for education, income, age, gender (1 = male), and citizenship (1 = born in the United States). Additionally, we include several other variables of potential importance in predicting neighborhood social trust, such as the tenure in one's community, homeownership, liberal-conservative political orientation, and religiosity. Last, we include a control for the racial diversity of respondents' social network, to hold constant variation in interracial contact in assessing the effect of residing in a gentrifying context. For more information about question wording or variable measurement, see the Supplemental Appendix.

Analytic Strategy

To test **H1**, we conducted moderated regression analysis employing multiplicative terms between $\Delta White$ and $\% Black$, thus enabling us to estimate the marginal effect of growth in white populations in respondents' immediate neighborhood (i.e., census tract) conditional upon variation in the racial composition of the surrounding community (i.e., zip code). To test **H2**, we estimated a three-way interaction between $\Delta White$, $\% Black$, and $\Delta Value$ (or $\Delta Rents$); further, we estimate this model for all black respondents, and then again for black renters only, in order to determine whether the joint effects of white growth and inflation in housing costs in majority-black communities are more pronounced when looking exclusively at those for whom cost increases are most deleterious. To test **H3**, given its specification of indirect effects, we estimated a mediated-moderated effects (Muller, Judd, and Yzerbyt 2005) structural equation model (SEM). Our SEM simultaneously estimated the regression of *Trust in Neighbors* on $\Delta White$, $\% Black$, $\Delta White \times \% Black$, and all contextual and individual controls, and each of our outcome dependent variables on *Trust in Neighbors*, $\Delta White$, $\% Black$, $\Delta White \times \% Black$, and all contextual and individual controls. The use of this type of SEM enables us to estimate the conditional indirect effect of $\Delta White$ an outcome variables via its effect on neighborhood social trust and the effect of trust, in turn, on the given outcome variable. Given the categorical nature of our trust and outcomes variables, we used probit and ordered probit link functions and estimated parameters using weighted least squares in the software package Mplus[®] (Muthén and Muthén 2007). In addition to presenting the results from our hypothesis tests using the 2000 SCBS, we replicate some of our core results using the 2006 SCCS ($N = 1,133$ black respondents).

RESULTS FOR OUR FIRST HYPOTHESIS

We present the results from our primary test of **H1** in column 1 of Table 1.¹² As hypothesized, the results reveal a significant and negative coefficient on the interaction term between $\Delta White$ and $\% Black$, indicating that growth in the white population in one's immediate neighborhood decreases trust in one's neighbors, but only where the surrounding community is predominantly Black. These effects are depicted graphically in Figure 1, Panel A, which displays the marginal effect of white growth

Table 1. The impact of growth in neighborhood white populations on trust in neighbors among black Americans

	2000 SCBS			Replication: 2006 SCCS		
	B	SE	<i>p</i>	B	SE	<i>p</i>
Contextual variables						
ΔWhite	2.33	(1.12)	.037	1.64	(1.01)	.106
% Black	2.28	(1.19)	.054	2.66	(1.23)	.031
ΔWhite × % black	-4.34	(1.95)	.027	-3.51	(2.13)	.098
Median income	1.55	(.416)	.000	1.97	(.727)	.006
% Foreign born	-1.16	(.352)	.000	1.52	(.775)	.050
Total population	1.63	(.785)	.038	-619	(.551)	.263
Individual-level variables						
Education	.846	(.157)	.000	.729	(.236)	.002
Income	.428	(.160)	.008	.149	(.039)	.000
Age	.020	(.003)	.000	.012	(.004)	.003
Gender	.099	(.083)	.235	.035	(.128)	.786
Unemployed	-.241	(.156)	.123	-.077	(.235)	.743
Union member	.030	(.110)	.788	-.398	(.240)	.097
Homeowner	.419	(.092)	.000	.410	(.139)	.003
Tenure in community	.327	(.150)	.029	.397	(.225)	.078
Married	.312	(.089)	.000	.243	(.136)	.074
Born in United States	-.034	(.323)	.915	.572	(.319)	.073
Political orientation	-.146	(.136)	.281	-.060	(.265)	.821
Religiosity	.047	(.172)	.784	-.232	(.213)	.277
Network diversity	.117	(.130)	.371	-	-	-
White affect	-	-	-	.835	(.241)	.001
Thresholds						
Cut 1	1.37	(.791)	.084	2.46	(.832)	.003
Cut 2	2.80	(.791)	.000	3.76	(.835)	.000
Cut 3	4.94	(.796)	.000	5.75	(.848)	.000
No. of Individuals (Level 1 units)					1,000	
No. of Tracts/Zips (Level 2 units)					322	
Effect size						
ΔPr (Y = Trust neighbors) due to						
Δ in ΔWhite when:						
-% Black @ 5th Percentile		.45			.36	
-% Black @ 95th Percentile		-.36			-.08	

Source: 2000 and 2006 Social Capital Benchmark Surveys.

Note: Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients from random-intercept ordered logistic regression models estimated using *gllamm* in the software package Stata®.

Reported effect sizes are in terms of the predicted probability of trust in one's neighbors "some" or "a lot".

Reported significance levels are based upon two-tailed hypothesis tests.




FIGURE 1. Conditional marginal effects of neighborhood white population growth on trust in neighbors among black Americans. (A) 2000 Social Capital Benchmark Survey ($N = 2,331$). (B) 2006 Social Capital Benchmark ($N = 1,000$). *Note:* For both panels, plotted line represents conditional marginal effect estimates and shaded region represents 90% confidence intervals

at the tract level when moving from mostly white to black zip codes. The graph shows how in communities with a minimal black population, growth in the white population is associated with a significant increase in neighborhood trust, that along a large portion of %Black (i.e.,

multiethnic communities) there is no effect of white growth on trust, and that in communities that are predominantly black, white growth is associated with a significant reduction in neighborhood social trust. We find that the exact tipping point in the data, where white growth starts to exert a significant negative effect, begins in communities that are roughly 75% black, which represents communities at or above the 85th percentile of %Black. While arguably at the margins of the data, these are precisely the communities of interest, as they are gentrifying contexts—places where blacks almost exclusively reside that are experiencing a novel growth in neighborhood white populations. In the 2000 SCBS data and looking at black respondents only, there are 96 neighborhoods (i.e., tracts) that experienced at or above 90th percentile growth in white populations and were situated in surrounding communities (i.e., zips) that were 75% or more black. Moreover, these 96 neighborhoods were scattered across 25 different metropolitan areas spread across 22 states; thus, rather than being driven by gentrification in a handful of places (e.g., NYC, Chicago, etc.), our results reflect a pattern of response to gentrification occurring in a range of neighborhoods across an array of cities. It is also important to note that trust is not lowered by residing in a black neighborhood alone, as an increase in percent black is only associated with *increased* trust in contexts with high white growth. Indeed, consistent with the black empowerment literature, in contexts with shrinking white populations, moving from non-black to black dominated communities is associated with a marginally significant increase in neighborhood trust.

Turning to the magnitude of these effects, the bottom row of [Table 1](#) displays the effect of neighborhood white growth conditional upon the racial composition of the surrounding community. As can be seen, white growth exerts substantially meaningful effects; for example, in the case of predominately black communities (i.e., %Black at 95th percentile), moving from minimum to maximum levels of $\Delta White$ is associated with a .36 decrease in the probability of trusting one's neighbors either "some" or "a lot." To give some geographic identity to these effects, [Table 2](#) provides case illustrations of the effects of neighborhood white growth and surrounding community racial composition across four different scenarios. While the control variables perform as expected, what is perhaps most important to note is that we observe an effect of residing in a gentrifying context holding constant variation across neighborhoods in income levels.¹³ This is an important feature of our results, as income level is associated with important neighborhood characteristics, such as "blight" or quality, and our analyses account for this type of variation, thus ensuring

Table 2. Predicted probabilities of trust in neighbors across different neighborhood scenarios

			Δ White 1990–2000 (tract)	
			<i>Below 5th percentile</i>	<i>Above 95th percentile</i>
<i>% Black 2000 (zip)</i>				
<i>Below 10th percentile</i>				
	4013092800		6075011100	
	Cactus District, Glendale, AZ		Nob Hill, San Francisco, CA	
	[6.5, –32.2] .20		[2.3, 3.9] .26	
<i>Above 90th percentile</i>				
	220330002000		39035114800	
	East Baton Rouge, LA		Central Cleveland, OH	
	[87.5, –39.5] .23		[95.5, 3.2] .13	

Note: Entries in bold are the estimated predicted probability, holding all other contextual variables at their true values and individual variables at their means, of trusting one’s neighbors “a lot” in each given scenario. Predicted probabilities were estimated using CLARIFY (King, Wittenberg, and Tomz 2003) in Stata®.

that the estimated effects of our core variables are not tapping into unmeasured variation in wealth and associated characteristics.

Replication: 2006 SCCS

To assess the robustness of the results from the 2000 SCBS, we performed a replication test using the 2006 SCCS.¹⁴ The 2006 SCCS was conducted by the Seguro Seminar at Harvard University and all control variables included in the 2006 analysis are identical in question wording to those in the 2000 analysis, making the two models nearly identical to one another.¹⁵ A few key differences between the 2000 and 2006 analysis are that in the 2006 analysis all of the contextual data is measured at the zip code level, and that Δ White is now the percentage point differences between the zip code percent White in 1990 and 2007 and all other contextual variables are updated to 2007 zip code estimates.¹⁶ The results from this replication analysis are presented in column 2 of Table 1. The results mirror those found with the 2000 data, as the effect of white growth on trust in one’s neighbors significantly reverses when moving from communities that are minimally to mostly black. Figure 1, Panel B depicts the marginal effect of neighborhood-level growth in the white population across levels of %Black, and reveals a pattern of conditional marginal effects comparable to those displayed in Panel A, where white

growth is associated with a significant decline in neighborhood trust only in contexts that are nearly exclusively black. We find these results to constitute a powerful demonstration of the robustness of our findings.

RESULTS FOR THE SECOND HYPOTHESIS

The results from our test of **H2** are presented in [Table 3](#). The top half of the table presents the results focusing on changes in median home values and the bottom half on changes in median gross rents. The results presented in column 1 are for all black respondents and those presented in column 2 are for black renters only. Whether looking at values or rents, the results reveal that the interactive dynamic observed in [Table 1](#) between $\Delta White$ and $\%Black$ is further conditioned by changing costs in housing, as indicated by the positive coefficients for the two-way interaction terms between $\Delta White$ and $\%Black$ and the negative coefficients for the three-way interaction terms in [Table 3](#). As hypothesized, white growth in one's immediate neighborhood is only found to erode trust in one's neighbors when the surrounding community is predominantly black (85% black or greater) *and* when changes in home values or rents are at their maximum values. Further, as expected, residential status plays an important part in the results, as the three-way interaction terms, while negative across the board, only attain statistical significance when restricted to Black renters.¹⁷ Given the complexity of these results, we present them in graphical form in [Figure 2](#), Panels A and B. These figures present the predicted probability of trust in one's neighbors among black renters residing in predominantly black communities at varying levels of white growth and changes in home values and rents. The figures reveal that among blacks residing in black communities where home values decreased or rents remained relatively unchanged, an increase in the white population either has no effect on neighborhood social trust or has a negligible positive effect. However, among blacks residing in black communities where home values and rents greatly increased, an increase in the white population is associated with a significant decrease in the probability of trust in one's neighbors. Interestingly, the figures reveal that an increase in real estate values is associated with a spike in neighborhood trust, however, this effect is suppressed when such changes are accompanied by white growth. What is important to note about these results is that they hold after controlling for variation across neighborhoods in absolute levels of affluence, again ensuring that the core dynamics

Table 3. The impact of neighborhood white growth conditional upon surrounding racial context and changes in property values and rents (2000 SCBS)

	Homeowners	Renters
MODEL 1: Median property values		
Contextual variables		
ΔWhite (tract)	−.629 (12.95)	−29.65** (9.61)
%Black (zip)	13.35 (22.51)	−27.31^ (16.40)
ΔMedian home value	−8.09 (22.43)	−51.67*** (16.20)
Two-way interactions		
ΔWhite × %black	−25.45 (36.64)	42.37^ (25.43)
ΔWhite × ΔMedian home value	10.38 (35.87)	83.59*** (25.90)
%Black × ΔMedian home value	−30.36 (64.49)	76.61^ (46.64)
Three-way interaction		
ΔWhite × %black × ΔMed. home value	58.46 (104.85)	−121.09^ (72.16)
Contextual controls		
Median income	1.94*** (.584)	1.77** (.651)
% Foreign born	−1.19** (.509)	−1.21** (.430)
Total population	1.58 (1.18)	2.05* (.969)
# of Individuals	1,415	1,257
# of Tracts	764	683
MODEL 2: Median rents		
Contextual variables		
ΔWhite (tract)	17.32 (14.79)	−14.83 (14.41)
%Black (zip)	22.14 (17.15)	−34.81* (17.55)
ΔMedian rent	22.43 (23.28)	−24.60 (19.65)
Two-way interactions		
ΔWhite × %black	−36.31 (28.46)	53.41^ (29.40)
ΔWhite × ΔMedian rent	−36.99 (38.65)	40.05 (35.71)
%Black × ΔMedian rent	−50.53 (45.67)	92.06* (45.98)
Three-way interaction		
ΔWhite × %black × ΔMed. rent	81.51 (75.66)	−143.61^ (76.71)
Contextual controls		
Median income	1.92*** (.598)	1.58* (.686)
% Foreign born	−1.26* (.511)	−1.10** (.412)
Total population	1.49 (1.18)	1.92* (.961)
# of Individuals	1,415	1,257
# of Tracts	764	683

Source: 2000 Social Capital Benchmark Survey.

Note: Entries are unstandardized coefficients and standard errors from ordered logistic regression models with standard errors clustered by tract. To simplify presentation, all estimates for individual-level control variables and cutpoints have been omitted from the table. All models include individual controls for education, income, age, gender, employment status, tenure in community, citizenship status, ideology, and religiosity.

^ $p < .10$, * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$. Reported significance levels are based upon two-tailed hypothesis tests.




FIGURE 2. Predicted probability analysis of impact of white growth in predominantly black contexts on trust in neighbors among black renters conditional upon changes in housing prices—2000 SCBS data. (A) Change in Median Property Values. Percent Black at 95th Percentile (i.e., 92% Black Zip Code). (B) Change in Median Rents. Percent Black at 95th Percentile (i.e., 92% Black Zip Code)

observed are not picking up variation across neighborhoods in income levels or income-related characteristics. Further, the demonstrated importance of housing cost inflation provides evidence in support of our realistic conflict approach to gentrification and against an approach focusing on racial identity that downplays material threat (e.g., social identity theory). Last, we should note that the results presented in Table 3 are robust against alternative analytic approaches. For example, we estimated

our $\Delta White \times \%Black$ two-way interaction model presented in Table 1 on high and low $\Delta Rents$ subsets of the data. When focusing on the subset of blacks residing in tracts where $\Delta Rents$ is below its 25th percentile value, we find that the constituent term for $\Delta White$ ($B = .86$, $SE = 2.6$) as well as the interaction term for $\Delta White \times \%Black$ ($B = -4.2$, $SE = 4.1$) are both insignificant. However, among a subset of blacks residing in tracts where $\Delta Rents$ is above its 75th percentile value, $\Delta White$ ($B = 3.7$, $SE = 1.9$, $p = .06$) and the interaction term for $\Delta White \times \%Black$ ($B = -6.8$, $SE = 3.7$, $p = .07$) are statistically significant.

RESULTS FOR THE THIRD HYPOTHESIS

The results from our test of **H3** are presented in Figure 3. The figure depicts the direct and indirect effects of $\Delta White$ (conditional upon $\% Black$) on neighborhood trust and political empowerment and engagement, as well as the direct effects of trust on empowerment and engagement. All coefficients listed along arrowed paths are direct effects, and the column of bracketed coefficients listed to the right of the figure displays the direct effect (β_D) and the indirect effects (β_I) of white growth on each outcome variable. As previously established, we see that white growth in mostly black communities is associated with a significant decrease in trust in one's neighbors. Next, as established or implied by extant research on SC and black empowerment, those that trust their neighbors are significantly less likely to expect leaving their community and to feel marginalized by local elites, and are significantly more likely to participate in neighborhood political activities and to engage with politics outside of the community. Turning to the direct effects of white growth on these ultimate outcome variables, the results listed in the column reveal that residing in a gentrifying context did not have any direct effect on these outcomes; however, residing in a gentrifying context exerted consistent indirect effects on these outcomes through its effect on neighborhood social trust. By eroding ties to one's neighbors, we find that residing in a gentrifying context indirectly augments forecasted community exodus and feelings of disempowerment, and dampens involvement in neighborhood activities and general political life.¹⁸

In sum, our results reveal that two important ultimate consequences of gentrification for black Americans are disempowerment and demobilization. While such findings are implied by existing research on black empowerment, our analysis empirically ties these outcomes to gentrification as the factor




FIGURE 3. Indirect effects of residing in a gentrifying context on black Americans. *Note:* Entries are mean and variance adjusted weighted least squares estimates (WLSMV) using delta parameterization and 1,000 iterations in Mplus (v.5.21). For all models, because Mplus treats categorical dependent variables as latent variables, the coefficient estimates listed along the paths represent the standard deviation unit change in the latent variable underlying the observed categorical variable associated with a unit change in the predictor variable. β_D indicates the direct effect of $\Delta White$ on the outcome variable and β_I is the indirect effect of $\Delta White$ on the outcome variable. $^{***}p < .001$, $^{**}p < .01$, $^*p < .05$, $^\dagger p < .10$ (one-tailed)

“breaking” the empowerment obtained by majority status. Additionally, our analysis highlights the critical importance of broken bonds of neighborhood trust and reciprocity in effectuating these outcomes.¹⁹

ALTERNATIVE HYPOTHESES: DISORGANIZATION, SELECTION-BIAS, AND REVERSE CAUSALITY

One potential problem with contextual research such as ours, where the goal is to identify the causal effect of context on attitudes and behavior, is that the treatment variable may be non-randomly assigned, a function of selection bias, and potentially endogenous. As with any analysis, concern over such problems, if not defined in terms of research design alone, grows with the ability to articulate a theoretically plausible alternative explanation subsuming the operation of such damaging elements for causal inference. With respect to our research, such an alternative explanation comes in the form of what we label the “disorganization counter hypothesis.” This alternative hypothesis, informed by social disorganization theory (Shaw and McKay 1942) and work on “broken windows” (Sampson and Raudenbush 2004; Wilson and Kelling 1982), begins with the logic that gentrification does not occur randomly and may be more likely in poor, blighted, and “disorganized” communities. Thus, according to this counter hypothesis, trust in one’s neighbors is low in gentrifying contexts because gentrification tends to occur in disorganized minority neighborhoods characterized by low levels of general social trust and low neighborhood quality. It is also worth noting here that perceived social disorganization is also associated with reductions in political participation (Michener 2013). Thus, finding support for this counter-hypothesis would not only call our claims about trust into question but also our overall claims about political participation. In sum, white growth is not causing distrust; rather, neighborhood distrust is a characteristic of locations that predicts where gentrification tends to occur.

We have identified three testable deductions from the disorganization counter hypothesis. First, disorganized neighborhoods are characterized by poverty, crime, and high levels of general distrust; therefore, if gentrification tends to occur in such neighborhoods, we should expect to observe low levels of general social trust among blacks in gentrifying contexts. Following this, we should also expect to observe low levels of intraracial trust among blacks residing in gentrifying contexts as it is a subcategory of general social trust. Last, the social disorganization literature finds a

Table 4. The effect of residing in a gentrifying context on intra-racial trust, community quality rating, and safety concerns among black Americans

	2000 SCBS			Replication: 2006 SCCS	
	Trust in blacks	Community quality rating	Concerned for safety	Trust in blacks	Community quality rating
Contextual variables					
ΔWhite	-.428 (1.27)	-1.87 (1.59)	.804 (1.70)	1.67 (1.14)	-1.61 (1.70)
% Black	.304 (1.35)	-.920 (1.64)	-.385 (1.81)	1.31 (1.37)	-2.06 (2.15)
ΔWhite × % black	-1.09 (2.21)	3.06 (2.69)	1.43 (2.94)	-2.51 (2.36)	3.46 (3.65)
Median household income	.976* (.471)	-4.01**** (.673)	-.434 (.611)	.930 (.791)	-4.11*** (1.42)
% Foreign born	-.964* (.400)	1.38** (.459)	.066 (.506)	1.24 (.834)	-.313 (1.23)
Total population	1.64 (.955)	-1.75 (1.11)	-.477 (1.14)	.153 (.607)	.649 (.957)
Individual-level variables					
Education	.754*** (.175)	-.730*** (.221)	-.128 (.224)	-.202 (.253)	-.097 (.349)
Income	-.047 (.179)	-1.04*** (.212)	-.108 (.227)	.048 (.043)	-.279*** (.057)
Age	.011*** (.003)	-.016*** (.004)	-.002 (.004)	.016*** (.005)	-.024*** (.006)
Gender	.131 (.094)	.064 (.111)	-.146 (.121)	-.108 (.142)	.143 (.184)
Unemployed	.002 (.180)	.611*** (.190)	.021 (.225)	.134 (.266)	-.215 (.311)
Union member	.056 (.124)	.185 (.146)	-.009 (.160)	-.049 (.269)	.486 (.332)
Homeowner	.003 (.103)	-.538*** (.120)	-.213 [^] (.130)	.271 [^] (.153)	-.460* (.194)
Tenure in community	.282 [^] (.169)	.146 (.195)	-.217 (.213)	.263 (.250)	.092 (.314)
Married	.172 [^] (.100)	-.169 (.122)	-.147 (.129)	.163 (.149)	-.225 (.202)
Born in United States	-.027 (.367)	.544 (.440)	.183 (.465)	.276 (.353)	.119 (.524)
Political orientation	.294 [^] (.152)	-.062 (.174)	.176 (.188)	.064 (.293)	-.140 (.373)
Religiosity	-.031 (.199)	.195 (.234)	1.07*** (.316)	-.052 (.234)	-.134 (.297)
Network diversity	.022 (.146)	-.095 (.171)	-.398* (.181)	-	-

White affect	–	–	–	1.72*** (.271)	–.745*** (.328)
Constant		1.43 (1.12)	–2.67 (1.22)		3.21 (1.37)
Thresholds	Not presented			Not presented	
No. of Individuals	2,280	2,389	2,394	970	1,000
No. of Tracts/Zips	1,060	1,097	1,098	316	322

Sources: 2000 and 2006 Social Capital Benchmark Surveys.

Note: Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients from random-intercept logistic and ordered logistic regression models estimated using *xtlogit* and *gllamm* in the software package Stata®.

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$ (two-tailed hypothesis tests).

link between objective disorganization and perceived disorganization and neighborhood quality. If gentrification occurs in disorganized neighborhoods, then we should also expect to find blacks residing in gentrifying contexts to be more likely to perceive their community as being of poor quality.

Drawing upon both the 2000 SCBS and the 2006 SCCS, we put these expectations to test, with the assumption being that, if the disorganization counter-hypothesis is correct, we should expect to find that the pattern of results (i.e., negative and significant interaction terms for $\Delta White$ and % *Black*) when analyzing general social trust, intraracial trust, and community quality ratings, mirror those when analyzing trust in one's neighbors. If, however, we fail to find such results, one could interpret such null findings as evidence against disorganization. Table 4 reveals that null results are precisely what we find. Across two datasets, we fail to find evidence that residing in a gentrifying context is associated with a range of manifestations of residing in a disorganized neighborhood, such as low trust across the board or rating of one's community as an undesirable place to live. Instead, we find that residing in a gentrifying context is only associated with lower levels of trust in one's immediate neighborhood. While these null results do not prove that the operative factor causing neighborhood distrust is white growth in black dominated contexts, they do cast doubt on the operation of a competing theoretical explanation.²⁰

CONCLUSION

In this paper, we take an important first step in directing the attention of political science to a timely and previously overlooked topic. While case studies focusing on various gentrifying neighborhoods have found mixed results in terms of how minorities react to the entrance of whites—which is strongly suggestive of a complex operation of factors that likely vary from neighborhood to neighborhood—our analyses find, when averaging across neighborhoods throughout the nation as a whole, that gentrification is damaging to black communities: gentrification “loosens” the social fabric of black communities, and results in political disempowerment and demobilization.

Our results suggest against both uniformity and simplicity in our thinking about the political consequences of racial diversity and segregation. While scholarly treatments of segregation primarily focus on its harms to the black community and facilitation of racial prejudice in white

communities, the black empowerment literature has led scholars to recognize that segregated contexts can have some social and political benefits that are not available to black Americans in multiethnic or white dominated communities. Thus, while research on interracial contact tends to forecast a high degree of promise associated with the diversification of white communities for creating a more racially tolerant and harmonious society, our results suggest caution when applying such expectations to black communities. Thus, while it may be the case that gentrification involves a reinvestment in urban centers previously suffering from divestment, our results support the skepticism voiced by opponents of gentrification in casting doubt on proponents' optimism regarding the distribution of the benefits of new investment.

Our analyses corroborate the fears of opponents of gentrification by suggesting a detrimental effect on minority participation and representation. While we view our findings as an improvement over prior research, we see the need for future work exploring longitudinal and experimental research designs, as well as work assessing whether our findings hold when applied to other non-Black minority communities. Further, as gentrification spreads, results such as ours give heightened urgency to the question of the occurrence and success of resistance efforts to gentrification enacted by black communities. While our study documents a demobilizing effect of gentrification on individual blacks—which we link in theory to threats of economic and political displacement—prior work has positioned the experience of racial degradation and social and market exclusion as a mobilizing resource available to black communities for political action (Orr 1999). Thus, it would be of interest for future research to systematically analyze how gentrification resistance movements form, and whether the individual-level effects observed in our study are drawn upon by black elites to empower and mobilize individual blacks in anti-gentrification efforts.

Another avenue for future research could involve assessing the effects of individual differences in gentrifying populations and how those differences interact with the behaviors of long-time residents. Japonica Brown-Saracino (2009) creates a typology of gentrifiers that is defined by the extent to which new residents strive to preserve the existing social ecology of a neighborhood. In contrast to “social preservationists” and “social homesteaders”, Brown-Saracino argues that “urban pioneers” are detrimental to gentrifying communities due to their economic motivations and apathy toward the community. It is possible that gentrifying communities with a larger mix of “social preservationists” and “social

homesteaders” relative to “urban pioneers” are better able to combat the negative effects of gentrification than areas defined by a large number of “urban pioneers.” Such a study could analyze the prospects for “bridging social capital” to emerge between entering whites and long-time black residents in order to procure perhaps the most ideal outcome of urban re-investment without displacement.

Supplementary Material

The supplementary material for this article can be found at <http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/rep.2016.8>.

NOTES

1. Gentrification is defined in the existing literature as a demographic change in urban communities characterized by a shift from lower SES residents to higher SES residents (e.g., Freeman and Braconi 2004). The term is distinct from terms such as “urban renewal,” “white return,” and “reurbanization” in that it is intended to focus on the entirety of the process, and the observed/potential displacement of lower SES residents by higher SES residents, typically as a function of rising property values. It is important to note that while conceptualized as a class-based process, in contexts where race and class are correlated, gentrification becomes “racialized.”

2. While gentrification is a phenomenon occurring in other minority communities, such as Latino communities, the majority of gentrifying areas are black neighborhoods, and many of the most salient instances of gentrification in the nation have occurred in black neighborhoods. Historically speaking, gentrification’s effects on black communities should also be unique, since white flight created many of these communities in the first place (Massey and Denton 1993). While we view understanding the effect of gentrification on Latino, Asian, and Mixed-Minority communities an important topic, we have chosen in this paper to focus on black communities. We view questions concerning possible heterogeneity in the effect of gentrification across different minority communities outside the scope of this initial study and worthy of future research.

3. Moreover, the vast literature on racial context in political science has largely focused on the effects of increasing “diversity” on the political attitudes and behavior of white majorities (e.g. Blalock 1967; Bobo 1983; Giles and Buckner 1993; Oliver and Mendelberg 2000). Relative to this research, there is a modest body of work on inter-minority relations (e.g., Gay 2006; Kaufmann 2003; McClain et al. 2006) and little to no work on how minorities react to the presence or growth of whites in their community (cf. Oliver and Wong 2003).

4. Institutional features might condition this relationship. Kesler and Bloemraad (2010) show that economic insecurity and multicultural policies moderate the relationship between immigration and several indicators of social capital, such that the expected negative relationship between diversity and social capital is reversed in places with low income inequality and broad support for multiculturalism. Hooghe (2007) explores whether societal features such as the existence of stable groups, network segregation, and legal recognition of minority groups might alter some of the conclusions in the social capital literature. Although we do not consider the role of institutions in this manuscript, we implicitly acknowledge that gentrifying communities are subject to high levels of *network segregation*. According to Hughe, network segregation should produce distrust, and our findings are consistent with this expectation. Furthermore, our findings are consistent with Kesler and Bloemraad because we predict that gentrification ought to increase perceptions of economic insecurity. Since many of the institutional features that are discussed by these authors are implicit in our paper, future research should explore the moderating role of local and state institutions in a more explicit fashion.

5. The earliest work on social capital was focused on defining the concept and considering its consubstantive and instrumental sources (see Portes 2000 for a review of the early social capital literature).

More recent studies have focused on testing the “constrict hypothesis” (Fieldhouse and Cutts 2010; Putnam 2007; van der Meer and Tolsma 2014), or the hypothesis that diversity reduces social capital. The purpose of our discussion here is not to question the validity of social capital as a concept, but the applicability of the theory to the topic of gentrification.

6. To be sure, we do not want to diminish other aspects of social capital theory (e.g., involvement in civic associations) by focusing on trust. However, at the individual level, we posit that the most immediate effects of gentrification will be reduced feelings of trust and reciprocity in neighbors. Ultimately, we argue (and find) that reduced trust leads to a “hunkering down” which affects local civic participation, among other outcomes.

7. The 2000 SCBS was conducted between July and November of 2000, was administered by telephone using random-digit dialing (RDD), and is comprised of a national sample and representative samples from 41 U.S. communities. For more information about sampling methodology, see the survey website at the Roper Center: http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/data_access/data/datasets/social_capital_community_survey.html

8. Relative to other possible data sources, such as the 1993 National Black Politics Study ($N = 1,206$), the 1996 National Black Election Study ($N = 1,216$), or the 1992–94 Multi-City Study of Urban Inequality (four cities: Atlanta, Boston, Detroit, and Los Angeles), we find the SCBS is a most optimal for our purposes given its topical focus, national scale and breadth of community samples, black sample size, and inclusion of fine-grained geocode data.

9. One problem afflicting contextual research such as ours, which typically compels scholars to use larger units of geographic aggregation such as MSA or county, is that smaller units, such as census tracts and zip codes, change over time. Thus, while use of tract and zip code is preferable over larger units in terms of their face validity in measuring respondent’s neighborhood and community, they come with the disadvantage of producing missing data when analysts are interested in analyzing change-based variables, as significant portions of tracts and zips recorded at the time of data collection may not have existed or been different just ten years prior. This is indeed the case with our data: the 2,078 unique tracts recorded for our 3,663 Black respondents are based upon 2000 census geographies, and while our matching of contextual data from the 2000 census with the SCBS data yielded missing tract data for only 92 respondents, similar matching of contextual data from the 1990 census yielded missing tract data for roughly 733 respondents.

10. Rather than creating a summative scale from these items, given their dichotomous nature, we created a Bartlett factors score from these items derived from the first factor of a factor analysis using the polychoric correlations between these seven items. The results from the factor analysis revealed that each of these items loaded highly onto a single factor. We chose to use the Bartlett method for scoring respondents on this latent factor because Bartlett scores have the advantage of being unbiased estimates of the true factor score (DiStefano, Zhu, and Mandrilla 2009).

11. We should note that the results presented in Table 1 entirely hold when controlling for 1990 Median Income instead of 2000 Median Income. This robustness check was conducted in light of the possibility that 2000 Median Income is a “post-treatment” variable, and thus biases estimates of white growth when included as a control.

12. When testing the model estimated in column 1 for influential data using Cook’s D, no observations had a Cook’s D value greater than 1. Further, when re-estimating the model in column 1 as an OLS regression and testing for multicollinearity, no predictor variable had a variance inflation factor (VIF) greater than 2.

13. While one might expect a limited amount of variation in income levels in predominantly black neighborhoods, we find that income varies considerably across tracts that are 85% black or higher ($\bar{x} = \$31,058$, $\text{min} = \$6,902$, $\text{max} = \$94,215$).

14. The 2006 SCCS was conducted by telephone utilizing RDD and contains a national adult sample and representative samples from 22 communities yielding a total sample of $N = 12,100$ and $N = 1,133$ non-Hispanic, Black respondents. For more information about the 2006 SCCS, see: http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/data_access/data/datasets/social_capital_community_survey_2006.html

15. The item we use to measure *Network Diversity* in the 2000 SCBS was not present in the 2006 data, so we relied upon an alternative measure—*White Affect*—to enable us to assess the effect of Δ White holding constant variation across black respondents in their positive/negative feelings toward Whites. For more information about variable measurement in the 2006 SCCS, see the Supplemental Appendix.

16. This is due to the smaller sample size of the 2006 data in conjunction with missing data at the tract-level (given the 2006 SCCS's reliance upon 2000 Census geographies) reducing the effective sample size to well-below 1,000 respondents. To preserve as many of the 1,133 black respondents in this data, and thus protect the statistical power of our tests, we used zip code level data because there was less missing data at this level given that there were fewer changes in zip codes than census tracts between 1990 and 2000. We use 1990 to 2007 as the time interval used to observe change because the survey data was collected in 2006, and the most complete zip code level census data conducted the closest in time to 2006 is the American Community Survey's 2007–2011 5-year data file.

17. The size of the coefficient estimates in Table 3 suggests that these models may suffer from some form of separation (Albert and Anderson 1984). To address this concern and demonstrate the robustness of our results, we re-estimated the models in Table 3 using weakly informative priors. Since separation inflates coefficient estimates, Gelman et al. (2008) recommend using weakly informative Cauchy priors (center = 0, scale = 2.5) as a means of stabilizing coefficients. The main results hold even after applying this correction (see Supplemental Appendix).

18. Given that our prior analysis demonstrated that changes in housing costs and residential status condition the effects of residing in black communities experiencing white growth, Figure A1 (in the Supplemental Appendix) presents the results from a SEM looking exclusively at black renters, and focusing on the direct and indirect effects of white growth in black-dominated communities as further conditioned by changes in rents being at their highest value. Figure A1 reveals that the patterns of findings displayed in Figure 3 essentially hold.

19. Fieldhouse and Cutts (2010) find that neighborhood-level diversity is associated with decreases in cooperative norms among whites, but not blacks and Hispanics, in the United States and United Kingdom. In addition, the authors find that in the United States, political participation for all three groups is lowest in diverse contexts. While the latter is consistent with our findings, the former runs contrary to what we observe. Several differences between Fieldhouse and Cutts' empirical strategy and our strategy should be noted. First, Fieldhouse and Cutts employ static measures of diversity, whereas we consider the role of *increases* in diversity. Second, Fieldhouse and Cutts do not consider the interaction between stable neighborhood demographics and neighborhood change. In contrast, our analysis explores how an influx of white residents disrupts stable patterns of social interaction in diverse communities (i.e. predominately Black communities). This dynamic approach is consistent with Hooghe (2007) who argues that the social capital literature should explore "diversity trends" rather than "stable patterns of diversity." As Hooghe argues, "what basically determines feeling of threat is not the actual level of diversity but rather the difference between the traditional or expected levels of diversity and the actually experienced levels." In the case of gentrification, we argue that the threats experienced are not tied to stable demographic patterns, but rather drastic changes in a community's makeup.

20. As an additional method of evaluating our theory, we assessed the effect of Latino growth on neighborhood trust among blacks. The entry of groups of lower SES relative to whites, such as Latinos, into majority black contexts should in theory be less likely to trigger the same threatened reaction as white entry. In estimating the model presented in Table 1 substituting Latino growth 1990–2000 (tract-level) in for white growth, we find that Latino growth is associated with a significant increase in neighborhood trust among blacks, and that this effect is not conditional upon the percent black at the zip code level in 2000.

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