declares that government punishment and monitoring almost always appear together, making it virtually impossible to test her proposition (p. 67). Similarly, in several places Yap states that, according to her statistical tests, if a government engages in self-punishment and monitoring when the economy is strong, citizens will withdraw their economic resources (pp. 14, 76, 148). Yet in the book's penultimate paragraph, Yap claims that governments never actually do this (p. 152).

Nevertheless, the book makes an important point that is worthy of consideration: Even authoritarian governments engage in self-criticism and policy change, and citizens can and do act in ways that pressure the government to do so.

Schock reaches a similar conclusion, while also making a substantial contribution to the literature on contentious politics. Importantly, Schock is one of the first to explicitly, analytically, and comparatively examine when and why nonviolent action succeeds or fails. He finds that—when employed in a particular fashion—nonviolent collective action is the most effective method that citizens can use to successfully challenge contemporary nondemocratic regimes (p. 41). For nonviolent action attacks the modern state at its "social roots" rather than at the "pinnacle of the state or its military/security apparatus." Thus, instead of "challenging the state on its own terms . . . nonviolent actions challenge the state using methods that operate to [the citizenry's] advantage" (p. 38). Further, nonviolent action is available to everyone—including the most vulnerable and weak. Accordingly, it holds the most promise for widespread public participation (p. 40).

Schock's argument derives from a comparison of four cases of successful nonviolent collective action (South Africa, 1983–90; the Philippines, 1983–86; Nepal, 1990; Thailand, 1991–92) with two cases of failed nonviolence (Burma, 1988; China, 1989). He finds that each of the successful cases displayed three common features. First, movement organization was decentralized and network-oriented rather than hierarchical. Second, successful movements utilized a diversity of nonviolent tactics and were able to innovate when one method failed. In particular, they shifted from "methods of concentration" (e.g., sit-ins) to "methods of dispersion" (e.g., strikes). They also utilized all three types of nonviolent action (protest [or persuasion], noncooperation, and nonviolent intervention). These two features gave regime challengers resilience in the face of repression, enabling them to exhibit the third essential feature of successful movements—the ability to target the groups upon which the state depends (pp. 50–53). Together, these three features give a nonviolent movement the necessary leverage to compel at least some regime elites to embrace reform (pp. 68, 143).

Schock's work is impressive, leaving room for only a few minor suggestions. First, the work would be strengthened by a more explicit clarification of the relative importance of the three common features of successful nonviolent action. Second, the book could further address the iterative effect of repeated liberalization and restriction on movement organization and success (cf. Paul Almeida, "Opportunity Organizations and Threat-Induced Contention: Protest Waves in Authoritarian Settings," [2003]). Third, the role of information flows could be better integrated into Schock's overall framework.

That said, the merits of Schock's work are manifold and substantial. To begin, the book is of immense practical value, serving as a virtual handbook for dissidents in illiberal regimes. Of more scholarly import, Schock brilliantly blends the literature on nonviolent action with the political process approach to contentious politics. Whereas students of nonviolent action focus on movement trajectories and emphasize human agency, the political process approach emphasizes movement origins and political structures (p. xiv). By bringing together these approaches, Schock shows how challengers can change the political opportunity structure to their benefit, even in the face of brutal repression. As such, he brings important new insights into the study of social movements in nondemocracies. At the same time, he takes us a long way in resolving the age-old question of the relationship between structure and agency.

Faith in Moderation: Islamist Parties in Jordan and Yemen. By Jillian Schwedler. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006. 252p. $80.00.
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— Russell E. Lucas, *Florida International University*

Many attribute the failure of democratization in the Islamic world to the existence of antidemocratic Islamist movements. Why should democratization move forward when the main beneficiaries would allow for "one person, one vote, one time"? Jillian Schwedler in *Faith in Moderation* refutes this common argument head-on. Schwedler, however, is not merely content in presenting two Islamist parties as "moderate" to show how Islam is not monolithic. She has a more analytical project in which she urges us to unpack many of our assumptions about regime transitions in the Middle East and in general. Her argument targets the linkage between the inclusion of Islamist opposition groups in politics and the effects of their participation in moderating their ideology and behavior. Her treatment of this topic, based in social movement theory, deserves our attention.

Schwedler contributes to an ongoing critique of "transitology" through her structured comparison of two Islamist political parties—the Islamic Action Front (IAF) in Jordan and the Islah (reform) party in Yemen. She argues that the dominant institutional approach to the "stalled" transitions in the two Arab countries fails to explain a key tenet of transitology: The inclusion of nondemocratic opposition parties in the political process will promote the moderation of those parties and thus prompt

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further democratization. For Schwedler, a focus on the lack of progress toward democracy underappreciates the effects of restructuring of political space on political parties even in the absence of democracy. Moreover, the focus on institutional structures and behavioral patterns cannot directly explain *ideological* moderation. Schwedler defines such moderation "not as behavioral change, but as change in ideology from a rigid and closed worldview to one relatively more open and tolerant of alternative perspectives" (p. 22).

Thus, her book compares the effects of the limited political openings in Jordan and Yemen on the restructuring of public political space. She finds that the Jordanian IAF became more ideologically moderate over time, but the Yemeni Islah did not. The variation between the two cases results from the restructuring of political space that changed: The political opportunity structures for Islah and the IAF, the internal group structures, and their boundaries of justifiable ideological action within the interplay of cultural narratives of Islam, democracy, and national unity. These dimensions also influenced each other.

As part of the critique of transitology, *Faith in Moderation* could help us move to the next step of exploring politics in the "gray zone" of autocracy from the analysis of "stalled democratization," with its reification of nondemocratic regimes, to a focus on authoritarian *dynamics*. Although Schwedler elucidates the effects of institutional change on opposition groupings, a key variation between the two cases lies in the different natures of authoritarianism in Jordan (a consolidated monarchy) and Yemen (the merger of two republics). She does note this contrast (p. 64); however, she could make more of this structural difference in explaining her other preferred variables—internal party structure and the mechanism of ideological change.

She rightly points out that the cultural dimensions of political contestation are underspecified by structural approaches and provides us with valuable information on the processes of ideological debate in the IAF and Islah. However, she downplays the degree that those debates were strongly influenced—if not determined (but not predetermined)—by regime-led structural changes. The histories of both regime and opposition in Jordan and Yemen enter her analysis (especially in Chapter 2); however, she perhaps too quickly discards notions of path dependency in favor of exploring ideological change in the 1990s in Chapters 4 and 5.

Another area where ideological change may be more strongly influenced by institutional structures than Schwedler argues lies in the issue of cooperation between Islamists and other opposition groups. She notes the issue of the imbalance in power between the Jordanian and Yemeni regimes and the Islamist opposition groups (e.g., p. 182) and the relationship between each party and their domestic Islamist rivals (in Chapter 6). However, how the two parties relate to non-Islamist opposition groups could be explored further. She explains that cooperation between Islah and the Yemeni Socialist Party was strongly influenced by the vicissitudes of the ruling General People's Congress (p. 188). However, a similar analysis of IAF—leftist cooperation in Jordan (p. 174)—fails to elaborate on the gradual reversal in the balance of power between the 1950s, when the Jordanian monarchy's chief rivals came from the left, to the 1990s, when the IAF, and its parent organization the Muslim Brotherhood, led the opposition forces. Such a change does a great deal to explain Islamist "moderation" because it came from a position of relative strength (at least vis-à-vis other opposition groups). On a technical note, all veto powers over the elected lower house in Jordan were in the constitution well before the 1991 National Charter—a document with normative, but not legal, standing (p. 100).

Schwedler offers an important contribution to the literature on democratization in the Middle East as well as to our study of Islamist political parties. Students of other regions who rely on the "inclusion-moderation" thesis should also take notice of this work. She rightly explores the assumption that structural change leads to unmediated ideological change. Moreover, she contributes to our knowledge of two commonly cited moderate Islamist groups. She also brings the often understudied case of Yemen into our discussions. Her exemplary diligence in the field gathering interviews and internal party documents should be commended.

Faith in Moderation should work its way into the reading lists of graduate courses on Middle East politics. Schwedler's more analytical approach means that she does not present the histories of the IAF and Islah chronologically but rather thematically, which may limit the book's utility for undergraduate audiences. However, her exercise in conceptual unpacking, which blends social movement theories and transitology, should help Middle East studies rejoin debates in comparative politics.

Democracy in Latin America: Political Change in Comparative Perspective. By Peter H. Smith. New York: Oxford University Press, 2005. 380p. $74.00 cloth, $28.95 paper.
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— Jennifer L. McCoy, *Georgia State University*

Peter Smith set out to write a textbook and ended up compiling an original database of Latin American democracy from 1900 to 2000. Analyzing a century of democratic change, Smith has written an impressive book that is accessible to undergraduates, a great literature review for graduate students, instructive for policymakers, and a significant contribution to scholarly understanding of a complex phenomenon. All of this is done with a lively and jargon-free writing style.

The central theme of the book is that Latin American democracy will endure now because it is safe, but it will

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