

poor. So an alternative reason for weak developing-country ownership of aid projects could also be that the preferences of donors and recipients do not overlap but differ. Moreover, development assistance tends to undergo rather rapid changes in “thematic fashions.” Thus, it could, also for this reason, be rational—rather than perverse—for the recipients not to become overly enthusiastic about projects, because aid priorities may shift again and new emphases might wipe away past efforts and results.

Donors’ Samaritan attitudes are no doubt important. But they need to be queried more rigorously. For it would be important for a full understanding of aid (in)effectiveness to know why donors are so “addicted” to providing aid. Raising the second question, then, could it be that foreign-aid giving generates for donors more than just a “warm glow”? Is it a tool for exerting policy conditionality and promoting national self-interest? Are the donors “pure” Samaritans?

While many of the problems identified in the book no doubt adversely affect aid, the question is how much of aid’s (in)effectiveness they do explain: more than 90% or perhaps only 1%? Considering the major countervailing macro forces against which foreign aid and the development of developing countries have had to succeed in recent decades (ranging from conflict and war to excessive financial volatility, a not-always-favorable international trade regime, mounting communicable-disease burdens, and environmental degradation), a reasonable conjecture could be that the answer is the latter: only a small part.

The present book deserves credit for highlighting the role of incentives in explaining aid effectiveness. But it also serves as a useful reminder that our understanding of the development assistance system is as yet quite limited—despite more than six decades of foreign aid.

A key topic for follow-up research might be the point that the authors of this book raise in their conclusion: Would a stronger voice of developing countries in shaping development assistance priorities help improve aid effectiveness? In fact, until the 1980s, the responsibility for determining aid priorities usually rested with developing countries. It was an integral part of national policymaking sovereignty. So an additional issue for follow-up research might be: Why did the international community move away from this demand-driven approach and choose a supply-driven aid strategy—with all its predictable problems of country ownership and sustainability?

For reasons of fairness it should perhaps be noted here that Sweden ranks very well on the Commitment to Development Index, notably in terms of aid (see http://www.cgdev.org/section/initiatives/_active/cdi/_country/sweden/). So the findings of the present book may apply not only to SIDA but perhaps even more so to other donors. This, however, would not distract anything from the earlier argument that the major problems of aid (in)effectiveness may lie elsewhere.

The Ideological Origins of Great Power Politics, 1789–1989. By Mark L. Haas. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005. 250p. \$39.95.
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— Steven B. Redd, *University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee*

Realists argue that state behavior is predicated on the distribution of power in the international system. Specifically, states attempt to acquire, maintain, exercise, and balance power in response to the same behavior expected of other states in the system. In this book, Mark L. Haas offers a compelling argument for thinking beyond power variables and considering the independent effects of ideology on leaders’ foreign policy decisions. The main thrust of his thesis is that the greater the ideological distance between decision makers of different states, the greater the likelihood that they will view each other as threats to domestic power and international security. Conversely, the greater the ideological affinity between states’ leaders, the greater the likelihood that they will see each other as mutually supportive of one another’s interests and, therefore, as less threatening. Decision makers’ conflictual or accommodative foreign policies, then, are a function of threat perception caused by ideological distance. The book begins with the explication of the theoretical argument and then applies the theory to five different historical case studies. Haas concludes with policy implications and prescriptions for current and future international politics generally, and U.S. foreign policy specifically.

Haas identifies three causal mechanisms that link ideological differences among state leaders with threat perception and subsequent foreign policy choices: 1) the demonstration-effects mechanism, 2) the conflict-probability mechanism, and 3) the communications mechanism. The demonstration-effects mechanism states that leaders witness changes occurring in other states and that the increasing ideological distance induces a fear of subversion within the domestic polity. The conflict-probability mechanism is grounded in social identity theory and posits that conflict is more likely when leaders identify ideological outgroups in other states that may pose a threat to their international security. The communications mechanism asserts that ideological rivals are prone to miscommunication and misperception, thereby increasing the likelihood of conflict.

For Haas, it follows that the “degree of ideological similarities among leaders across states” is an important independent variable (p. 31). Ideological beliefs of decision makers are defined in terms of their primary economic, domestic, political, and social goals. These conceptual variables are operationalized by examining regime types, political economy systems, and the extent of civil rights. The dependent variable is the leaders’ perceptions of threat and the resultant foreign policy strategies, for example, alliances, threats or use of force, defense spending, and so

on. Since the author is testing his hypotheses with case studies, he uses process-tracing techniques focused on the public and private statements of leaders, as well as their actual behaviors.

Haas offers an interesting selection of historical cases spanning two hundred years: the three wars of the French Revolution, the Concert of Europe, the 1930s and the origins of World War II, the rise and fall of the Sino-Soviet alliance, and the 1980s and the end of the Cold War. While all of the cases are noteworthy, I believe that the Sino-Soviet split case study provides the strongest evidence in support of the ideological distance hypothesis. The People's Republic of China (PRC) and the USSR were ideological allies and "should" have remained so, especially in light of their shared enmity of the United States. However, Haas deftly illustrates how Mao's increasing ideological radicalization alienated the Soviet Union, even though realist arguments would predict that the two states should have allied to balance the power of the United States.

A marked strength of this book is that it does not attempt to oversell the importance of the central tenet of ideological distance. Haas does not ignore significant realist arguments, and his theoretical exposition outlines the conditions under which power variables versus ideological distance considerations would be expected to operate. The case studies bear this out as well. For example, in the chapter on the origins of World War II, he states that realist explanations based on power maximization help explain much of Soviet behavior toward Germany. Of course, he later qualifies these realist arguments and clarifies how ideological variables may have been the motivating factor behind Soviet foreign policies.

Although the book has few weaknesses, a few are worth discussing. In my view, Haas's theory of a "communications mechanism" is problematic. It posits that ideological distance will lead to miscommunication and misperception. Yet, throughout the book, he explains in great detail how leaders began to see each other as threats because of the things they said and did in terms of ideology. He admits the indeterminacy of this factor when he states that "there is not an inevitable connection between an inability to communicate effectively and increasing perceptions of international threats" (p. 14).

Second, in several places, Haas refers to the fact that power variables were constant or identical, inferring that leaders' decisions had to be based on other factors, that is, ideological variables. However, it seems plausible that different actors within and between states will have different perceptions of relative power. In such cases, power variables may play a more influential role in foreign policy decisions than otherwise accounted for by his ideological-distance thesis.

Third, I found myself repeatedly thinking of possible counterfactuals to Haas's primary thesis. For example, how

do we reconcile the United States (and other Western powers) allying with the Soviet Union during World War II against Hitler's Germany when the United States had been at "ideological war" with communism long before Hitler's fascism/Nazism? Why did the PRC move toward rapprochement with the United States in the early 1970s when, ideologically speaking, Chinese leaders had much more in common with Soviet leaders, notwithstanding their disagreements? I suspect that Haas would answer that in these cases, power considerations became paramount.

Despite these weaknesses, *The Ideological Origins of Great Power Politics, 1789–1989*, is a definite must read. Haas is an effective writer; each of the case studies is meticulously researched, and the evidence marshaled in support of the hypotheses is impressive. The theoretical argument also lends itself nicely to what I hope will be a quantitative approach in future work. Overall, he makes a strong case for the inclusion of ideological factors, specifically distance, in examining and predicting the behavior of leaders of nation-states toward each other.

Keepers of the Flame: Understanding Amnesty

International. By Stephen Hopgood. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006. 249p. \$49.95 cloth, \$19.95 paper.
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— James Ron, *Carleton University*

As human rights promotion gradually comes to rival development and democratization in the Western policy pantheon, more human rights-related books appear each year. Only a minority of these are empirically and methodologically rigorous, however, and even fewer are theoretically adventurous. Stephen Hopgood's unique study of Amnesty International is thus a welcome contribution from a political scientist with anthropological instincts, and it is likely to become a classic in the field. Hopgood immersed himself for over a year in Amnesty's culture, rituals, and politics, and then interpreted this data with insights from Emile Durkheim and Pierre Bourdieu. He writes clearly and well, and his interpretations should appeal to students of transnational organizing, human rights, and international affairs, broadly conceived.

The book's underlying thesis is that the Western human rights movement is a secular religion whose spiritual and organizational core is Amnesty International. Hopgood treats the group as a tribe worthy of ethnographic analysis, studying Amnesty's London-based "International Secretariat" much as one might perceive global Catholicism through the prism of Vatican politics. His interpretations are provocative and important, and the book is likely to be read, and reread, for years to come.

For students of international organizations, one of the book's most intriguing elements is the author's representation of the Amnesty employee experience. Although the organization is devoted to promoting empathy, its