Owen's theory of the social determinates of character formation to achieve Bentham's ideal of happiness maximization. With Thompson making this move, Kaswan believes that Bentham's bourgeois individualism is unmasked: together, they are read as precursors of Antonio Gramsci's theory of capitalist hegemony. Subjective happiness as mere experience of discrete pleasures gives way to an objective and continuous sense of well-being. Thompson lists four components of pleasure that are essential for happiness: "the preservation of health," "individual independence" as the provision of one's own physical space, "social and intellectual enjoyment and self-improvement," and "economy of labor" as shortening its time and intensity and combining it with more pleasurable accompaniments (p. 69). These ends share many features of contemporary discussions of objective well-being and Amartya Sen's capabilities approach for measuring social happiness. Kaswan thus stresses Thompson's belief that institutions should not be evaluated "based on how well they perform the role they are meant to play" but, rather, on "the principles on which the institutions are based and how well they adhere to those principles." The questions of need fulfillment and the development of capacities become practical and political questions regarding the structuring of the institutions "through which we fulfill our needs and exercise our abilities" (p. 91).

The second part of the book addresses Thompson's "politics of happiness." While Bentham's "greatest happiness" is a sum of individual happiness, Thompson's is always a political question regarding "the structure of the social institutions within which people act" (p. 96). Bentham's happiness rests on security of (individual) expectations, premised on private property and contractual enforcement producing subsistence and abundance—and, with luck and over time, increasing material equality. Governments are required only to provide security by enforcing property and contractual rights. Thompson held that enforcing Bentham's "security" guaranteed poverty and inequality. His answer was political democracy and common property. Kasawn reads Thompson's theories as prescient anticipations of the critiques of political economy by Marx and Engels. And it is here—more than halfway through the book—that the author addresses Thompson's cooperative answer.

Only one of Thompson's writings specifically outlines his cooperative ideal. Each community, of between 500 and 2,000 members, would be autarkic, both in production and consumption. He saw little need for outside market relationships because cooperation would result in enough for all and no incentive to produce more for outside sale. On this rather sketchy foundation, Kaswan then constructs two contrasting theories of political democracy. For Bentham (and James Mill), representative democracy is only a check against misrule; for Thompson, political democracy is a shared way of life—a social practice that pervades all relationships. Thompson's cooperatives, by abolishing any distinction between public and private, screen out "politics" altogether: public opinion replaces legal coercion, while "governance becomes little more than a way of solving coordination problems" (p. 155).

The least satisfactory part of *Happiness, Democracy, and the Cooperative Movement* concludes by exploring Thompson's principles put into practice, first by looking at early (and short-lived) cooperative societies such as the Rochdale Pioneers and various Owenite initiatives. Kaswan's examples of long-lived contemporary cooperative societies are bitterly ironic: Sunkist (oranges), Ocean Spray (cranberries), and Land o' Lakes (dairy)—mega–consumer advertisers and distributors of the produce of large-scale (but family-owned) industrial farms. That said, Kaswan's study of Thompson reminds us that supposedly fixed concepts in political theory can become metaphors that creatively migrate and mutate from mind to mind. Those like Bentham, and Hobbes before him, fought losing battles with their readers who have minds of their own.

Political Uses of Utopia: New Marxist, Anarchist, and Radical Democratic Perspectives. Edited by S. D. Chrostowska and James D. Ingram. New York: Columbia University Press, 2017. 376p. $105 cloth, $35 paper.
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— Gregory Claeys, *Royal Holloway, University of London*

After the collapse of the USSR in 1991, the more directly political applications of the generic utopian concept fell into disrepute. The notion that human societies can improve dramatically and swiftly, chiefly through revolution; the expectation that human nature forged in such circumstances would emerge morally cleansed and recharged; and the idea that a morally superior proletariat would be the chief agent of such a transition are now upheld by very few. To its critics (including many insiders) Marxism-Leninism was the chief cause of the practical failure of these assumptions, which often resulted in oppressively dystopian regimes. Notwithstanding efforts to reconstruct the Marxist edifice on humanist foundations in the 1960s and 1970s, the project was largely abandoned by the mid 1980s.

Nonetheless, the world has moved on, and after the 2008 economic crisis, the relevance of any critique of a persistently unstable and exploitative capitalism system became increasingly clear. The present collection of essays addresses this context. Utopia seems useful again —witness the popularity of Rutger Bregman's *Utopia for Realists* (2017)—because alternative ways of viewing the world now seem again insufficient and/or defective. The general proposition that we should be able to conceive of much better worlds, and try to create them, then, seems widely relevant once again. The general question at issue

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is whether anything useful has been learned respecting the relationship between utopia and dystopia, such that a chastened but more mature political thought can reappropriate the concept of utopia without once again embracing its more manifest failures.

The present collection engages very little with the concept of dystopia by way of any admission of utopian guilt, and that is a pity. Stalin is mentioned twice, Mao three times, and Pol Pot not at all. Their regimes killed about a hundred million people applying utopia to politics, and many historians regard them as no better than Hitler's. But no historical account is offered here of why. Auschwitz is condemned as a threat to utopia (p. 277), Kolyma not. Why? The Left's ostrich-like, persistent incapacity to come to terms with the worst parts of its history is thus revealed again. Why did Leninism destroy the possibility of opposition? Is unanimity the heart of utopian aspiration in politics? Did Marxism necessarily terminate in Bolshevism? Is utopianism more antipolitical than political? Such questions demand a historical response, not merely pure theory.

One would expect, given the title of this book, that some concession would be made to the contradictions among the three perspectives indicated in the subtitle: In 1921, Lenin killed off anarchism in the new Bolshevik state, and at the 10th Party Congress and in suppression of Kronstadt also any radical (Soviet) democratic alternative. Without a confrontation with these tragic developments, left thinking cannot move forward. No Utopia Without Dystopia should be the motto of such explorations. One editor simply tells us that "the perversions into which earlier utopias once fell have been more or less purged and their dangers diffused" (p. xxiii), as if that was the end of the story. And, the presumption seems to persist that Marxism is not itself a form of utopianism (p. xxviii), which is now wholly unsustainable. The editors criticize utopian studies for not engaging sufficiently with such themes but then hardly do so themselves, ignoring much that has been written in this field by non-Marxists.

Nonetheless, the 14 essays in *Political Uses of Utopia*, chosen from publications across some 40 years of scholarship (so why are these billed as "new" perspectives?) offer a broader plea for the readmission of utopia to political debate, albeit one skewed by their temporal asynchonicity. Marx, central to many of these essays, is the specific subject of one by Franck Fischbach. But there is little concession to the argument that the Marxian approach to utopia has generally been very biased and one-sided, and that the pretence that "scientific socialism" dwarfed and negated "utopian socialism" has long been highly suspect. The fact that Marxism continues, through writers like Frederic Jameson, to exert a considerable influence on the field of utopian studies is not found remarkable, much less suspect, or worthy of scrutiny. One editor insists that a "dialogue" with Marxism is the most important aspect of modern utopianism (p. xxvii). To do this, a dialogue between Marxists and non-Marxists is necessary. Miguel Abensour's very dated but still provocative and incisive essay here, from 1971–72, shows Marx and Engels engaged with earlier socialists, though much more is known today about this relationship, but its plea for a revival of the programmatic aspects of Marxian communism (p. 45) seems hopelessly misplaced today.

A 2004 essay by a leading German utopian scholar, Richard Saage, asks whether the classic definition of utopia has relevance for our future. Here, at least, Karl Popper's critique of utopia is utilized, though it is appraised as having missed the target (p. 62). But the dystopias of George Orwell and others are treated seriously, as posing a real challenge to utopianism, and the intolerance of Marxian communists for other forms of utopias is acknowledged (p. 77). Francisco Fernandez Buey gives a good contextual overview of Thomas More's original work and some of its interpreters, with some reflections on Herbert Marcuse, Ernst Bloch and the "end of utopia" debate. Peter Hallward treats the issue of a "general will" in relation to the utopian tradition. Étienne Balibar focuses on the contrast of "utopia" to "imagination." John Grant examines the specific contribution of Frederic Jameson to modern debates on the subject. Michèle Riot-Sarcy examines some early nineteenth-century French approaches to utopia. Michael Löwy discusses the contemporary global justice movement. Ruth Kinna looks at some of the many points of intersection between utopianism and anarchism. A series of essays by Jacques Rancière, Raymond Geuss, and Étienne Tassin then look at some of the more theoretical implications of the main concept. The collection is rounded out by a fine essay by S. D. Chrostowska, which distances contemporary radical politics from many forms of utopianism and makes a plea for utopian politics as a politics of "happiness" (p. 291).

Collectively, these essays indicate the increasing attractiveness of the idea of utopia for current movements seeking social and political change, as well as the likely irrelevance of many traditional approaches to the central issues raised by the concept. Some disclaimers notwithstanding, this penetrating and well-chosen collection of essays, many of which have not previously been available in English, is a useful place to start engaging with the broader problems the title indicates. "Utopia" will continue to mean many different things, but its relevance to contemporary affairs can now be restored. Liberalism, too, has presented its utopia and this too has been found wanting. The time is ripe to reassess the entire subject, to recognize that its "three faces," as Lyman Tower Sargent terms them, require a unitary approach, and to use

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a confrontation with past failings as a means of projecting better futures.

The Political Thought of America's Founding Feminists. By Lisa Pace Vetter. New York: New York University Press, 2017. 320p. $89.00 cloth, $30.00 paper.
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— Penny Weiss, *Saint Louis University*

Lisa Pace Vetter's focus in this book is the "unsung advocates and chroniclers" who worked on behalf of "marginalized populations initially left out of the founding narrative" of America. Vetter rightly criticizes political scientists for ignoring the Jacksonian-era female thinkers she so ably tackles. While she suggests that the cause of such neglect has to do with "founding feminists" writing in "unconventional modes of theorizing" (p. 3), that strikes me as overly generous, given the discipline's willingness to accommodate diverse sources by people deemed important, and the fact that many writings by and for the marginalized were, in fact, standard theoretical treatises. Nonetheless, she is spot-on in taking the discipline to task for its exclusionary tendencies.

Vetter credits each of the seven figures she explores with something we are learning about more and more marginalized thinkers: "[N]ot only were these advocates engaging in many of the same theoretical debates and on many different levels, but, equally important, *they were also broadening and innovating on traditional mainstream theoretical concepts to better accommodate women and the disenfranchised*" (p. 4; my emphasis). The result, she asserts, is "a transformative understanding of democratic citizenship" (p. 6), and "a new political space" (p. 16), or "counterpublic," in which to theorize and to act. Vetter's strategy is to "bring the theoretical underpinnings of these reformers' efforts to light by framing them from the perspective of specific contemporaneous [male] political theorists such as Alexis de Tocqueville, Adam Smith, and Jeremy Bentham . . . without portraying early women's rights theorists as derivative of their male counterparts" (p. 18). She mostly succeeds in this endeavor.

Vetter first tackles freethinker Frances Wright. Especially given the breadth of her oeuvre, the influence of her lectures and newspaper, and the importance of the trends and theories she used and contested, the paucity of a secondary literature on Wright is almost shocking. Vetter's chapter adds significantly to it. I was especially happy to see attention to Wright's epistemology and the democracy it supports. As is often the case, the more Wright focused on systems of inequality, the more radical her thought became, shifting from a "romanticized republicanism" (p. 40) to a "withering portrayal of American society" (p. 41). The author convincingly shows that while Wright used the ideas of many, she always did so for her own ends: Her socialism was more political than that of Robert Owens, her appeal to the founding principles was more absolute than Jeremy Bentham's, and her vision of just gender relations was more egalitarian and less sentimental than Tocqueville's. Building in part on Bentham's work on corruption, Wright understands inequality in very modern terms, as Vetter notes: "[W]hite male privilege is supported by an elaborate network of corrupt political and religious institutions and sustained by oppressive social and cultural practices" (p. 57). She confronts the privileged with a new look at the costs to them of their seemingly desirable position (pp. 62–63). Vetter makes Wright quite appealing, from her "rhetorical prowess" (p. 63) to her independent thinking, which includes "inquiry and self-scrutiny" (p. 68) and "release from the authority of elites and the doctrines they sought to impose" (p. 70).

Harriet Martineau, like Wright, endured "vitriolic attacks" for her life and her politics (p. 76), and was an amazingly prolific writer in multiple genres. Vetter focuses intently and productively on Martineau's work on the concept and practice of sympathy. Vetter is most excited by the way Martineau moves Adam Smith's internal, "imaginative" practice of sympathy to a dialogic one. Vetter worries that "Smith's sympathetic observer may encounter difficulties in placing oneself in the shoes of someone of the opposite sex, or of a different race, or of a radically different socioeconomic status and accurately understanding that person's position." Martineau, in contrast, advocates direct engagement and discourse (which includes having factual social knowledge, as well as listening and observing), which allow the "other" to be heard, on their own terms (p. 81). Turning from a comparison with Smith to one with Tocqueville, Vetter compares their methods of coming to grips with the institution of slavery (Martineau's is more detailed, thorough, and filled with anecdotes and examples, as sympathy requires [p. 91]), and how those methods relate to Tocqueville's resigned conclusions and Martineau's hopeful ones. Vetter then shows how "Martineau's extensive analysis of the lamentable plight of American women in *Society in America* contrasts sharply with Tocqueville's" (p. 93), and the difference again turns out to be her robust practice of sympathy. Tracing one concept in this chapter is a source of its richness. In the end, both Smith and Tocqueville seem to shrink in comparison to the innovative Martineau. The first two chapters are wonderful.

Following is a relatively short, less satisfying chapter on Angelina Grimke, a figure "committed to a non-doctrinal, non-hierarchical, egalitarian form of Christianity" (p. 117). The two conversations into which she is placed, one with Catherine Beecher and one with Adam Smith, concern the ability of two sides of a deep political divide to hear each other and ultimately act in concert for greater equality. This time, the framing overwhelmed rather than made more visible the featured thinker's contributions.

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