

Canada. When Foreign Minister Pearson denies planning to integrate Canada and the United States, his denial becomes evidence for Teigrob that the government was indeed taking this idea seriously.

Admittedly, Teigrob's are wonderfully argumentative claims that are certain to enliven the most tiresome graduate seminar, but they are not representative of the kind of carefully calibrated research that really advances historical understanding. And that is too bad. A nuanced and sophisticated discussion of Canadian public opinion and the Cold War would be very welcome.

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Daryl Copeland, *Guerrilla Diplomacy: Rethinking International Relations* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2009, \$25.00). Pp. 320. ISBN 978 1 5882 6655 2.

Daryl Copeland presents the case for a new approach to international relations in the form of guerrilla diplomacy. The use of force in the first decade of the twenty-first century, particularly in Iraq and Afghanistan, has demonstrated limitations in the approach adopted particularly by Blair and Bush and the coalition of willing participants. *Guerrilla Diplomacy* presents an alternative approach to the challenges of contemporary international relations and a call to reinvigorate diplomacy.

Guerrilla diplomacy, as Copeland presents the concept, is a reinterpretation of the purpose of diplomacy at a strategic level. It is also the blueprint for a new type of diplomat, nimble enough to engage in a strategy requiring interaction with a plethora of new international actors and flexible enough to mix with the population as well as mingle with colleagues inside the increasingly high and heavily guarded embassy walls. This dual layered approach seeks to demonstrate how the practitioner on the ground would fit into a broader diplomatic strategy.

At the strategic level, guerrilla diplomacy argues for a reallocation of emphasis from a narrow interpretation of security to a strategy focussed on development. To support this reallocation, Copeland breaks away from a First World/Third World interpretation to one which he characterizes as ACTE – the advancing, contingent, tertiary, and excluded worlds.

The A world is made up of the advanced nations, along with the economically advantaged elite in less-developed countries. The “contingent” world includes the emerging developed states. “Tertiary”-world countries are mainly the dependent, underdeveloped “Third World,” with the addition of the “the uninsured poor in the United States (such as those who suffered in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina.)” and pockets of poverty in other states. The “excluded” world comprises those groups largely isolated from development, mostly in sub-Saharan states, Amazonia and Central Asia.

This interpretation of the world sets up the role development can play increasing security in both the A and CTE worlds by reducing the currently widening economic gaps between these worlds. Copeland argues that “we must make a substantial effort to identify the critical points at which A-world knowledge, C-world skills, and T- and E-world needs intersect” (137). The means through which this may be achieved are

a greater emphasis on science and technology providing the potential for CTE worlds to engage in greater ownership of knowledge and the ability to engage in greater levels of R & D to further feed economic development. While Copeland highlights some examples of negotiation, these are seen at the periphery rather than at the core of strategy. As a result, the argument predominantly maintains a hierarchical flow from A to CTE worlds, with relatively little attention given to the reverse flow from ETC to A.

The second element of the book, the view of the guerrilla diplomat “on the ground,” is an enlightening and challenging perspective on the skills a diplomat will need in a world dominated by globalization. These diplomats are no longer seen dealing with representatives of other governments but comfortably navigating local traditions and numerous environments to engage a wider range of actors and NGOs. With physical and virtual barriers being erected to prevent citizens engaging directly with embassy staff, the options are to hunker down in mini “green zones” or become nimble enough to operate beyond the concrete barriers and automatic weapons. The guerrilla diplomat should “swim with comfort and ease in the sea of the people rather than flop around like a fish out of water, and prefer to mix with the population rather than mingle with colleagues inside the embassy walls”.

What is worthy of note is that some responses to guerrilla diplomacy have comprised the incongruous pairing of (a) assertions that foreign ministries are already engaged in this activity, and (b) an insistence that it will not work within the organizational culture of an embassy. All of which suggests that Copeland has hit a raw nerve with his clarion call for a new form of diplomat. Many have observed the changing world in which public diplomats operate; few have articulated at any length how embassy staff should respond. In articulating a response to globalization, Copeland demonstrates the extent to which contemporary diplomacy does not utilize the full range of options. Even for those who disagree with the image of guerrilla-in-diplomat’s-clothing, the book makes a strong argument that diplomacy is not currently configured for optimal results.

The book, for good or ill, is not ivory-towered scholarship – it is a rich argument spiced by Copeland’s years of experience on the ground. As a result it puts forward an inescapable challenge with which scholars and practitioners alike will have to grapple as they attempt to define a role for diplomacy in the future of international relations.

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