

David Scobey's words, "the crux of civic education lies in the pedagogical encounter between teacher and student" (p. 192). In each essay, the author narrates a powerful and personal tale of educational transformation on the part of her/his students. And the story of student learning is not a general or theoretical case, but often centers on the teachers' use of particular assignments or exercises and the analysis or essays that students in the authors' classes produce. For example, Carmen Werder's chapter analyzes students' written responses to an assignment asking them to construct metaphors for themselves as "learners," "communicators," and "citizens," while Michael Smith examines the revision of his environmental history course to include an experiential local component. The case/course narratives, as exemplary reflections on the scholarship and art of teaching, will be useful to teachers in any discipline, including those of us in political science.

There is one significant flaw in the book that diminishes its contribution to the field of citizenship education in the college curriculum. The authors miss the opportunity to connect their arguments and course narratives to an existing literature in civic learning and engagement. In the introduction, ironically titled "Ending the Solitude of Citizenship Education," Smith, Nowacek, and Bernstein invoke the WAC movement to make an argument about citizenship education. But this argument has been made for at least a decade, as Edward Zlotkowski's concluding essay indicates, and was the basis for an entire effort begun in 1999 by Campus Compact to engage a number of different disciplines in the enterprise of citizenship education. In political science, the American Political Science Association began its own civic education initiative in the 1990s, featuring curriculum workshops, resources from conceptual essays to syllabi, and a standing committee on Civic Education and Engagement. The course narratives and reflections that make up the bulk of *Citizenship Across the Curriculum* were preceded by an entire set of more than 20 discipline-based monographs on educating for engagement through service-learning (see, e.g., Richard M. Battistoni and William E. Hudson, eds., *Experiencing Citizenship: Concepts and Models for Service-Learning in Political Science*, 1997), none of which is referenced by any of the authors. It would have bolstered the arguments in this volume for the authors to have incorporated the findings in these monographs.

Even some of the definitions of citizenship announced by the different authors would have been bolstered by reference to other works. For example, Nowacek's understanding of "citizenship as vocation" has been expressed most recently by Ross Roholt, Roudy Hildreth, and Michael Baizerman (*Becoming Citizens*, 2009), and would have been strengthened by reference to their arguments about the formation of civic vocation in young people. The irony is that one of the main reasons for this book was the building of a community among the authors

through their CASTL residency at the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching. The book's arguments and contributions would have been enhanced by an effort to "build community" outside of the volume's authors, with an extensive larger literature in the field of citizenship education and engaged learning.

In the end, the insights that emerge from the essays about citizenship, teaching, and learning more than make up for the flaws made by the authors in failing to address the larger literature of civic engagement and education. At a time when other academic disciplines and courses are paying attention to the development of citizens who can understand and address the issues confronting us in our public life, political scientists would do well to think about what it means to be a citizen in the twenty-first century, and how our own scholarship and teaching can produce these capacities in our students.

Hobbes on Resistance: Defying the Leviathan. By Susanne Sreedhar. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010. 192p. \$85.00.

Persecution or Toleration: An Explication of the Locke-Proast Quarrel, 1689–1704. By Adam Wolfson. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2010. 132p. \$55.00. doi:10.1017/S1537592710003804

— Richard Vernon, *The University of Western Ontario*

These compact and lucid books illuminate important seventeenth-century discussions of the limits of state power. Susanne Sreedhar's book succeeds in finding something original to say about a topic that has been thoroughly worked over, while Adam Wolfson's helps to clarify an episode that is still not sufficiently well known. Sreedhar's book draws out the implications of something that Hobbes made inadequately explicit, while Wolfson's concerns a debate that was conducted at enormous length by Locke and an adversary, but which is in need of succinct "explication."

A received view is that Hobbes argued for absolute obedience to sovereigns, with the sole exception that one could refuse obedience in order to save one's life, on the grounds that the right to preserve one's life is something that one could never contract to give up. Other scholars, however—notably Jean Hampton—have argued that there are wider grounds of resistance in Hobbes's political theory, but that these undermine that theory's consistency and viability. Sreedhar rejects both the received view and the charge of inconsistency. The received view is wrong, she argues, because, in the first place, Hobbes allows that people may contract away their right to life, and that all Hobbes claims (and needs) is the view that one would not do so in a *social* contract, for one could not *rely on* others' doing so (p. 37). In the second place, it is wrong because Hobbes has a longer list of "resistance rights" that the social contract leaves intact: one has a right to refuse imprisonment, to

join with others in resisting it, to refuse to punish close relatives, to refuse a military draft, and to refuse to incriminate oneself. As for Hampton's critique, Sreedhar deploys a view of legal authority developed by Joseph Raz: Legal authority necessarily excludes some reasons for disobedience, but does not necessarily exclude all reasons. Hobbes needs to exclude only those reasons that, if acted on, would undermine the exercise of sovereignty. He needs to exclude what may be called conscience-type reasons, or claims to substitute one's personal judgment for the sovereign's; he does not need to exclude what we may call security-type reasons, or claims based on fear for one's own safety.

How, though, do we get to a right of rebellion, which clearly does undermine the exercise of sovereignty? One avenue lies through the security rights of those who, having wrongly rebelled in the first place, can combine to protect themselves from punishment; another lies through the consideration that the obligation to obey depends on the sovereign's protective capacity and vanishes when a sovereign's capacity fails. "[I]f people are justified in continuing a rebellion out of regard for self-preservation, then there is no reason to think they are not justified in starting one for the same reason" (p. 141). If sovereigns conduct themselves as Hobbes recommends, security right-based rebellions are not much to be feared.

The "resistance rights" are, as Sreedhar fully acknowledges, of the somewhat peculiar Hobbesian variety: that is, freedoms that one cannot be blamed for exercising, rather than freedoms that anyone else has a reason to respect, let alone enforce (pp. 13–14). So from a conceptual point of view, it is not a problem to maintain both that subjects retain resistance rights in that sense and also that the sovereign enjoys the authority to overcome and punish resistance: The conflict, though potentially violent, is only practical. But I am not sure that all conceptual awkwardness has been overcome. Take, for example, the case of military service. In "A Review and a Conclusion," appended to *Leviathan*, Hobbes maintained that if a subject failed to lend support to a sovereign in wartime, he would fall into a "manifest contradiction of himself," for he would be failing to protect the power by which he was himself protected. If Hobbes intended this to be an appeal to moral consistency, then he would be saying in effect that the noncompliant subject would be morally blamable, and so could not be said to be exercising a non-blamable freedom (a right). On the other hand, if the noncompliant subject is blamable only if his own contribution is essential, whether or not he has a right depends on the decisions of others about compliance—an odd result, and also (conceptually and practically) unworkable in that the same consideration would recur with respect to each subject's decision. But Sreedhar does not claim to have wrapped up every loose end, only to have made Hobbes clearer than he was before, and in this, she has certainly succeeded.

Unlike Hobbes and Locke, Jonas Proast has no canonical status. It is only quite recently that the most basic facts of his biography have been unearthed. Yet Locke devoted over five hundred pages of rebuttal to Proast's critique of his *Letter Concerning Toleration*, and Wolfson is quite right to say that if we want to take the measure of Locke's defense of toleration, we have to look beyond the *Letter* and try to grasp what was going on in his lengthy defenses of it. Few readers will have the motivation to plough through the original texts, or perhaps even the abridged version that was published (in *Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy*) almost simultaneously with Wolfson's book. Wolfson provides a clear, helpful, and accurate guide to what was going on in the protracted debate between Locke and his critic.

In the original *Letter*, Locke puts forward several arguments for toleration, among which is, famously, one that may be termed "the argument from belief," an argument (quite unoriginal, one may note) to the effect that states cannot, by the use of coercion, induce changes in people's beliefs, so that persecution for belief is simply irrational. In his first critique of the *Letter*, Proast takes this to be Locke's only argument, and successfully shows that while coercion cannot directly change belief, coercion can be used to bring into play things that *can* (eventually) change belief, such as compulsory attendance at the state church. Since (as Wolfson shows) Locke does not resurrect the argument from belief in its original form, the subsequent debate between him and Proast—and also subsequent scholarship on the point—really turns on whether Locke has a more nuanced version to offer, or else other arguments of an independent kind.

Wolfson not only traces the course of the debate but also takes account of recent scholarship, and he fairly and accurately represents both. Three brief but richly detailed chapters take the reader through the key issues of political consent, the bases of belief, and the relation between faith and knowledge. In noting, as rather few commentators have done, that Locke accepted that we depend on trust and deference in adopting our beliefs, the argument undermines the common view that Locke's defense of toleration rested on a "protestant" idea of authenticity and personal struggle, a view that would of course seriously limit the potential appeal of his theory. Wolfson favors an alternative view, one in which the demand for uniformity in doctrine and practice is greatly relaxed, and in which dogmatic claims to truth are abandoned as untenable.

There can be no doubt that Locke entertained both aspects of that view. But is it one thing to show that he entertained them, another to show that they are basic to his political argument? Beyond a minimal core, Locke, it is true, saw varieties of doctrine and liturgy as matters of "indifference"—but his discussion of toleration depends on taking seriously the fact that they are not a matter of indifference to committed sectarians. (If everyone saw them as indifferent, after

all, then the disagreements that concerned him would not arise.) Likewise, Locke attacked Proast's claim that doctrinal truth could be known. But whether it can be known or not, it remains a political fact that rulers who are authorized to impose doctrinal truth will impose what they take it to be—and that would remain a political fact even if, on a view-from-nowhere account, doctrinal truth could be known. Even after reading Wolfson's careful treatment, in the course of which he makes some telling points in favor of his view, one may still have queries about the claim that Locke's advocacy of toleration rested on a demand for a change in "religious worldview" (p. xv), defined in terms of attitudinal and epistemic change, as distinct from a recognition of the fact of pluralism, and of what it means for politics. In making a very important debate more accessible to readers, Wolfson's book will sharpen discussion of the basis and justification of a crucial political value.

Sreedhar ends by pointing out, interestingly, that Hobbes's resistance rights were more generous than those acknowledged by many contemporaries, and even than those defended by later liberals. It cannot be said, however, that Hobbes favored a right to religious freedom, the prime example of the (supposed) conscience-type right that would undermine political order. The sovereign may impose, and subjects must accept, religious uniformity, if that is what order (in the sovereign's judgment) requires. Locke himself had held exactly that view in 1660, arguing (in the work now known as the *Two Tracts on Government*) that political authority comprehended a power to establish religious observance. Why he abandoned that view for the idea of toleration is a key question, and reading the debate with Proast may suggest that foremost in his mind was his recognition that, given the deep nature of religious attachments, imposing conformity was far more likely to provoke rebellion than to foster order. As Wolfson notes (p. 36), the fear of heresy gives way to the fear of the damage caused by persecution. Both of the books under review lead us to think about that issue of political judgment, and about what it should mean for the justification of political authority. For Hobbes, political judgment acts as a prudential constraint on sovereign power, while for Locke, it acts as a limit to the powers that rulers should have in the first place.

Democracy and Moral Conflict. By Robert B. Talisse. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009. 216p. \$93.00 cloth, \$39.99 paper.
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— Michael E. Morrell, *University of Connecticut*

Robert B. Talisse's *Democracy and Moral Conflict* addresses what he calls the problem of "deep politics." In democracies there is a plurality of moral doctrines "that conflict with each other but nonetheless individually meet some rather loose conditions for minimal plausibility" (p. 13). This gives rise to a paradox in that democratic legitimacy

requires justifying decisions to all citizens, but because of moral divisions, there is also disagreement regarding what justification requires. Given this paradox, democracies face the problem of justifying their existence to those for whom the outcomes of democratic politics violate some fundamental moral value they hold.

Neither viewing democratic politics as a civil war by other means nor adopting a pragmatic approach that sees democracy only as a *modus vivendi* is satisfying because both create commitments that can evaporate in the face of changing circumstances or power relations. Theories of democratic proceduralism are also unpersuasive because they unrealistically presuppose that citizens can see their "deepest moral and religious commitments as *wants, preferences, and interests*" and "are willing to view their commitments as *fungible* items that can be exchanged and bargained with" (p. 27, emphasis in original). John Rawls's public reason approach, what Talisse calls the politics of omission, is also unconvincing because requiring citizens to bracket off their comprehensive doctrines when entering the public sphere will likely generate instability and "create social conditions under which extremist groups can flourish, grow, and become more extreme" (p. 62). Of even more importance, Rawls and those who have extended or modified his theory, such as Charles Larmore, Jeffrey Stout, and Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, must always fall back on a presumption of a common commitment to some moral principle to ground their democratic theories. These principles are in need of justification, but since this is impossible given deep moral divides, these theories cannot provide a good reason for citizens to maintain their democratic commitments.

As an alternative, Talisse develops an argument grounded in a theory of "folk epistemology" that he bases upon the "epistemic commitments that can be plausibly expected to be shared among persons deeply divided over moral and religious fundamentals" (p. 79). Five principles constitute his theory: 1) To believe some proposition, *p*, is to hold that *p* is true; 2) to hold that *p* is true is generally to hold that the best reasons support *p*; 3) to hold that *p* is supported by the best reasons is to hold that *p* is assertable; 4) to assert that *p* is to enter into a social process of reason exchange; 5) to engage in social processes of reason exchange is to at least implicitly adopt certain cognitive and dispositional norms related to one's epistemic character. The implication of these five principles is that anyone who is committed to being an epistemically proper believer must be committed to democracy. Since all citizens are committed to their beliefs, regardless of the content of their moral commitments, they must also commit to democracy. Talisse calls the theory he derives from this folk epistemology "dialogical democracy."

Democracy and Moral Conflict is a well-written book that should be accessible to a variety of readers. It elucidates an interesting argument that provides a justification for democracy that escapes some of the criticisms aimed at