

Clientelism and the Utility of the Left-Right Dimension in Latin America

Saskia P. Ruth

ABSTRACT

This article analyzes the relationship between clientelism and citizens' political orientation in Latin America. Consistent political perceptions in the citizenry are central in traditional theories of political competition. This article argues that clientelism hinders the development of consistent political orientation by reducing the utility of information cues, such as left-right labels. More specifically, clientelistic parties generate indifference among their supporters toward the left-right divide by offering them an alternative voting rationale, and increase uncertainty in the political realm by making left-right labels less meaningful. Both arguments are tested with multilevel regression analyses using cross-sectional data covering 18 Latin American countries. The results indicate that clientelistic party supporters are more likely to show indifference toward the left-right dimension and, to a lesser extent, that their left-right orientation corresponds less with their political attitudes.

The quality of representative democracy depends on the presence of free, fair, and regular elections and on the competitive interaction of political elites for public office (see, e.g., Sartori 1976; Schumpeter 2008 [1942]). One of the most prominent models concerned with the quality of representative democracy is the responsible party model (APSA 1950; see also Thomassen 1994). This model rests on the prevalent assumptions of policy-based competition between political parties and policy-based political behavior of the electorate. In such circumstances, political elites are induced to be responsive to the interests of their citizens (Manin et al. 1999; Pitkin 1967). Therefore it is essential for substantive representation that citizens perceive the political space in a coherent manner.

While the assumptions of the responsible party model are more or less met in advanced democracies, they may be problematic in the context of new democracies (Thomassen 1994). Due to different trajectories of democratization, Latin American democracies did not develop patterns of party competition that favored the development of responsible parties (Dalton and Klingemann 2007). Therefore, the idealization of programmatic party competition may hamper awareness of other modes of political competition and their consequences for democratic representation. Especially in new democracies, political parties do not compete only in pro-

Saskia P. Ruth is a postdoctoral fellow at NCCR Democracy, University of Zurich. saskia.ruth@zda.uzh.ch

grammatic ways; they may pursue completely different electoral mobilization strategies (Kitschelt 2000; Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007).

One important prerequisite for programmatic party competition is that citizens possess clear and structured political perceptions (Downs 1957). The most common tools that summarize complex political issues into a one-dimensional political space are the ideological labels of left and right. Ideally, these labels help political elites to coordinate their programmatic appeals, and serve citizens as information cues to orient themselves in the complex political world (see, e.g., Downs 1957; Fuchs and Klingemann 1989). However, the utility of the left-right dimension differs between established and new democracies, and only recently have scholars begun to uncover the role of individual- and context-level factors in explaining these differences (e.g., Harbers et al. 2013; Wiesehomeier and Doyle 2012; Zechmeister and Corral 2013). Even so, the importance of mesolevel factors, such as political parties' nonprogrammatic linkage strategies, has so far been neglected. Clientelism in particular creates incentives for elites and citizens to base their political behavior on a different rationale from programmatic appeals (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007; Stokes 2007).

To address this research lacuna, this study analyzes the link between clientelism and the utility of the left-right dimension as an orientation tool for Latin American citizens. Building on the literature on party-society linkages, political behavior, and political representation, it develops a theoretical model of the relationship between clientelism and citizens' left-right perceptions.

This article seeks to explain the influence of clientelism on left-right perceptions by two mechanisms on the micro level. One is that clientelistic parties generate indifference toward left-right labels on the part of their voters by offering them another rationale to inform their electoral decisions (i.e., material benefits). The second is that clientelistic parties decrease citizens' ability to develop clear and structured perceptions of the political space by sending unclear policy signals that blur ideological labels and challenge their capacity to gather different policy issues under one umbrella. To test these arguments, the study applies multilevel regression analyzes using cross-sectional data from 18 Latin American democracies. Citizens' political perception is operationalized in two ways: first, individual citizens' ability and willingness to position themselves on the left-right ideological dimension is measured to capture their indifference toward left-right labels. Second, individual citizens' degree of association between their left-right position and their economic policy preferences, democratic values, and religious beliefs is used to capture the (in)consistency of their left-right perceptions.

The article begins by highlighting the relevant issues from the literature on political representation and political competition and developing the theoretical argument. The empirical analysis is structured in two parts: the first focuses on the importance of the left-right dimension; the second analyzes the usefulness of the left-right dimension as an orientation tool for citizens.

THEORETICAL APPROACH

Political representation is usually defined as the link between citizens' policy preferences and the policy preferences or behavior of their elected representatives (see Manin et al. 1999; Pitkin 1967). In a democracy, political representation is realized through repeated, free, open, secret-ballot, and fair elections. Yet another key feature of representative democracies is competition between political parties in these elections for public office and power. Political parties thus fulfill a central role in mediating between citizens and the state by channeling citizens' policy preferences and selecting political elites for elected positions (Mainwaring and Scully 1995; Sartori 1976). From the perspective of the responsible party model, competition between political parties for votes is believed to create desirable societal outcomes, such as accountability and responsiveness (APSA 1950; Thomassen 1994).

However, the responsible party model rests on the prevalent assumptions of policy-based competition between political parties and policy-based political behavior of the electorate. Thus the model sets high standards for both parties and voters in representative democracies. However, the weakest link in the model is its requirements on the voters' side (Thomassen 1994, 252). Coherent political perceptions on the part of voters are essential for substantive political representation. Free, competitive, and repeated elections are not sufficient to induce political parties to be responsive to their voters' preferences. Voters need to select political elites on the basis of policy promises and to notice unresponsive behavior on the part of political parties in order to be able to punish them in the next election (Bowler 1990). Consequently, programmatic party competition becomes more likely as the level of consistent political orientation in the citizenry rises (Kitschelt et al. 2010). Building on this insight, this article systematically analyzes the quality of citizens' political orientations in Latin America.

THE UTILITY OF THE LEFT-RIGHT DIMENSION IN LATIN AMERICA

Political orientation may be defined as a citizen's ability and willingness to develop consistent perceptions of the political space (e.g., Converse 1975; Dalton and Klingemann 2007). Political orientations are consistent if they correspond to an individual's political attitudes in a theoretically expected way and if they are coherent with the general patterns of political orientation in a specific context. The most prominent tool to make sense of the complex political space is the left-right dimension. These ideological labels can help both elites and citizens to communicate about political phenomena (Downs 1957; Inglehart and Klingemann 1976).

Fuchs and Klingemann (1989) ascribe two interrelated functions to the left-right divide. It helps elites to coordinate and communicate their stances on complex political issues by summarizing them under the labels of left and right (signaling function). In addition, left-right ideological labels help individuals to orient them-

selves in the political space at a lower information cost (orientation function). However, if political elites do not use these labels in a clear and structured way, the left-right divide loses its potential to help citizens orient themselves in the political space.

Differences between new and established democracies in the importance and usefulness of the left-right dimension as a heuristic to make political decisions, as well as differences within the group of new democracies, are still understudied topics (Harbers et al. 2013; Kitschelt et al. 2010). Initial descriptive evidence shows that the level of left-right orientation differs between established and new democracies: the mean proportion of respondents positioning themselves on a left-right scale in 2009 amounted to 84.5 percent in Western Europe, as opposed to 78.6 percent in Latin America (European Commission 2009; Latinobarómetro 2009). However, these percentages do not explain the usefulness of left-right labels in the respective regions. Analyzing the utility of the left-right dimension in Latin America, Zechmeister (2010) distinguishes a symbolic and a substantive component of these labels. While the symbolic component is closely related to partisanship, the substantive component mirrors the consistency between policy issues and left-right labels. Therefore, the more left-right semantics refer to symbolic partisan labels instead of substantive meanings, the lower the correspondence of left-right labels with specific political issues and attitudes (Zechmeister 2010).

Therefore, it is important to identify which factors favor or hinder the development of left-right orientations among the public, especially in new democracies. For Latin America, recent research has tested the dimensionality of political competition and shown that political elites consistently differentiate themselves and their political parties on a general left-right dimension (e.g., Zoco 2006). Zechmeister (2010), for example, shows that the left-right semantics of political elites across Latin American countries correspond at least to the economic or religious divide. A similar picture emerges when experts are asked to assess the positioning of political parties on the left-right dimension (e.g., Altman et al. 2009; Wiesehomeier and Benoit 2009).

On the basis of expert survey data, Wiesehomeier and Benoit (2009) show that economic policy issues strongly correspond to the left-right dimension in Latin American party systems. However, different accounts arise when it comes to citizens. In line with the symbolic component of left-right semantics, Colomer (2005) shows that citizens with a partisan predisposition are more likely to be able to locate themselves on the left-right dimension. With respect to the substantive component of left-right semantics, however, recent studies are more skeptical, showing that left-right attitudes in Latin America are rather fluid and vary across individuals and contexts (Harbers et al. 2013; Zechmeister 2006). The political orientation individuals possess depends on the political context in which they are embedded; for example, the availability of information and the clarity of political signals (Álvarez and Franklin 1994; Downs 1957; Zechmeister 2006).

Depending on the structuration of the supply side, citizens may rely on other information cues than ideological left-right shortcuts to make political decisions (see Calvo and Murillo 2013; Harbers et al. 2013; Zechmeister and Corral 2013). However, it is not only the system level that impinges on the utility of left-right labels

but also the meso level, where individuals in the same country are influenced by the different mobilization strategies of political parties. And this is exactly where clientelism gains relevance.

CLIENTELISTIC PRACTICES: VOTE BUYING AND PATRONAGE

As noted, structures of competition between political parties in Latin America are, to various extents, shaped by clientelistic linkages between citizens and political parties. For the purpose of this article, clientelism is defined as a “direct exchange of a citizen’s vote in return for direct payments or continuing access to employment, goods, and services” (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007, 2). Stokes (2007) further distinguishes two subtypes of clientelism: patronage and vote buying. Patronage is defined as “the proffering of public resources (most typically, public employment) by office holders in return for electoral support”; vote buying refers to “a more narrow exchange of goods (benefits, protections) for one’s own vote” (Stokes 2007, 606). This definition of clientelism focuses on those qualities of the phenomenon that directly relate to the electoral process in democratic political systems (see Kitschelt 2000; Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007; Stokes 2007).

Clientelism is thus understood as an electoral mobilization strategy based on the distribution of particularistic benefits to voters. It may be distinguished from other—more programmatic—forms of distributional strategies through the conditionality of the exchange relationship. Clientelistic parties target specific individuals and reward them with particularistic benefits conditional on their willingness to support the party—either with their votes or as activists (Stokes 2007). Opposed to such a conditional (direct) exchange, programmatic strategies, such as allocational policies or pork-barrel spending, are directed to groups or regions, and therefore not exclusively targeted and conditional (Schaffer and Schedler 2007). The distributive efficiency of clientelistic parties, however, depends on their capacity to gather information about the responsiveness of potential clients to selective benefits and their commitment to vote for the party even under the protection of the secret ballot (Stokes 2007, 610–15). To overcome these problems, as ethnographic studies show, clientelistic parties invest in dense networks of local intermediaries (brokers) to identify and monitor potential clients over time and to build long-term reciprocity-based relationships with them (Auyero 2013).

But how is the relationship between clientelism and an individual’s left-right orientation established? The influence of clientelism on left-right perceptions may be explained by two mechanisms on the micro level. Clientelism may hinder an individual from developing consistent political perceptions either by encouraging indifference toward the ideological left-right spectrum or by increasing uncertainty in the political realm.

Clientelism and Indifference

Clientelistic parties perpetuate or increase the indifference of their voters toward the political space and other parties' policy differentials by offering them alternative information cues to ideological labels on which they can base their voting decisions. For example, Calvo and Murillo (2013) show, on the basis of survey data from Argentina and Chile, that voters use either ideological cues or their proximity to party organizations to build distributive expectations in order to inform their political decisions. Therefore, citizens close to clientelistic networks should care less about the policy positions of political parties and potential future benefits through public policy, and more about the immediate material advantage that they might receive for their vote (Kitschelt 2000; Stokes 2007). Their political behavior is not built on proximity calculations between their own position and the policy programs of political parties within the ideological space. Instead, it rests on the less time-consuming information about their proximity to party networks, and bears lower costs for their involvement in political participation. However, the voting act thereby loses its capacity to signal policy preferences. In this sense, clientelism reduces the importance of the left-right dimension as a viable cue for political behavior.

H1 (indifference). Ceteris paribus, the more a political party pursues a clientelistic linkage strategy, the lower the probability that its supporters will locate themselves on the left-right continuum.


Clientelism and Inconsistency

The mere ability or willingness to make use of left-right labels does not necessarily correspond to clear and structured political perceptions, but may be based on a symbolic (partisan) attachment toward party labels (Carreras et al. 2015). The consistency of left-right labels, however, depends on their substantive meaningfulness. Consequently, political perceptions are clear and structured if they help to simplify the complex political reality in a substantive manner.

Besides the symbolic component of left-right semantics, the lack of clear and structured political perceptions has been ascribed to the ubiquitous uncertainty in the political realm (Álvarez and Franklin 1994; Downs 1957). Since the signaling and orientation functions of the left-right divide are interrelated, left-right labels help to reduce the uncertainty in the political realm and assist citizens in determining their political orientation (Fuchs and Klingemann 1989). If citizens receive clear policy signals, they are more capable of informing themselves about the ideological spectrum of the political space. Hence, left-right labels are consistent if they bundle different policy issues into one package and if they relate to an individual's political beliefs and values (see Inglehart and Klingemann 1976).

This leads us to the second mechanism. Clientelistic parties increase the uncertainty in the political realm by sending unclear policy signals that blur the divide between left and right.¹ Clientelistic linkages, as opposed to programmatic linkages, "reduce parties to their most basic, self-referential political function: electing candi-

Figure 1. The Relationship Between Clientelism and Left-Right Orientation



dates from their ranks into public office” (Roberts 2002, 29). Moreover, clientelistic parties, unlike programmatic parties, do not provide mechanisms of interest aggregation. On the contrary, they offer no orientation in the policy space and even cut across cleavages, catering to highly heterogeneous clients (Roberts 2002; Zechmeister 2006). Such ambiguity in the signaling process of political representation increases the uncertainty in the political realm. In this sense, clientelism reduces the correspondence between left-right orientations and political attitudes and beliefs.

H2 (uncertainty). Ceteris paribus, the more a political party pursues a clientelistic linkage strategy, the lower the consistency between the political attitudes and left-right orientations of its supporters.

To sum up, clientelism may have severe consequences for the utility of the left-right divide and hence for the quality of substantive political representation. Where political competition is structured by clientelistic linkages between political elites and the electorate, it is more likely that citizens are unable or unwilling to make political decisions based on their policy preferences. Figure 1 gives a graphical overview of the theoretical arguments on which these hypotheses are based.

The Issue of Reverse Causation

Prominent theories about clientelistic targeting invite questions about a reverse direction of causality between clientelism and citizens’ political orientation (or the lack thereof), especially with respect to hypothesis 1. Therefore, a brief discussion of these arguments will contrast them with other accounts in the literature that substantiate the direction of causality proposed here.

While most of the literature on clientelistic targeting concurs that clientelistic parties specifically target the poor, scholars differ in their prognosis of clientelistic targets’ most likely electoral profiles; for example, party attachment, ideological position, or predisposition to turn out to vote (see Carlin and Moseley 2015; Cox 2009). The swing voter theory is based on the logic of persuasion, according to

which clientelistic parties use selective benefits to change indifferent voters' preferences in their favor (Dixit and Londregan 1996; Lindbeck and Weibull 1987). According to this theory, clientelistic parties gain the most if they invest their finite and scarce resources in pivotal swing voters. Thus, from this perspective, the direction of causality runs from the lack of political orientation to clientelism, indicating a problem of endogeneity for the present study.

Other studies suggest that the direction of causality is more ambiguous. Qualitative research on several developing countries indicates that clientelistic parties target loyal voters far more often than swing voter theory would predict (see especially Stokes et al. 2013 for evidence from Argentina, Venezuela, Mexico, and India).² These studies are more in line with the core voter theory, which is based on the logic of gratification and mobilization: clientelistic parties use selective benefits to induce loyal party supporters to turn out to vote (Cox and McCubbins 1986; Cox 2009; Nichter 2008). According to this theory, risk-averse clientelistic parties spend their scarce resources on core supporters, since these parties are better informed about them and can better predict how they react (Cox and McCubbins 1986). Recent studies on the topic indicate that clientelistic parties often use a portfolio of strategies to distribute selective benefits to swing and core voters depending on the electoral context, the public goods that are distributed, or the incentive structure of clientelistic brokers (e.g., Rosas et al. 2014; Stokes et al. 2013).

Moreover, the main focus of formal models of clientelistic targeting lies on the supply side of the clientelistic exchange relationship. Voters' behavioral logic (the demand side), in contrast, is assumed to be based on an ideological calculation. Yet as mentioned earlier, voters in patronage-based electoral environments can also use other criteria to inform their electoral decisions. Voters who are risk-averse and who discount the future may weigh the value of selective benefits higher than long-term and uncertain public goods (see Calvo and Murillo 2013; Desposato 2007). Consequently, they may base their electoral decision on another distance-minimizing calculation; that is, their proximity to clientelistic party machines (Calvo and Murillo 2013, 855–56).

This behavior is even more likely to occur if we relax another simplifying assumption often made in formal models; namely, that clientelistic exchanges are one-shot games. Evidence from ethnographic studies shows that “in the daily workings of patronage, what matters most is not short-term, quid pro quo exchanges but diffuse, long-term reciprocity based on the embedding of the machine operators (brokers, and through them, patrons) in poor people's everyday lives” (Auyero 2013, 118).

In sum, it appears to be difficult to ascertain a clear direction of causality. Unfortunately, there is no direct way to rule out the potential endogeneity with cross-sectional survey data like those used in this study. For the time being, and to the best of our knowledge, there are no cross-sectional time-series datasets available on the topic that would allow us to better identify a causal relationship. Therefore, this study will revisit the issue of reverse causation in the empirical part of this article as well as in the conclusion.

ALTERNATIVE DETERMINANTS OF LEFT-RIGHT ORIENTATION

As the hypotheses stated here are assumed to hold *ceteris paribus*, other explanatory factors influencing left-right orientation have to be included in the statistical analysis as control variables. Three sets of control factors seem to be relevant: party system characteristics, party linkages, and individual-level characteristics.

The first set of control factors comprises two classic features of party systems that may influence citizens' left-right orientation in a country: the number of political parties in a party system and the polarization of party systems. The number of political parties raises the complexity of competitive interactions; that is, the more parties in a party system, the more interaction streams between political parties (Sartori 1976). Such a rise in complexity makes it more demanding for citizens to orient themselves in the political space and to decide among the offers made by several political parties. This may lead to a higher probability that citizens either will base their political decisions on an alternative rationale or will abstain from voting (Blais and Dobrzynska 1998). Moreover, Zechmeister and Corral (2013) argue that fragmented party systems in Latin America are likely to feature younger political parties with less-developed ideological platforms. Therefore, a high number of relevant political parties in a party system should complicate the development of clear and structured political orientation.

Independent of the number of political parties, party system polarization may facilitate the differentiation between political parties with a more meaningful use of ideological labels and easier access to such information for voters (see Zechmeister 2006). Therefore, with higher levels of polarization, citizens should be more apt to develop consistent left-right orientations.

The second set of control factors includes the two classic linkage strategies political parties may pursue other than clientelism: programmatic and personalistic linkages (Kitschelt 2000). In line with the literature on the responsible party model, we can assume a positive association of a programmatic link between political parties and their supporters with the left-right orientations of the latter. With respect to the personalistic linkage strategy, no systematic relationship with the left-right orientation of a party's supporters is expected, since the policy pledges personalistic parties make usually remain opaque, as their leaders do not want to limit their leverage on the party strategy (Weyland 1999).

The third set of control factors refers to the influence of several individual-level factors on citizens' left-right placements: political sophistication, political experience, poverty, and the population density at an individual's place of residence. Following Downs (1957, 77–79), political ignorance may be removed by education and the acquisition of information. These two proxy variables are used to measure two dimensions of the latent concept of political sophistication (Luskin 1990). People with a higher level of education have a higher cognitive capacity to evaluate political information, and a person's willingness to pay for costly information depends on the motivational dimension of political sophistication; that is, a person's interest in politics.

Furthermore, the evaluation of political parties' policy positions may be more demanding for citizens in new democracies, as their democratic experience is shorter. Over time, citizens become more familiar with their political system (e.g., electoral rules) and the choices offered them, thereby gaining more confidence in left-right shortcuts as a basis for their political decisions (Van der Brug et al. 2008).

We need to control for individual citizens' level of income and the population density of their residence because both might be related to the level and consistency of left-right orientation, as well as clientelistic targeting. Since the utility of consumption compared to ideology decreases with higher income and higher population density, the importance of the left-right dimension as a basis for political decisions should increase (Dixit and Londregan 1996; Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007).

EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

The following analysis focuses on the relationship between different practices of clientelism and left-right orientation in Latin American democracies. Part 1 examines the influence of vote buying and patronage on the indifference of party supporters toward the left-right dimension. Part 2 investigates the consistency between political attitudes and left-right self-placements, conditional on a party's emphasis on either vote buying or patronage.

The focus on Latin America is important for two reasons. Besides the variance in parties' linkage strategies between new and established democracies, Kitschelt et al. (2010) have recently shown that there are also differences within the group of new democracies. This is especially true for the degree of clientelism in Latin America, which varies both between and within countries. At the same time, Latin American countries share similar historical backgrounds and institutional setups. Many of them experienced phases of military rule during the 1970s and 1980s and phases of redemocratization in the 1990s (see, e.g., Hagopian and Mainwaring 2005). In addition, all countries in this study are presidential regimes and thus share similar structures of horizontal accountability (Mainwaring and Shugart 1997). Therefore, this study allows us to focus on clientelism while holding other contextual factors constant.

Both parts of the empirical analysis are based on a hierarchical dataset that combines information taken from the Latinobarómetro survey (hereafter LAB) in 2009 (Latinobarómetro 2009) and the Democratic Accountability and Linkages Project Expert Survey (hereafter DALP) in 2007–8 (Altman et al. 2009; Kitschelt 2013).³ In total, this study covers individuals and political parties in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. Descriptive statistics are provided in the appendix, table 3.

ANALYSIS PART 1: CLIENTELISM AND THE IMPORTANCE OF THE LEFT-RIGHT DIMENSION

This section addresses hypothesis 1 and focuses on the potential indifference toward the left-right spectrum to which clientelism may lead.

Operationalization

The concept of left-right indifference is operationalized as individual citizens' inability or unwillingness to locate themselves on a left-right spectrum. Therefore, the LAB provides a valuable database, as it asks respondents, *inter alia*, to place themselves on a left-right scale (item Q69ST). To build the dependent variable, the survey item is recoded into a dummy variable. Respondents who reported their position on the 11-point scale obtained the value 1, indicating that they were able to locate themselves on the left-right spectrum. All other responses, such as "do not know," "none," and "no answer," were coded 0, indicating that the respondent did not report any position on the left-right scale. To match respondents of the LAB with political party scores from the DALP, the study used the LAB item that asked respondents, "If elections were held this Sunday, which party would you vote for?" (item Q35ST). For all party supporters included in this part of the study, the mean rate of self-placement in 2009 was 84.5 percent (standard deviation 3.6).⁴

With respect to the main independent variable, comparative research on clientelism has often faced the problem of data availability. Recently, however, comparative party-level data have become available. A new dataset on democratic accountability mechanisms covering political parties in 18 Latin American countries, the DALP, provides a variety of measures of party-society linkages that are directly related to the concept of clientelism (Altman et al. 2009; Kitschelt 2013). The DALP asks experts to explicitly rank political parties' emphasis with respect to several clientelistic practices. The questions are categorical and range from 1 to 4, with higher values indicating a more frequent use of the respective practice. Two indicators were used to operationalize clientelism: the extent to which a political party offered preferential goods to attract voters (vote buying, item B2); and the extent to which a political party provided its voters with employment opportunities (patronage, item B3). An index of vote buying or patronage was derived by taking the mean of the expert responses to the respective survey item. Both indicators are positively correlated with $r > 0.8$ at a 99 percent confidence level.

Regarding the three sets of control variables in the analysis, due to the small sample size, the number of control variables on the macro level was confined to two: the fragmentation and polarization of party systems. The former was measured on the basis of seat shares using the index of the effective number of parliamentary parties (ENPP) (Laakso and Taagepera 1979).⁵ To account for an increasing influence of ENPP, the variable entered the regression in logarithmic form. Party system polarization was measured by the Taylor-Herman index (Taylor and Herman 1971)

and was calculated on the basis of the DALP data on political parties' left-right placement (item D6) and their seat shares in the national legislature.

On the meso level, the analysis controlled for a political party's emphasis on a programmatic or personalistic linkage strategy. Data were taken from the DALP survey that provides expert ratings with respect to both linkage strategies (items E2 and E1). The questions are categorical and range from 1 to 4, with higher values indicating a more frequent use of the respective linkage strategy. The mean expert rating of a party indicates its emphasis on each linkage type.

On the micro level, two proxies were used to measure political sophistication: the respondent's level of education and the level of political interest. Education was measured on a seven-point scale, with higher values indicating higher levels of education (item REEDUC1). Political interest was measured on a four-point scale, with higher values indicating higher levels of interest in politics (item Q32ST). Political experience was controlled for by the respondent's electoral experience, along with the respondent's age. The former was coded as a dummy variable for which the value 1 indicated that the respondent voted in the last election and the value 0 referred to all other responses to the question (item Q37STM).

The age of a respondent (item S6) was entered in part 1 of the empirical analysis in linear and squared form to account for a possible life cycle effect on the dependent variable. Studies on political participation suggest that the utility of participating in politics, and hence the need to develop political perceptions, is lower for both very young and very old individuals (e.g., Nie et al. 1974). Moreover, the likelihood of an individual's being a clientelistic target was controlled for by an individual's perceived poverty, measured on a ten-point scale from poor to rich (item Q17ST.A), as well as the size of the city an individual lived in (item TAMCIUD), measured on an eight-point scale ranging from rural areas with fewer than five thousand inhabitants to metropolitan areas with more than one hundred thousand inhabitants. All independent variables were rescaled to run from 0 to 1 to ease interpretation.

Estimation Model

The statistical estimations rely on a logistic regression model (e.g., Hosmer and Lemeshow 2000). Furthermore, the application of multilevel estimation techniques is recommended because the dataset is structured hierarchically—with individuals nested in parties and countries (Steenbergen and Jones 2002). Therefore, statistical estimations for the dependent variable of political perception rely on a three-level logistic random intercept model (Snijders and Bosker 1999; Hox 2010). The model to test hypothesis 1 is specified as follows:

$$\log\left(\frac{P_{ijk}}{1 - P_{ijk}}\right) = \beta_0 + \beta V_{ijk} + \beta X_{jk} + \beta Z_k + U_{0jk}$$

The subscript i ($=1, \dots, I$) denotes the units on the individual level, the subscript j ($=1, \dots, J$) refers to the units on the party level, and the subscript k ($=1, \dots, K$) refers

to the country level. The linear predictor of the log odds of an individual's probability of being able to position himself or herself on the left-right scale are modeled by an intercept β_0 , a vector of coefficients on the individual level (V), a vector of coefficients on the party-level (X), and a vector of coefficients on the country level (Z). For the random effect U_{0jk} , a normal distribution with a zero mean and a variance of σ_ϵ^2 is assumed. Individual-level residuals follow from the probability of y and are therefore not included in the equation (Snijders and Bosker 1999).⁶

Results and Interpretation

Table 1 presents results for the baseline model and one additional model for each of the two indicators of clientelism. Results for the baseline model are reported first (model 0), followed by the coefficients and average marginal effects of vote buying (model 1) and patronage (model 2) on the dependent variable.

Hypothesis 1 proposes that the greater emphasis a political party places on clientelistic practices, the lower the probability that its supporters will report a left-right position. For both models, the analysis confirms a negative correlation between a political party's degree of clientelistic practices and the probability of party supporters' positioning themselves on the left-right dimension. Both coefficients are significant at a 95 percent confidence level. Thus, clientelistic parties seem to offer party supporters alternative cues on which they can base their political behavior, and thereby diminish the importance of left-right labels.

Comparing the average marginal effects in model 1 with those in model 2, we can further see that both clientelistic practices decrease the probability of party supporters' positioning themselves on the left-right scale by 8 percentage points. Concerning the model fit, the model that includes the vote-buying indicator fares best with respect to the reduction of the log likelihood and the BIC, compared to both the baseline model and model 2. However, as mentioned in the theoretical discussion, these results may also be interpreted in favor of the swing voter theory, which predicts that clientelistic parties prefer to target indifferent voters.

The sample used for the analysis at least partly controls for this endogeneity problem. On the one hand, it probably overrepresents core party supporters; this is due to the matching procedure between voters and parties, which is based on the respondent's voting preference at the time of the survey and therefore prior to the distribution of selective benefits. Swing voters, by definition, should not express a preference for a specific party unless they are persuaded by selective incentives to do so shortly before an election (Cox 2009). On the other hand, the estimation procedure of the dependent variable probably underestimates the degree of indifference in the population, since the response format of the left-right question in the LAB is based on an 11-point scale—thus including a midpoint, which decreases the possibility of nonresponse by allowing respondents to indicate a centrist, moderate, or indifferent position on the scale (Álvarez and Franklin 1994).

Although the control variables are not the main focus of this analysis, they merit a closer look. With respect to the macrocontrols, party system polarization

Table 1. Random Intercept Logistic Regression Models
(DV = Left-right response)

	Model 0	Model 1		Model 2	
	b/se	b/se	AMEs	b/se	AMEs
Fragmentation		-0.478 0.832	-0.057 0.099	-0.543 -0.835	-0.065 0.099
Polarization		1.254* 0.644	0.150* 0.080	1.294** -0.645	0.154* 0.080
Vote buying		-0.67* 0.359	-0.080* 0.044		
Patronage				-0.684* 0.384	-0.082* 0.047
Program		-0.315 0.482	-0.038 0.058	-0.345 0.494	-0.041 0.059
Personalism		-0.121 0.326	-0.014 0.039	-0.202 0.312	-0.024 0.037
Education		0.988*** 0.13	0.118*** 0.019	0.991*** 0.13	0.118*** 0.019
Political interest					
A little interested		0.47*** 0.072	0.066*** 0.012	0.47*** 0.072	0.066*** 0.012
Fairly interested		0.818*** 0.085	0.104*** 0.015	0.818*** 0.085	0.104*** 0.015
Very interested		1.366*** 0.138	0.146*** 0.019	1.366*** 0.138	0.147*** 0.019
Voter		0.149* 0.078	0.018* 0.009	0.149* 0.078	0.018* 0.009
Age		1.601*** 0.541	0.191*** 0.067	1.6*** 0.541	0.191*** 0.067
Age (squared)		-2.157*** 0.691	-0.258*** 0.086	-2.154*** 0.691	-0.257*** 0.086
Poor-rich		0.478*** 0.155	0.057*** 0.019	0.479*** 0.155	0.057*** 0.019
Rural-urban		0.298*** 0.108	0.036*** 0.013	0.296*** 0.108	0.035*** 0.013
Constant		1.824*** 0.169	0.94 0.685	1.062 0.72	
Variance 1 (country)		0.454*** 0.175	0.397*** 0.148	0.398*** 0.149	
Variance 2 (party)		0.069** 0.035	0.021 0.021	0.022 0.022	
Log likelihood		-3633.62	-3459.03	-3459.16	
BIC		7294.46	7072.28	7072.54	

* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

N (country) = 18, N (parties) = 75, N (individuals) = 8,707

AME = Average marginal effects. Political interest reference category = "Not at all interested in politics."

seems to yield more meaningful cues for citizens with respect to the left-right dimension, and therefore eases the development of political orientation. The coefficient of polarization is robust over both models at conventional significance levels. The coefficient of party system fragmentation is insignificant, but the sign points to the expected direction; that is, a negative association with the dependent variable.

With respect to the meso-level factors, the personalistic linkage type has no significant impact on the dependent variable—as expected. However, a surprising finding is the negative and insignificant coefficient of a political party's emphasis on the programmatic linkage strategy on the dependent variable in both models. This pattern also arises in the bivariate model (not reported, available on request); the coefficient has a negative sign and does not reach common significance levels. While other studies found significant correlations between programmatic party–society linkages or programmatic party system structuration and the specific placement of individuals on the left-right scale (Harbers et al. 2013; Ruth 2012), the present findings indicate that this positive association does not hold with respect to party supporters' indifference toward the left-right scale in general. Thus, this finding hints at the conclusion that programmatic parties should invest more in educating voters and helping them to understand what the labels “left” and “right” mean and where the parties stand on this scale, if they wish to win voters away from clientelistic parties.

With respect to the individual-level controls, the assumed relationship between political sophistication and left-right orientation is confirmed by the results. The coefficients are highly significant at a 99 percent confidence level and robust over both models. Higher levels of education increase the probability of respondents' positioning themselves on the left-right scale, and politically interested party supporters are more likely to report their position on the left-right continuum than those with lower levels of political interest.

Furthermore, the division of party supporters into voters and nonvoters shows the expected positive association with the dependent variable, although at a lower confidence level than other individual-level controls. The highly significant coefficients of both age and age-squared suggest a bell-shaped curvilinear association between age and respondents' probability of perceiving the left-right scale, confirming the theoretically expected life cycle effect. In addition, the two controls capturing clientelistic targeting are also highly significant and show the expected signs. Individuals with higher income who live in urban areas are more likely to position themselves on the left-right dimension.

To sum up, the results of this first empirical analysis reinforce the main theoretical arguments: *ceteris paribus*, supporters of parties that pursue a clientelistic linkage strategy are more likely to be indifferent toward the left-right dimension.⁷

ANALYSIS PART 2: CLIENTELISM AND THE CONSISTENCY OF LEFT-RIGHT SELF-PLACEMENTS

This section addresses hypothesis 2 and focuses on the association between political attitudes and left-right self-placements, conditional on the degree of clientelism. This part of the analysis thus delves deeper into the relationship between clientelism and consistent left-right orientations.

Operationalization

To evaluate the consistency of left-right orientations, an individual's left-right self-placement can be related to three political domains that the literature has identified as most salient in determining the left-right divide in Latin America: economic preferences, democratic values, and religious beliefs (see Harbers et al. 2013; Wiesehomeier and Doyle 2012; Zechmeister and Corral 2013). Following the theoretical arguments in this study, we can expect the correspondence between these three political domains and the left-right divide to decrease the more political parties pursue clientelistic practices like vote buying or patronage.

With respect to economic preferences, the LAB provides an item that asks respondents to place themselves in a one-dimensional economic issue space (item Q80ST). This item measures economic preferences on a ten-point scale, with lower values indicating a stronger state-interventionist stance on economic policies and higher values indicating a free market stance on economic policies. Several studies have shown that the economic divide is the policy domain most closely related to left-right labels in Latin America, assuming a positive correlation between state-interventionist preferences and leftist positions, as well as free market preferences and rightist positions on the left-right dimension (e.g., Kitschelt et al. 2010; Wiesehomeier and Benoit 2009).

With respect to democratic values, the LAB asks respondents if they would support a military coup (item Q21ST). The two answer categories, "support for military coup" and "no support for military coup" (0), were coded into a dummy variable. As Kitschelt et al. (2010) show, besides the economic issue divide, some party systems are still structured along an authoritarian-democratic regime divide. Here we can assume that individuals who would support a military coup are more conservative, and hence, more to the right on the left-right spectrum (see Harbers et al. 2013; Zechmeister and Corral 2013).

To capture religious beliefs, two items from the LAB that ask respondents about their religious denomination (item S7) and their religious devotion (item S8) were combined into a five-point scaled index. Those respondents who reported no religious denomination or stated that they were atheists in item S7 were coded as 0 and combined with the inverse four-point scale of item S8, ranging from 1 ("not at all devoted") to 4 ("very devoted"). As Zechmeister and Corral (2013) show, religious devotion is positively linked to the left-right dimension in Latin America.

Those individuals who attend religious services more frequently are also more likely to position themselves on the right of the ideological spectrum. Due to reasons of interpretation, all three political attitudes were rescaled to run from 0 to 1.

To ease the comparability of the results in both parts of the empirical analysis, the operationalizations of the main independent variable and the control variables resemble those in the previous section. However, in contrast to the former analysis, we can expect a linear positive relationship between individual respondents' age and their position on the left-right scale, assuming that older individuals are more likely to be conservative and therefore should report more rightist positions than younger respondents.

Estimation Model

This part of the analysis relies on a three-level hierarchical linear random intercept model with left-right self-placements as the dependent variable (Hox 2010). The model to test hypothesis 2 is specified as follows:

$$Y_{ijk} = \beta_0 + \beta V_{ijk} + \beta X_{jk} + \beta Z_k + \beta W_{ijk} + U_{ijk}$$

Subscripts refer to the same units as in part 1 of the analysis. The linear predictor of the dependent variable is modeled by an intercept β_0 , a vector of coefficients on the individual level (V), a vector of coefficients on the party level (X), and a vector of coefficients on the country level (Z), as well as a cross-level interaction term (W) measuring the marginal effect of political attitudes conditional on a political party's level of clientelism. For the random effect U_{ijk} , a normal distribution with a zero mean and a variance of σ_ε^2 is assumed.

Results and Interpretation

Table 2 reports the results for the basic model (model 3, which includes the three attitude variables as well as the controls) and three models for each of the two indicators of clientelism. Due to the small sample size, cross-level interactions between clientelism and the three political attitudes were analyzed one at a time. Models 4a and 4b focus on the state-market dimension, models 5a and 5b on the support for military coups, and models 6a and 6b on religious devotion. Because we are interested in the moderating influence of the level of clientelism on the match between political attitudes and left-right self-placements, the table also reports the results of likelihood ratio tests (hereafter LR) indicating if the cross-level interaction adds explanatory power for the respective model.

At first glance, the models in table 2 corroborate the expectations formulated in the theoretical section. The associations between the state-market dimension, support for military coups, and religious devotion and the dependent variable are all positive. Furthermore, the cross-level interaction terms of both vote buying and patronage with the respective political attitudes all have the expected negative sign,


Table 2. Random Intercept Regression Models
(DV = Left-right self-placement)

	Model 3 b/se	Model 4a b/se	Model 4b b/se	Model 5a b/se	Model 5b b/se	Model 6a b/se	Model 6b b/se
Vote buying		1.889** 0.906	0.879	2.125**	0.932	2.190**	
Patronage			2.000** 0.920		1.798** 0.878		2.072** 0.955
State-market	0.332** 0.134	0.636 0.504	1.333** 0.619	0.343** 0.134	0.343** 0.134	0.327** 0.134	0.329** 0.134
State-market *Vote buying		-0.436 0.700					
State-market *Patronage			-1.418* 0.857				
Support for coups	0.160** 0.072	0.162** 0.072	0.164** 0.072	0.990*** 0.284	0.857** 0.348	0.158** 0.072	0.159** 0.072
Support for coups *Vote buying				-1.172*** 0.389			
Support for coups *Patronage					-0.964** 0.471		
Religious devotion	0.283** 0.119	0.277** 0.119	0.276** 0.119	0.269** 0.119	0.280** 0.119	0.833** 0.416	0.996** 0.505
Religious devotion *Vote buying						-0.816 0.588	
Religious devotion *Patronage							-1.028 0.707
Constant	4.899*** 1.175	3.856*** 1.261	3.405** 1.359	3.625*** 1.253	3.480*** 1.347	3.617*** 1.276	3.310** 1.376
Variance (country)	0.000 0.000	0.000 0.000	0.000 0.000	0.000 0.000	0.000** 0.000	0.000 0.000	0.000 0.000
Variance (party)	0.133 0.096	0.113 0.097	0.120 0.097	0.110 0.097	0.119 0.098	0.114 0.097	0.119 0.097
Variance (residuals)	0.910*** 0.009	0.910*** 0.009	0.910*** 0.009	0.909*** 0.009	0.910*** 0.009	0.910*** 0.009	0.910*** 0.009
Log likelihood	-15044	-15041	-15040	-15037	-15040	-15040	-15040
BIC	30255	30265	30264	30258	30263	30264	30265

* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

N (country) = 18, N (parties) = 72, N (individuals) = 6,420. Control variables not shown here.

Figure 2: Marginal Effects on Left-Right Self-Placements



Source: Calculations based on DALP and LAB 2009 data. Dashed lines indicate 90 percent confidence intervals.

indicating a negative moderating effect on the consistency of left-right self-placements. However, only some of them reach conventional significance levels. Figure 2 shows the average marginal effects of political attitudes on left-right self-placements at differing degrees of clientelism (Brambor et al. 2006).

The negative slope lines in figure 2 indeed suggest that clientelistic practices condition the correspondence between left-right self-placements and political attitudes in the expected direction (hypothesis 2). For one thing, the confidence bands (dashed lines) in figure 2 indicate that the average marginal effect of an individual’s position on the state-market dimension on his or her position on the left-right spectrum varies depending on the level of patronage (lower left panel). The cross-level interaction term for patronage is marginally significant at the 90 percent confidence level ($p = 0.098$). For the vote-buying model, the LR test shows that the cross-level interaction term does not significantly increase the explanatory power of the model ($p = 0.534$). Therefore, only the practice of patronage decreases the coherence between economic attitudes and left-right self-placements.

A second observation is that both interaction models are significant with respect to the match of democratic values and left-right self-placements (LR test $p = 0.003$ for vote buying and $p = 0.041$ for patronage). For supporters of parties that

do not (or only moderately) use clientelistic practices, strong support for military coups is associated with more right-leaning positions on the left-right dimension. However, this association between democratic values and left-right positions decreases significantly the more political parties pursue either vote buying (upper middle panel) or patronage (lower middle panel). At high levels of clientelism, the correspondence between support for coups and left-right placements becomes insignificant (confidence bands crossing the 0 line on the y axis). These results are even more alarming since Carlin and Moseley (2015) recently have shown that clientelistic parties are inclined to target voter types with less democratic attitudes.⁸ Thus, combined with the associations found in models 5a and 5b, this might indicate a feedback loop between the targeting of less democratic voter types and the decrease in consistent left-right perceptions of these voters.

The pattern regarding religious devotion is less conclusive. LR tests fall just under conventional significance levels ($p = 0.165$ for vote buying and $p = 0.146$ for patronage). Nevertheless, although we should be careful with respect to the robustness of the interaction models concerning religious devotion, the results point in the expected direction, since the slope lines are both negative.

With respect to the control variables (results not shown in table 2), only three variables significantly influence an individual's placement on the left-right scale. On the one hand, party system polarization is negatively associated with an individual's left-right self-placement; that is, individuals in more polarized settings tend to position themselves toward the left end of the ideological spectrum. On the other hand, the level of political interest and the age of a respondent positively influence an individual's left-right self-placement; that is, more interested and older individuals tend to position themselves toward the right end of the ideological spectrum.

To sum up, the results for H2 are mixed. We find some correlational evidence indicating that, *ceteris paribus*, the consistency of left-right self-placements—at least with respect to economic preferences and democratic values—decreases with the level of clientelism of the political party the respective individual supports.⁹ Overall, the analyses in this article constitute a first empirical test to investigate the relationship between clientelism and the importance, as well as the usefulness, of the left-right dimension as an orientation tool for Latin American citizens. However, much more remains to be done.

CONCLUSIONS

This study set out to evaluate the relationship between clientelism and the utility of the left-right dimension. This topic is of special relevance, as consistent perceptions of the political space among the citizenry are a precondition for the development of responsible and responsive political parties. Only then are citizens able to evaluate and punish unresponsive behavior on the part of political parties (APSA 1950; Thomassen 1994). In contrast, when parties offer citizens alternative clues on which they can base their political behavior, citizens' votes lose the capacity to signal policy preferences. Consequently, by hindering the development of left-right orientation

in the citizenry, clientelism may have severe consequences for the quality of political representation.

The empirical analysis in this study provides the first indications of a negative association between clientelism and the utility of the left-right dimension. First, the findings suggest that a political party's emphasis on clientelistic practices is associated with an increase in the indifference of its supporters toward the left-right spectrum. Second, the results indicate that a political party's emphasis on clientelistic practices decreases the coherence of voters' left-right orientation with respect to their democratic values, as well as—to a lesser extent—their economic preferences. The results contribute to the discussion about the problematic relationship between clientelistic practices and the quality of democratic representation (e.g., Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007; Stokes 2007).

Relating these results to recent research on clientelistic targeting and democratic values (Carlin and Moseley 2015), these findings might indicate a vicious cycle between the targeting of less democratic voter types and the decrease in consistent left-right orientations over time.

This article offers various avenues for future research. Most important, to test empirically the endogeneity problem in conjunction with clientelistic targeting and voters' distributive expectations, future research should invest in the collection of comparable data on clientelism across space and time. The inclusion of questions on clientelistic targeting and political parties' linkage strategies in both public opinion and expert surveys marks a first step toward solving this data availability problem (see Altman et al. 2009; Stokes et al. 2013). Moreover, to disentangle the relationship between clientelism, political orientation, and democratic accountability, research should direct its attention to citizens' accuracy in evaluating political parties' policy positions, and a potential distorting influence of clientelism on the congruence between actual and perceived party positions. Finally, the alarming disconnect between democratic values and political orientation due to clientelistic practices needs to be analyzed further.

APPENDIX: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICSTable 3. Descriptive Statistics
(parts 1 and 2)

Variable	Number	Mean	Standard Deviation	Minimum	Maximum
Country level					
Fragmentation ^a	18	3.67	1.94	2.05	9.32
Polarization ^a	18	4.08	3.63	0.02	13.83
Part 1					
Party level					
Vote buying	75	0.69	0.20	0.13	0.98
Patronage	75	0.71	0.16	0.13	0.95
Program	75	0.73	0.13	0.29	0.94
Personalism	75	0.72	0.17	0.13	1
Individual level					
Left-right orientation	8,707	0.84	0.37	0	1
Education	8,707	0.45	0.29	0	1
Political interest	8,707	2.22	0.99	1	4
Voting experience	8,707	0.79	0.41	0	1
Age ^a	8,707	40.54	16.78	16	98
Poor-rich	8,707	0.37	0.21	0	1
Rural-urban	8,707	0.64	0.30	0	1
Part 2					
Party level					
Vote buying	72	0.69	0.20	0.13	0.98
Patronage	72	0.70	0.17	0.13	0.95
Program	72	0.74	0.12	0.29	0.94
Personalism	72	0.72	0.17	0.13	1
Individual level					
Left-right self-placements	6,420	5.42	2.85	0	10
State-market dimension	6,420	0.36	0.24	0	0.90
Support for coups	6,420	0.30	0.46	0	1
Religious devotion	6,420	0.56	0.29	0	1

^aOriginal scale reported.

Source: Calculations based on Latinobarómetro 2009 and DALP (Kitschelt 2013).

NOTES

For their comments and advice, I thank Sarah Berens, Simon Franzmann, Ulrich Glassmann, Annika Hennl, André Kaiser, Leonce Röth, Ingo Rohlfing, Jan Sauermann, Gregor Zons, and Christina Zuber. Particular thanks go to the editors and the three anonymous referees for their excellent comments, which have helped me to improve this article. I also thank Mirko Dallendörfer and Felix Hienzsch for their valuable research assistance. All remaining errors are my own. Supplementary material for this article is available in an online appendix at <https://saskiaruth.files.wordpress.com/2015/01/supplement.pdf>

1. Data from the DALP expert survey show that experts' agreement on the ideological position of political parties is more dispersed the more a political party uses clientelistic practices like vote buying or patronage. The degrees of both vote buying and patronage are positively correlated with the standard deviation of left-right ratings of the respective political party among experts (vote buying: $r = 0.306$, $p < 0.004$; patronage: $r = 0.204$, $p < 0.058$).

2. Using survey data from Argentina, Nichter (2008) develops a formal model explaining the distribution of selective incentives to loyal party supporters based on the logics of buying turnout or rewarding loyalty. Lawson and Greene (2012) show, on the basis of survey data from Mexico, that clientelism may become self-enforcing by turning clientelistic targets into party loyalists over time.

3. The Latinobarometer is based on a stratified probabilistic national sample design with 1,000 or 1,200 respondents per country (Latinobarómetro 2009). Question wordings for all survey items used in this study are available online: Questionnaire LAB 2009, <http://www.latinobarometro.org/latContents.jsp>; Questionnaire DALP, <https://web.duke.edu/democracy/papersurvey.html>.

4. Note that the value differs from the general level of left-right orientation for all respondents (78.6 percent) in the Latinobarometer 2009 survey. This hints at the conclusion that party supporters are, on average, more likely to position themselves on the left-right dimension.

5. Data for the distribution of seats are available on request.

6. In line with a logistic distribution, the residual variance of level 1 is $\pi^2/3$ (Snijders and Bosker 1999, 224).

7. To probe the robustness of these results, the analysis of part 1 was rerun with a similar dataset based on public opinion data from the AmericasBarometer (2010). Results remained remarkably stable with respect to both the size and signs of coefficients of both vote buying and patronage, although at slightly lower significance levels. Results are available on request.

8. While this might also indicate a potentially spurious relationship—that less democratically minded voters are less likely to have consistent left-right perceptions—descriptive evidence does not support this claim. Based on the LAB data, individuals supporting military coups are more likely both to position themselves on the left-right scale (78.42 percent compared to 75.78 percent of those not supporting a military coup) and to be more consistent in their positions on this scale (their mean self-placement is 0.3 points farther to the right and less dispersed compared to those not supporting a coup).

9. The analysis of part 2 was duplicated with the same data described in note 7 (AmericasBarometer 2010). Results for the cross-level interaction effects point in a similar direction—they all show the expected negative sign—although significance levels for the economic policy dimension drop considerably. Results are available on request.

REFERENCES

- Altman, David, Juan Pablo Luna, Rafael Piñeiro, and Sergio Toro. 2009. Partidos y sistemas de partidos en América Latina: aproximaciones desde la encuesta a expertos 2009. *Revista de Ciencia Política* 29, 3: 775–98.
- Álvarez, R. Michael, and Charles H. Franklin. 1994. Uncertainty and Political Perceptions. *Journal of Politics* 56, 3: 671–88.
- American Political Science Association (APSA). Committee on Political Parties. 1950. Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System. *American Political Science Review* 44: Supplement.
- AmericasBarometer. 2010. Database. Nashville: LAPOP, Vanderbilt University. www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/free-access.php
- Auyero, Javier. 2013. Lessons Learned While Studying Clientelistic Politics in the Gray Zone. In *Clientelism, Social Policy, and the Quality of Democracy*, ed. Diego Abente Brun and Larry Diamond. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 114–29.
- Blais, André, and Agnieszka Dobrzynska. 1998. Turnout in Electoral Democracies. *European Journal of Political Research* 33, 2: 239–61.
- Bowler, Shaun. 1990. Voter Perceptions and Party Strategies: An Empirical Approach. *Comparative Politics* 23, 1: 61–83.
- Brambor, Thomas, William Roberts Clark, and Matt Golder. 2006. Understanding Interaction Models: Improving Empirical Analyses. *Political Analysis* 14: 63–82.
- Calvo, Ernesto, and María Victoria Murillo. 2013. When Parties Meet Voters: Assessing Political Linkages Through Partisan Networks and Distributive Expectations in Argentina and Chile. *Comparative Political Studies* 46, 7: 851–82.
- Carlin, Ryan E., and Mason Moseley. 2015. Good Democrats, Bad Targets: Democratic Values and Clientelistic Vote Buying. *Journal of Politics* 77, 1: 14–26.
- Carreras, Miguel, Scott Morgenstern, and Yen-Pin Su. 2015. Refining the Theory of Partisan Alignments: Evidence from Latin America. *Party Politics* 21, 5: 671–85.
- Colomer, Josep M. 2005. The Left-Right Dimension in Latin America. Economics and Business Working Paper No. 813. Barcelona: Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
- Converse, Philip E. 1975. Some Mass-Elite Contrast in the Perception of Political Spaces. *Social Science Information* 14, 3–4: 49–83.
- Cox, Gary W. 2009. Swing Voters, Core Voters, and Distributive Politics. In *Political Representation*, ed. Ian Shapiro, Susan C. Stokes, Elisabeth J. Wood, and Alexander S. Kirshner. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 342–57.
- Cox, Gary W., and Mathew D. McCubbins. 1986. Electoral Politics as a Redistributive Game. *Journal of Politics* 48, 2: 370–89.
- Dalton, Russell J., and Hans-Dieter Klingemann. 2007. Citizens and Political Behavior. In *The Oxford Handbook of Political Behavior*, ed. Dalton and Klingemann. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 3–26.
- Desposato, Scott. 2007. How Does Vote Buying Shape the Legislative Arena? In *Elections for Sale: The Causes and Consequences of Vote Buying*, ed. Frederic C. Schaffer. Boulder: Lynne Rienner. 101–22.
- Dixit, Avinash, and John Londregan. 1996. The Determinants of Success of Special Interests in Redistributive Politics. *Journal of Politics* 58, 4: 1132–55.
- Downs, Anthony. 1957. *An Economic Theory of Democracy*. New York: Harper & Row.
- European Commission. 2012. Eurobarometer 71.2 (5–6 2009). ZA4972 Datenfile version 3.0.2. DOI 10.4232/1.10990. Brussels: TNS Opinion & Social, Producer. Cologne: GESIS Datenarchiv.

- Fuchs, Dieter, and Hans-Dieter Klingemann. 1989. The Left-Right Schema. In *Continuities in Political Action: A Longitudinal Study of Political Orientations in Three Western Democracies*, ed. M. Kent Jennings and Jan W. van Deth. Berlin: De Gruyter. 203–38.
- Hagopian, Frances, and Scott P. Mainwaring. 2005. *The Third Wave of Democratization in Latin America: Advances and Setbacks*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Harbers, Imke, Catherine E. de Vries, and Marco R. Steenbergen. 2013. Attitude Variability Among Latin American Publics: How Party System Structuration Affects Left-Right Ideology. *Comparative Political Studies* 46, 8: 947–67.
- Hosmer, David W., and Stanley Lemeshow. 2000. *Applied Logistic Regression*. New York: John Wiley and Sons.
- Hox, Joop. 2010. *Multilevel Analysis: Techniques and Applications*. New York: Routledge.
- Inglehart, Ronald, and Hans-Dieter Klingemann. 1976. Party Identification, Ideological Preference and the Left–Right Dimension Among Western Mass Publics. In *Party Identification and Beyond: Representations of Voting and Party Competition*, ed. Ian Budge, Ivor Crewe, and Dennis J. Farlie. London: John Wiley. 243–73.
- Kitschelt, Herbert. 2000. Linkages Between Citizens and Politicians in Democratic Polities. *Comparative Political Studies* 33, 6–7: 845–79.
- . 2013. Democratic Accountability and Linkages Project. Durham: Duke University.
- Kitschelt, Herbert, and Steven I. Wilkinson. 2007. *Patrons, Clients, and Policies: Patterns of Democratic Accountability and Political Competition*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Kitschelt, Herbert, Kirk A. Hawkins, Juan P. Luna, Guillermo Rosas, and Elizabeth J. Zechmeister. 2010. *Latin American Party Systems*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Laakso, Markku, and Rein Taagepera. 1979. “Effective” Number of Parties: A Measure with Application to West Europe. *Comparative Political Studies* 12, 1: 3–27.
- Latinobarómetro (LAB). 2009. Latinobarómetro Survey Data. Santiago, Chile: Corporación Latinobarómetro. www.latinobarometro.org/latContents.jsp
- Lawson, Chappell, and Kenneth F. Greene. 2011. Self-Enforcing Clientelism. Unpublished mss.
- Lindbeck, Assar, and Jörgen W. Weibull. 1987. Balanced-Budget Redistribution as the Outcome of Political Competition. *Public Choice* 52: 273–97.
- Luskin, Robert C. 1990. Explaining Political Sophistication. *Political Behavior* 12, 4: 331–61.
- Mainwaring, Scott P., and Matthew S. Shugart. 1997. *Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Mainwaring, Scott P., and Timothy R. Scully. 1995. *Building Democratic Institutions: Party Systems in Latin America*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Manin, Bernhard, Adam Przeworski, and Susan C. Stokes. 1999. Introduction. In *Democracy, Accountability, and Representation*, ed. Przeworski, Stokes, and Manin. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1–26.
- Nichter, Simeon. 2008. Vote Buying or Turnout Buying? Machine Politics and the Secret Ballot. *American Political Science Review* 102, 1: 19–31.
- Nie, Norman H., Sidney Verba, and Jae-on Kim. 1974. Political Participation and the Life Cycle. *Comparative Politics* 6, 3: 319–40.
- Pitkin, Hanna F. 1967. *The Concept of Representation*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Roberts, Kenneth M. 2002. Party-society Linkages and Democratic Representation in Latin America. *Canadian Journal of Latin American and Caribbean Studies* 27, 53: 9–34.

- Rosas, Guillermo, Noel P. Johnston, and Kirk Hawkins. 2014. Local Public Goods as Vote-Purchasing Devices? Persuasion and Mobilization in the Choice of Clientelist Payments. *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 26, 4: 573–98.
- Ruth, Saskia P. 2012. Clientelism and Ideological Congruence in Latin American Party Systems. Paper presented at the workshop “Legitimacy Under Attack,” Leiden University, October 25–26.
- Sartori, Giovanni 1976. *Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Schaffer, Frederic C., and Andreas Schedler. 2007. What Is Vote Buying? In *Elections for Sale: The Causes and Consequences of Vote Buying*, ed. Frederic C. Schaffer. Boulder: Lynne Rienner. 17–30.
- Schumpeter, Joseph A. 2008 [1942]. *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy*. New York: Harper Perennial.
- Snijders, Tom A. B., and Roel J. Bosker. 1999. *Multilevel Analysis: An Introduction to Basic and Advanced Multilevel Modeling*. London: Sage.
- Steenbergen, Marco R., and Bradford S. Jones. 2002. Modeling Multilevel Data Structures. *American Journal of Political Science* 46, 1: 218–37.
- Stokes, Susan C. 2007. Political Clientelism. In *The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics*, eds. Carles Boix and Stokes. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 604–27.
- Stokes, Susan C., Thad Dunning, Marcelo Nazareno, and Valeria Brusco. 2013. *Brokers, Voters, and Clientelism: The Puzzle of Distributive Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Taylor, Michael, and V. M. Herman. 1971. Party Systems and Governmental Stability. *American Political Science Review* 65, 1: 28–37.
- Thomassen, Jacques. 1994. Empirical Research into Political Representation: Failing Democracy or Fail Models? In *Elections At Home and Abroad*, ed. M. Kent Jennings and Thomas E. Mann. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 237–65.
- Van der Brug, Wouter, Mark Franklin, and Gábor Tóka. 2008. One Electorate or Many? Differences in Party Preference Formation Between New and Established European Democracies. *Electoral Studies* 27, 4: 589–600.
- Weyland, Kurt. 1999. Neoliberal Populism in Latin America and Eastern Europe. *Comparative Politics* 31, 4: 379–401.
- Wiesehomeier, Nina, and David Doyle. 2012. Attitudes, Ideological Associations, and the Left-Right Divide in Latin America. *Journal of Politics in Latin America* 4, 1: 3–33.
- Wiesehomeier, Nina, and Kenneth Benoit. 2009. Presidents, Parties, and Policy Competition. *Journal of Politics* 71, 4: 1435–47.
- Zechmeister, Elizabeth J. 2006. What’s Left and Who’s Right? A Q-method Study of Individual and Contextual Influences on the Meaning of Ideological Labels. *Political Behavior* 28, 2: 151–73.
- . 2010. Left-Right Semantics as a Facilitator of Programmatic Structuration. In Kitschelt et al. 2010. 96–118.
- Zechmeister, Elizabeth J., and Margarita Corral. 2013. Individual and Contextual Constraints on Ideological Labels in Latin America. *Comparative Political Studies* 46, 6: 675–701.
- Zoco, Edurne. 2006. Legislators’ Positions and Party System Competition in Central America: A Comparative Analysis. *Party Politics* 12, 2: 257–80.