with Tocqueville. Their works differ in "background, genre, discipline, and reception," acknowledges Euben. But they share a stake in claiming the authority of pedagogical *theoria,* she contends, the notion that one may travel to faraway places "in search of political wisdom to bring home" (p. 91).

From there, Euben employs al-Tahtawi and Tocqueville in a project of mutual enrichment. It becomes clear that together, they both reflect a world slowly transforming "by an increasing *awareness* of regions and peoples separated by vast oceans and thousands of miles" (p. 97). Both men, as such, are concerned not merely with changes across space but also with changes across time. They share ambivalences about what they view, being at once skeptical and appreciative of the possibilities that a changing world might offer—though they do not ever express skepticism about their own mode of seeing.

In the book's fifth chapter, Euben extends her own view to include questions of gender in the travel genre. Here the comparison is between Montesquieu's *Persian Letters* and Sayyida Salme's *Memoirs,* and the claim is that both texts confound "the coding of travel and travel writing as heroic, masculine, Western, and scientific" (pp. 16–17). Moreover, both challenge the notion that only certain genres, like philosophical treatises, "count" as political theory, whereas other genres, like novels and memoirs, do not.

These are compelling claims, and Euben's defense of them tends toward the masterful. But while she devotes an extensive portion of this chapter to Salme's exilic experiences of nostalgia, dislocation, and permanent homesickness, she relegates to a footnote the fact that Montesquieu's character Usbek also suffers the pains of exile. (Early in the *Letters,* Usbek confides to a friend that the "real reason" for his journey is self-preservative; surrounded by political enemies, he told the king that he wanted to instruct himself in Western knowledge as a pretext for getting out of town.) In Euben's telling, Usbek is a man who sets off on a "heroic adventure, an ennobling quest" whose ultimate despair is occasioned primarily by his wives' revolt (p. 146). This contrasts with the book's picture of Salme as haunted by her "life of permanent fragmentation and dislocation" (p. 159). If, though, we read Usbek and Salme as victims of the same exilic blade, they may complicate more than associations of travel and gender. For they suggest, in line with Euben's broader analysis, that one cannot separate a world in which long-distance travel is possible from a world in which exile—both forced and self-imposed—is frequent. Sometimes it is hard to tell the difference between a seeker and a fleer, if there is a distinct difference between the two in the first place.

Both of these chapters—and a prior juxtaposition of Herodotus with the fourteenth-century Maghribi traveler Ibn Battuta—fall between a sweeping analysis of present-day scholarly and political concerns. Euben begins both her first and final chapters by speaking about globalization, and reminds us that this process has a long history and is "not merely the product of the spread of Western cultural and economic power throughout the globe" (p. 175). In that light, current debates about cosmopolitanism seem dangerously ahistoric and provincial, emphasizing as they do dominant Western ideals while ignoring the disenfranchisements and power inequalities that are an inextricable part of the package. This observation overlaps with another of Euben's insights into the narrowness of contemporary political understandings, which take a view of Islam as both a singular and insular entity or which suppose an easy dichotomy of "Islam versus the West" (p. 5).

Strikingly, Euben does not fall into the trap of limiting these critiques to "ordinary" citizens or political practitioners. She connects them to the failings of political theorists who, too confident in their own mode of vision—its increasing specializations, its canons, its favored forms—neglect to see its limitations. They are thus kin to Tocqueville and al-Tahtawi, quick to see the privileges of a traveler's position but quicker to ignore its weaknesses and exclusions. To pull all of these strands together is to arrive at an astonishing place: If political theory rests on comparison, and if comparison depends upon translation, and translation has necessary imperfections, then theory, like the travel narrative, is "transformative if inevitably flawed" (p. 15).

In this book, Euben offers the rare pleasure of seeing a political theorist practice as she preaches. By blurring so many familiar edges and thus opening so many new possibilities for thought, she takes us on what can only be called an enlightening journey.

Naming Evil, Judging Evil. Edited by Ruth W. Grant. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006. 232p. $35.00.
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— Kennan Ferguson, *University of South Florida*

Interdisciplinarity is much praised and rarely practiced. Too often, it boils down to a sociologist adding a few anthropological works to a bibliography, or a geographer applying for a political science grant. The ideal of learning from and engaging with other intellectual traditions and conceptualizations is easily lost.

Ruth Grant's collection, *Naming Evil, Judging Evil,* however, demonstrates what interdisciplinarity can achieve when done for its own sake. In bringing together a variety of scholars from Duke University, Grant encourages an extensive discussion of a central concept in political theory. This results in a reflective and engaged discourse, one that is never undisciplined but that productively strains across the various interlocutors' backgrounds.

The concept is that of evil—for many moderns a troublesome if not potentially archaic concept. More than one essay mentions the difficultly of coming to terms with

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"evil" in a post-Hitlerian world, not because the man himself did not commit great evil (all are in agreement that he did) but because his legacy has come to stand for evil itself. Such a benchmark, as Michael Allen Gillespie argues, leaves us ill-equipped to make judgments of people or events that are not quite as bad as the Holocaust.

Yet the best aspects of this collection arise from precisely this attempt to grapple with the generation of evil and the human efforts to come to terms with it. "Evil" remains an unsolved and intriguing question not only for political theorists but also for theologians, ethicists, historians, and philosophers. The collected essays take up the central question that—it is presumed—must be answered before one can take an ethico-political stand: How do we properly determine what evil is?

A plurality of the authors conceptualize this modern problem of evil as arising from the difficulty of identifying evil within liberal, democratic pluralism. Malachi Hacohen, who most engages with and against his fellow essayists, argues that this problem, our inability to call out evil and contest it, is rooted deeply in liberalism's history. Thomas Spragens, Jr., sees the American polity as trapped between those with an absolutist vision of good and evil and those whose "soft form of nihilism" (p. 191) leads them to a "pan-nonjudgmentalism" (p. 208) that paralyzes their ability to even recognize evil. While I may disagree with this particular diagnosis (who, exactly, are these nihilists, other than students afraid to develop a central argument?), these authors spell out the issues and the possible effects of such a dualism with intriguing histories and justifications.

Other contributors investigate the intellectual historical conditions that allow for or encourage our conceptions of evil. Particularly noteworthy here are the editor herself and Stanley Hauerwas. Grant identifies a particular dynamic of Rousseau's thought in our willingness to blame evil on systemic or structural conditions. Such a conception, she argues, leads to a Manichean totalization that encourages radical revolutionary attitudes: If society is to blame for man's fallen state, then the necessary corollary is that social structures must be (violently) overthrown and reworked anew. Hauerwas, in his essay, returns to St. Augustine to offer a denial of evil as existing in the world. His intriguing reading of Christianity's history attempts to recenter humility, the idea that one can never know God's intentions, as the proper implication of Augustine's narrative of pride as the cause of evil results.

As with all collections, the essays are uneven. The need to carefully lay out the historical and intellectual conditions of previous attempts to grapple with evil occasionally overcomes any sort of contemporary application or even significance. Other essays approach banality, and not in the Arendtian sense. Something seems disingenuous in a long, footnote-laden, discursively complex analysis that, after much wheezing, teaches us something that is already widely assumed in the West: that, for example, what we call "female genital mutilation" is an evil done to innocent girls. This is not to single out Elizabeth Kiss, whose essay treating this issue also develops a nuanced critique of torture. It is, instead, to ask why the contributors often stack the deck, scoring points against known (and commonly agreed-upon) evils instead of engaging with those who claim evil in more common American practices. It is easy to condemn Hitler or forced child marriage, but neither seems up for debate in contemporary Western society. What about other, more germane but less agreed-upon evils: what some call "male genital mutilation" and others call "circumcision"? Is imprisoning animals and eating their flesh evil? What about the privatization of water and food? Or "pro-life" or "pro-choice" legislation, both of which are denounced as perpetrating evil? If we are truly to confront and judge evil, should we not at least know where the contributors would take us?

Thus, the best essay in the collection, by Peter Euben, describes the localized and specific nature of everyday evils. Euben examines how one particular work of literature, Kazuo Ishiguro's *The Remains of the Day* (1989), raises questions of quotidian evil by contesting the protagonist's conflict between duty (he has been a technically superb butler) and judgment (as a superb butler, he has ignored his employer's fascism). Indeed, it may be possible that his employ makes it impossible for him to be a moral person, that "the dignity of his profession requires him to be complicit in his own humiliation" (p. 116). The honest reader of the novel, of which Euben seems ideal, comes away not discovering how best to judge evil, but instead questioning how his or her commitments, practices, and habits allow or even encourage the persistence of evil. This provocation alone would make Grant's volume merit attention. Its ability to put such insights in conversation with ideas from other disciplines makes it exemplary.

Poverty and Inequality. Edited by David B. Grusky and Ravi Kanbur. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006. 200p. $55.00 cloth, $21.95 paper.

Capabilities Equality: Basic Issues and Problems. Edited by Alexander Kaufman. New York: Routledge, 2005. 224p. $125.00.
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— S. Abu Turab Rizvi, *University of Vermont*

Two trends, each a generation in the making, have affected the recent study of poverty and inequality. In 1979, Amartya Sen asked "Equality of What?" in his Tanner Lecture at Stanford University. There, and in numerous articles and books since, Sen and his collaborators developed a rich account of poverty, inequality, and of human well-being more generally considered. This work, though its original basis was in the classical political economy of subsistence and human freedom, grew to be buttressed by

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