the sociology of law, always in conjunction with social theory, legal theory, socio-legal theory, and the like only to speak of the real or imagined connections among these disciplines and fields of study. In other words, the lack of a clear conceptual logic and disciplinary foundation that is inherent to Cotterrell's work is also reflected in many of the writings in this book.

The reader may observe that the perspective of this review comes from a sociologist of law who is a sociologist and therefore does not share the peculiar notion of a non-sociological sociology of law which Cotterrell has sought to popularise as a branch of jurisprudence and/or legal studies. It remains puzzling, on purely logical grounds alone, why no better phrased label could be developed in terms of a sociologically grounded legal theory, possibly as a sociological jurisprudence (writ small should associations with the work of Roscoe Pound be avoided) or as sociological legal studies (similar to critical and empirical legal studies). In any case, as a result of this peculiar perspective, the so-called anarchic heterogeneity that Cotterrell is fond of observing in the socio-legal community, in fact, betrays a refusal to draw disciplinary boundaries, which especially in contemporary times remains anything but a triviality.

As a result, the chapters in this book, like Cotterrell's own writings, are bursting with a wide range of themes and theories that are collected in rather obscure ways without much attention to a clear exposition of said perspectives and the theoretical problems that are associated with merging diverse strands of thinking. Betraying an inability to make hard choices on the relative suitability of multiple theories, the authors in this book too often resort to the cop-out of eclecticism and fanciful name-dropping. Fond of interpreting rather than developing or applying theories, the authors of this book perhaps sought to constitute a pluralist multiverse. But, sociologically, one must observe that this pluralism bears little fruit, to wit the wide diversity of perspectives suggested in this volume and the relative lack to successfully interpret legal ideas sociologically. The empirically oriented chapters are a refreshing exception to this critique, not primarily because they are empirical, but because they show the value of theoretically grounded analysis of various aspects of law in concrete socio-historical settings. These admirable efforts thereby also show that only a veritable disciplinary perspective – whether it is rooted in sociology, psychology, anthropology, or any other behavioural and social science – can adequately analyse relevant dimensions of law in society.

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The Cambridge Rawls Lexicon. By Jon Mandle and David A. Reidy (eds.) [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015. 881 pp. Hardback £110. ISBN 9780521192941.]

This is a very useful book. It consists of 225 short essays, by various authors, on a variety of topics drawn from, or related to, the work of John Rawls. The level of scholarship is high, practically all of the essays are valuable and useful, and many of them are genuinely stimulating and thought-provoking. The editors have aimed to produce a volume that acknowledges the scope for genuine interpretative debate while recognising that "not everything is debateable". Indeed, they state it as their goal "to enable students and scholars to better distinguish what is debateable from what is not and to bring the latter more fully to bear on the former" (p. xxii). The plan is wisely framed and skilfully executed.

Since the core of Rawls's theory is to be found in some simple and memorable ideas (rational choice from behind a "veil of ignorance", the "thin theory of the good", and so forth), many of his more casual readers neglect and underestimate the complexity and refinement of the argument that unpacks and sustains that core. In working out the detail of his position, Rawls develops a complex and carefully constructed apparatus of concepts and these must be mastered by anyone seeking to attain a substantial grasp of the theory. Many of the entries in the book aim to elucidate this elaborate conceptual framework, and perusal of the book should therefore make it easier for a typical reader of Rawls to get to grips with the real substance of his theory. Here we learn of such things as "burdened societies" and "the burdens of judgment"; "chain connection" and "close knitness"; "primary goods" and "public reason"; "outlaw states" and "overlapping consensus". There are, perhaps, some curious omissions (e.g. why no entry on "the two moral powers", an idea which is important to Rawls yet which does not even appear in the index to the present volume?) but readers tackling the Rawlsian labyrinth with serious intent will find this aspect of the book invaluable.

Other entries concern more general topics of political philosophy and reflect on Rawls's view of those topics: what is the position of Rawls on "animals" or "the environment", for example? What is the relationship between Rawls and "democracy", the "economy", and "civic republicanism"? How does the Rawlsian theory of justice relate to that offered by "luck egalitarianism"?

A third category of entry concerns those contemporaries of Rawls, within political philosophy and welfare economics, whose views have a significant bearing upon Rawls's theory. Here we find discussions of the bearing upon Rawls's theory of the work of Kenneth Arrow, Brian Barry, Gerry Cohen, Ronald Dworkin, John Harsanyi, Martha Nussbaum, Thomas Pogge, Amartya Sen, and many others. Finally are entries on figures from the past whose work has influenced Rawls, or bears an interesting relationship to that of Rawls, including obvious figures such as J.S. Mill and Henry Sidgwick, and somewhat less obvious ones such as Aquinas and Leibniz. Rawls's rich and deep understanding of the history of moral and political philosophy (revealed by his posthumously published lectures) makes these short essays particularly interesting and appropriate.

Although Rawls always wrote in a clear and accessible style, his work nevertheless presents his readers with a daunting challenge. In part, the difficulty springs from the sheer bulk and complexity of his writings, but the difficulty is greatly increased by the fact that his work evolved over a long period of time, and the relationship between earlier and later versions of the theory is not always transparent. For example, some readers view his 1993 book *Political Liberalism* as a fundamental departure from his 1971 work *A Theory of Justice*, while others see considerable continuity. His many published essays and his posthumously published lectures on the history of moral and political philosophy add to the overall complexity of the picture. Although, in his 2001 book *Justice as Fairness*, Rawls offered us an integrated statement of his mature position, it remains the case that, for a full picture of his thinking on many issues, one must consult a great diversity of sources and then puzzle over the relationships obtaining between them. Many of the essays in the *Cambridge Rawls Lexicon* help the student carefully to piece together relevant observations from across the full range of Rawls's work, and offer thoughtful reflections on the internal coherence of the positions expressed. Readers of the volume cannot fail to deepen their understanding in consequence.

Like J.S. Mill, Rawls possessed considerable expertise in fields with which philosophers are not always completely comfortable: in Rawls's case, the most relevant fields being welfare economics, decision theory, and game theory. Readers coming to his work from a background in law, for example, are likely to encounter

difficulties with these aspects of his work. Here again, the present volume is very helpful, offering ready assistance and lucid clarifications.

But, principally, the volume is a smorgasbord of interesting and thought-provoking miniature essays which invite the reader to sample and enjoy. The sumptuous production and high price of this volume both suggest that Cambridge University Press see it as principally a reference work for purchase by libraries. This is very regrettable, since (price permitting) it would surely have found a place on many desks and broadened the understanding of many students of Rawls's work. Could a less costly format not have been adopted?

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Philosophical Foundations of Contract Law. By Gregory Klass, George Letsas, and Prince Saprai (eds.) [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014. viii + 391 pp. Hardback £75. ISBN 978-0-19-871301-2.]

Theorising about contract law is flourishing. One more piece of evidence is the formidable collection *Philosophical Foundations of Contract Law*, edited by Gregory Klass, George Letsas, and Prince Saprai. The book contains 17 essays that range from high abstraction to policy recommendation to doctrinal analysis. Anyone interested in theoretical discussions of contract law would be well advised to read this book. As noted in the book's introduction (p. 13), there remain many important topics and perspectives on contract law that this volume does *not* get to, but, as the text indicates, that is the inevitable product of trying to maintain a volume of moderate size (and expense).

The book is entitled *The Philosophical Foundations of Contract Law* – a title set by the Oxford University Press Series in which it appears. It is worth considering what it means to be looking for (or asserting that one has found) the philosophical foundations of a doctrinal area of law like contract. Gregory Klass states at the beginning of this collection: "Contract theory is not one thing, but a collection of related inquiries" (p. 1). In particular, he notes, one can approach the topic variously, by focusing on "contract law's function, its justification, [or] its conceptual structure" (p. 2). However, there remains a prior question that is not considered in the volume: why assume that there is a general theory of contract law (a theory of all current or possible systems of contract law), rather than viewing the appropriate theoretical focus as being the contract law of a particular legal system at a particular time? What reason is there to think that there is some monolithic thing, "contract law", that is constant across societies and over time? And there is also a concern one might have about many contract theories: that there might be a bias towards the rules and principles of a small number of jurisdictions. For example, in this volume, almost all of the contributors teach or were trained in either Britain or the US, and most of the cases and doctrinal rules cited come from English or American law (Liam Murphy's contribution is a rare instance where the discussion at least touches on the contract law of other countries). One might suspect that contract law would be viewed differently if the theorists' focus were more on (say) certain civil law legal systems. Additionally, the volume contains hardly any references to other authorities that loom large in contracting law and practice: e.g. the United Nations Convention on the International Sale of Goods (the "CISG" or "Vienna Convention"), which governs most international sale of goods, the UNIDROIT Principles, or the EU directives on consumer transactions.