

REBELLIOUS YOUTH IN COLONIAL AFRICA*

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ABSTRACT: ‘That rebellious youth’ alarmed colonial authorities and elders alike is increasingly an issue for historians. This article surveys the issue as an introduction to the two studies that follow. It considers both the creation of images of youthful defiance as part of a debate about youth conducted largely by their seniors and the real predicaments faced by young people themselves. Concern revolved around the meanings of maturity in a changing world where models of responsible male and female adulthood, gendered expectations and future prospects were all in flux. Surviving the present and facing the future made elders anxious and divided as well as united the young. The article concludes by suggesting a number of areas, including leisure and politics, where the voice of youth might be more clearly heard, and proposes comparisons – with the past, between racial groups and between ‘town’ and ‘country’ – that link the varied experiences of the young.

KEY WORDS: gender, colonial, generational conflict, masculinity, youth.

THE rebelliousness of youth in Africa has a long history, as do attempts to tame it. The need to control young people and to channel their energies in socially productive ways is a common theme in precolonial tradition: the ordered progress of initiation was as much designed to remind the young of the costs of defying their elders as it was to celebrate their growing maturity. In their time, colonial institutions attempted to do much the same. There was reason for this, for the young have always had power, if not authority. For example, the teenage soldiers of the Revolutionary United Front in Sierra Leone had their precursors in the *rugaruga*, the ‘brutalised young gunmen’ of late nineteenth-century Tanganyika.¹

Notions of defiance and discipline are but two sides of the same coin of intergenerational tension, a force that both predated and outlasted colonialism. Household heads have always been concerned over the fractious immaturity of the young, but youth has always had its own internal codes of self-discipline and proper behaviour, often deliberately contrasted with the world of elderhood. Honour, as Iliffe has recently pointed out, ‘is always a contested notion’. The *murran* of late nineteenth-century Arusha were remembered as moral crusaders who ‘hated anything evil or dirty’; their Maasai coevals contrasted their own stern virtue with the softness and equivocation of their elders. Mau Mau fighters, whom the British thought

* Several papers, including those by Fourchard and Summers that follow, were presented on a panel at the 2003 ASA Conference in Boston. My thanks to Tim Parsons, the other panelists and discussants and an anonymous reader for their valuable suggestions.

¹ P. Richards, *Fighting for the Rain Forest* (Oxford, 1996); J. Iliffe, *A Modern History of Tanganyika* (Cambridge, 1979), 62–3.

savage and much Kikuyu opinion condemned as the epitome of youth gone bad, debated endlessly about discipline in the forest and were stung by accusations that they behaved like ‘children’, not as responsible adults.²

Yet while there is much evidence of strain in the precolonial past, there is little indication of societies dividing along the axis of age. Tension seems to have remained in bounds, partly because of the knowledge that the young would inevitably become old and thus inherit the authority, the wealth and the worries of their elders. ‘We are yet young men but we shall be elders’, warned the youth of Rabai on the Kenya coast.³ Moreover, if the future appeared to belong to the young, the past was the preserve of their elders, and it was from mastery of the past that authority sprang. It was only under conditions of extreme disruption – famine, epidemic, conquest – that relations of age, like those of kinship and gender, dissolved.

Colonial rule inherited the concerns of age, but altered the terms of the debate between generations in two particular ways: by changing the structure of opportunity that made the young patient and their elders more tolerant; and by proposing new models of responsible behaviour which, in some ways, discounted the past. Foremost amongst these were the ideals of productive masculinity, tamed by work and made responsible through the obligations of marriage and citizenship, and of modern wifehood and motherhood that taught girls the disciplines of a new but still subordinate domesticity.⁴

The colonial view of youth was of necessity ambivalent. The period of conquest and resistance was pre-eminently the time of young men, for it was they who, in and out of uniform and on both sides, did the fighting and hoped for the rewards. Colonial states had then grown by harnessing their energies, as uniformed *askaris* and petty functionaries in the colonial bureaucracy, as catechists and teachers and as labourers building a modern economic infrastructure. Yet giving them authority, economic power and, importantly, space had its drawbacks. The arrogance of youth, now often armed with literacy and dressed in western fashion, threatened to antagonize powerful constituencies amongst those who still controlled the resources of land, labour and legitimacy on which colonial states depended. As one Zulu chief complained in 1902, ‘the youths had come to defy the nation’.⁵ Thus, as with the ‘slow death of slavery’, colonial regimes came to appreciate the virtues of

² J. Iliffe, *Honour in African History* (Cambridge, 2005), 305; T. Spear, *Mountain Farmers* (Oxford, 1997), 71; J. Lonsdale, ‘Authority, gender and violence’, in E. Atieno Odhiambo and J. Lonsdale (eds.), *Mau Mau and Nationhood* (Oxford, 2003), 46–75.

³ Quoted in J. Willis, *Mombasa, the Swahili and the Making of the Mijikenda* (Oxford, 1993), 44.

⁴ L. Lindsay and S. Miescher (eds.), *Men and Masculinities in Modern Africa* (Portsmouth NH, 2003), esp. chs. by Miescher and Lindsay; C. Summers, *Colonial Lessons* (Portsmouth NH, 2002), ch. 6; T. Ranger, *Are We Not Also Men?* (London, 1995); E. Schmidt, *Peasants, Traders and Wives* (Portsmouth NH, 1992), ch. 5; S. Morrow, ‘“No girl leaves the school unmarried”: Mabel Shaw and the education of girls at Mbereshi, Northern Rhodesia, 1915–1940’, *International Journal of African Historical Studies*, 19 (1986), 601–35; G. Mianda, ‘Colonialism, education and gender relations in the Belgian Congo: the évolué case’, in J. Allman, S. Geiger and N. Musisi (eds.), *Women in African Colonial Histories* (Bloomington, 2002), 144–63.

⁵ Quoted in B. Carton, *Blood from Your Children* (Charlottesville, 2000), 35.

discipline and stability, and, having apparently provided the tools of emancipation, they now attempted to re-impose control.⁶ They devoted considerable effort to buttressing the domestic authority of African elders and forged alliances with local gerontocracies to create, define and manage 'tradition'.⁷

At the heart of colonialism's ambivalence lay a contradiction that became increasingly apparent as colonialism itself developed. Co-opting the young and turning them into productive and responsible citizens alone offered colonialism a future. This required appropriately modern or modernized institutions of socialization – schools, youth organizations, welfare and, if necessary, penal agencies – and also an agreed upon discourse of modernity and maturation. Yet the disruptive and unequal opportunities of social and economic change and the realities of racial domination were apparently creating juvenile delinquents, not junior citizens, and encouraging new forms of unruliness and defiance. The experiences of conversion, education and migration gave the young confidence and the resources to challenge their elders' authority, thereby undermining an alliance between colonialism and 'tradition'. Gender imbalance and unemployment in towns threatened the stability of family life, and urban spaces were all too often the preserve of young 'spivs', who combined the two crowning colonial vices of idleness and insolence.⁸ Labour migrancy removed adult men from rural families and appeared to pervert both marriage and the process through which masculinity was fashioned and transmitted.⁹ In the late colonial era, political mobilization fed on generational discontents and, through the recruitment of youth wings, appeared to give licence to hooliganism. The very institutions of socialization were being subverted. 'Ere long', warned one *Bantu World* reader, 'we shall be ruled by our children in our own homes'.¹⁰ Schoolboys went on strike, girls absconded and street gangs offered a disturbing – and sometimes tragic – parody of normal 'family life', infused with values that seemed alien and antagonistic to the modernizing project. Colonialism seemed to have lost whatever control it had once had over youth and its aspirations at the very moment at which the future seemed most uncertain.¹¹

⁶ P. Lovejoy and J. Hogendorn, *Slow Death for Slavery* (Cambridge, 1993).

⁷ For a recent discussion of the debate over 'tradition', see T. Spear, 'Neo-traditionalism and the limits of invention in British colonial Africa', *Journal of African History*, 4 (2003), 3–27.

⁸ See e.g. A. Burton, 'Urchins, loafers and the cult of the cowboy: urbanization and delinquency in Dar-es-Salaam, 1919–1961', *Journal of African History*, 42 (2001), 199–216.

⁹ 'Mine marriages' appeared to reproduce an 'anti-family' of men, though miners, in fact, used them to reinforce more conventional notions of gendered authority at home. See P. Harries, *Work, Culture and Identity* (Portsmouth NH, 1994), 200–8. The structure of early prostitution in Nairobi perhaps offers a female example of 'alternative families', in the work of L. White, *The Comforts of Home* (Chicago, 1990), 62–5, 120–3. Similar solidarities may have been concealed within the juvenile street gangs and prostitution networks that alarmed urban authorities in Nigeria. See L. Fourchard, 'Lagos and the invention of juvenile delinquency in Nigeria, 1920–1960', this vol.

¹⁰ Quoted in C. Glaser, *Bo-Tsotsi: The Youth Gangs of Soweto, 1935–1976* (Portsmouth NH, 2000), 22.

¹¹ See C. Summers, "'Subterranean evil" and "tumultuous riot": authority and alienation at King's College, Budo, Uganda, 1942', this vol.

Why had youth gone wrong – and from whose perspective? Colonial rule did not create youthful rebelliousness, but it did force it into new channels. For one thing, it presented a future sharply divided and tightly controlled within the colonial hierarchy of opportunity. While for some young men colonial rule offered an accelerated path to wealth and status, to others it seemed to deny a future altogether. Kikuyu *athomi* (readers) strove diligently to persuade their elders that their new skills and positions were legitimate, but the ill-educated sons of the land-poor or landless were not alone in fearing that they might never attain full adulthood.¹² Obedience and respect were pointless where they could gain no reward. This crisis of confidence in the promise of maturity manifested itself in a variety of ways. In Ghana, and doubtless elsewhere, rising alcoholism reflected what Akyeampong has called ‘the tenuousness of adulthood’.¹³ In South Africa, street gangs fought for honour in a fractured world where the realities of racial domination undermined the masculinity of men who were no longer masters in their own homes. Gangsters, both local and celluloid, became the role models for township youths. They were openly contemptuous of both employment and the law: the one was closed to them, the other was their enemy.¹⁴ Frustration with the present and fears for the future could lead the young to reject authority altogether, for if the official world harassed or excluded them perhaps they could imagine or make another for themselves.¹⁵

For the privileged few, enclosed within mission and school structures, it was control of the future, not its lack, that was at issue. At the root of much unrest in schools was the pupils’ demand that they be given a ‘white-collar’ education and treated with the respect due to future leaders. Moreover, schooling and literacy were giving them the skills and knowledge both to understand and to confront authority.¹⁶ Summers’s study offers an insight into the private worlds of meaning and action that schools as enclosed communities created, and suggests how disciplinary codes might be appropriated and used to express defiance and the desire for self-mastery. Like other elite schools, King’s College, Budo, offered a rigorous literary, rather than vocational, curriculum and tried to instil in its pupils a sense of citizenship and loyalty to the civilizing project of colonialism. However, it also embodied the essence of the British view of their relationship with the rulers of Buganda – indeed, the heir to the throne was himself a pupil – and it taught

¹² J. Lonsdale, ‘Listen while I read: the orality of Christian literacy in the young Kenyatta’s making of the Kikuyu’, in L. de la Gorgendiere (ed.), *Ethnicity in Africa: Roots, Meanings and Implications* (Edinburgh, 1996), 17–53; G. Kershaw, *Mau Mau From Below* (Oxford, 1997), ch. 7.

¹³ E. Akyeampong, *Drink, Power and Cultural Change* (Portsmouth NH, 1996), ch. 7. Akyeampong is referring to the post-Independence period, but drunkenness had been common before.

¹⁴ Iliffe, *Honour*, 301–5; C. Campbell, ‘Learning to kill? Masculinity, the family and violence in Natal’, *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 18 (1992), 614–28; Glaser, *Bo-Tsotsi*, 61–71.

¹⁵ See e.g. J. Seekings, *Heroes or Villains?* (Braamfontein, 1993), and T. Lodge and W. Nasson, *All, Here, and Now: Black Politics in South Africa in the 1980s* (London, 1992).

¹⁶ Summers, *Colonial Lessons*; J. Hyslop, *The Classroom Struggle* (Pietermaritzburg, 1999); D. Peterson, *Creative Writing* (Portsmouth NH, 2004), esp. ch. 6. Concerns over (professional) status also led African teachers, at least tacitly, to side with their pupils.

the successors of the court pages of the nineteenth century the disciplines and obligations of authority under colonial overrule. The challenge to authority at Budo in 1942 was thus a very serious one. It raised the question of to whom the school 'belonged' and where its pupils' and teachers' loyalties really lay. Protest at Budo blended the familiar structures and rituals of school authority – prefects, masters' meetings, school ceremonies – with the rawer ingredients of riot, arson and allegations of homosexuality to create something that was disturbingly different. Budo had apparently bred a culture of defiance: the instrument had turned in the hands of its makers.

MARKING MATURITY

But what – and who – was 'youth' in the colonial period? For 'youth' was acquiring a new definition and range of meanings, constructed along the axes of age and gender and shaped by changing ideas of what constituted maturity. Indeed, the 'problem' of youthful unrest was in part a problem about maturity, for colonial interventions had altered its boundaries and erased its markers. When and how did boys now become men and girls women?

The path to maturity had once followed the processes of social reproduction, leaving youth and adolescence as a transition between childhood and adulthood rather than as a period of time defined in years. The transition was experienced differently by men and women; and so was its reshaping. As Thomas reminds us, it was the onset of reproductive maturity, as much as marriage, that marked a sharp if sometimes contested divide between female child and adult. Thus 'over-aged spinsters' in Asante, for example, confounded both age and gender expectations.¹⁷ By contrast, adulthood for men emphasized the achievement of independence as household heads, a longer process, begun but not completed by initiation, in which marriage was only one stage and the aim a controlled and responsible masculinity.

Colonial authorities were at first willing to accept this gradational view of maturity. Legal officers, for example, were reluctant to commit themselves in such sensitive matters as the age of consent and majority where gender and age intersected.¹⁸ Missions, however, were more active in reshaping maturity within the framework of the church. Women were particularly affected, since their transition was often inscribed on the body and included initiations that missionaries saw as obscene in their physicality. Attempts to ban circumcision and to substitute Christian rites of passage removed some of the markers of maturity and left young women uncertain of their status. Reflecting back, a Kikuyu woman told Davison: 'Nowadays, you wouldn't know who is mature and who isn't'.¹⁹ Male maturity was reshaped by colonial demands for law and order and through education and the labour

¹⁷ L. Thomas, *Politics of the Womb* (Berkeley, 2003), 3–17; J. Allman, 'Rounding up spinsters: gender chaos and unmarried women in colonial Asante', in D. Hodgson and S. McCurdy (eds.), *'Wicked' Women and the Reconfiguration of Gender in Africa* (Portsmouth NH, 2001), 130–48.

¹⁸ T. Kanogo, *African Womanhood in Colonial Kenya, 1900–1950* (Oxford, 2005), 20–7, 144–5.

¹⁹ Thomas, *Politics of the Womb*, ch. 3; J. Davison, *Voices from Mutira* (Boulder, 1989), 201. For a similar reaction, see T. Ranger, 'Missionary adaptations of African religious institutions: the Masasi case', in T. Ranger and I. Kimambo (eds.), *The Historical Study*

process. 'Warrior' bands, militias and initiation groups, important spaces for the socialization and self-determination of young men and the proving of manhood, were disbanded or severely curtailed, though they continued to give trouble. From the 1920s, Maasai *murran* were hurried into premature retirement, to become adults before their time.²⁰ In general, 'youth' may have begun earlier and lasted longer during the colonial period. The disciplines of labour and learning also impinged on the process of coming of age. At first, opportunities for wage employment and the competition for labour enabled youths to escape from parental controls and to accumulate resources independently of their fathers. They made their own maturity through migration.²¹ Later, however, as opportunity narrowed, the young shared in the same experience of dispossession and dependency as their seniors. Child/youth labour was already important in the mines and towns and on the farms of Southern Africa from the turn of the century and, despite the fact that the legal age for labour registration in Kenya had been fixed at 15, at least 36,000 children over the age of 10 were at work in 1938. In some ways, their experience too was of premature adulthood, but without prospects.²²

Confusion over maturity emphasized gender and focused on marriage. That the image of youth became gendered is suggested by the fact that 'youths' usually seem to be male. Indeed, youth as a specific frame of reference may be of less relevance in the study of women's experience during colonialism than it is for men's. Partly this may derive from their different paths to maturity. The 'new masculinity', together with the telescoping of the process of male maturation, located maturity more firmly in marriage and increased the pressures on young women to conform. The discourse of respectability, family and marriage narrowed their options, and threatened to expose them as unruly simply because they aspired, or were forced, to be independent.²³ The transitional space of 'youth' was perhaps not something

of *African Religion* (Berkeley, 1972), 237. Ranger notes that although the adaptation of male initiation was relatively successful that of female initiation was not, 247.

²⁰ R. Waller, 'Disciplining youth in colonial Maasailand', paper presented at the ASA Conference, Boston, 2003. For *nyau* in Malawi and *asafo* in Ghana as examples, see I. Linden, 'The resistance of the Nyau societies to the Roman Catholic missions in colonial Malawi', in Ranger and Kimambo (eds.), *Historical Study*, 261–7; D. Fortescue, 'The Accra crowd, the Asafo and the opposition to the Municipal Corporations Ordinance', *Canadian Journal of African Studies*, 24 (1990), 348–75.

²¹ See e.g. E. Eldredge, *A South African Kingdom* (Cambridge, 1993), ch. 13; Carton, *Blood from Your Children*, 30–1, 86–7; L. Lindsay, 'Money, marriage and masculinity on the colonial Nigerian railway', in Lindsay and Miescher (eds.), *Men and Masculinities*, 140–1.

²² Harries, *Work, Culture and Identity*, 201–2; C. van Onselen, *Studies in the Social and Economic History of the Witwatersrand, 1886–1914*, 11 (Harlow, 1982), 17–19; B. Bozzoli, *Women of Phokeng* (Portsmouth NH, 1991), ch. 2; H. Bradford, *A Taste of Freedom* (New Haven, 1987), 38–9; A. Clayton and D. Savage, *Government and Labour in Kenya, 1895–1963* (London, 1974), 191–2; T. Kanogo, *Squatters and the Roots of Mau Mau* (London, 1987), 81–2. Van Onselen implies that children may have been less sexually threatening to white householders, as well as cheaper, than adults.

²³ E.g. Kanogo, *African Womanhood*; J. Allman and V. Tashjian, *I Will Not Eat Stone* (Portsmouth NH, 2000), chs. 4–5; D. Jeater, *Marriage, Perversion and Power* (Oxford, 1993); T. Barnes, 'We Women Worked So Hard' (Portsmouth NH, 1999), ch. 4; J. Parpart, "'Wicked women" and "respectable ladies": reconfiguring gender on the

to which they could legitimately lay claim – though some took it nonetheless. If adolescence was an elite category in the colonial era, as Parsons suggests, it was largely a male one.²⁴

Thomas's insight also helps to explain why transgressive behaviour by young women was construed so narrowly in terms of sex and marriage and so differently from that of men. Male deviants were stigmatized as idle, potentially violent and possibly criminal; their female counterparts were simply 'loose'. 'Girls behaving badly' in non-sexual ways and contexts seem largely invisible in the record.²⁵ As Fourchard shows, officials in post-war Lagos were certain that the risks run by girls and boys were of different sorts and led to different fates, and it was girls who bore the brunt of post-war legislation. Juvenile courts in Lagos spent more time dealing with young female hawkers, who were not criminals – indeed, they were an important part of the street trading networks that fed Nigerian cities – but were thought to be in moral danger, than with young male pickpockets and touts, who were both criminal and semi-destitute.²⁶ In South Africa, urban 'welfarists' thought that much urban dysfunction – disease, poverty, maladjustment and crime – sprang ultimately from unrestrained female sexuality: African parents agreed, and both sought ways of keeping the sexuality of unmarried girls safe within institutions that either substituted for or supported parental authority.²⁷ Addressing the sexuality of boys, however, seemed beyond the reach – or perhaps the imagination – of both state and family.²⁸

Young women, in fact, bore a double burden of expectation and censure. On the one hand, they and their procreative powers were central to the creation of the families whose existence supported civility and progress and maintained ethnicity; on the other, out of place and out of control, they were the most visible sign of social dislocation and the collapse of traditional structures of authority and obedience – 'gender chaos' as Allman aptly terms it.²⁹ Moreover, it was not only their elders who thought young women

Zambian Copperbelt, 1936–1964', in Hodgson and McCurdy, *'Wicked' Women*, 274–92. None of these studies present women as passive victims, however.

²⁴ T. Parsons, *Race, Resistance and the Boy Scout Movement in British Colonial Africa* (Athens OH, 2004), 22. Parsons's account indicates that youth group activity was aimed at boys not girls.

²⁵ In 1947, for example, schoolgirls at Dadaya Mission in Zimbabwe staged a boycott for which the ringleaders were flogged, but, as Barnes fears, this may simply become another 'eclipsed footnote' to a male narrative. She speculates that assertions of masculinity may have obscured women's actions. See Barnes, *'We Women Worked So Hard'*, 108, 135.

²⁶ Fourchard, 'Invention of juvenile delinquency'. In 1946, street hawking was proscribed for girls under 16.

²⁷ See e.g. C. Glaser, 'Managing the sexuality of urban youth: Johannesburg, 1920s–1960s', *International Journal of African Historical Studies*, 38 (2005), 301–27; S. Klausen, *Race, Maternity and the Politics of Birth Control in South Africa, 1910–1939* (New York, 2005); D. Gaitskell, "'Wailing for purity": prayer unions, African mothers and adolescent daughters, 1912–1940', in S. Marks and R. Rathbone (eds.), *Industrialisation and Social Change in South Africa* (London, 1982), 338–57.

²⁸ The idea of 'manliness' promoted by youth movements did, however, include sexual abstinence as well as respect. See Parsons, *Boy Scout Movement*, 17–21, 60–1.

²⁹ S. Marks, 'Patriotism, patriarchy and purity: Natal and the politics of Zulu ethnic consciousness', in L. Vail (ed.), *The Creation of Tribalism in Southern Africa* (London,

unruly, young men also accused them of being mercenary and behaved badly towards them when they could. Gendered expectations, competition over marriage and the violence of masculinity under threat might divide young people in town as much as age united them.³⁰

DEFINING DELINQUENCY

Until the 1940s, outside South Africa where urban controls developed much earlier, the definition of youth was still left largely in the hands of parents, missions and employers. However, partly guided by metropolitan sensitivities deriving from an earlier period of social welfare and reform and impelled by a belated realization that the conditions that had driven those reforms were now emerging in urban Africa, colonial governments eventually intervened to impose a new and legally defined age category of ‘juveniles’ that cut across the older boundaries between children and adults.³¹ Colonial courts had always drawn a distinction, however rough and ready, between adult and young offenders, but the expansion of child and youth welfare now forced governments to frame laws with specific, but varying, age limits, and to create or expand age-specific institutions to cope with the influx of juvenile offenders that the enforcement of such laws produced.

Fourchard’s study of the belated ‘discovery’ of juvenile delinquency in Lagos during the Second World War shows how and why this was done. Discovery was largely a matter of visibility – of what was being looked for and why. When officials began to look for minors to protect and youth offenders to reform they found them. Like the poor, they had been there all along, but hitherto unremarked: now, their presence on the streets made urban public space, reserved for settled working families, dangerous and disordered in colonial eyes.³² Yet established urbanites, who were better able to draw distinctions within the informal economy between who was respectable and who was not and between acceptable and unacceptable uses of public space, protested that the law targeted the wrong people. They wanted pickpockets not hawkers put away, and complained that respectable girls were being intimately examined and placed in hostels with real delinquents.

1989), 225–30; Allman, ‘Rounding up spinsters’. Young women themselves, however, did not necessarily see their lives in town as disordered; nor were all of them disreputable – White, *Comforts of Home*; B. Frederiksen, ‘African women and their colonisation of Nairobi’, *Azania*, 36–7 (2001–2), 223–34.

³⁰ E. Akyeampong, “‘Wo pe tam, won pe ba” (“You like cloth but you don’t want children”): urbanization, individualism and gender relations in colonial Ghana c1900–1939’, in D. Anderson and R. Rathbone (eds.), *Africa’s Urban Past* (Oxford, 2000), 222–34; G. Kynoch, “‘A man among men”: gender, identity and power in South Africa’s Marashea gangs’, *Gender and History*, 13 (2001), 249–72. Similar attitudes are revealed in popular fiction: examples in S. Newell (ed.), *African Popular Fiction* (London, 2002).

³¹ For background, see J. Lewis, *Empire State-Building* (Oxford, 2000). Lewis notes the connection between the discovery of urban poverty in Africa and its re-discovery in the metropole during the Second World War on pp.68–79.

³² For a recent review of the literature on demarcating urban space, see A. Burton, *African Underclass: Urbanisation, Crime and Colonial Order in Dar-es-Salaam* (Oxford, 2005).

Once alerted, the authorities looked for causes, which they found, predictably, in the erosion of family life and discipline in a rapidly growing city of immigrant strangers; they also proposed remedies, which involved creating categories of delinquents and juveniles 'at risk', placing legal restraints on their activities, taking them off the streets and into hostels or reformatories where they might be better supervised and disciplined or deporting them to their rural homes.³³ Yet the problem colonial administrations faced was a double one: first the lack of opportunity and employment in the country and then its consequences in town.³⁴

Colonial authorities were as out of their depth in dealing with juvenile crime as they were with the transgressions of privileged adolescents. Their understanding of youth did not stretch far enough to encompass its life on the streets.³⁵ Juveniles might be operating on the margins of colonial order from necessity, not choice. For 'jaguda-boys' and their like, petty crime was a matter of survival, and in certain situations violence might be functional for the young. Extending the net of the law, though it certainly created a 'crime wave' in the courts,³⁶ did not address the causes of disorder; nor would reformatories transform young offenders into young citizens. Attempts to close the niches in the informal street economy occupied by those apparently at risk merely made their life more precarious. The authorities lacked the resources and the knowledge to make control effective. Pickpockets operated openly; prostitution networks that brought under-age girls to town with the promise of domestic work and guardianship were too well organized to break up; and young migrants relied on anonymity to return to town as fast as they were put out, for they had nowhere else to go.

Defining youth by age in this way may not have solved 'the problem', but it did provide an official focus for public concern and also one frame of reference for youthful self-definition. 'Juvenile' and 'delinquent' came to be almost synonymous, perhaps for three related reasons. First, it proved difficult in practice to separate the ideals of protection and rehabilitation from the reality of confinement.³⁷ Second, 'juvenile' was as much a moral as an

³³ Repatriation orders were instituted during the war, though mechanisms for removing 'undesirables' were already in place under existing ordinances. As elsewhere, they were draconian but ineffective in reducing the numbers – see Burton (ed.), *African Underclass*, ch. 12, and S. Heap, "'Jaguda Boys': pickpocketing in Ibadan, 1930–1960', *Urban History*, 24 (1997), 336–9. South African pass laws had similar aims, but probably increased rather than decreased the scale of the problem by making it impossible for those without papers to get legal employment. See Glaser, *Bo-Tsotsi*, 38–41, 101.

³⁴ Nigeria was unusual in its continuing concentration on urban social welfare; other colonies shifted their attention to rural community development. See J. Iliffe, *The African Poor* (Cambridge, 1987), 187, 200–6.

³⁵ The same might be said of historians. Existing colonial urban studies outside South Africa tell us little about youth crime (as opposed to the criminalization of youth activities). However, the study of court, police and prison records has perhaps now reached the point where young criminals can be looked for and studied apart from 'criminal youth'.

³⁶ There were about thirty juvenile convictions a year in Nigerian courts in the late 1920s: in the mid-1940s the figure was 845. By late 1949, Ibadan courts were dealing with twenty cases a day according to Heap, "'Jaguda Boys'", 341.

³⁷ The elision, perhaps best captured by the American term 'correction', appears in the earliest colonial reformatories in South Africa and Senegal, both of which arose from a need to control those set adrift by conquest or emancipation. See L. Chisholm, 'The

age-determined category. The concern with juvenile delinquency emerged in part from a growing sense of 'moral panic' that paralleled the 'erosion scare' that swept the Empire at the same time.³⁸ Youth behaviour was not only a focus of specific concern in itself but also an issue that drew on and expressed a range of much wider and less clearly articulated anxieties about the state of colonial society. Even though some of their actions were clearly criminal, the putatively delinquent status of juveniles arose primarily from their position as subjects in a wider debate about the norms and expectations of maturity and about behaviours and attitudes thought (by their seniors) to be appropriate to the young. Young men and women, out of defiance or necessity, appeared to be challenging these assumptions and thus, by extension, the value systems that underpinned them. Negative images of 'modern' youth – 'wicked women', loafers, hooligans, 'cowboys' and gangsters – thus emerged both as part of the apparatus of late colonial social control and of a defensive public reaction to the pressures of progress.

The third reason lies in the connection between youth, poverty and idleness. Here two discourses intersected: one about wealth and poverty, the other about industry and idleness. Clearly not all juveniles were poor or destitute – but some were, especially in towns; and poverty had moral as well as material connotations. Prosperity came from careful and laborious husbandry and was a sign of virtue: poverty was its opposite. As Iliffe has shown, the nature of poverty changed during the colonial era, with unemployment becoming a major factor, especially in towns. While growing structural inequality was undermining the connection between industry and uplift for the poor, and perhaps making them both more visible and more resentful, it had not yet forced their betters to re-evaluate their attitudes towards poverty.³⁹ At the same time, both fathers and colonial officials were determined that the young should be working – either in school or elsewhere – not 'loafing'. Pressure began early in the countryside, but shifted to town and gained definition with the emphasis on the creation of a stable working class, which Cooper sees as a major concern of the late colonial 'modernising state'.⁴⁰ Unemployment, now definable and visible, threatened this order. Juveniles, able-bodied but idle, were especially suspect in the eyes of the virtuous, their poverty wilful and morally threatening, their lack of employment a choice rather than a consequence.

pedagogy of Porter: the origins of the reformatory in the Cape Colony, 1882–1910', *Journal of African History*, 27 (1986), 481–95; I. Thioub, 'Juvenile marginality and incarceration during the colonial period', in F. Bernault (ed.), *A History of Prison and Confinement in Africa* (Portsmouth NH, 2003), 79–95.

³⁸ K. Thompson, *Moral Panics* (London, 1998); D. Anderson, 'Depression, dust bowl, demography and drought: the colonial state and soil conservation in East Africa in the 1930s', *African Affairs*, 83 (1984), 321–43. Both erosion and delinquency, as newly discovered 'problems', shared a certain blindness to the past, created climates of anxious inquiry and moral questioning, fostered a determination to intervene through legislation and were part of an attempt by the Colonial Office to manage its territories in a more scientific and centralized manner.

³⁹ Iliffe, *African Poor*, esp. chs. 10–11. I am indebted to John Lonsdale for ideas about the moral dimension of poverty.

⁴⁰ F. Cooper, *Decolonization and African Society* (Cambridge, 1996), esp. Part III.

The construction of delinquency was as much part of an African debate about maturation and authority into which officials inserted themselves, often to little effect, as it was a colonial debate about control and criminality imposed on Africans. Both Summers and Fourchard suggest this wider discourse. Unrest at Budo came at a particularly sensitive moment, just as a new and youthful, but still subordinate ruler was about to be transferred from classroom to palace. Summers argues that the disturbances ushered in a new, more public and more confrontational political debate in Buganda, which would replace an older discourse of patronage, respect, hierarchy and negotiation that had avoided the awkward question of who exercised power in the kingdom and on what terms. Budo had played an important part in that older discourse; it might now have a place in the new. Beneath the concern with restoring discipline, there was a strong undercurrent of tension between political generations. Again, the relationship between public concern and official action in Lagos was not a simple matter of initiative and response. Lagos newspapers and urban organizations had complained about youth on the streets for years before welfare-minded officials took notice. Moreover, while there was general agreement that undisciplined youth posed a problem, there may have been far less over this situation's causes and remedies. While negative stereotypes were broadly shared, we cannot be certain that they carried the same meanings for all the participants in the debate.

RE-THINKING YOUTH

The treatment of youth and its discontents in these papers suggests that we still know too little about how disaffected youth understood their various predicaments, what young people wanted and why they acted as they did. How might this be remedied? We might begin by recognizing that youthful defiance was in part an acknowledgment that elders continued to hold most of the cards throughout the colonial period. They controlled marriage, access to land and livestock, education, employment, and also the social knowledge that the young would need to survive and prosper. They 'made custom' in the courts, instilled discipline in the schools, shaped 'respectability' and controlled the debate about youth. Only the most alienated youth were beyond their reach. The dominance of age also has shaped our own historical understanding. Just as women once seemed invisible in the record, except as objects of male concern, condemnation and action, so much of what we know of youthful rebellion during the colonial period comes from the writings of those who sought to reprove and check it.

We might escape from the constraints of the dominant colonial discourse of age, in which youth is inevitably marginalized, stereotyped and constructed from outside, by 'giving the young some room to dance', understanding youth in its own terms rather than in the terms of its critics. One obvious starting point is within the field of leisure.⁴¹ Viewing youth 'at

⁴¹ From the rich literature, not necessarily focused on the young, see especially: P. Martin, *Leisure and Society in Colonial Brazzaville* (Cambridge, 1995); articles in E. Akyeampong and C. Ambler (eds.), 'Leisure in African society', Special Issue, *International Journal of African Historical Studies*, 35 (2002); M. Moorman, 'Dueling bands and good girls: gender, music and nation in Luanda's *musseques*, 1961-1974', *International Journal of African Historical Studies*, 37 (2004), 255-88; L. Fair, *Pastimes*

play' emphasizes the everyday ways in which young people created a space for themselves and reproduced their culture rather than highlighting merely the moments of confrontation in which they mobilized in opposition or resistance to others – though the two are not mutually exclusive. Through music and dance, dress, sport, alcohol and the cinema, on the street and in the clubs, the young sought to fashion themselves, to create meaning, community and identity.⁴²

Recreation, dance and dress present the public and collective face of youth; autobiography provides insights into the more private areas of individual self-fashioning. Early autobiographies often suffer from the flattening effects of the models they followed and the expectations of their editors and audiences, though Clements Kadalie, for example, created himself in print as the epitome of the youthful self-confidence that so irritated authorities.⁴³ Later autobiographies are more immediately revealing, and they can usefully be supplemented by the kinds of co-operative projects that have already made other overlooked experiences available.⁴⁴

Another place to look for the voices of youth is in nationalism and liberation. The salience of generational tensions and youth involvement in these movements is apparent and need not be repeated here. However, while it may be obvious what the young were against, it is much less clear what they were for. Two comments may be apposite here. The boundary between politics and play could be very porous. Alcohol and youth played a key part in the 1948 Accra Riots which drew their inspiration more from carnival than from communism but nonetheless marked a significant change in the pattern of Gold Coast politics.⁴⁵ Allman's and Geiger's studies of nationalist mobilization in the 1950s convey a vivid sense that politics could be fun; and, for some, even street violence could be 'a glorious game'.⁴⁶ By contrast, the significance of adolescent defiance could be magnified by nervous authorities. The 'Nazi Party' that so shocked investigators at Budo went in for

and Politics (Athens OH, 2001); J. Burns, *Flickering Shadows: Cinema and Identity in Colonial Zimbabwe* (Athens OH, 2002); Akyeampong, *Drink, Power and Cultural Change*.

⁴² The 'fantasy space' opened up by colonial cinema and the cultural space of 'otherwise' were important arenas for self-fashioning – see e.g. C. Ambler, 'Popular films and colonial audiences: the movies in Northern Rhodesia', *American Historical Review*, 106 (2001), 81–105; idem, 'Mass media and leisure in Africa', in Akyeampong and Ambler (eds.), 'Leisure in African society', 125–9; Moorman, 'Dueling bands', 262–3. For a modern example of the appropriation of film narratives and types by dissident youth, see Richards, *Fighting for the Rain Forest*, 107–11.

⁴³ C. Kadalie, *My Life and the ICU* (London, 1970), chs. 1–2.

⁴⁴ E.g. E. Mphahlele, *Down Second Avenue* (London, 1959). See also S. Miescher, 'The life histories of Boakye Yiadom', in L. White, S. Miescher and D. Cohen (eds.), *African Words, African Voices* (Bloomington, 2001), 162–93. Bozzoli, *Women of Phokeng*, and S. Geiger, *TANU Women* (Portsmouth NH, 1997), provide models for interactive biography. Multigenerational biographies may be especially useful – e.g. R. Werbner, *Tears of the Dead* (Edinburgh, 1991).

⁴⁵ Akyeampong, *Drink, Power and Cultural Change*, 120–4. Also see comments on defending the right to recreation in Akyeampong and Ambler (eds.), 'Leisure in African society', 9.

⁴⁶ J. Allman, 'The youngmen and the porcupine: class, nationalism and Asante's struggle for self-determination, 1954–1957', *Journal of African History*, 31 (1990), 263–79; Geiger, *TANU Women*; Seekings, *Heroes or Villains?* 63.

nothing more sinister than 'boxing and guitar playing ... beer-drinking, smoking, defiance of authority and bravado'.⁴⁷ Moreover, Seekings's study of rebellious youth in the South African townships of the 70s and 80s suggests that activism brought together a very disparate 'crowd'. Some were political, but others were looters and thrill-seekers; some were students, some not; but all were young people looking for confrontation, reputation and self-esteem.⁴⁸ It was often officialdom, and sometimes history, rather than youth itself, that imposed uniformity, coherence and the narrative of 'resistance' on their actions.⁴⁹

But youths were not just out for fun; some also wanted power and authority and were willing to take it by force.⁵⁰ Underlying much rebelliousness is the sense of betrayal, by both seniors and circumstances. The rebels of Zululand in the 1900s, the *anake a forty* in post-war Nairobi and the rioters of Soweto were all disillusioned young people angry that adult society would neither provide for nor protect them; nor give them guidance. Here, defiance arose from the frustrations of a compromised maturity, but was a reflection of a greater loss: that of self-mastery in household and community.⁵¹ If moral authority had been dissolved, as much by greedy patriarchs as by colonial rulers, how might it be regained except through the exertions of youth? In this view, it was adults, not the young, who were delinquent. We might see youthful rebellion as a struggle for renewal, almost a secular revival. The often rather puritan vision of the future espoused by uniformed party youth contained within it not only a challenge to the present authority of adults but also the hope of a return to order and virtue and of the achievement of self-mastery through independence. While this vision might be captured for a time by leaders struggling to control and channel youthful enthusiasm in what they saw as the wider public interest,⁵² it was not always congruent with the necessary compromises of nation-building, and the questions that it raised were not necessarily answered by victory at the polls or in the bush. 'Hooliganism' did not end with independence. New African rulers have been as contemptuous of urban 'undesirables' as their colonial predecessors – and even more determined to put them to work – while the young have continued to search both for civic renewal and for ways of imposing order.⁵³

We might next reinsert youth into the mainstream by considering complementarity across generations rather than merely opposition between

⁴⁷ Summers, 'Authority and alienation'.

⁴⁸ Seekings, *Heroes or Villains*, ch. 3. Unfortunately, there are relatively few similar anatomies of the youthful 'crowd' elsewhere.

⁴⁹ See F. Cooper, 'Conflict and connection: rethinking colonial African history', *American Historical Review*, 99 (1994), 1516–45.

⁵⁰ For one example, see N. Kriger, *Zimbabwe's Guerrilla War* (Cambridge, 1992), ch. 5.

⁵¹ J. Lonsdale, 'The moral economy of Mau Mau', in J. Lonsdale and B. Berman, *Unhappy Valley* (London, 1992), ch. 12.

⁵² Keeping pace with the radical demands of youth worried the ANC leadership and may also have been a problem elsewhere – Lodge and Nasson, *Black Politics in South Africa*, 188.

⁵³ E.g. T. Burgess, 'Cinema, bell bottoms and miniskirts: struggles over youth and citizenship in revolutionary Zanzibar', *International Journal of African Historical Studies*, 35 (2002), 287–313; Burton, *African Underclass*, conclusion; Fourchard, 'Invention of juvenile delinquency'. Vigilantism may be one expression, youth wingers as social disciplinarians another.

them, thus avoiding both the polarizing rhetoric of delinquency and the somewhat structuralist framing of generational tension. Laying claim to masculinity linked younger and older men together; negotiating respectability did the same for women. Generational relations might be quite fluid and complex. Some leisure activities transcended generation and their organization provided a frame for interaction. Football drew large crowds and provided young men with a space to let off steam and gain reputation and older men with opportunities to act as mentors and patrons. As Fair observes, football clubs in Zanzibar reinforced male networks, emphasized community and provided a space for boys to grow into men.⁵⁴ *Beni* dance teams offered similar opportunities,⁵⁵ so too did music. Learning to play in Luanda was an 'intergenerational male experience'. *Taarab* in Zanzibar, however, favoured women and, although the band members themselves may have been older, their songs spoke to the concerns of young people as well and created a community of critique. Clubs and music also provided a space within which gender and class relations could be negotiated.⁵⁶ Drinking, by contrast, appears to have been a more divisive activity, marked by age, status and gender, as well as being an obvious target of colonial regulation.⁵⁷

We might finally compare the different experiences of youth. Three fields of comparison suggest themselves: between past and present, between town and country and between races. Both the stereotypes and the realities of rebellious youth spanned all three.

Images of youth were as potent in dreams of a stable past as they were in nightmares of a disordered present. Officials and elders tended to agree that discipline had been stronger – if harsher – before, and young people under better control when they were free of modern temptations.⁵⁸ But it was a suitably edited past that was being rehearsed here. Sons had not always been obedient nor daughters submissive. Maasai *murran* had threatened their elders and Anlo girls had even married gods in order to choose their own human partners. Iliffe suggests that one reason why youth culture became deviant was that adult culture became respectable.⁵⁹ Studies such as Carton's lay down a useful baseline for conflict in the colonial period but they deal with societies already being reshaped by incorporation into a colonial world. It is worth probing backwards in time to see whether and how youthful defiance has changed over the long term. In parts of East Africa the succession of generations may have been more jagged and contested in the past than the ethnographic models suggest. Traditions that emphasize

⁵⁴ Martin, *Leisure and Society*, ch. 4; Fair, *Pastimes and Politics*, ch. 5.

⁵⁵ T. Ranger, *Dance and Society in Eastern Africa* (London, 1975). Retired migrants sponsored dance teams in the lakeshore villages of Northern Malawi.

⁵⁶ Moorman, 'Dueling bands', 275; Fair, *Pastimes and Politics*, ch. 4. Both authors note connections between football and music – Moorman, 'Dueling bands', 274; Fair, *Pastimes and Politics*, 262–3.

⁵⁷ J. Willis, *Potent Brews* (Oxford, 2002), chs. 6–7; Akyeamong, *Drink, Power and Cultural Change*, 53–8.

⁵⁸ M. Chanock, *Law, Custom and Social Order* (Cambridge, 1985), 125–36.

⁵⁹ R. Waller, 'Waving or drowning? Age organisation in the long term', paper presented to the conference on Precolonial African History in a Postcolonial Age, Madison, 2005; S. Greene, *Gender, Ethnicity and Social Change on the Upper Slave Coast* (Portsmouth NH, 1996), ch. 3; Iliffe, *Honour*, 301.

continuity may not only conceal conflict and rebellion but also deny both the legitimacy of any youthful critique of gerontocracy and the existence of alternative theories of power.⁶⁰ Looking to the past also reminds us that images of defiance have had their own generations of change.⁶¹

Constructions of delinquency also drew on a presumed and morally weighted dichotomy between town and country.⁶² Yet this division oversimplified reality. Much recent work has concentrated on delinquency in colonial towns, but there were idle and threatening youths in the countryside well before they appeared on the street corners and in the imagination of respectable urbanites. The colonial stereotype of the Maasai *murrān* – ‘swaggering’, belligerent, beyond control and up to no good – could be made to fit the urban ‘spiv’, and the use of language and dress codes to express solidarity and defiance was not confined to town.⁶³ Moreover, the most determined disturbers of the early colonial peace were young warriors with shields and spears, however doomed their cause, not young pickpockets and prostitutes. Yet these warrior bands are not usually understood as gangs, despite similarities between them and their urban counterparts.⁶⁴ Even later, colonial governments probably had more to fear from young guerrillas in the bush than from gangsters on street corners.⁶⁵

Rebelliousness linked town and country. The ‘youth problem’ began at home, but was exported to town.⁶⁶ Young Zulu who sought refuge in town after the Bambatha Rebellion that they had done much to provoke were not ‘newcomers to the world of insubordination’. They were followed by casualties of the impact of migrancy on rural communities. Many Sotho beer brewers were either wives who moved in search of absent husbands or unmarried women abandoned by young male migrants unable to afford marriage. Young Haya women, however, came to town to make money, partly to relieve the indebtedness of rural households. As Carton suggests, rural youth were squeezed between two rival patriarchies and in flight from both.⁶⁷ The mobility of youth meant that a fully urbanized youth culture took

⁶⁰ Waller, ‘Waving or drowning’. See also J. Lonsdale, ‘Contests of time: Kikuyu historiography, old and new’, in A. Harneit-Sievers (ed.), *A Place in the World* (Leiden, 2002), 202–54.

⁶¹ Hodgson and McCurdy, arguing for a ‘chronology of uncontrollability’, note that varieties of ‘wickedness’ are historically specific – Hodgson and McCurdy, *‘Wicked’ Women*, 10–14.

⁶² In Kenya, the dichotomy took on a distinctly ‘anti-urban’ bias that survived and became part of the self-image of delinquency, as suggested by the dystopic view of town in the picaresque novels of Meja Mwangi and Mwangi Ruheni. See also J. Lonsdale, ‘Town life in colonial Kenya’, *Azania*, 36–7 (2001–2), 207–22.

⁶³ Waller, ‘Disciplining youth’; M. J. Hay, ‘Changes in clothing and struggles over identity in colonial Western Kenya’, in J. Allman (ed.), *Fashioning Africa: Power and the Politics of Dress* (Bloomington, 2004), 75–7.

⁶⁴ But see P. Spencer, *The Samburu* (London, 1965), ch. 5, and Waller, ‘Disciplining youth’. For an example that links migrant and rural experiences, see W. Beinart, ‘The origins of the *Indlavini*’, *African Studies*, 50 (1991), 103–28.

⁶⁵ My thanks to Tim Parsons for reminding me of this.

⁶⁶ The forcible re-export of problem youth thus seemed an obvious solution to urban authorities, both colonial and post-colonial.

⁶⁷ Carton, *Blood from Your Children*, 134–7; P. Bonner, ‘Desirable or undesirable Basotho women? Liquor, prostitution and the migration of Basotho women to the Rand,

time to emerge in the newer colonial towns, even if it was already present in older centres. Until the 1940s, at least, urban youth were straddlers of a sort, suspended awkwardly between life in town and roots in the country. The Regiment of the Hills, whose criminality was shaped by the peri-urban geography of the early Rand, were ‘essentially rural people’, adapting to the outlaw possibilities of town.⁶⁸ Forty years later, it was still the vibrant mix of migrant and town-bred youth that formed a crucial ingredient in the post-war urban crucible.⁶⁹ The struggle of urbanized youth to find a place for itself, partly in play and partly in politics, gave the post-war towns much of their volatility. It may have been then that youth culture crystallized.⁷⁰

In South Africa, gender and age anxieties sometimes spanned the racial divide. In inter-war Johannesburg, young female migrants, both black and white, threatened to transgress patriarchal and sexual norms and were believed to require constraint. Moreover, there were white gangs in the 1950s, as threatening if not as predatory as their black counterparts.⁷¹ However, if youthful transgression might transcend race, it did not escape racial categorization. South Africa has white teenagers but black youth, the former a neutral term, the latter laden with meaning. As Chisholm points out, while black girls were punished for transgressing social norms in general, white girls were punished for betraying the standards of white society in particular. White gangsters were viewed in a similar way.⁷² Further north, settler societies were perhaps too small and too new for white delinquency to take root. Yet in Kenya, for example, the future of local youth did become an issue, as concern shifted from whether children could survive the tropics to what prospects they might have in a narrowly based and relatively inelastic economy where race and class expectations determined the nature of employment.⁷³

The sheer variety of youthful experience in the colonial period, the heterogeneity of ‘youth’ itself and the complex interplay of image and reality make it hard either to determine how ‘rebellious’, ‘delinquent’ or alienated youth actually was or to be certain of how to interpret their actions. But defining defiance is probably less important than recognizing the multiplicity of its meanings and contexts, and listening to what young people were saying about how they saw the colonial world.

1920–1945’, in C. Walker (ed.), *Women and Gender in Southern Africa to 1945* (Cape Town, 1990), 221–50; White, *Comforts of Home*, 110–19.

⁶⁸ Van Onselen, *Social and Economic History of the Witwatersrand*, II, 193–4. Rurally oriented *amalaita* gangs were not displaced by urban *tsotsis* until the 1930s.

⁶⁹ F. Cooper, *Africa since 1940* (Cambridge, 2002), 34–5.

⁷⁰ This point is best pursued within the periodization of urban culture generally – see Lonsdale, ‘Town life’, 220–2.

⁷¹ J. Hyslop, ‘White working class women and the invention of apartheid: “purified” Afrikaner nationalist agitation for legislation against “mixed” marriages’, *Journal of African History*, 36 (1995), 57–81; K. Mooney, ‘Ducktails, flick-knives and pugnacity: subcultural and hegemonic masculinities in South Africa, 1948–1960’, *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 24 (1998), 753–74.

⁷² Seekings, *Heroes or Villains?* xii; L. Chisholm, ‘Gender and deviance in South African industrial schools and reformatories for girls, 1911–1934’, in Walker (ed.), *Women and Gender*, 306.

⁷³ The topic has received little attention, but see D. Kennedy, *Islands of White* (Durham, 1987).