

Descartes and the Ingenium: The Embodied Soul in Cartesianism.

Ed. Raphaële Garrod and Alexander Marr.

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"In period terms, the *ingenium* was one's individual, inborn nature, that is, the temperamental and cognitive specificities of one's *embodied* mind" (1). The term expresses a Renaissance equation of natural individuality with the "lineaments" (195) of embodied cognition. The combination of Descartes and *ingenium* is not arbitrary. This volume poses the central importance of *ingenium* and the "corporeal imagination" (3) for discovery and invention, as a truer alternative to supposed Cartesian dualism. Meanwhile, Raphaële Garrod maintains that this reconsideration of Descartes points toward a reassessment of the *âge classique* as an age of imaginative ingenuity rather than universally shared reason. The persuasive angle, variety of topics broached, and striking intellectual diversity of contributors make this volume a new starting point for future study of Descartes.

The volume's contributions explore what ingenious cognition looks like, how *ingenium* could be trained, and the implications of embodied, hence individualized, cognition for the "human variety" (158) of minds and Descartes's "anthropology" of souls (109). Garrod has grouped the contributions in two: focused studies of ingenuity in particular aspects of Descartes' work (in math, medicine, method, morals, etc.), and contextual histories of ingenuity that situate Descartes in older Scholastic and pedagogical traditions. This organization allows for an unusual diversity in contributors' methods, aims, and uses of evidence: the first half of the volume has a more philosophical flavor, while the second is more historical, and contributors across the volume seem eager to go beyond traditional accounts. The so-called *Rules for the Direction of the Mind*—which Richard Oosterhoff reads as Descartes's effort to bring mathematics to bear on a longstanding tradition of treatises for training the *ingenium* (182)—figures prominently in both divisions.

One philosopher, quoted as a chapter epigraph, declared that "what the *ingenium* is, and what it consists of, is as obscure as it is clear that it exists" (139). This continues to be true here: accounts of the term have a family resemblance but do not coincide. For instance, *ingenium* as the "basic unity of application, reflection and invention" (25) leads Denis Kambouchner to associate the term with rhetorical *industria*; David Rabouin, meanwhile, shows *ingenium* at work in the mathematics of the *Rules* as "figurative imagination" (65). An outstanding contribution (bearing the epigraph in question) is Igor Agostini's history of *ingenium*, which helpfully delineates the Scholastic descent of the term's four meanings: as "inborn nature," as "capacity of the soul to discover," imagine, and remember (of rhetorical, not Scholastic descent); as "rational faculty"; and as differentiator between individuals (142).

The mix of scholarship from anglophone and francophone communities showcases the intellectual thickness of Descartes's writings, which respond well to careful reading

of various types, from the technical-philosophical to the erudite-historical. I wanted more direct confrontation of these approaches. How does Oosterhoff's account of "method" as an outgrowth of Jesuit pedagogy compare with Kamboucher's emphasis on Cicero? How does Roger Ariew's claim that Descartes ultimately offers a "logic" (itself seemingly consistent with a Jesuit view that mathematics derives its soundness from logic) sit with Rabouin's account of imaginative mathematical practice? How does Garrod's emphasis on Descartes's literary decorum relate to Dennis Sepper's call to study Descartes's "psychological anthropology," and how does it sit with widespread emphasis, in the first half of the volume, on technical interpretation?

The contributors may agree on the importance and, broadly, the character of *ingenium* for Descartes; they do not seem to agree on how to read him. Garrod's culminating contribution about the *politesse de l'esprit*—*esprit* was the French translation of *ingenium*—arranges for this confrontation, arguing that Descartes's views on *ingenium* shaped his writing.

The realization that politeness is "recognition of the diversity of human wits" and that one's own *ingenium* gives rise to a "singular cognitive style" (187, italics in original) might lead to dissimulation as a kind of ingenious condescension. Instead, Garrod argues, Descartes looks to politeness as the political prerequisite of an intellectual community characterized by natural difference rather than universally shared reason (200). Garrod's own *politesse* is on display in her deft treatment of other contributions: it is clear enough that she has thought through the contributions' coherence.

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John Fletcher's Rome: Questioning the Classics. Domenico Lovascio.

The Revels Plays Companion Library. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2022.
xviii + 232 pp. £85.

The False One. Domenico Lovascio.

The Revels Plays Companion Library. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2022.
xxx + 248 pp. £80.

Published in the newer Revels Plays Companion Library series that complements the meticulously edited Revels plays scholars have relied on for decades, Domenico Lovascio's *John Fletcher's Rome: Questioning the Classics* is even more closely tied than most to the Revels project of expanding the parameters of Jacobean and Caroline drama: his monograph on Fletcher's Roman plays has just appeared in tandem with his superb Revels edition of Fletcher and Massinger's *The False One*, which promises to spur renewed interest in a playwright once considered Shakespeare's and Jonson's near equal. Fletcher's classicism, in contrast with that of the other titans of the