

Maritime Rivalry, Political Intervention and the Race to Antarctica: US–Chilean Relations, 1939–1949

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Abstract. Throughout the nineteenth century, the United States and Chile competed for dominance in the Pacific, and their maritime rivalry reemerged in the race to Antarctica during the 1940s. The US Navy was able to circumnavigate the white continent, for the first time ever, while Chile's once great navy no longer posed a threat even to its neighbours. The Chilean government expressed concern about the scope of US exploration since the Antarctic always had been an essential component of its maritime policy with national security ramifications. President Gabriel González Videla seized upon Washington's unsuccessful attempts to determine the legal fate of the Antarctic to gain acceptance for a Chilean proposal that avoided the need to renounce sovereignty claims. In doing so, he secured essentially maritime objectives by diplomatic means. This success was more profound than widely appreciated since it came at a time when US intervention in Chile's domestic affairs had reached an unprecedented level.

Introduction

The limited historiography of relations between the United States and Chile corresponds to the distance, both geographical and cultural, between them as well as to the absence of overt conflict. US historians have tended to address specific incidents such as the *Baltimore* affair or Chile's neutrality during the First World War. They have fairly portrayed it as a reluctant partner bent on shirking the benefits of a closer alliance with the United States. Despite the efforts of Vera Micheles Dean and Erna Ferguson, for example,¹ Anglo–American historiography reinforces

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¹ Erna Ferguson, *Chile* (New York, 1943); Vera Micheles Dean, *Latin America and the War* (London, 1942). The author wishes to thank Dr María Consuelo León Wöppke of the University of Playa Ancha for inviting him to participate in a research grant from the Antarctic Institute (INACH) of the Chilean Foreign Affairs Ministry. This article adopts much of its theoretical framework from her unpublished dissertation, 'US–Chilean Relations in the Pacific Basin Context', Southern Illinois University at Carbondale, 1995.

generalisations that neglect the numerous characteristics that distinguish Chile from its neighbours.²

Many US specialists in Latin America have taken for granted the right and duty of their country to lead the region.³ Ambassador Claude Bowers unmistakably fell into this category during his lengthy service in Chile, which spanned the period under analysis.⁴ Works by Federico G. Gil and Frederick B. Pike are understandably considered classics, given their scope and documentation, but they refrain from presenting diplomatic affairs against the dynamic maritime background.⁵ Robert Burr applies a more revealing balance-of-power approach to Chile and its foreign relations.⁶ This article carries his method further by applying it to a pivotal decade in which the global scenario brought the United States and Chile into renewed competition, now over a polar region that, in the latter's perspective, extended to Latin America.

US exploration of the Antarctic increased steeply in 1939 as the threat of war in Europe heightened the interest of many powers, including Germany and to some extent Japan, in the continent's unexploited minerals and fissionable materials. The press accurately portrayed the United States as seeking to lead this race for uranium, the existence of which, although unsubstantiated, was one of the leading military factors that would motivate exploration during this period – as well as cold weather training opportunities and the desire to establish an alternate

² Jules R. Benjamin, 'The Framework of the US Relations with Latin America in the Twentieth Century', *Diplomatic History*, vol. 11, no. 2 (Spring 1987); Edwin Liewen, *US Policy in Latin America* (New York, 1965); Federico G. Gil, *Latin American–United States Relations* (New York, 1971); J. Lloyd Meacham, *The US and the Inter-American Security, 1889–1960* (Austin, 1967). See also Howard T. Pittman, 'From O'Higgins to Pinochet: Applied Geopolitics in Chile', in Philip Kelly and Jack Child (eds.), *Geopolitics of the Southern Cone and Antarctica* (Boulder, 1988), p. 173.

³ Spruille Braden, *Diplomats and Demagogues: The Memoirs of Spruille Braden* (New York, 1971); Adolf A. Berle, *Latin America: Diplomacy and Reality* (New York, 1962).

⁴ Claude G. Bowers, *Chile Through Embassy Windows: 1939–1953* (New York, 1958).

⁵ Federico G. Gil, *The Political System of Chile* (Boston, 1966); Frederick B. Pike, *Chile and the United States, 1880–1962* (Notre Dame, 1963); Frederick B. Pike, 'Our Unlikely Friends in Latin America: The Example of Chilean Rightists', *The Centennial Review* vol. 6, no. 3 (Summer 1962), pp. 358–72; Emilio Meneses Cuifardi, *El factor naval en las relaciones entre Chile y los Estados Unidos: 1881–1951* (Santiago, 1989); Philip Somerwell, 'Naval Affairs in Chilean Politics, 1910–1932', *Journal of Latin American Affairs*, vol. 16, no. 2, Nov. 1984, pp. 381–402; Michael A. Morris, *The Strait of Magellan* (Dordrecht, 1989); Andrew Barnard, 'Chilean Communists, Radical Presidents, and Chilean Relations with the United States, 1940–1947', *Journal of Latin American Studies*, vol. 13, no. 2, Nov. 1981, pp. 347–74; Paul W. Drake, 'Corporatism and Functionalism in Modern Chilean Politics', *Journal of Latin American Studies*, vol. 10, no. 1 (May 1978), pp. 83–116.

⁶ Robert N. Burr, *By Reason Or Force: Chile and the Balancing of Power in South America, 1830–1905* (Berkeley, 1965).

means of passage between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans in case the Panama Canal were to be destroyed.⁷

Chile, in contrast to the United States, took a forthrightly self-interested approach, yet its military decline and economic turmoil had virtually nullified its ability to secure advantages in the region where its declared interests long predated Washington's. Moreover, its experience with the Monroe Doctrine had been embittering. While the White House initially cited this as a rationale for US exploration, it later denied that the hemispheric defence clauses could be invoked against the British, whose Antarctic claim overlapped with both of the Southern Cone nations'. Even though its historical rivalry with the US Navy had been forfeited in logistical terms, Chile played a significant role in the strategic competition that emerged, and it managed to do so at a time when Washington's political intervention in Chile had reached a level tantamount to that of an occupying power.

From the Chilean perspective, Jaime Eysaguirre and Mario Barros Van Buren adopt a pro-Hispanic approach that is legitimate on the basis of events and the stated context in which they evolved, rather than due to any ideological sacrosanctity.⁸ Chilean historians across the political spectrum convey a cautious, often hostile attitude toward the United States,⁹ usually based on the economic underdevelopment of their country and involving allegations of imperialism.¹⁰ Instead, this article adopts the

⁷ See 'Antarctic Is Held Uranium Source', *The New York Times*, 6 November 1946. The Department of Defense feared that pursuing a condominium in the Antarctic might jeopardize its rights in the Arctic where, at this time, it was thought there might lie a continent; the British shared similar concerns. Secretary of Defense (Forrestal) to Secretary of State, 12 April 1948, Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States*, hereafter *FRUS*, 1948, vol. 1, pt. 2, *The United Nations* (Washington, 1975), pp. 971–4; Secretary of State to Secretary of Defense, 8 July 1948, National Archives, RG 59, 800.014 Antarctic; British Embassy to Department of State, 17 March 1948, National Archives, RG 59, 800.014 Antarctic. The navy considered the Antarctic ideal for its cold-weather training objectives since it had evoked less controversy than the Arctic. Acting Secretary of Navy (Koehler) to Secretary of State, 3 May 1949, *FRUS*, 1949, vol. 1, *National Security Affairs* (Washington, 1976), pp. 796–7.

⁸ Mario Barros Van Buren, *Historia Diplomática de Chile* (Barcelona, 1970); Eugenio Pereira Salas, *Los primeros contactos entre Chile y los Estados Unidos: 1778–1809* (Santiago, 1971); Cristian Guerrero Y., 'Chile y los Estados Unidos: Relaciones y Problemas, 1812–1916', in Walter Sánchez G. and Teresa Pereira L. (eds.), *Cientocincuenta años de política exterior chilena* (Santiago, 1979); Hernán Mery Squella, *Relaciones diplomáticas entre Chile y los Estados Unidos de América, 1829–1841* (Santiago, 1965); Selín Carrasco Domínguez, *El reconocimiento de la independencia de Chile por España* (Santiago, 1961).

⁹ See Eduardo Labarca Goddard, *Chile invadido: reportaje a la intromisión extranjera* (Santiago, 1968); Heraldo Muñoz y Carlos Portales, *Una amistad esquivo: las relaciones de Estados Unidos y Chile* (Santiago, 1987); Joaquín Edwards Bello, *El nacionalismo continental* (Madrid, 1925).

¹⁰ Hernán Ramírez Necochea, *Balmaceda y la contrarrevolución de 1891* (Santiago, 1958); Hernán Ramírez Necochea, *Historia del imperialismo en Chile* (Santiago, 1970).

1940s geopolitical viewpoint of Ramón Cañas Montalva which strongly influenced the Chilean military and academic establishments of the time, casting Antarctica as an integral part of the Pacific and therefore linked to the national aspiration to be reckoned with as an oceanic power.¹¹

If English-language studies of US–Chilean relations downplay the relevance of Antarctica to the countries’ broader visions, those regarding the general polar context either completely avoid it or grossly underestimate its impact. Peter Beck admits that the Southern Cone nations’ desire to invoke the Rio Treaty was not groundless, yet he questions their motives for rejecting Britain’s call to go before the International Court of Justice at The Hague,¹² an alternative incompatible with their hemispheric orientation. US officials also perceived them as recalcitrant, although none of the parties involved could agree on the legal basis to govern collective interaction. Chile’s Escudero Plan would provide the only hope for this, but even that plan, it is widely agreed, would avoid the divisive issue of sovereignty.¹³

The controversy and later war over the Falklands revealed shortcomings in the piecemeal approach that Washington took in an attempt to extend its world leadership to the far south. Leslie W. Hepple’s otherwise insightful treatment of this subject makes no mention of how Chilean diplomats proposed the only viable, if evasive, means of balancing the interests of Argentina, Britain and the United States with their own, which were not fully compatible with those of any other nation.¹⁴ Chile acted independently despite its promulgated allegiance to its neighbour. Neither did the United States reforge its plans to accommodate Britain, and its later acceptance of an important cue from Chile did not correlate to a new Pan-American thrust; it was simply necessitated by the hurdles

¹¹ See Ramón Cañas Montalva, ‘Estructuración geográfica de America: agrupación o confederación del Pacífico’, *Revista Geográfica de Chile Terra Australis*, vol. 2 (Dec. 1949), pp. 15–19; Ramón Cañas Montalva, ‘El valor geopolítico de la posición antártica chilena’, *Revista Geográfica de Chile Terra Australis* (June 1953), p. 11; Ramón Cañas Montalva, ‘Misión o dimisión en el Pacífico Sur antártico’ *Revista Geográfica de Chile Terra Australis*, vol. 10 (1953). See also Pittman, ‘From O’Higgins to Pinochet’ in Kelly and Child (eds.), *Geopolitics of the Southern Cone*, p. 177; María Teresa Infante, ‘Chilean Antarctic Policy: The Influence of Domestic and Foreign Policy’, in Olaf Shram Stokke and Davor Vidas (eds.), *Governing the Antarctic: The Effectiveness and Legitimacy of the Antarctic Treaty System* (Cambridge, 1996), p. 363.

¹² Peter Beck, *The International Politics of Antarctica* (New York, 1986), p. 36.

¹³ Peter Calvert, ‘British Relations with the Southern Cone States’, in Michael A. Morris (ed.), *Great Power Relations in Argentina, Chile, and Antarctica* (New York, 1990), p. 45.

¹⁴ Leslie W. Hepple, ‘The Geopolitics of the Falklands/Malvinas and the South Atlantic: British and Argentine Perceptions, Misperceptions, and Rivalries’, in Kelly and Child (eds.), *Geopolitics of the Southern Cone*, p. 236. See also Peter J. Beck, ‘A Cold War: Britain, Argentina, and Antarctica’, *History Today*, vol. 37 (1987), pp. 16–23.

that its own diplomats faced. The relationship between these two countries, accordingly, can serve as a lens through which to focus the general quagmire.

Jack Child writes of the ‘bewildering’ array of nations that started to appear on the continent in the late 1940s and how their presence grew even more so upon their tacit agreement to set aside the matter of territorial jurisdiction.¹⁵ His perspective conveys the tenuous position that prevailed when nations were scrambling to establish themselves there without being certain of which, if any, criteria would be agreed upon as legitimate or even what was at stake.¹⁶ More boldly and less accurately, in the opening sentence of *Eagle over the Ice*, Christopher C. Joyner and Ethel R. Theis portray the United States as ‘the chief architect of law and policy for the Antarctic.’ They proceed to laud US policymakers for their ‘consistency and continuity’, traits of which there is no evidence during the crucial years that witnessed the same individuals abandon their own initiative in favour of Escudero’s.¹⁷

Of course, studies of Antarctica owe such limitations to their methodology and corresponding purpose. Few reach or aspire to the category of diplomatic history, the approach taken here since it permits analysis of the distinct but also distinctly related elements of a bilateral relationship. Contrary to Kenneth J. Bertrand’s *Americans in Antarctica*,¹⁸ which presents US exploration as a series of uncontested triumphs, this essay dwells on the brinkmanship that overshadowed governments’ interaction. Bertrand deserves recognition for having compiled a thorough, chronologically arranged volume of data available nowhere else. He refrains, however, from offering any critical analysis. Others offer this only to a limited degree, but, fortunately, scholars can delve into the National Archives in pursuit of that objective. Of paramount importance are unpublished papers of the Department of State, for this was the branch of government that directed US policy both toward Chile and toward the Antarctic. In the latter case, officials began to accept that their seemingly pragmatic moves were contributing to a ‘headache’ of global proportions.¹⁹

¹⁵ Jack Child, ‘South American Geopolitics and Antarctica: Confrontation or Co-operation?’ in Kelly and Child (eds.), *Geopolitics of the Southern Cone*, pp. 188–9.

¹⁶ Since the region was still being mapped, its resources became a matter of conjecture, and not until the late 1950s would scientists establish that Antarctica was a continent.

¹⁷ Christopher C. Joyner and Ethel R. Theis, *Eagle over the Ice: The US in the Antarctic* (Hanover, 1997), pp. 1–9. See also Frank G. Klotz, *America on Ice: Antarctic Policy Issues* (Washington, 1990); Barbara Mitchell and Lee Kimball, ‘Conflict over the Cold Continent’, *Foreign Policy*, vol. 35 (1979), pp. 124–41.

¹⁸ Kenneth J. Bertrand, *Americans in Antarctica, 1775–1948* (New York, 1971).

¹⁹ Division of European Affairs, Memorandum, 1 March 1948, National Archives, RG 59, 800.014 Antarctic.

Narrative

Chile's maritime orientation dates back to its earliest days of statehood.²⁰ Founding father Bernardo O'Higgins declared its rights over 'all the Great Pacific', as well as from the continental boundary to the South Pole, and he intended to transform Valparaíso into the South Pacific's major port of entry.²¹ By the 1830s, the ocean had become the centrepiece of the country's foreign policy, and officials aspired to wield control over as much of it as possible.²² The following decade, Chile consolidated possession of the Strait of Magellan while expanding its trade throughout the Pacific.²³

After an unsuccessful attempt by US sailors in 1849 to occupy the island of Juan Fernández, near Valparaíso,²⁴ Washington took some interest in obtaining Chiloé and Valdivia as ports for its merchant marine.²⁵ When Secretary of State James Blaine sought to prevent any territorial change after Chile's decisive triumph in 1879 over Peru and Bolivia in the War of the Pacific, the Chilean Navy suggested that, if pressed, it might choose to sink the entire US fleet.²⁶ The US public and government expressed shock at such a threat made by a country as small as Chile, while recognising that the Chilean Navy indeed could shell America's Pacific coast with impunity. The US press noted that Chile had emerged from war as the region's uncontested power with its anti-US sentiment at a pinnacle.²⁷

Secretary Blaine's attempted intervention had exacerbated but not created this hostility. Earlier, when Britain had taken an interest in acquiring the Strait of Magellan and Cape Horn, and France had attempted to incorporate the Patagonia into its empire, Washington had remained mute. More tellingly, Chile had appealed to the Monroe Doctrine when Spain seized the Chincha Islands from Peru in 1864.²⁸ US ships had promptly left Valparaíso on the morning that Spain launched a

²⁰ Luis Bravo, 'Proyección Marítima Nacional', in Claudio Collados Nuñez (ed.), *El Poder Naval Chileno*, vol. 1 (Valparaíso, 1985), p. 232.

²¹ See Rafael Hernández Ponce and Ricardo Coujoumdjian Bergamali, 'Visión histórica nacional' in Collados, *Poder*, vol. 1, pp. 221–35. ²² Barros, *Historia*, 98–9.

²³ Hernández in Collados, *Poder* 1: 221–3; Barros, *Historia*, 152, 166, 196.

²⁴ See Carvallo to Chilean Foreign Affairs Minister, 1 Nov. 1846, 4 March 1847, 7 Sept. 1850, Archivo Nacional, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, in Ramírez, *Historia*, 82–3; Barros, *Historia*, 195.

²⁵ See Richard K. Showman and Lyman S. Judson (eds.), *The Monroe Doctrine and the Growth of Western Hemisphere Solidarity* (New York, 1941), p. 9.

²⁶ George T. Davis, *A Navy Second to None: The Development of Modern American Naval Policy* (New York, 1940), p. 32.

²⁷ 'The Growing Power of the Republic of Chile', *Atlantic Monthly*, vol. 54, no. 321 (July 1884). ²⁸ Barros, *Historia*, p. 227; Sater, *Chile*, pp. 23–7.

devastating attack on the city. Then Secretary of State William Seward had explained that the United States did not wish to become involved with any foreign power.²⁹

Chile's consolidation of its Pacific sphere of interest culminated in 1888 with the purchase of Easter Island – twenty-three hundred miles west of Valparaíso – from French authorities in Tahiti.³⁰ Now controlling two major inter-oceanic passages,³¹ Chile seriously competed with the United States to establish its presence in the Pacific. However, in the following decade, US naval power grew exponentially.³² America's 'splendid little war' expelled Spain from the Caribbean,³³ while its role in the Philippines and Hawaii set precedents for intervention that Chileans feared might be followed in Latin America.³⁴ One US representative observed that Chileans were 'too proud' to welcome the expanding presence of the United States in the Western Hemisphere and Pacific.³⁵

The Chilean government, perhaps proudly from Washington's perspective, declared the Strait of Magellan neutral during the First World War.³⁶ All major Chilean forces insisted on maintaining their country's non-alignment in the conflict. Not only was this beneficial economically; it also indicated a resolve to counter US influence in the hemisphere and elsewhere.³⁷ Ambassador Walker Martínez captured the widespread sentiment of his countrymen by warning that they had more to fear from US 'protection' than from European 'aggression'.³⁸

Chilean public opinion did not spurn commercial relations with the United States, but it remained cautious since the Northern Colossus linked business to the spread of its own political institutions.³⁹ Galvarino Gallardo Nieto agreed with many other Latin American diplomats that US administrations sought every available means to intervene in

²⁹ Henry Clay Evans, Jr., *Chile and its Relations with the United States* (Durham, North Carolina, 1927), p. 95.

³⁰ Cesar Fagot, 'La Isla de Pascua', *Revista de Marina* (1951), p. 206.

³¹ *El Mercurio* (Valparaíso), 21 Feb. 1890; *Boletín de la Sociedad Nacional de Agricultura*, vols. 21–2, nos. 3, 19, 20 (1890–1). See also Mauricio Jara Fernández, 'La compañía de vapores japonesa "Toyo Kisen Kaisha" y las relaciones chileno-niponas entre 1896–1906', *El Pacífico: Realidad Pasada y Presente* (Valparaíso, 1990), p. 94.

³² Meneses, *Factor*, p. 51; Davis, *Navy*, pp. 40, 93. ³³ Davis, *Navy*, p. 152.

³⁴ Antonia Rodríguez Canessa, 'Notas acerca de la guerra hispano-americana en las Filipinas: 1898–1900', *Primer Congreso de Estudios Americanos* (Santiago, 1989), pp. 49–59. ³⁵ Meneses, *Factor*, pp. 126–8.

³⁶ Percy Alvin Martin, *Latin America and the War* (Baltimore, 1925), pp. 276.

³⁷ Galvarino Gallardo Nieto, *Panamericanismo* (Santiago, 1941), pp. 7–9; Joaquín Walker Martínez, *Clamores de intervención diplomática* (Santiago, 1919), p. 21.

³⁸ Pike, *Chile*, p. 137.

³⁹ Kenneth J. Hagan, *American Gunboat Diplomacy and the Old Navy: 1877–1889* (London, 1973), p. 191.

countries' domestic affairs.⁴⁰ This trend, coupled with the United States's historical support for Chile's neighbouring rivals, had transformed the Monroe Doctrine into a 'poisoned candy', as Diego Portales had called it.⁴¹

More than a century later, the Antarctic began to emerge as a point of contention between Chile and the United States. The Department of State in January 1939 announced its reservation of all sovereignty rights in the Antarctic but chose to assert none at the time.⁴² Its denial that other nations held legitimate claims reiterated the 1924 declaration by Secretary of State Charles E. Hughes that permanent occupation was the only valid criterion.⁴³ Since then the Department's legal experts had concluded that this was a poor basis for US policy. Its dual objectives of not making claims and avoiding prejudice against future claims were not easily reconciled. Moreover, technology had advanced insufficiently to calculate the continent's value, a reality that would persist throughout period under consideration.⁴⁴

Many Americans had pioneered Antarctic exploration – including Nathaniel B. Palmer, Lincoln Ellsworth, Finn Ronne, and Richard E. Byrd – yet Washington had never chosen to formalise their claims. The need had not been recognised, since in the past adventure and fame had been the overriding motivations, and the virgin continent had not been seen as relative to great powers' quest for natural resources.⁴⁵ Ellsworth's unofficial claim in March 1939 to an eighty thousand square mile Antarctic region stirred resentment abroad even though it did not lead to legislation or an executive decree.⁴⁶ Washington's primary motivation for reserving

⁴⁰ See Gallardo, *Panamericanismo*, pp. lxiv–lxv.

⁴¹ Ernesto de la Cruz and Guillermo Feliú Cruz, *Epistolario de Don Diego Portales, 1811–1837*, vol. 1 (Santiago, 1966), pp. 76–7; Barros, *Historia*, p. 99. See also Arthur P. Whittaker, *The United States and the Southern Cone: Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay* (Cambridge, MA, 1976), p. 60. Diego also insisted upon his country's predominant role in the Pacific. Pittman, 'From O'Higgins to Pinochet', in Kelly and Child (eds.), *Geopolitics of the Southern Cone*, p. 175.

⁴² Acting Secretary of State (Welles) to Chargé in UK (Johnson), 6 Jan. 1939, *FRUS*, 1939, vol. 2, *General* (Washington, 1956), p. 1; Roosevelt to Byrd, 25 Nov. 1939, reproduced in US Antarctic Projects Officer, *The United States in Antarctica: 1820–1960*, 1 Aug. 1960, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abeline, Kansas, Bacon Papers.

⁴³ See Robert H. Hall, 'The "Open Door" in Antarctica: An Explanation of the Hughes Doctrine', *Polar Record*, vol. 25, no. 153 (1989), pp. 137–40.

⁴⁴ See Legal Adviser, Memorandum, 8 Aug. 1933, National Archives, RG 59, 800.014 Antarctic.

⁴⁵ See Jason Kendall Moore, 'Tethered to an Iceberg: United States Policy toward the Antarctic', *Polar Record*, vol. 35, no. 193 (April 1999), pp. 125–34.

⁴⁶ Division of European Affairs, Memorandum of Conversation, 3 March 1939, National Archives, RG 59, 800.014 Antarctic.

sovereignty rights, even at the risk of offending allies, was to counter the large German expedition that had scattered swastika flags over a sizeable expanse of the Antarctic.⁴⁷ US officials foresaw eventual involvement in the European war and sought to prevent Axis penetration within the hemisphere via Antarctica, where reports suggested the Third Reich had already established naval bases or intended to.⁴⁸

President Franklin D. Roosevelt personally helped to convince congress to fund Admiral Byrd's third expedition, which departed in November to survey natural resources that the Department of Interior believed to exist in vast quantities near the South Pole.⁴⁹ The creation of the United States Antarctic Service allowed Byrd to coordinate efforts with four cabinet-level agencies in pursuing the establishment of three permanent outposts, laying a possible basis for reversing the non-claimant policy.⁵⁰ US policymakers hoped to avoid the impression of being engaged in a 'race' to Antarctica with Germany by stressing the Monroe Doctrine – which excluded non-continental powers from territorial acquisition within the hemisphere – and their purely scientific objectives.⁵¹

Roosevelt assured Latin American governments that the US expedition intended to safeguard their collective rights against European or Asian claims.⁵² Argentina strenuously objected to this expansion of the Monroe Doctrine in both theory and practice – or want of practice. Its public statement recalled that Latin America had never been consulted about the

⁴⁷ Translation from *Frankfurter Zeitung*, 11 March 1939, in Embassy in Berlin to Secretary of State, No. 638, 20 March 1939, National Archives, RG 59, 800.014 Antarctic.

⁴⁸ Byrd to Roosevelt, 11 Oct. 1941, Byrd Polar Research Center, Columbus, Ohio, folder 2900. See also National Security Staff Study on Antarctica, 13 July 1954, Eisenhower Library, White House Office, Office of Assistant Secretary of National Security Staff NSC Series, Policy Papers Subseries; Enrique Gajardo Villarroel, 'Genesis del Tratado Antártico', *El Mercurio*, 22 June 1981.

⁴⁹ Department of Interior to Division of Northern European Affairs, 12 Aug. 1939, National Archives, RG 59, 800.014 Antarctic; Division of European Affairs, Memorandum, 18 July 1939, *FRUS*, 1939, vol. 2, *General* (Washington, 1956), pp. 7–8.

⁵⁰ Bertrand writes that this development was consistent with growing public interest in the Antarctic, and press coverage indicates that Byrd's personal heroism accounted for this more than anything else. Bertrand, 407; Jason Kendall Moore, 'Reading between Glacial Lines: Antarctic Politics in the US Press, 1939–1949', submitted in November 1996 to the Antarctic Institute (INACH) of the Chilean Foreign Affairs Ministry in partial completion of a research grant.

⁵¹ Byrd to Division of European Affairs, 15 July 1939; Department of Interior, US Antarctic Service, Memorandum for Byrd, 22 Aug. 1939, National Archives, RG 59, 800.014 Antarctic.

⁵² Acting Secretary of State (Welles) to Diplomatic Officers in the American Republics, 8 Aug. 1939, *FRUS*, 1939, vol. 2, pp. 9–10. See also Department of State to Diplomatic Officers in the American Republics, 11 Dec. 1939, National Archives, RG 59, 800.014 Antarctic.

doctrine and, worse still, that Washington had not opposed Britain usurping the Falkland Islands in 1833. Argentina contended, and Chile agreed, that geography was a more legitimate criterion for rights and that the Antarctic Peninsula was an extension of the South American continent.⁵³ Buenos Aires held that any form of international cooperation first required sovereignty issues to be addressed.⁵⁴

With similar resolve President Pedro Aguirre Cerda appointed a professor of international law, Julio Escudero Guzmán, to provide a scholarly basis for Chile's pending claim that had been taken for granted since statehood but never formalised.⁵⁵ The Southern Cone nations announced coordinated efforts to avoid what the Chilean foreign affairs ministry publicly referred to as possible 'differences of appreciation' with the United States.⁵⁶

US Antarctic policy was still in a formative period, but its makers considered a more active role necessary to avoid being excluded from the continent.⁵⁷ The Roosevelt administration encouraged Chile to make an official claim,⁵⁸ which it interpreted as an acknowledgement of the historical and geographical basis for its rights. Accepting Roosevelt's suggestion immediately, Chilean officials feared, might have been seen as an acceptance of US leadership in determining the fate of the continent. Not until November 1940 did Santiago decree sovereignty over the sector from 53° to 90° West, which as the other sectors pointed like a triangle to the South Pole.⁵⁹ At this time it informed Washington that the decree was not simply a claim but a 'determination of limits.'⁶⁰

⁵³ John White, 'Argentina Claims Antarctic Land in Conflict with US and Britain', *The New York Times*, 25 July 1939. Chile referred to the Antarctic Peninsula as O'Higgins Land; Argentina as Tierra de San Martín; Britain as Graham Land; and the United States as Palmer Land. The Southern Cone nations had not emphasized their Antarctic rights before this time, as they had seen no reason to, but citizens had always seen these rights as being linked to their national patrimony. See, for example, Embassy in Buenos Aires to Department of State, 5 Jan. 1950, National Archives, RG 59, 702.022/1-550.

⁵⁴ John W. White, 'Argentina Listing Antarctic Claims', *The New York Times*, 27 July 1939.

⁵⁵ 'Chile to File Antarctic Claims', *The New York Times*, 4 Oct. 1939.

⁵⁶ Translation from *La Prensa*, 22 Feb. 1940, in Embassy in Argentina to Secretary of State, 29 Feb. 1940; Embassy in Argentina (Armour) to Secretary of State, 29 May 1940, no. 718, National Archives, RG 59, 800.014 Antarctic.

⁵⁷ Department of State, Policy and Information Statement: Polar Regions (Secret), 27 Jan. 1947, Department of State, *FRUS*, 1947, vol. 1 *International Organizations* (Washington, 1972), p. 1044; Mericq, p. 59. ⁵⁸ See Gajardo, 'Génesis.'

⁵⁹ Jack Child, *Antarctica and South American Geopolitics: Frozén Lebensraum* (New York, 1988), p. 106.

⁶⁰ See Gajardo, 'Génesis', and Oscar Pinochet de la Barra, *La Antártica chilena* (Santiago, 1944), p. 171. Ambassador Pinochet de la Barra currently directs the Antarctic Institute (INACH) of the Chilean Foreign Affairs Ministry.

The United States turned its attention elsewhere once it became involved in the Second World War, but a secret British expedition to the Antarctic indicated that the region held and would continue to hold a high degree of strategic significance.⁶¹ The Foreign Office hoped that Operation Tabarin would expand the legal basis for Britain's occupation, in the unlikely situation that the other claimant nations were to accept occupation as the rationale for a claim. Another priority, shared by the United States, was to forestall German advances in the region,⁶² especially given the Southern Cone's reluctance to take sides in the war. The US embassy in Buenos Aires reported with distaste in 1943 that pro-Axis papers praised an Argentine expedition, accompanied by three Chileans, to Deception Island, which Britain claimed as its own. This expedition, Argentina's second in two years, related to the dispute over the Falkland Islands whose dependencies fell within the Antarctic sphere. The US Embassy resented that 'Nazi elements and their nationalist sympathisers' were exploiting the issue against the United States as much as against Britain.⁶³

Chile's reluctance to sever relations with the Axis also roused US concerns. Samuel F. Bemis acknowledges that Chile's 'prudent neutrality' resulted in part from early Anglo-American defeats in the Pacific.⁶⁴ Chile sought to avoid becoming involved in a conflict from which it had nothing to gain and that entailed the risk, however slight, of a Japanese attack on its long seashore.⁶⁵ Even after Chile, under considerable US pressure, suspended relations with the Axis, Washington regarded it as a questionable ally, and its naval power had dwindled to the point of jeopardising the defence of its own ports.⁶⁶ President Juan Antonio Ríos, keeping the post-war economy in mind, actively sought to improve relations with the United States, requesting a US naval mission and appointing a pro-US chief of the navy.⁶⁷

The Department of State foresaw the likelihood of renewed discord since US explorers had been active in the Antarctic peninsula, and planned to continue their activity. It was here that Chile's sector overlapped with Argentina's, from 24° to 68° West, while Britain's, from 20° to 80° West,

⁶¹ 'British Group Explores Regions of Anarctic', *The New York Times*, 24 April 1944.

⁶² Bertrand, pp. 16–17. Beck says that officials also saw the operation as linked to preserving their colonial interests worldwide. Beck, *International Politics*, p. 32.

⁶³ Ambassador in Argentina (Armour) to Secretary of State, 22 March 1943, No. 9448, National Archives, RG 59, 800.014 Antarctic.

⁶⁴ Collados, *Poder*, vol. 2, p. 614; Samuel Flagg Bemis, *The Latin American Policy of the United States* (New York, 1943), p. 379.

⁶⁵ Sater, *Chile*, p. 114; Meneses, *Factor*, p. 199.

⁶⁶ Bowers to Secretary of State, 5 Feb. 1945, Department of State, *FRUS*, 1945, vol. 9, *The American Republics* (Washington, 1969), p. 762; Meneses, *Factor*, pp. 197–8.

⁶⁷ Bowers to Secretary of State, 5 Dec. 1944, reproduced in Meneses, *Factor*, pp. 203–4.

almost enveloped the neighbours' joint sector, from 24° to 90° West.⁶⁸ Deciding to put aside their own long-standing disputes, the Southern Cone nations continued their largely theoretical common stance against non-hemispheric encroachment.⁶⁹ Washington had been firm in reiterating its non-recognition policy, based on the 1924 Hughes Doctrine that discovery and exploration without settlement provided an insufficient basis for claims.⁷⁰ At the same time, however, the Department of State tentatively planned to cite exploration as a basis for its future claims.⁷¹

As the war drew to a close and hemispheric relations were deteriorating, Ambassador Bowers recommended that Latin American military establishments be kept to a minimum since the republics, including Chile, felt no particular allegiance to the United States and sympathised with the Axis powers. By the cessation of hostilities, Washington had transferred only a third of the total armaments that it had pledged to Chile, which had finally broken with the Axis powers in early 1945,⁷² and concern about its Axis sympathies persisted into the post-war era.⁷³

In Chile this concern took the form of Proclaimed Lists, or black lists, issued by the US government against Chileans believed to be part of Nazi 'spearhead' organisations.⁷⁴ Officials did not balk at invoking the threat and use of sanctions to coerce Santiago's compliance in liquidating or otherwise redistributing such individuals' resources.⁷⁵ The Department of State believed that pro-German elements might again rise to prominence given the opportunity.⁷⁶ Bowers recognised that Chileans

⁶⁸ A. G. Ronhovde, Division of Northern European Affairs, Argentine and Chilean Claims in the Antarctic, 23 Nov. 1944, National Archives, RG 59, 800.014 Antarctic. See also John White, 'Argentina Claims Antarctic Land in Conflict with US and Britain', *The New York Times*, 25 July 1939.

⁶⁹ Pinochet de la Barra, *Antártica*, p. 181; Arthur P. Whitaker, *Inter-American Affairs 1941-1945*, vol. 1 (New York, 1942-46), p. 201.

⁷⁰ See Hall, 'The "Open Door" in Antarctica', pp. 137-40; Evan Luard, 'Who Owns the Antarctic?' *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 62 (Summer 1984), pp. 1175-93.

⁷¹ Department of State, Office of Geography (Saucerman), Sovereignty of Deception Island, [28 July 1942], to Division of European Affairs, National Archives, RG 59, 800.014 Antarctic. See also F. M. Auburn, *Antarctic Law and Politics* (London, 1982); Jeffrey D. Myhre, *The Antarctic Treaty System: Politics, Law, and Diplomacy* (Boulder, 1986); Christopher C. Joyner, 'Nonmilitarisation of the Antarctic: The Interplay of Law and Geopolitics', *Naval War College Review*, vol. 42, no. 4 (1989), pp. 83-104; John D. Negroponte, 'The Success of the Antarctic Treaty', *Department of State Bulletin*, vol. 87, no. 2123 (June 1987), pp. 29-30; W. M. Bush (ed.), *Antarctica and International Law* (London, 1982).

⁷² Hull to Bowers, 6 Jan. 1944; Leche to Bevin, 17 Dec. 1945, in Meneses, *Factor*, pp. 169, 208.

⁷³ Bowers to Secretary of State, 26 July 1945, *FRUS*, 1945, vol. 9, p. 748.

⁷⁴ Bowers to Secretary of State, 11 July 1946, *FRUS*, 1946, vol. 11, pp. 588-9.

⁷⁵ Alexander Schnee, Division of North and West Coast Affairs, Memorandum, 14 Jan. 1946, *FRUS*, 1946, vol. 11, pp. 576-9.

⁷⁶ Division of North and West Coast Affairs, Memorandum, 15 Jan. 1946, *FRUS*, 1946, vol. 11, p. 579.

recoiled at the black lists, which they regarded as anathema to Washington's espousal of self-determination,⁷⁷ and that they only acquiesced to US wishes out of fear.⁷⁸

The Antarctic controversy began to reemerge against this tense backdrop of US–Chilean relations. In 1946 Britain sent an expedition to reinforce its presence in the Falkland Dependencies,⁷⁹ prompting Chile and Argentina to repeat their claims with enhanced vigour. Ideas in Washington came into no clearer focus now than before the war.⁸⁰ Though Byrd's 1939 expedition had been intended to lay the basis for future claims, the Department of State had not formulated a clear official position since, without a permanent population, the continent defied the usual purview of international law. In light of the Antarctic Peninsula's transportation routes, communication potential, and strategic importance, US officials realised the need to decide upon the criteria for sovereignty.⁸¹

Cries of protest resounded from the Southern Cone upon reports of the US Navy's plan to send Operation High Jump to the Antarctic with four thousand personnel, one dozen icebreakers, and an aircraft carrier. This expedition, which departed under Admiral Byrd's command in December 1946, bore striking similarity to a wartime assault, an impression that amid rumours of the discovery of uranium, bred doomsday speculation.⁸² The navy considered the quest for fissionable materials to be as high a priority as polar training opportunities, and therefore insisted on the exclusion of foreigner observers.⁸³ For this reason and to avoid offending Britain and Argentina with apparent favouritism,⁸⁴ the United States refused a request to allow a Chilean observer and instead invited one to accompany a small

⁷⁷ Bowers to Secretary of State, 31 Oct. 1946, *FRUS*, 1946, vol. 11, pp. 590–1.

⁷⁸ W. E. Dunn (for Bowers) to Secretary of State, 29 March 1946, *FRUS*, 1946, vol. 11, pp. 582–4.

⁷⁹ 'Australia Plans Antarctic Study', *The New York Times*, 1 Dec. 1946.

⁸⁰ Department of Interior, Board of Geographical Names, to Department of State Division of Geography, 25 April 1946; Division of Geography to Department of Interior, 13 May 1946; Division of American Republics (Brundage), Top Secret Memorandum, Antarctic Expeditions, 15 Aug. 1946, National Archives, RG 59, 800.014 Antarctic.

⁸¹ Department of State, Polar Regions: Secret Policy and Information Statement, 1 July 1946, National Archives, RG 59, 800.014 Antarctic; Department of State, Office of Intelligence Collection and Dissemination, Report No. 4269, History and Current Status of Claims in Antarctica, 3 Oct. 1947, RG 218, Geographical File.

⁸² Ambassador Bowers to Secretary of State, 8 Aug. 1946, No. 14302, National Archives, RG 59, 800.014 Antarctic.

⁸³ Division of American Republics to Division of North and West Coast Affairs, *et al.*, Antarctic Expedition Headed by Commander Finn Ronne – Navy Ideas Regarding, 25 Sept. 1946, National Archives, RG 59, 800.014 Antarctic.

⁸⁴ Division of North and West Coast Affairs to Assistant Secretary of State Braden, *et al.*, 8 Oct. 1946, National Archives, RG 59, Division of American Republic Affairs, Memoranda on Chile.

non-governmental expedition by Finn Ronne. Santiago refused the insulting consolation prize.⁸⁵

When Chilean Chargé d'Affaires Mario Rodríguez requested further explanation about Operation High Jump, Assistant Secretary of State Spruille Braden replied that he knew as little about it as the Chileans did.⁸⁶ This position was curious, since journalists worldwide had surmised that Washington sought uranium to solidify its nuclear monopoly.⁸⁷ US attempts to prevent that interpretation by stressing science were failing in part because Byrd had been candid to reporters about his estimation of the continent's value.⁸⁸ Due to the overwhelming size, undisguisedly military nature and bad publicity of High Jump,⁸⁹ the Department of State foresaw bleak prospects for achieving an international agreement.⁹⁰

At this delicate moment, in November 1946, the United States reaffirmed its non-recognition policy, which, according to Bowers, sent the Chilean public and government into a state of disbelief that verged on outrage. The ministry of national defence responded by expanding cooperation with Argentina and insisting that Chile's sovereignty in Antarctica was non-negotiable.⁹¹ This trend accelerated when the US embassy inquired about British allegations that Chileans had vandalised Byrd's old base at Marguerite Bay.⁹² A series of heated protests from the

⁸⁵ Division of North and West Coast Affairs, Memorandum of Conversation, 20 Jan. 1947, National Archives, RG 59, 800.014 Antarctic.

⁸⁶ Department of State, Memorandum of Conversation, 12 Nov. 1946, National Archives, RG 59, Division of American Republic Affairs, Memoranda on Chile.

⁸⁷ Embassy in Chile to Secretary of State, No. 14796, 10 Jan. 1947; Embassy in London (Harrison) to Secretary of State, 7 Nov. 1946, No. 2465, National Archives, RG 59, 800.014 Antarctic. See also 'Antarctic Is Held Uranium Source', *The New York Times*, 6 Nov. 1946.

⁸⁸ Department of Interior, US Antarctica Service, Memorandum for Byrd, 22 Aug. 1939; Office of the Judge Advocate of the Navy, Top Secret Brief, Ulterior Mission and Objectives of Naval Expedition to Antarctica, 21 Nov. 1946, in Captain R. E. Dennison to Division of Northern European Affairs, 22 Nov. 1946; Ambassador Bowers to Secretary of State, No. 575, 14 July 1947; Ambassador Walter B. Smith to Secretary of State, No. 4188, 21 Nov. 1946; Embassy in Peru to Department of State, No. 722, 21 Nov. 1946; Embassy in Argentina to Secretary of State, [22 Nov. 1946], No. 1305, National Archives, RG 59, 800.014 Antarctic. See also Division of North and West Coast Affairs, Memorandum, Chile and Argentina in the Antarctic, 10 Feb. 1947, National Archives, RG 59, Office of American Republic Affairs, Memoranda on Chile.

⁸⁹ Byrd to Admiral Chester Nimitz, Memorandum on Press Conference, 15 April 1947; Proposed Press Release, circa 1947, Byrd Polar Research Center, folder 7295.

⁹⁰ Memorandum by Division of American Republic Affairs, 15 Nov. 1946, *FRUS*, 1946, vol. 1, pp. 1492–3.

⁹¹ Ambassador Bowers to Secretary of State, No. 1003, 15 Nov. 1946; Embassy in Argentina to Secretary of State, [22 Nov. 1946], No. 1305, National Archives, RG 59, 800.014 Antarctic. See also Ambassador in Argentina (Messersmith) to Secretary of State, 9 Dec. 1946, *FRUS*, 1946, vol. 1, pp. 1495–6.

⁹² Acting Secretary of State (Acheson) to Embassy in Chile, [26 March 1947], National Archives, RG 59, 800.014 Antarctic.

Chilean defence ministry deterred the Department of State from pressing the issue, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff warned President Harry S. Truman that resentment in Chile could reach a counterproductive level.⁹³

Assistant Secret of State Dean Acheson repeated President Roosevelt's earlier encouragement for Byrd's men to drop written claims to gain 'maximum advantage.'⁹⁴ Washington was inundated with rumours of a forthcoming Antarctic claim and plans to take the issue before the International Court of Justice at The Hague.⁹⁵ Chile, Argentina and Britain had each expressed interest in this alternative at different times but never collectively consented to it. The possibility disappeared in January 1947 when Secretary of State James F. Byrnes told the press that there would be no conference or legal debate about Antarctica since there were too many other, more pressing matters on the international agenda.⁹⁶

That statement heightened apprehension about US intentions in the Antarctic. Bowers noted with concern that President Gabriel González Videla had rallied public support for a Chilean expedition by emphasising the continent's economic and military value.⁹⁷ The Department of State viewed Chile's nationalistic attitude as one of the most serious deterrents to a non-confrontational resolution of Antarctic disputes.⁹⁸ However, it opposed taking the issue before The Hague since the Southern Cone nations might choose to involve the United Nations General Assembly and there cultivate support among the majority of members against the semblance of imperialism.⁹⁹

The United States was not pleased that González Videla had assumed a personal role in the issue. It had identified him as the candidate most dangerous for US interests but apparently refrained from interfering in

⁹³ Division of American Republic Affairs to Assistant Secretary of State Braden, 25 April 1947; Ambassador Bowers to Secretary of State, No. 15100, 2 April 1947, National Archives, RG 59, 800.014 Antarctic.

⁹⁴ Acting Secretary of State (Acheson) to Secretary of Navy (Forrestal), 14 Dec. 1946, *FRUS*, 1946, vol. 1, *General* (Washington, 1972), pp. 1497–8.

⁹⁵ 'US Maps Formal Claims', *The New York Times*, 6 Jan. 1947.

⁹⁶ Division of European Affairs to Division of American Republic Affairs, 30 Jan. 1947, National Archives, RG 59, 800.014 Antarctic. See also Secretary of State (Marshall) to Embassy in UK, 30 Jan. 1947, *FRUS*, 1947, vol. 1, p. 1050.

⁹⁷ Embassy in Chile to Secretary of State, No. 14796, 10 Jan. 1947; Embassy in Santiago to Division of American Republic Affairs, No. 413, 13 June 1949, National Archives, RG 59, 800.014 Antarctic.

⁹⁸ Division of North and West Coast Affairs to Assistant Secretary of State Braden, *et al.*, Memorandum: Chile and Argentina in the Antarctic, 10 Feb. 1947, National Archives, RG 59, Division of American Republic Affairs, Memoranda on Chile. See also Special Adviser for Geography (Sheldon W. Boggs) to Division of American Republic Affairs, *et al.*, Memorandum: What the Antarctic is Worth in Relation to International Problems, 2 June 1947, National Archives, RG 59, 800.014 Antarctic.

⁹⁹ Division of Northern European Affairs, Memorandum, 16 Dec. 1947, Department of State, *FRUS*, 1947, vol. 1, pp. 1057–58.

the election that brought him to office in late 1946.¹⁰⁰ Ambassador Bowers observed that the president had attempted to bridge his country's deep internal divisions,¹⁰¹ and in doing so received endorsements from both the Communist Party and the right-wing Liberal Party.¹⁰² With members of each appointed to cabinet posts, however,¹⁰³ his coalition quickly frayed, partisans feuded violently among themselves, and the country plunged into regular states of emergency.¹⁰⁴ Social and labour unrest mounted until González Videla made an unexpectedly fervent anti-communist speech in September 1947, declaring what less than a year earlier the Department of State had never expected – that Chile sought to align itself with the West. The president began removing from his government leftist ministers who refused to renounce the Communist Party.¹⁰⁵

Ambassador Bowers wrote to the new secretary of state, George C. Marshall, that the battle against communism had grown 'acute' in Chile. Foreign Minister Germán Vergara Donoso agreed that, if left unchecked, communist agitation there would have repercussions throughout South America.¹⁰⁶ Even though much-needed economic assistance from the United States remained suspended, and despite the black lists, anti-communist sentiment in Chile was rising quickly.¹⁰⁷ González Videla ordered the armed services to end a debilitating coal strike led by communists,¹⁰⁸ who alleged that he was acting under US pressure. According to Andrew Barnard, Department of State records substantiate this position, and, tellingly, it was only after this incident that Washington finally lifted its informal embargo against Chile.¹⁰⁹

However encouraging this development was for US–Chilean relations in general, it did not temper González Videla's defiance in the Antarctic. In February 1948 he sailed with a naval mission to 'take

¹⁰⁰ Bowers, *Chile*, p. 328; Federico G. Gil, *The Political System of Chile* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co, 1966), pp. 71–2.

¹⁰¹ Bowers to President, 1 July 1946, Harry S. Truman Library, Liberty, Missouri, Official File, Box 1285. ¹⁰² Barnard, 'Communists', p. 364.

¹⁰³ Bowers, *Chile*, pp. 161–2. ¹⁰⁴ Gil, *System*, p. 72.

¹⁰⁵ Bowers to Marshall, 11–15 June 1947, 17–23 Sept. 1947, *FRUS*, 1947, vol. 8, pp. 497–501.

¹⁰⁶ Bowers to Marshall, 13 Oct. 1947, *FRUS*, 1947, vol. 8, pp. 504–7.

¹⁰⁷ See Chargé in the Soviet Union (Durbrow) to Marshall, 13 Oct. 1947, *FRUS*, 1947, vol. 8, p. 508.

¹⁰⁸ Barnard, 'Communists' p. 367; Bowers, *Chile*, pp. 168–9.

¹⁰⁹ Barnard, 'Communists', p. 368. The Department of State suddenly requested the Export-Import Bank to provide Chile loans to purchase additional coal. Memorandum by Assistant Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Armour) to Marshall, 17 Oct. 1947; Bowers to Marshall, 17 Oct. 1947, *FRUS*, 1947, vol. 8, pp. 509–10.

personal possession' of the Chilean Antarctic in his own words.¹¹⁰ The Chilean claim, he clarified, had an indisputable foundation based on 16th century Spanish decrees, and the Southern Cone nations would not quarrel about boundaries within their common sector.¹¹¹ He presided over an elaborate ceremony that named a new military base after Bernardo O'Higgins, and the Chilean press responded with patriotic fervour. The US embassy in Santiago reported that newspapers devoted at least complete front pages, at most entire editions, to the event. Gonzalez Videla called for the Rio Treaty of hemispheric defence to be invoked against the British, but Washington refused to consider such an unambiguous interpretation of its own ideals.¹¹²

Encouraged by US inaction,¹¹³ Britain dispatched the *Nigeria*, the flagship of its South Atlantic Fleet and one of its heaviest cruisers, to deter Chile and Argentina from asserting their Antarctic claims.¹¹⁴ No less than a dozen warships, including two battle-ready US icebreakers, menaced each other in the waters between Tierra del Fuego and Marguerite Bay.¹¹⁵ Prospects for a negotiated settlement were hardly helped when the *Manchester Guardian* published a scathing editorial that referred to the Southern Cone nations as 'buccaneering playboys trying to scratch empires out of the ice.'¹¹⁶

Washington made some effort to feign a neutral position while admitting, in response to an Argentine charge, that it considered Britain the leading bulwark of US ideals regardless of its socialist system and controlled economy.¹¹⁷ Confirming suspicions of Anglo-American

¹¹⁰ British Ambassador to Chile (Leche) to Chilean Foreign Affairs Minister German Vergara Donoso, No. 128, 17 Dec. 1948; Vergara Donoso to Ambassador Leche, No. 1036, 31 Jan. 1948, in Embassy in London to Secretary of State, No. 390, 16 Feb. 1948, National Archives, RG 59, 800.014 Antarctic. See also 'Chilean President Sails to Claim Polar Regions', *The New York Times*, 10 Feb. 1948.

¹¹¹ Ambassador Bowers to Secretary of State, No. 140, 25 Feb. 1948, National Archives, RG 59, 800.014 Antarctic. See also 'Chile Sets Up Second Base in Dispute Antarctic Zone', *The New York Times*, 19 Feb. 1948.

¹¹² Embassy in Chile (Trueblood) to Secretary of State, No. 34, 15 Jan. 1948; Ambassador Bowers to Secretary of State, Nos. 96 and 103, 18 and 20 Feb. 1948; Embassy in Chile to Secretary of State, No. 133, 19 Feb. 1948, National Archives, RG 59, 800.014 Antarctic.

¹¹³ Acting Secretary of State to Embassy in UK, 16 Dec. 1947, *FRUS*, 1947, vol. 1, pp. 1053–4.

¹¹⁴ Embassy in London (Gallman) to Secretary of State, No. 604, 18 Feb. 1948, National Archives, RG 59, 800.014 Antarctic.

¹¹⁵ 'Britain to Uphold Antarctic "Titles"', *The New York Times*, 17 Feb. 1948; Milton Bracker, 'Argentines React Sharply', *The New York Times*, 19 Feb. 1948; Walter Sullivan, 'New Struggle is on for Antarctic Bases', *The New York Times*, 22 Feb. 1948.

¹¹⁶ Embassy in London (Douglas) to Secretary of State, A-448, 25 Feb. 1948, National Archives, RG 59, 800.014 Antarctic.

¹¹⁷ Ambassador in Argentina (Bruce) to Secretary of State, 10 March 1948; Secretary of State to Embassy in Argentina, 17 March 1948, *FRUS*, 1948, vol. 1, pt. 2, pp. 966–8.

collusion, the US delegation to the March 1948 Pan-American Conference held in Bogota refused to participate in discussions about European colonies in the Western Hemisphere on the grounds that they would be biased against the parties not present.¹¹⁸ It was only from Britain that the Department of State sought advice regarding how to handle the Antarctic.¹¹⁹ Chile and Argentina, suspecting as much, re-amplified their commitment to defend the Southern Cone's common Antarctic interests against Britain – their earlier, mostly rhetorical statements now transfigured into the official Donoso–La Rosa Declaration.¹²⁰

The warships gathered in the Antarctic refrained from firing upon each other, but, uncertain that this would remain the case, the Department of State hastened to complete a draft agreement for internationalisation that predictably emphasised scientific cooperation and called for claimants, which the United States would join, to put fissionable materials under UN control.¹²¹ In the interlude, Chile rejected a US-supported proposal for negotiations with Argentina and Britain.¹²² Its foreign ministry countered with a proposal for negotiations between the Southern Cone and the United States, excluding Britain, in keeping with the Pan-American approach Washington had promulgated in the past.¹²³ No agreement had been reached by June 1948, when the Department of State presented these countries, plus France and Norway, with its plan for internationalisation.¹²⁴

All the countries promptly rejected this proposal. Since Chile and Argentina expressed the most adamant opposition, the Department of State dispatched Caspar D. Green to convince them to reconsider. A specialist in northern European affairs already popular with Chilean

¹¹⁸ Secretary Marshall to British Ambassador (Inverchapel), 27 Feb. 1948, National Archives, RG 59, 800.014 Antarctic.

¹¹⁹ Secretary of State (Marshall) to Embassy in London, 4 March 1948; British Embassy to Secretary of State (Marshall), 8 March 1948, National Archives, RG 59, 800.014 Antarctic. See also Secretary of State to British Ambassador (Inverchapel), 17 March 1948, *FRUS*, 1948, vol. 1, pt. 2, p. 967.

¹²⁰ Embassy in Santiago (Bowers) to Secretary of State, No. 165, 8 March 1948, National Archives, RG 59, 800.014 Antarctic. See also Peter J. Beck, 'International Relations in Antarctica: Argentina, Chile, and the Great Powers', in Kelly and Child (eds.), *Geopolitics of the Southern Cone*, p. 103.

¹²¹ Special Adviser for Geography (Boggs), Memorandum: Draft Agreement on the Antarctic, 22 March 1948, National Archives, RG 59, 800.014 Antarctic.

¹²² Embassy in Argentina, Memorandum of Conversation, 26 March 1948, National Archives, RG 59, 800.014 Antarctic.

¹²³ Embassy in Santiago (Bowers) to Secretary of State, No. 262, 16 April 1948, National Archives, RG 59, 800.014 Antarctic.

¹²⁴ Paper Prepared in Department of State, undated, *FRUS*, 1949, vol. 1, pp. 800–3.

diplomats,¹²⁵ Green arrived in Santiago to find that Chile shared Washington's desire to prevent additional naval displays but also that it would not budge on the matter of internationalisation.¹²⁶ Julio Escudero Guzmán, who had remained an adviser to the foreign ministry since his involvement in drafting the national claim, presented Green with a plan to suspend all claims for five to ten years.¹²⁷ Congress, he explained, would never approve ceding its sector to an international body,¹²⁸ aside from the idea being contrary to both the Western Hemisphere's integrity and Chile's tradition of seeking legal solutions to international disputes.¹²⁹

Green left for Buenos Aires having failed to change the Chileans' perspective, and he found the Argentines even less malleable. They resented not only being second on his travel agenda but also the fact that the Escudero Plan undermined the Southern Cone's united front.¹³⁰ Another 'anti-US press outburst', as the US embassy referred to it, dwelled on these facts and Washington's tacit complicity in the Falklands.¹³¹ In rejecting the US proposal even as the basis for discussions,¹³² Argentina offered no alternative. Chile was the only one of the seven claimant nations to have done so.¹³³

An apparent rift had appeared in the Southern Cone. The Chilean foreign ministry stridently denied a *New York Times* article that it was willing to cooperate only with Argentina. In fact, the ministry assured Bowers, it was eager to cooperate with the United States.¹³⁴ The

¹²⁵ Division of American Republic Affairs to Division of European Affairs, 18 May 1948; Marshall to Embassy in Santiago, Control 4595, 18 June 1948, National Archives, RG 59, 800.014 Antarctic.

¹²⁶ Caspar D. Green, Memorandum of Conversation, 12–13 July 1948, in Embassy in Santiago to Department of State, 13–14 July 1948; Embassy in London (Douglas) to Secretary of State, No. 3089, National Archives, RG 59, 800.014 Antarctic.

¹²⁷ Embassy in Santiago (Bowers) to Secretary of State, No. 495, 19 July 1948, National Archives, RG 59, 800.014 Antarctic.

¹²⁸ Embassy in Santiago to Division of European Affairs, *et al.*, No. 475, 19 July 1948, National Archives, RG 59, 800.014 Antarctic.

¹²⁹ Caspar D. Green, Memorandum of Conversation, 17 July 1948, in Embassy in Santiago to Division of European Affairs, *et al.*, No. 477, 19 July 1948, National Archives, RG 59, 800.014 Antarctic. See also Walter Waggoner, 'U.N. Antarctic Rule Opposed by Byrd', *The New York Times*, 17 April 1947.

¹³⁰ Embassy in Santiago (Bowers) to Secretary of State, No. 504, 21 July 1948, National Archives, RG 59, 800.014 Antarctic.

¹³¹ Embassy in Argentina (Ray) to Secretary of State, No. 730, 21 July 1948, National Archives, RG 59, 800.014 Antarctic.

¹³² Embassy in Argentina (Bruce) to Secretary of State, 1 Nov. 1948, *FRUS*, 1948, vol. 1, pt. 2, p. 1011.

¹³³ The seven claimant nations were Argentina, Australia, Britain, Chile, France, New Zealand, and Norway.

¹³⁴ Ambassador Bowers to Secretary of State, No. 537, 6 Aug. 1948; Memorandum of Conversation, by Division of North and West Coast Affairs, 9 Aug. 1948, National Archives, RG 59, 800.014 Antarctic.

Department of State still preferred internationalisation to the Escudero Plan but realised that the latter might be the only alternative acceptable to all powers.¹³⁵ The Chilean ministry contended that the post-war era was unstable enough to warrant ‘shelving’ the Antarctic issue.¹³⁶ It then circulated the Escudero Plan to the claimant nations through its embassy in Washington, though without Washington’s knowledge or consent.¹³⁷ Counteracting the apparent one-upmanship, General Ramón Cañas Montalva, the commander-in-chief of the Chilean armed forces, informed Bowers of his desire for closer ties with the United States since he feared that Argentina had not given up its historic quest to usurp Chilean territory.¹³⁸ The foreign ministry declared that, for the same reason, Chile actually had no intention of letting the Falklands dispute affect its relations with the United States or Britain.¹³⁹

In the wake of this development, the Department of State refrained from advancing the elaborate non-sector claim that it had delineated after years of consideration.¹⁴⁰ Officials also feared that presenting it might prompt the Soviet Union to formalise a claim or interfere with the agreement between the Southern Cone and Britain to avoid further naval displays.¹⁴¹ In a significant victory for the Chileans, Washington finally decided to abandon its internationalisation proposal and promote the Escudero Plan.¹⁴² The Southern Cone had not turned into a bloc overtly hostile to the United States, and it would not do so since the neighbouring

¹³⁵ Division of Northern European Affairs to Division of American Republic Affairs, *et al.*, 26 Aug. 1948, National Archives, RG 59, 800.014 Antarctic.

¹³⁶ Ambassador Bowers to Secretary of State, No. 592, 2 Sept. 1948, National Archives, RG 59, 800.014 Antarctic.

¹³⁷ Division of Northern European Affairs (Green), Memorandum of Conversation, 7 Sept. 1948, National Archives, RG 59, 800.014 Antarctic.

¹³⁸ Division of North and West Coast Affairs, Memorandum, 9 Sept. 1948; Ambassador Bowers to Secretary of State, No. 508, 2 Aug. 1948; Paul C. Daniels for Acting Secretary of State to Ambassador Bowers, 24 Aug. 1948, National Archives, RG 59, 800.014 Antarctic.

¹³⁹ Ambassador in Chile (Bowers) to Secretary of State, 8 Oct. 1948, *FRUS*, 1948, vol. 1, pt. 2, pp. 1009–10.

¹⁴⁰ Undersecretary of State (Lovett) to Secretary of Defense (Forestal), 13 Aug. 1948, *FRUS*, 1948, vol. 1, pt. 2, pp. 1000–1.

¹⁴¹ Memorandum of Conversation, by Division of North and West Coast Affairs, 29 Dec. 1948; Embassy in London (Douglas) to Secretary of State, No. 786, 5 March 1949, National Archives, RG 59, 800.014 Antarctic. See also ‘Three Nations Bar Warships in Antarctic Area in ’49’, *The New York Times*, 19 Jan. 1949; ‘Moscow Renews Claims to Share in Antarctic’, *The New York Times*, 18 Feb. 1949.

¹⁴² Secretary of State (Acheson) to Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Souers), 29 Aug. 1949; Draft Declaration on Antarctica, Prepared by Department of State, in Memorandum of Conversation, by Division of Northern European Affairs, 13 Sept. 1949, *FRUS*, 1949, vol. 1, pp. 804–9.

states had territorial disputes that undermined their common Antarctic frontier.¹⁴³

Even though only Britain indicated receptiveness to the US-championed Chilean initiative, the other nations would be not require much persuasion to accept what amounted to formalised procrastination. In place of the Japanese and German ambitions in the Antarctic that had alarmed the United States a decade earlier there were now Soviet plans, albeit more perceived than real. Chilean officials were even more determined than their US counterparts to exclude the Soviets since their country neighboured the Antarctic and had first-hand experience of communist agitation.¹⁴⁴

As Argentina's government also had earned notoriety for its anticommunism, this ideology became a point around which the Anglo-Americans and Southern Conists could unite as the major Antarctic players. Substantial differences remained among them, but the threat of a common enemy could not be discounted. The United States, therefore, accepted the Chilean status quo proposal as the best means by which to gain more time for agreement on how to confront the 'red menace'. Escudero had authored the political status quo moratorium that called for a suspension of sovereignty claims and would be enshrined in Article IV of the Antarctic Treaty of 1959. That publicly overlooked feat was more than noteworthy; it was pivotal. Omission of this article would have counteracted the treaty's central purpose to address, however evasively, the question of ownership.¹⁴⁵

Conclusion

Among the many wonders discovered by Antarctic explorers in the 1940s were multi-coloured lakes that did not freeze despite being surrounded by glaciers.¹⁴⁶ The slow and eventually transient convergence of US and Chilean policies toward the white continent created another kind of oasis.

¹⁴³ Division of Northern European Affairs, Memorandum of Conversation, 23 March 1949, *FRUS*, 1949, vol. 1, pp. 795–6. See also Division of Riverplate Affairs to Division of Northern European Affairs, *et al.*, 25 March 1949; Division of Northern European Affairs (Green), Memorandum, 8 March 1949, National Archives, RG 59, 800.014 Antarctic.

¹⁴⁴ Embassy in Santiago (Trueblood) to Secretary of State, No. 118, 17 Feb. 1949, National Archives, RG 59, 800.014 Antarctic.

¹⁴⁵ Division of European Affairs, Trusteeship Agreement for Antarctica, 1 March 1948, National Archives, RG 59, 800.014 Antarctic. See also Office of American Republic Affairs, Memorandum, 15 Nov. 46, Department of State, *FRUS*, 1946, vol. 1, *The United Nations* (Washington, 1975), pp. 971–4.

¹⁴⁶ 'Navy Will Study Warm Polar Lakes', *The New York Times*, 4 Nov. 1947.

Early maritime rivalry had evolved into extreme political intervention from which Chileans recoiled at the same time as their officials capitalised on Washington's inability to gain support for internationalising the Antarctic. Rather than gaining anything substantive, Escudero and González Videla effectively prevented loss. Given their inability and unwillingness forcibly to expel others from the Chilean sector, their nominal preservation of territorial sovereignty was a formidable achievement.

Protestations of friendship with the United States had become obligatory since it was now the hemisphere's undisputed power broker. González Videla's disastrous experience attempting to share power with communists finally pushed him to assume a Cold War posture. Chile, however, was not the country that Ambassador Bowers chose to see through his embassy windows. It did not face a simple choice between communism and democracy, as he believed,¹⁴⁷ but one that spanned the political continuum from national socialism to Trotskyism – extremes that democratic coalitions had proven unable to rein in.

Early US representatives had declared on a regular basis that Washington had done Chile a favour by recognising its independence in 1822 and that this had left it with a moral debt.¹⁴⁸ The Department of State acted upon a similar assumption by coercing the Chilean government to enter the Second World War, and then by attempting to determine the status of Antarctica oblivious to the rights taken for granted by Chileans since the time of Bernardo O'Higgins. Yet, with characteristic political acumen, González Videla began to transform widespread bitterness toward US hegemony into rapprochement since Argentina and the Soviet Union posed more menacing threats.

After the Second World War, the United States had become obsessed with its own balance-of-power considerations that spanned the globe. Antarctica held far greater maritime and national security ramifications for Chile,¹⁴⁹ but the Department of State recognised that world wars had ignited over more 'trivial' disputes.¹⁵⁰ US officials' perception of the Pacific Basin as a *tabula rasa* had carried over to the Antarctic, another

¹⁴⁷ Bowers to Marshall, 13 Oct. 1947, *FRUS*, 1947, vol. 8, pp. 504–7.

¹⁴⁸ See Evans, *Chile*, 13–15 ff; Sater, *Chile*, 1, 16; Ramírez, *Historia*, p. 29; Mery, *Relaciones*, p. 73.

¹⁴⁹ Even today the Chilean Antarctic Institute (INACH) remains subject to national security legislation.

¹⁵⁰ Paper Prepared by the Policy Planning Staff, 9 June 1948, *FRUS*, 1948, vol. 1, pt. 2, pp. 977–87. See also PPS 31, Copy 9, attached to Secretary of State (Marshall) to Secretary of Defense (Forrestal), 10 June 1948, National Archives, RG 59, Records of the Policy Planning Staff. Of course, the Southern Cone nations and Britain considered the Antarctic anything but 'trivial.'

frontier that they considered ready to be ‘Americanised’.¹⁵¹ González Videla dared to assert national dignity in a successful attempt to preserve the Chilean Antarctic as a *tabula non rasa*.

William F. Sater presents the countries as *Empires in Conflict*,¹⁵² and his paradigm applies to their Antarctic interaction, linked, as it was, to their historic maritime rivalry and increasing US meddlesomeness in the smaller republic’s internal affairs. Though diplomats on both sides retained their composure, they fully appreciated that they were in the midst of what was effectively the world’s last great colonial partition. By 1949 the United States had encouraged the Southern Cone nations and Britain to sign a prohibition of naval displays that each would circumvent to its own advantage, and which did not deter later conflict over disputed territories. The Department of State itself, however, did not sign because it expected the US Navy to stage another major expedition.¹⁵³

Peter Beck refers to the ‘acrimonious’ tone of Southern Cone–British relations during this period without suggesting that this had any bearing on Chile’s attitude toward the United States, which ignored Latin America’s appeals to the Rio Treaty.¹⁵⁴ Escudero himself had indicated to Casper D. Green that Chileans resented US reluctance to oppose what they perceived as Old World imperialism. By poignantly referring to Chile as David standing before Goliath, he implied that the United States had chosen to aid and abet the latter.¹⁵⁵ Outright conflict was unimaginable, but Escudero’s counterproposal to the North American plan must be regarded as a bold initiative.

María Teresa Infante demurs on this point, indicating that the more was based on the assumption that the United States had decided against making a claim to discourage the Soviet Union from doing likewise.¹⁵⁶ However, during this period, Chileans both within and outside the policymaking establishment properly suspected that Washington had drafted plans for a claim extending over most of the continent, including the Chilean Antarctic.¹⁵⁷ The Soviet Union had announced no plans for

¹⁵¹ See Arrel Morgan Gibson, *Yankees in Paradise: The Pacific Basin Frontier* (Albuquerque, 1993), p. 3.

¹⁵² Sater, *Chile and the United States: Empires in Conflict* (Athens, Georgia, 1990).

¹⁵³ Division of North and West Coast Affairs to Office of American Republic Affairs, 1 Feb. 1949; Acting Secretary of State (Lovett) to Ambassador Bowers, 1 Dec. 1948, National Archives, RG 59. ¹⁵⁴ Beck, *International Politics*, p. 33.

¹⁵⁵ Caspar D. Green, Memorandum of Conversation, 17 July 1948, in Embassy in Santiago to Division of European Affairs, *et al.*, No. 477, 19 July 1948, National Archives, RG 59, 800.014 Antarctic.

¹⁵⁶ Infante in Stokke and Vidas (eds.), *Governing the Antarctic*, p. 364. See also Luís H. Mericq, *Antarctica: Chile’s Claim* (Washington, 1987).

¹⁵⁷ Secretary of Defense (Forrestal) to Undersecretary of State (Lovett), 3 Sept. 1948, *FRUS*, 1948, vol. 1, pt. 2, p. 1004; Undersecretary of State, Memorandum of Conversation, 16 Aug. 1948, RG 59, 800.014 Antarctic.

an expedition, only that it believed it had basis for claiming historical rights. Chile's growing anti-communist position did not deter the public from fearing the worst of Operation High Jump's military agenda – that it sought to turn the Antarctic into a nuclear testing ground, compared to which the Red Menace seemed almost benign.¹⁵⁸

Peter Beck employs secondary sources and apparent common sense to determine that Washington's primary motivation was to block potential Soviet advances,¹⁵⁹ and it is true that policymakers initially viewed an eight-power condominium arrangement as the best means by which to exclude the USSR. However, their unwillingness to announce a US claim became a self-imposed hurdle. The Escudero plan allowed for the possibility of forging an arrangement with the same objective. Chilean officials cautioned that any announcement of US rights beyond the unclaimed sector from 90° to 150° West would provoke animosity rather than cooperation. Their northern counterparts were aware of this and preferred to extend unstated rights over as much of Antarctica as possible in the misplaced anticipation that there might come a more opportune moment to formalise them.

If Chile could not take full responsibility for defeating the United States's proposal for internationalisation, it could do so for redefining how the continent would be addressed – with calculated avoidance rather than naïveté. Beck collectively blames the 'ambitions' of the claimant powers,¹⁶⁰ yet the Soviet Union would have benefited from the proposal's renunciation of sovereignty. Grave discord persisted in Washington where officials proved unable to agree upon and forward a claim or lead the claimant nations into any effective means of excluding the USSR. The Escudero Plan would later serve as the basis for the second US proposal for internationalisation, which would culminate in the Antarctic Treaty of 1959. Beck understates its significance; instead of merely being 'taken up in part',¹⁶¹ it became the prerequisite for any form of agreement. US officials recognised that the rest of the treaty would be rendered meaningless without Article IV, which incorporated Escudero's political moratorium.¹⁶²

The mutual mistrust that Joaquin Fernandois observes has always characterised US–Chilean relations was evident but still nuanced during

¹⁵⁸ See Ambassador Bowers to Secretary of State, 8 Aug. 1946, National Archives, RG 59, 800.014 Antarctic.

¹⁵⁹ Beck, *International Politics*, p. 40.

¹⁶⁰ Ibid.

¹⁶¹ Ibid., p. 36.

¹⁶² Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs to Office of the Deputy Undersecretary of State, Subject: Status of Information Discussions on Antarctica, 22 April 1959, RG 59, 702.022/4-2359.

these years.¹⁶³ The two empires – one past and never fully realised, the other present and undeniable – remained engaged in conflict, but now in a purely diplomatic arena in which cordiality defined the terms of engagement. They reached the threshold of cooperation, yet this would prove to be superficial when the United States later chose to involve the Soviet Union by extending to it a proposal that linked internationalisation to the Escudero Plan. As much as Santiago found this abhorrent, it had no choice other than to accept it. There would be no small irony in realising that it had contributed indirectly to legitimating the USSR's presence so close to its Antarctic sphere, and not far from its continental land mass.¹⁶⁴

The three-faceted rivalry addressed by this article resulted from differing national perceptions of Antarctica's value. Although little had been substantiated in regard to its mineral resources or means of exploiting them, for Chile Antarctica always had been a matter of geographical integrity. The peninsula that lay beneath it, regarded as the gateway to the frozen continent, could be utilised as easily as a gateway to the Southern Cone. National security issues accordingly preoccupied Santiago, whereas this was not the case for Washington, despite Admiral Richard E. Byrd's tendency to present his explorations as having serious consequences for his fellow countrymen. Jack Child posits that South Americans exaggerated the Antarctic's geopolitical significance,¹⁶⁵ however eloquently a map might suggest otherwise.

Chilean academics and policymakers always have seen the concept of geopolitics not as an abstract theory but as a series of practical initiatives. It is disappointing that Howard T. Pittman does not recognise the Escudero Plan as the exemplar of this tradition about which he writes,¹⁶⁶ for it, the brainstorm of a professor, effectively defended the country's self-perceived borders. Chargé d'Affaires Mario Rodríguez attempted to sensitise the Department of State to the fact that Chileans across the domestic political spectrum rallied behind their government's polar assertiveness.¹⁶⁷ Only when forced by circumstance did Washington

¹⁶³ Joaquin Fernandois, 'Chile and the Great Powers', in Morris (ed.), *Great Power Relations*, p. 103.

¹⁶⁴ Jason Kendall Moore, 'A "Sort" of Self-Denial: United States Policy toward Antarctica, 1950–1959', *Polar Record*, vol. 37, no. 200, Jan. 2001, pp. 13–26.

¹⁶⁵ Jack Child, 'South American Geopolitics and Antarctica: Confrontation or Cooperation?' in Kelly and Child (eds.), *Geopolitics of the Southern Cone*, pp. 188–9.

¹⁶⁶ Pittman, 'From O'Higgins to Pinochet', in Kelly and Child (eds.), *Geopolitics of the Southern Cone*, pp. 179–82.

¹⁶⁷ Division of Northern European Affairs (Green), Memorandum of Conversation, 30 Aug. 1948, National Archives, RG 59, 800.014 Antarctic. See also Christopher C. Joyner, 'The Role of Domestic Politics in Making United States Antarctic Policy', in Stokke and Vidas (eds.), *Governing the Antarctic*, p. 409.

accommodate this fact. Though US–Chilean relations had not diverged far from their tradition of scepticism, they did spare the world’s last continent from another *Baltimore* affair. It is to be hoped that today’s English-speaking scholars will recognise Antarctica as one of the most dynamic aspects of Latin America’s interaction with the rest of the world.