the need for emergency powers to bolster their own power. The most striking figure in this regard is Viktor Orbán in Hungary, who bypassed the normal constitutional procedures for initiating a state of danger—the legal form of a state of emergency—by proposing a new law that gave him unlimited decree powers for the duration of the pandemic, a duration that he had the power to determine himself.

This case is most extensively discussed by Kim Lane Scheppele and David Pozen, who also note, in what is a highly innovative analysis, that this form of constitutional overreach can be contrasted with the constitutional underreach of Donald Trump in the United States and of Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil. Both Trump and Bolsonaro failed to use the powers that were available to them to put in place scientifically advised public health measures. Instead, they pandered to their electoral base by siding with anti-public health protests and movements. Scheppele and Pozen suggest that such underreach is as much a danger to fundamental constitutional norms as overreach. We might say that those in authority should act with authority, including the authority of science.

Michael Ignatieff points out that for governments to follow the science meant, in effect, using epidemiology to legitimize a massive if temporary reduction in human freedoms. Even in the United Kingdom, France, and Canada, where the status of scientific advice was never under threat in the way it was with Trump and Bolsonaro, the science on offer was never simply technical advice, and the presence of scientists in press conferences and the like reinforced political authority with the authority of science. Those in political authority were buttressed by those with scientific authority.

In their introduction, Maduro and Kahn note that the pandemic broke at a time when populist movements had grown in democracies, building in part on a distrust of expertise as such. Although one feature of the pandemic was the pervading of everyday conversations by the sharing of epidemiological, viral, and modeling concepts in the mainstream and social media, this phenomenon coexisted with the mismatch between scientific evidence (what you can see) and everyday experience (what can be reasoned with).

That leads to the role of citizens in a democracy during a pandemic. Both Neil Walker and Susan Neiman draw attention to the forms of citizen collective action that contributed to public health goals. Walker sees compliance with lockdown measures as a form of widespread, if low cost, citizen participation. Neiman nicely puts on display some of her collection of "good news" stories from the pandemic, noting the many cases in which people volunteered time and resources to contribute to the public good. She sees this spontaneous collective action as leading to a wider undermining of the assumption of self-interest in political life, with positive implications for the future of democracy. These points are well taken, but the volume as a whole would have benefited from an analysis of how countervailing interests, including those of self-styled libertarians and anti-vaxxers, were able to solve *their* collective action problems when advancing their demands.

The book was produced during the height of the pandemic, before any vaccines had been discovered, before the election of President Biden, and before the sharp economic bounce-back in many countries that has led to fears of resurgent inflation. Inevitably, then, its half-life is likely to be short. Yet, this does not mean that some essays do not have lasting significance. In this category I would place Michael Ignatieff's stand-out discussion of the principles of democratic leadership during the pandemic. In 15 deftly written pages, Ignatieff uses comparative evidence to interrogate and show the limits of four principles that supposedly form a responsible policy stance to manage the pandemic: go early and hard, follow the science, be transparent, and do what it takes. He illustrates in particular how citizens and political scientists evaluating the performance of their governments have to make subtle judgments of timing and comparability.

In addition to these analytical points, Ignatieff offers a broader political message, suggesting that the pandemic shows the need for years of hard political work to correct inequalities that inflict premature death on people of color and the poor. In this context, his conclusion is noteworthy: "The moment that has arrived is a reckoning not with our virtues or with our identities, but with our willingness to sustain a politics with strangers we need as allies, across the racial and class divide." We might say it is a moment for governments to act with authority that is fully democratically legitimate and in the public interest.

The Liberalism of Care: Community, Philosophy and Ethics. By Shawn C. Fraistat. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2021. 280p. $105.00 cloth, $35.00 paper.
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Shawn Fraistat's *The Liberalism of Care*: *Community, Philosophy and Ethics* makes an important contribution to rethinking both the liberal tradition and the reading of that tradition in contemporary care ethics. Much of the work on care ethics tends to fall into one of two camps: work that contends that care is absent in the dominant texts of the western traditions or work that contends that care is so fundamental to the human condition that it has always been "there"—if only on the margins and done by the marginalized. Fraistat makes the novel argument that care has been a central feature of the way three philosophers—Plato, Rousseau, and Godwin—have configured the rights and responsibilities of citizens. Because these thinkers do not sit comfortably within the canon of

liberalism, nor are they commonly sources for work on care, Fraistat's task is both novel and ambitious.

The book is organized as a "care"-themed rereading of the texts of these three thinkers. Plato, Rousseau, and Godwin each get two chapters devoted to their respective works: one highlighting care and a second elaborating the relationship between care and political authority. Fraistat begins by offering a reading of Plato that challenges the more conventional one by asserting that the philosopher is not merely contemplative but is also caring: "philosophers retain those elements of *eros* that find their expression in care for others" (p. 49), and "while Plato presents contemplation as the most exalted activity of which human beings are capable, one that diminishes the urgency of other concerns, it transforms the way one cares for others without wholly displacing it" (p. 50). Because Plato's philosophers are also "kings" charged with ruling, this care is already a political concept, albeit one that inclines to authoritarianism—a concern that Fraistat acknowledges while also praising Plato for recognizing the value of expert knowledge in caregiving (p. 76).

A key theme emerges here and is sustained throughout the book: expertise, Fraistat claims, need not preclude soliciting the input of or being responsive to one's charges. Although Plato's work doesn't concede this possibility, Fraistat argues that Rousseau's nuanced account of "subordinate sovereignty" reconciles the role of expertise with meaningful political participation. "Subordinate sovereignty," as Fraistat defines it, is "the principle that authority relationships should be configured such that the superordinate party molds the judgment of the subordinate, even while the subordinate is entrusted with the final say" (p. 85). Here Fraistat celebrates what many have criticized in Rousseau: the tension between his commitment to participatory democracy and his conviction that it is the general will and not merely majority will that must guide our collective political decisions. Fraistat's comfort with this tension is grounded in his reading of Rousseau's work on education in *Emile.* He sees in Emile's socialization a commitment to caring authority with greater attention to the problem of domination than evidenced in Plato: "All of Rousseau's model authority figures, including Emile's tutor, Wolmar in *Julie* and the lawgiver in the Social Contract use their authority to promote the well-being of others by meeting important needs. They do so with attentiveness, responsibility, competence and responsiveness, and they are described in caregiving terms" (p. 117). And yet, he concedes that Rousseau still suffers from the problem of being insufficiently democratic: "political wisdom remains the preserve of a few and women are excluded altogether" (p. 145). Ultimately it is not, however, the democratic failings of Rousseau that chiefly concern Fraistat. Instead, it is Rousseau's illiberalism. Although both Rousseau and Plato outline caring institutions, he concludes that they provide "insufficient space for critical reflection and self-determination" (p. 146). It is to remedy this that Fraistat turns finally to Godwin.

Godwin, like Rousseau and Plato, offers an account of education in which caring morality is evident. According to Fraistat, Godwin comes the closest to offering a version of care resonant with the contemporary literature: "Godwin places a great deal of emphasis on responding to and remedying vulnerability by meeting important needs. Stressing the care-ethical value of responsibility, Godwin deplores the neglect with which so many are treated, arguing in favor of a capacious mandate to seek out and assist vulnerable individuals" (p. 159). Centering care must, as feminist work on the subject has recognized, avoid both domination and neglect. Although liberalism has historically been attentive to the problem of domination, it has in both theory and practice had little to say about neglect. Godwin's anarchist sympathies set him up to avoid rather than address the problem of domination by imagining away the problem of authority altogether. As Fraistat points out, Godwin acknowledges that some tasks might be appropriately "expert" (homebuilding for example), but "politics doesn't admit of expertise to the same degree" (p. 186). Here, we might understand Godwin as taking a more meaningfully democratic turn in centering conversation and neighborly relations because doing so will "inspire individuals with the caring disposition that will lead them to attend to others without complex coordination or coercion" (p. 189). In Godwin we get the first account of care in which the roles of caregiver and cared-for are potentially fluid, rather than fixed locations rooted in contextually specific responsive rather than recalcitrant relationships of authority.

In rereading these texts with a focus on care, Fraistat offers a challenge to the more familiar theoretical understanding of liberalism as inevitably the "minimal liberalism" he associates with John Locke, John Rawls, and Robert Nozick. This is an important move. But Fraistat articulates his motivation for his project as something more than a revision of intellectual history: "I am pointing to a political crisis around caregiving services: insufficient levels of care are creating political upheavals that pose a threat to individual rights and to democratic governance" (p. 5). Because Fraistat grounds his account of care almost exclusively in the relationship between educator and student, his work is limited in its ability to address this broader crisis. Fraistat ends with a call to "theorize the kinds of educative experiences that might equip students to care more about the interests of others, including those who don't resemble themselves" (p. 204). Although this is surely appealing from both the perspective of liberal democracy and of care, it is also inadequate for addressing the care crisis. First, without a more grounded analysis of the institutional power and politics within which such an educative experience

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unfolds, it is unclear how this educative experience informs a move from what Joan Tronto calls "caring about" to "doing the work of care." That, as Nancy Fraser, Mignon Duffy, and Jennifer Nedelsky have recognized, will require significant intervention in the existing relationship between markets and states. Second, although we may join Fraistat in his concern about the potential excesses of authority on the part of caretakers as "educators," we are more likely to worry about the potential exploitation of caretakers as nursing assistants or public school teachers under COVID. A more focused engagement with some of the recent work on care ethics would position Fraistat to speak to both sets of concerns.

AMERICAN POLITICS

Firepower: How the NRA Turned Gun Owners into a Political Force. By Matthew J. Lacombe. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2021. 312p. $29.95 cloth.
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Observers of gun politics have long noted that much of the National Rifle Association's (NRA) political influence comes from its ability to mobilize its members effectively. Journalistic accounts suggest that gun rights supporters inundate the offices of elected officials with calls every time a bill noxious to the NRA's agenda is introduced. Yet, going back to Mancur Olson's 1965 book, *The Logic of Collective Action*, studies of interest groups have warned how difficult it is to sustain collective action among the public. In *Disarmed*, Kristin Goss (2006) showed that gun control activists have been unable to generate the kind of sustained enthusiasm and commitment required for policy change. So how has the NRA succeeded where many others have failed?

To answer this question, Matthew Lacombe draws on social identity theory. A perspective in psychology that has recently made inroads in political science, social identity theory argues that people have an innate need to belong and behave as group members. According to Lacombe, organized groups such as the NRA build identities by vesting membership not simply with material benefits, but also with positive traits appealing to current and prospective members. In this case, gun owners are "law-abiding citizens" and "peaceable" Americans. This identity-building encourages members to "see themselves as a distinct social group and feel emotionally tied" to other members (p. 22). Group opponents are depicted in undesirable terms, in this case as "elitists" and out of touch. Negative depictions of opponents create an "us vs. them" context, increasing the emotional distance between the two groups and hardening intergroup boundaries. The NRA has further empowered this gun owner identity by linking it to other important identities such as gender, race, and religion (p. 178).

Creating a social identity is not by itself sufficient to turn an organization into a political influencer. According to Lacombe, the NRA has been a successful political player because it "politicized" its members' social identity. The association vested the gun owner identity with political meaning and created linkages between being a group member and various political attitudes and policy preferences. It has successfully disseminated this identity and related ideology through popular programs geared to the general public—from kids' gun safety to adult concealed-carry training—programs that the NRA monopolizes. In effect, in the context of practical skills programs, the group teaches participants what it means to be a good gun owner and what political groups and policy ideas fit in with that understanding of the self. The in-person socialization acts to further cement people's ties to the organization through identity development (p. 229). Finally, organizations can use identities to mobilize their members politically. Group members tend to respond to threats to their identities, and the politicization of the gun owner identity suggests that action in the domain of politics is the appropriate response to neutralize the threat.

The creation of a gun owner social identity and its embeddedness in a gun-centric ideology with linkages to other political issues have served the NRA well in multiple ways. First, the organization has implicit agenda-setting power: anticipating a vocal response from NRA members, politicians are more hesitant to introduce legislation inconsistent with its preferences. Second, the NRA is an essential player in electoral politics because its members are active at the voter booth and are primarily single-issue voters. Third, by investing gun ownership with an ideology, the NRA has successfully linked its core concern (gun rights) to other issues such as crime, enabling the association to develop strong coalitions within the broader conservative space and become a pivot player in Republican Party politics.

Lacombe seeks evidence that the NRA has cultivated a social identity and a gun-centric ideology in a clever and careful analysis of texts from the 1930s to the twenty-first century. His methodology includes content analysis based on machine learning and plagiarism algorithms that compare across texts and identify the level of similarity. Public opinion data are also interspersed in the chapters to help make broader claims.

Lacombe's analysis of the editorial columns of *American Rifleman*, the NRA's flagship monthly magazine, shows