

if, though, the Old Oligarch's contention ([X.] *Ath.* 2.18) about the *demos's* restrictions on abuse of democracy in comedy is factual (so that the purpose of invective comedy was to *protect* the *demos* against its own political leaders)? In that case, the audience conjured by O. could not exist and the play, despite appearances, could not be saying what it appears on the surface to be saying. O's thesis would be undermined further if the play referred to at 378–9 were not *Babylonians* (we have only the assertion of the notoriously unreliable scholia as evidence), or if Rosen (*Old Comedy and the Iambographic Tradition* [Atlanta, 1988], 63–4) is correct in seeing the whole Kleon conflict as a fiction constructed to enhance the poet's own reputation (admitted by O. on p. xxx to be 'impossible to prove . . . not true'). With comedy especially, one needs to establish a context for interpretation independently of the text, precisely because the comic text is designed to mesh with and respond to knowledge already possessed (or presumed to be possessed) by the intended audience.

My second question, the relationship between Aristophanes and his comic rivals, also has a bearing on this issue. There can be no doubt that there is cross-reference between comedies. What if allusion to and parody of other comedies were a central rather than a peripheral feature of the genre? This would mean that inferences which connect the text directly with reality would all be questionable: a comic scene might be the point of reference. On the more specific application of this theory to *Acharnians*, O. (p. 180 on 405–6) dismisses Bowie's suggestion that Dikaiopolis was meant to recall for the audience not Aristophanes himself but the comic poet Eupolis with the argument that 'the intrusive "I" that breaks into the text for the first time at 299–302 is beyond any doubt the voice of the author of the present play rather than of one of his rivals'. I note here first the lack of consistency between this interpretation of the 'I' of 299–302 and that offered for the 'me' of 1154–5, where O. is prepared to see (among a number of other possibilities) the chorus referring to its past self as a chorus of Cratinus or Eupolis. On what grounds can we say that the 'I' of 299–302 might not have a similar referent? Secondly, it is a standard narrative ploy in modern fiction to have an 'I' represent someone other than the actual author, and given the state of our evidence and of the discussion on this issue, there is no way of telling from the text itself whether or not this is the way the device is being used in *Acharnians*. O. seems altogether too positive given the state of the evidence that a knowledge of the plays of Aristophanes' rivals would not fundamentally transform our understanding of Aristophanes' comedies. More generally, we risk fooling ourselves if we think that there is safety in sticking to the positivistic notion that texts—especially comic plays from a widely different and long-dead culture—offer us the blueprint for their own understanding.

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## CITIZENS IN COMEDY

J. F. MCGLEW: *Citizens on Stage. Comedy and Political Culture in the Athenian Democracy*. Pp. vii + 239. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2002. Cased, US\$52.50/£37.50. ISBN: 0-472-11285-6.

James F. McGlew, previously known to scholarship for *Tyranny and Political Culture in Ancient Greece* (Ithaca, 1993), now turns his attention to Old Comedy. However, despite the reference to the stage in the title, his new book is not about stagecraft or performance, but about political ideology. He aims to show the relationship between

private life and political activities in the late fifth and early fourth centuries B.C. by examining the ways in which comedy presents the Athenian citizen.

His introduction begins, surprisingly, with the speech attributed to Aristophanes in Plato's *Symposium* and with the tripartite state and soul in the *Republic*; although he asserts in a footnote 'The present book is predominately about metaphorical divisions of the soul and the body politic', I never discovered the relevance of this to the rest of the book. Six chapters follow. The first argues that Kratinos opposed the ideals of Perikles, as presented in the funeral oration attributed to him by Thucydides. The next two discuss *Akharnians* and *Horsemen (Knights)* respectively. The fourth chapter departs from comedy to discuss the motives of the profanation of the Mysteries and the mutilation of the Hermai in 415. Then comes consideration of *Lysistrata*, together with the parabasis (only) of *Frogs*. The sixth chapter is about *Ekklesiazousai* and *Wealth*, and is followed by a few pages of conclusion subtitled 'In Defense of Desire'. Thus five of the extant plays of Old Comedy are not discussed; the omission of *Wasps*, with its depiction of the citizen-juror, is especially surprising.

The subject is potentially interesting, but unfortunately the book is marred by serious weaknesses. First, the author's grasp of the Greek language is unreliable; for example, within the short passage *Lysistrata* 387–98 he blunders twice, translating *ὀρχουμένη* as 'crying' and *ὑποπεπωκῆ* as 'falling' (pp. 144–5). Secondly, he misuses technical terms, as when, also in *Lysistrata*, he states that Kinesias has 'his own personal agon' (p. 156). Thirdly, his specific references are sometimes careless and inaccurate; in *Akharnians*, for instance, he refers to 'Lamachus's gorgon-crested helmet', confusing the helmet with the shield (p. 70). Fourthly, his style of writing is so poor that in many of his sentences the meaning is drowned in vague abstractions, making parts of his argument unintelligible. What are we to make of sentences like 'with her sex strike, [Lysistrata] not only labels a new outbreak of coercive and divisive rhetoric but also proposes a solution that would fix the social and political infrastructure from which that rhetoric arises' (p. 148)?

But the most serious fault is the weak quality of the argumentation. I give one example. Chapter 1, entitled 'Exposing Hypocrisy', draws a contrast between the Perikleian (or Thucydidean) funeral oration and Kratinos' lost comedy *Dionysalexandros*, and maintains that Kratinos attacked the 'sordid desires' underlying Perikles' rhetoric. Actually the extant fragments of *Dionysalexandros* never mention Perikles, as M. admits, so that his argument rests entirely on the last sentence of the fragmentary *hypothesis* of the play (P. Oxy. 663; Kassel and Austin, *Poetae Comici Graeci* 4, p. 140—which is not, as M. supposes, fr. 38 KA), translated by M. thus: 'Pericles is very persuasively attacked in the play by insinuating that he brought the war on the Athenians' (p. 47). That might mean simply that one speech in the play blamed Perikles for the Peloponnesian War, much like *Akharnians* 515–39. However, one phrase, omitted in M.'s translation but mentioned in his next sentence, may perhaps tell us more; it is *δι' ἐμφάσεως*, but what does it mean? The word *ἐμφάσις* is notoriously difficult. If it comes from *ἐν* and *φάσις*, does it refer to Perikles' 'appearance in' the play? M., ignoring that possibility (which would have supported his view), takes it as meaning 'allegorical suggestion', and proceeds, with no other evidence, to assume that Dionysos in the play represented Perikles, and that, when the three goddesses (in the Judgement of Paris scene, in which Dionysos took the place of Paris) offered a choice of political power, success in war, or personal beauty, Perikles was being accused of having all three of those selfish aims. M. goes on to assert: 'Pericles' private desires are made the driving engine behind the mythological adventure described in the hypothesis of *Dionysalexandros*; exposed in the Judgment of Pericles, with which the play opens,

they are elaborated throughout the rest of the play' (p. 52). But the evidence is quite inadequate to support such a reconstruction. Apart from responsibility for the war, we know nothing at all of what Kratinos said about Perikles in that play.

My conclusion is that, regrettably, I have learned nothing about Old Comedy from this book.

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## APOLLONIAN ANGER

P. DRÄGER: *Die Argonautika des Apollonios Rhodios. Das zweite Zorn-Epos der griechischen Literatur*. Pp. viii + 174. Munich and Leipzig: K. G. Saur, 2001. Cased, €80. ISBN: 3-598-77707-8.

Many of the Apollonian studies of the last two decades have presented us with the certainty that the Argonautic protagonists were quite different 'heroes' from those of Homer, and that an important manifestation of this difference was the rejection of 'Achillean' anger as a behavioural pattern by most of the Argonautic characters (see lastly R. Hunter, 'Le 'Argonautiche' di Apollonio Rodio e la tradizione epica', in R. Hunter and M. Fantuzzi, *Muse e modelli, la poesia ellenistica da Alessandro Magno ad Augusto* [Rome and Bari, 2002], 137–52). We have therefore to welcome Dräger's provocative effort to show that the whole *Argonautica* is structured (i) around the anger of Zeus as prime mover of the Argonautic enterprise, an anger primarily caused by the attempted sacrifice of Phrixus at Zeus' altar, which had to be expiated with the return of the golden fleece to Greece, as is first stated at ll. 2.1194–5 and 3.336–9; later aroused again by the sacrilegious *maschalismos* of Apsyrtos, which had to be expiated with the purification by Kirke and the Lybian wanderings, cf. 4.557–61; and (ii) around the cooperative actions of Apollo, who utters the oracle to Pelias, which is quoted at the beginning of the poem as the cause of the expedition. This 'double perspective' is, according to D., a unitarian design underlying the *Argonautica*, though as a *poeta doctus* Apollonius would keep the motive of Zeus' anger hidden to the readers till the middle of the poem (after all, the anger of Poseidon, the most crucial mover of Odysseus's wanderings, had also been revealed in the *Odyssey* just before the middle of the poem, at 11.102–3 and 121–31: cf. pp. 126–34). Indeed, this double perspective is hardly attested in the other versions of the Argonautic myth (pp. 7–58), and hence would be a conscious imitation/emulation by Apollonius of the same double perspective operating in the *Iliad* (pp. 59–61): it accounts for a number of events of the enterprise which are generated by somebody's anger or indignation for transgressions of laws or customs (pp. 62–79); it also explains (on pp. 85–119) the prominence in the poem of descendants from Zeus (Pelus, Telamon, Polydeukes and Kastor, Herakles), or of characters connected with Apollo (Orpheus, Idmon, Mopsus, Phineus), no less than the consequent overshadowing of some heroes who are not connected with Zeus (Meleager, Theseus, Idas).

No previous essay has pursued the unity of the narrative design of the *Argonautica* with a subtlety and a logical coherence comparable to D.'s, and as an answer to the task of finding a 'Leitidee' (p. 5), this book is a success, though not all the modern scholars involved in the 'Rehabilitierung der hellenistischen Dichtung' will (still) believe that to spot the 'unity' of the *Argonautica* is a vital aim of this task. It is also a successful continuation of the interest about the rôle of divine agency inside the *Argonautica* and