in developed democracies, but also because they turn on its head classic findings of voting behavior in Argentina (see Mora y Aurajo y Llorente's *El Voto Peronista*, 1975). In so doing the book shows that, contrary to conventional wisdom, voters in contemporary Argentina no longer cast their votes based on partisan affiliations or positional issues; instead they do so mostly based on valence issues.

A Political Economy of the United States, China, and India: Prosperity with Inequality. By Shalendra D. Sharma. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2018. 230p. $99.99 cloth, $29.99 paper.
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After a relative period of neglect, the subject of economic inequality has attained significant prominence in social science research, at least since the early 2000s. Among the major works that have addressed the issue since then, Thomas Piketty's *Capital in the Twenty First Century* (2013) has certainly been one of the most quoted (or alluded to); indeed, it has reached a level of popular acclaim or at least recognition that is unmatched by most other academic titles of its kind. One interpretation of Piketty's central point— that inequality results when, in the long run, the average rate of return on capital exceeds the growth rate—is that this phenomenon is inherent in capitalism. Joseph Stiglitz ("Inequality is Not Inevitable," *New York Times*, June 29, 2014), among others, has criticized this interpretation. Shalendra Sharma's *A Political Economy of the United States, China, and India* likewise interprets Piketty's argument as positing the inevitability of this outcome under a capitalist system. And Sharma—again, much as Stiglitz and others do—points out that inequality, rather than being inevitable, is a result of policy choices, which in turn are quintessentially political outcomes.

The book does not have an overarching argument or a theoretical framework about the causes of inequality. Rather, it summarizes research on the determinants of inequality in each of the three countries in its title. Thus, for instance, chapter 2 on the United States, recapitulates research in political science and economics—including work by Raj Chetty and colleagues, Martin Gilens and Benjamin Page, Jacob Hacker and Paul Pierson, and Nicholas Carnes—on the determinants of economic inequality. Chapters 3 and 4 continue in a similar vein, summarizing research on this topic relevant to China and India, respectively. The surveys are generally organized under (the mutually nonexclusive) categories of "politics" or "political economy" and "globalization," with the former focusing on the domestic political sources of inequality and the latter on the dynamics of global trade and finance that also tend to have an effect on inequality. Although the lack of a theoretical framework leads to one obvious weakness—there is no theoretical justification for the selection of the three cases (beyond the practical or pragmatic one of examining inequality in three politically and economically important countries)—such an approach also has its advantages. The literature covered is quite comprehensive, and the asides on the politics of interstate trade and finance (especially between China and the United States) are obviously of great interest. As such, this book would be valuable to anybody seeking an introduction to the recent debate on economic inequality.

Sharma makes sure that all sides of the debate get a fair hearing. He includes thinkers who argue either that inequality is not the problem it is made out to be (because, *inter alia*, personal well-being has improved greatly) or that it is not as severe as some of the data might lead one to believe. Sharma also considers the views of those who claim that redistribution to equalize wealth and income would be either impractical or unjust (pp. 154–55). He points out, for instance, that those making more than one million dollars in the United States (comprising 0.3% of all tax returns) contribute 27% of total revenues (p. 45). This, however, should not be too surprising given progressive taxation and high levels of income inequality. Comparable figures from some of the other OECD countries (which are not provided) would perhaps have helped better make at least part of the case—presumably that higher shares in government revenues somehow compensate for inequality or inequality is an inevitable (or just?) price to pay for higher government revenues.

Part of Thomas Piketty's argument, however, is also about politics. His work can be seen as providing, in Stiglitz's words, "an institutional context for understanding the deepening of inequality over time" ("Inequality Is Not Inevitable"). Sharma briefly notes something similar when he quotes Piketty as acknowledging the political nature of economic inequality (p. 10), but then accuses him of disregarding his own advice not to reduce everything to "purely economic mechanisms" (p. 10). Yet Piketty's economic mechanisms are themselves replete with politics. To take just one example, his explanation of how low inflation throughout the nineteenth century, combined with regular interest payments by governments (principally in Britain and France) on their huge public debts, essentially redistributed wealth upward (*Capital in the Twenty First Century*, pp. 126–34) implies some fundamentally political calculations on the part of policy makers. Perhaps the central problem is the very distinction between "political" and "economic" mechanisms. Sharma briefly references Polanyi to make the point that the market is fundamentally political in nature (p. 11), but then subsequently reverts to the distinction between economic and political causes of inequality. He argues, for instance, that the political prerogatives of the

Communist Party distort "the workings of free markets" (p. 32), yet an appreciation of Polanyi's and other economic sociologists' arguments would imply that there is no such thing as the natural "free market."

Further, as noted earlier, Sharma distinguishes between global market forces and politics (p. 33). Yet global market forces are not bereft of politics, at least if we take seriously Polanyi (and other economic sociologists, like Greta Krippner, whom the author quotes). Again, in the chapter on India, Sharma bemoans that decisions regarding the allocation of resources are "heavily influenced by political considerations rather than sound technical and economic criteria" (p. 149), as if "technical and economic criteria" are not or cannot be political. A realization that "markets and states are intrinsically interwoven" (p. 154)—or, as some might put it, mutually constitutive—is not quite consistent with statements about how "state intervention" distorts the market and is a "second-best" solution (pp. 155, 162). Some degree of contradiction is perhaps inevitable in a work that seeks to represent all sides of a debate without taking any specific position—beyond the very broad one that both market forces and politics matter—because some theoretical positions are difficult to reconcile, as is the case with the sociological and neoclassical views of the market.

Finally, let me offer a few minor—mainly production-related—observations; the "high earner" referred to on p. 155 is presumably Mark Zuckerberg (the CEO of Facebook), and not Mark Zuckerman. Some direct quotes on pp. 89 and 90 are missing page number citations. Illegal immigration, and the resultant labor market competition, is mentioned as one of the causes of growing inequality in the United States, but no evidence is cited for this assertion (p. 50).

Overall, the book's broad coverage is valuable, even if it lacks a precise and cohesive argument and its claims about the relationship between politics and economics with respect to the market are problematic. As such, it would be useful in an undergraduate or beginning graduate course on inequality and economic development.

Mines, Communities, and States: The Local Politics of Natural Resource Extraction in Africa. By Jessica Steinberg. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019. 282p. $99.99 cloth.
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Jessica Steinberg's new book aims to explain the logic and outcomes of the "three-actor strategic contexts" (p. 21) in which firms, communities, and states interact. She does so with an innovative mixed-methodology approach that combines formal (game-theoretic) modeling, fieldwork-based case studies, and statistical analysis. The ambition of this book is staggering. Steinberg purports to unify three distinct literatures on social conflict within a single framework to explain why firms provide goods to communities, when communities choose to mobilize, and how states respond to mobilization. The book delivers on this promise. Indeed, I think it may be the most important intellectual contribution to scholarship on resource conflicts in a decade. It certainly joins a small club of analyses that have opened new intellectual vistas and methodologies for the study of local resource conflicts. Consequently, this book is a must-read for anyone working in the highly dynamic subfield of subnational resource conflicts, regardless of geographical expertise.

The innovative core of the book—that is to say the formal (game-theoretical) model of the three-actor strategic context—is found in chapter 3, pp. 66–82. Readers who are short on time or commitment should focus their effort on these pages. It is hard reading for those from intellectual and disciplinary traditions that do not embrace formal modeling (such as this reviewer), but it's worth it. Steinberg provides the required equations and proofs, but her qualitative explanation is accessible and not overrun by modeler's jargon. Chapters 5 and 6 test the internal validity of the model with case studies from Mozambique, Zambia, and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Chapters 9 and 10 test the external validity of the model with statistical analyses of when communities mobilize and when governments choose to repress protest. Chapter 11 draws together the main conclusions of the book and provides an interesting sketch of avenues for future research.

As Steinberg puts it, she develops a single theoretical frame that explains "incentives for goods provision by firms, mobilization by communities in extractive regions, and the use of government repression" (p. 23). She starts from the observation that local resource conflicts are territorialized by definition, and therefore they compel the interaction of the three actors examined in the book: the mining firm, local populations, and the government. In this context, actor beliefs about each other's behavior, as well as contextual characteristics (such as the interruptibility of the mine, the cost of mitigating environmental externalities, the costs of engaging in protest), shape the incentives for actor behavior. The complexity of the model makes the argument difficult to summarize briefly in written format, but the figure on p. 74 provides a useful summary of the sequence of play and key decision points.

Her model begins with the firm figuring out the value of a "transfer" to local populations that is necessary to compensate for the externalities associated with the mine and that constitutes the bundle of contractual and voluntary undertakings promised as a result of the environmental impact assessment, relocation plan processes, and corporate social responsibility. At the first decision point, the firm decides whether to honor that promise or to renege on it. If it honors the promise,