

## TANGIER IN THE RESTORATION EMPIRE\*

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**ABSTRACT.** *This article reintegrates the colonization of Tangier into our understanding of the development of the English empire in the latter half of the seventeenth century. At its acquisition in 1661, Tangier appeared integral to the imperial ambitions of the restored monarchy and promised to carry England's commercial and maritime empire into the Mediterranean. This article argues that the particular conceptions of imperial and commercial organization that underlay the occupation of Tangier isolated the city from England's wider empire and contributed to its failure. The creation of a free port and crown colony at Tangier reflected prevalent perceptions of the political economy of trade in the Mediterranean, but added to a wider process whereby ideological debates over the organization of trade and empire helped to create legal and jurisdictional boundaries that differentiated oceanic space. As a free port, Tangier was out of place within an empire increasingly defined by exclusive and restricted trade. It was, however, the ideological significance of Tangier's status as a crown colony that made it unsustainable. Unable to sustain or surrender its sovereignty over Tangier, the crown abandoned the city in the face of Moroccan empire-building.*

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Although the occupation of Tangier between 1661 and 1684 was one of the most ambitious and intensive overseas projects of the seventeenth-century English state, the ultimate evacuation of the city in the face of parliamentary opposition and Moroccan hostility has long caused historians to neglect the colony and its significance for the development of English empire.<sup>1</sup> This

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<sup>1</sup> The older histories that remain the key references for the settlement of Tangier tended not to trace connections between Tangier and England's global empire, as in E. M. G. Routh's *Tangier: England's lost Atlantic outpost, 1661–1684* (London, 1912), which remains the only full-length study of the English occupation of Tangier, or focused on the city's role for English naval history in the Mediterranean, as with Julian Corbett's *England in the Mediterranean: a study of the rise and influence of British power within the Straits, 1603–1713* (London, 1904). Stephen

teleological perspective reflects the broader absence of the Mediterranean from an imperial historiography preoccupied with the rise of settler colonialism in North America and, to a lesser extent, with the commercial success of the East India Company. Since England's empire ultimately centred on the Atlantic and Indian Oceans, scholars have generally assumed that Tangier and the Mediterranean were irrelevant for English empire-building. At a time when the Levant Company enjoyed its greatest prosperity, and wars against Muslim corsairs regularly occupied the royal navy, the colonization of Tangier testified, however, to the enduring importance of the Mediterranean for England's commercial and maritime expansion.<sup>2</sup> Charles II, some of his ministers, and a range of observers envisioned the North African city as a hub within England's trading empire and accordingly sought to transform it into an entrepôt and safe harbour linking the increasingly global threads of English commerce. Seemingly out of place in the evolution of an empire oriented around its American colonies, Tangier could appear central to a seaborne empire that incorporated 'acquisitions' in the Americas, 'ports' in the Indies, and 'important fortresses in Africa'.<sup>3</sup>

Recent scholarship focused on the Anglo-Moroccan relations that shaped Tangier's development has thus largely missed the city's real consequence for the development of an English empire. These works have argued that the settlement of Tangier illustrates either England's increasingly aggressive approach to the Muslim world or the limits of its ability to confront Muslim powers.<sup>4</sup> Yet the full significance of the colonization of Tangier lies in its relationship to England's wider imperial development. Proclaiming Tangier a free port, the crown adopted a mercantile policy that departed from the legally defined national and corporate trades that increasingly linked England to its overseas possessions. While the Navigation Acts reserved England's colonial commerce for English merchants and ships, the colonization of Tangier rested on a different approach to the political economy of empire. As a crown colony and free port at the junction of Atlantic and Mediterranean worlds, Tangier stood quite

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Saunders Webb later presented Tangier as a training ground for the authoritarian governor-generals he saw as the primary drivers of the seventeenth-century English empire, *1676: the end of American independence* (New York, NY, 1984), pp. 151–4, 203–4, and idem, *Lord Churchill's coup: the Anglo-American empire and the Glorious Revolution reconsidered* (New York, NY, 1995), pp. 18–25. Historians of Britain's seventeenth-century overseas expansion have begun to reintegrate Tangier into the wider early modern British empire, most influentially Linda Colley in *Captives: Britain, empire and the world, 1600–1850* (New York, NY, 2004), ch. 1, passim.

<sup>2</sup> James Mather, *Pashas: traders and travellers in the Islamic world* (New Haven, CT, and London, 2009), pp. 129–30; Sari Hornstein, *The restoration navy and English foreign trade, 1674–1688: a study in the peacetime use of sea power* (Aldershot, 1991).

<sup>3</sup> See Pietro Mocenigo's description of the English empire in his dispatch to the Senate of Venice, 9 June 1671, in Allen B. Hinds, ed., *Calendar of state papers relating to English affairs in the archives of Venice* (38 vols., London, 1864–1947), xxxvii 1671–1672, p. 55.

<sup>4</sup> These contrasting approaches are best represented by, respectively, Nabil Matar, *Britain and Barbary, 1589–1689* (Gainesville, FL, 2005), ch. 5, passim, and Colley, *Captives*, pp. 37–41.

literally at the cross-roads of ideological debates that shaped the development of English empire from the mid-seventeenth century. The imperial vision that underlay the colonization of Tangier proved ill-suited, however, to the changing context of North African politics and English empire.

This article argues that the ideological foundations of the occupation of Tangier not only contributed to the colony's ultimate failure, but also isolated it within the evolution of an English empire based on the Atlantic and Indian Oceans. Rather than reaffirming the absence of the Mediterranean from our understanding of English imperial development, the abandonment of Tangier instead highlights an extended process through which competing models for the organization of overseas trade and empire defined the shape of empire for the following century. The first section of this article accordingly recovers the particular conception of English empire that inspired the acquisition of Tangier. Alison Games has recently observed that the history of Tangier testifies to the existence of 'multiple English paths toward imperial rule', arguing that plans for Tangier drew on contrasting models of colonial plantation and commercial accommodation drawn from the English experience of the Atlantic and Mediterranean trading worlds respectively.<sup>5</sup> Neither model, though, fully reflects expectations for Tangier's value within a self-consciously maritime and trading empire. The questions that surrounded the settlement of Tangier centred not on whether the English should pursue commerce or conquest along the North African coast, but on how that trade should be organized and whether the crown or a company should oversee it. The second section examines how these debates divorced Tangier from the development of England's increasingly global empire. The creation of a free port at Tangier oriented the city toward the Mediterranean, but further reflected the rise of intra-imperial boundaries that increasingly differentiated maritime space. As the Navigation Acts defined an economy spanning the Atlantic, they also excluded Tangier from that emerging colonial system.

Crown possession of Tangier similarly proved to be incompatible with domestic opposition and the sovereign claims of an assurgent Moroccan empire. Throughout the Mediterranean, centuries of religiously inspired warfare shaped the ideological dynamics of state formation and competition. Inimical to the Islamic states of the Mediterranean, Christian settlements on the northern coast of Africa, such as Tangier, were particularly vulnerable to the revitalized Muslim polities that emerged or resurfaced in the later seventeenth century as major powers in the Mediterranean basin.<sup>6</sup> As the final

<sup>5</sup> Alison Games, *The web of empire: English cosmopolitans in an age of expansion, 1560–1660* (Oxford, 2008), pp. 289–99.

<sup>6</sup> For the relationship between the ideology of holy war and state formation in Morocco, see Johan de Bakker, *Slaves, arms and holy war: Moroccan policy vis-à-vis the Dutch Republic during the establishment of the 'Alawi dynasty, 1660–1727* (Amsterdam, 1991); Amira K. Bennison, *Jihad and its interpretations in pre-colonial Morocco: state–society relations during the French conquest of Algeria* (London and New York, NY, 2002), pp. 15–33; J. A. O. C. Brown, 'Anglo-Moroccan relations

section of this article illustrates, however, neither English weakness nor Moroccan hostility sufficiently explains the failure of Tangier. In the years following Tangier's abandonment, the East India Company successfully navigated the final throes of Mughal expansion and the early rise of successor states that made sovereign claims over exposed factories; slaving forts along the African coast similarly survived and even thrived despite their vulnerability to the powerful polities that fed the trade they served. Company factors navigated a world of 'composite sovereignties', drawing legitimacy through both European and extra-European sources, but the imperial aspirations and ideological factors that inspired Charles II's investment in Tangier ensured that a different process dominated there.<sup>7</sup> In the face of Moroccan expansion, the crown's claim to unitary sovereignty over Tangier proved unsustainable.<sup>8</sup>

## I

In 1661, Charles II's marriage to Catherine de Braganza of Portugal brought with it Tangier, Bombay, and great hopes for the restored monarchy's global future. For the Portuguese, two poor and vulnerable communities surrounded by enemies were a small price for English support in their war against Spain.<sup>9</sup> For the earl of Clarendon and his fellow advocates of the marriage alliance between England and Portugal, however, these two colonies 'situated very usefully for trade' defined the crown's imperial ambitions as potential commercial centres that would allow England to overcome the advantage the Dutch had secured in the Mediterranean and Indian Ocean.<sup>10</sup> Although royal administration of Bombay proved fleeting, the apparent strategic and commercial potential of a harbour at the Strait of Gibraltar led the English state into one of

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and the embassy of Ahmad Qardanash, 1706–1708', *Historical Journal*, 51 (2008), pp. 599–620 at p. 605. Besides Tangier, several Spanish and Portuguese possessions remained perched on the African coast, including the cities of Oran and Ceuta, Bakker, *Slaves, arms, and holy war*, pp. 5–6.

<sup>7</sup> See Philip J. Stern, "A politie of civill & military power": political thought and the late seventeenth-century foundations of the East India Company-State', *Journal of British Studies*, 47 (2008), pp. 253–83. For the position of Europeans on the African coast, see Robin Law, "Here is no resisting the country": the realities of power in Afro-European relations on the West African "Slave Coast", *Itinerario*, 18 (1994), pp. 50–64; John Thornton, *Africa and Africans in the making of the Atlantic world, 1400–1800* (Cambridge, 1998), pp. 66–71; P. E. H. Hair and Robin Law, 'The English in Western Africa to 1700', in Nicholas Canny, ed., *The Oxford history of the British empire: the origins of empire* (Oxford, 1998), pp. 260–2; David Eltis, *The rise of African slavery in the Americas* (Cambridge, 2000), pp. 147–9.

<sup>8</sup> Stern, "A politie of civill & military power", pp. 257–61, 264–5.

<sup>9</sup> G. L. Belcher, 'Spain and the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance of 1661', *Journal of British Studies*, 15 (1975), pp. 67–88; Ronald Hutton, *Charles II: king of England, Scotland and Ireland* (Oxford, 1989), pp. 157–60; John Miller, *Charles II* (London, 1991), ch. 4, passim.

<sup>10</sup> Edward Hyde, earl of Clarendon, *The life of Edward, earl of Clarendon* (3 vols., Oxford, 1759), II, p. 152; see also Jonathan I. Israel, 'The emerging empire: the continental perspective, 1650–1713', in Canny, ed., *The Oxford history of the British empire*, pp. 422, 428–9.

its most ambitious overseas projects of the seventeenth century. Over twenty-two years, Charles II and his ministers invested more in Tangier than in any other English colony, pouring some two million pounds into developing and defending a harbour that promised control over the inner sea and the security of an English port linking the burgeoning Atlantic economy to its Iberian and Mediterranean markets.<sup>11</sup>

Although Charles II acquired Bombay and Tangier together, few historians have compared their early histories or considered the significance of their divergent trajectories. Admittedly, few observers directly linked these two former Portuguese colonies at the fringes of powerful Muslim polities. Initial, if overly optimistic, expectations for their development nevertheless point to a common imperial vision. In early 1662, the propagandist, James Howell, defended the addition of Tangier and Bombay to a set of global acquisitions that favoured English trade and navigation and glorified their possessor, extending 'his Fame as well as his power making Him most redoubtable farr & neer'. For Howell, England's new possessions of Bombay, Jamaica, Tangier, and Dunkirk fulfilled the classic strategic and economic roles of colonies, providing employment for the country's surplus population while promising to support England's global navigation, fostering trade and industry, and tending 'to the universall Good of all people which is the chiefest Designe & Desire of his Maiesty by being to that end at such extraordinary expences by Sea & Land'.<sup>12</sup> In Howell's vision of Charles II's empire, the North Sea and the Mediterranean were as important for the expansion of English commercial and maritime power as the Atlantic and Indian Oceans. Although visions of royal empire proved equally illusory at Bombay and Tangier, the different outcomes of that failure make the comparison of these two colonies all the more compelling.

Bombay was turned over to the East India Company in 1667, under whose management it would eventually become a seat of British empire in the Indian Ocean. Conversely, early proposals to create a company to conduct trade along the Moroccan coast proved short-lived and Tangier remained under royal control. Behind these contrasting trajectories were common questions regarding the political economy of overseas trade and the relationship between state

<sup>11</sup> George Louis Beer, *The old colonial system, 1660–1754* (New York, NY, 1912), p. 115; Routh, *Tangier*, pp. 36–7, 115–16; Colley, *Captives*, pp. 25–30.

<sup>12</sup> 'A short discours of the late forren acquets which England holds', The National Archives (TNA), State Papers (SP) 29/52, fos. 263v–4r. For Howell's authorship of this memorial, see Paul Seaward, 'A Restoration publicist: James Howell and the earl of Clarendon, 1661–1666', *Historical Research*, 61 (1988), pp. 121–31, at pp. 127–8. Howell's account of the advantages England derived from colonies and his use of examples drawn from Rome and Venice to prove their benefits evoke Elizabethan arguments in favour of plantation in Ireland and America; however, his attention to the importance of colonies for supporting English navigation and commerce reflects the emphasis that both the Commonwealth and Restoration monarchy placed on England's overseas trade. For the development of English ideologies of empire through this period, see David Armitage, *The ideological origins of the British empire* (Cambridge, 2000).

and corporate authority. Trading companies were not merely commercial organizations, but rather political entities that exhibited sovereign characteristics within their jurisdictions.<sup>13</sup> As state-like bodies, companies were designed to protect and regulate trade where local political conditions appeared to render merchants vulnerable to oppression or competition but where the crown could not exercise effective authority. Underlying the divergent histories of Bombay and Tangier were thus ideological arguments that contrasted the political and commercial conditions of the Mediterranean and Indian Oceans.

In August 1661, as preparations began to dispatch an expedition to occupy Tangier, Robert Starr, the English consul at the Moroccan port of Salé, petitioned Charles II for patents granting exclusive trading rights on Africa's Atlantic coast from Cape Blanco, on the north-western coast of Africa, to Salé.<sup>14</sup> Starr explained that, as a result of his long engagement with them, 'the people of that country' were willing to yield up into his 'sole possession & power' an island and a castle off the Moroccan coast that would serve as a safe harbour for English ships sailing into the Mediterranean or Atlantic and Indian Oceans, and further requested a garrison of one hundred men, arms and provisions, cannon, and 1,500 pounds annually out of the customs revenue in order to defray expenses.<sup>15</sup> Starr's petition was referred to the Lords and Commissioners for Foreign Plantations and gained the support of powerful backers. On 11 September 1661, a patent was granted to the duke of York and a group of prominent merchants and courtiers incorporating them as the Morocco Company along the lines Starr had originally proposed.<sup>16</sup>

Although patented, the Morocco Company never came to fruition; instead, the patentees appear to have shifted their attention to the Company of Royal Adventurers trading to Africa, under whose jurisdiction the Atlantic coast of Morocco would fall in its revised charter of January 1663.<sup>17</sup> It is probable, however, that the company was doomed by the vocal opposition it evoked among officials and merchants involved in the settlement of Tangier. For E. M. G. Routh, the only historian to note the proposed Morocco Company and

<sup>13</sup> Stern, "A politie of civill & military power", pp. 255–7.

<sup>14</sup> The proposed trading zone of the Morocco Company fell outside that of the Levant Company, which monopolized English trade to the Ottoman empire. The fact that both Tangier and the Moroccan coast fell outside its jurisdiction probably explains why the Levant Company's members do not appear to have been closely involved in the colonization of Tangier or debates surrounding it.

<sup>15</sup> Petition of Robert Starr, 13 Aug. 1661, TNA, SP 71/13, fo. 107r.

<sup>16</sup> British Library (BL), Sloane MSS 3509, fo. 4r. The docket largely mirrors Starr's request, but lists the grantees as 'his Highness Royall, Lord Willoughby of Parham, Coll. William Legg, Thomas Cullinge, Alexander Bence, Robert Starr, John Lewis, Philipp Payne of London, Marchants' and explicitly incorporates them as the Morocco Company for thirty-one years and with 'all such clauses & authorities as have beene heretofore graunted in Charters of the like nature'.

<sup>17</sup> George Frederick Zook, *The Company of Royal Adventurers trading into Africa* (Lancaster, 1919), p. 13. For the succession of English companies trading to Africa, see G. Davies, *The Royal African Company* (London, 1957), pp. 38–46.

the debate surrounding it, their rejection of corporate trade deprived Tangier of a proven means to develop trade in an insecure environment and thus of an imperial future comparable to that enjoyed by Bombay under the East India Company. Routh's verdict offers a telling counterfactual insofar as it suggests that institutional organization, rather than geographic location, explains the different fates of Tangier and Bombay.<sup>18</sup> Yet, opposition to the Morocco Company foreshadowed the problems that would later emerge from the brief co-existence of corporate monopoly and a royal colony in the Indian Ocean. Company domination was no less contested in Bombay than in Morocco and, in March 1667, Bombay's governor, Sir Gervase Lucas, denounced the independent sovereignty the East India Company appeared to enjoy in the Indian Ocean. Lucas complained that the Company's resistance to a port outside its control stifled his efforts to develop the trade of Bombay and advised, 'so long as Your Majestie continues that Company, your affaire[s] in these parts will never answer your great designe and noble intention of advancing trade'.<sup>19</sup> Even the company factor, Henry Gates, who became deeply involved with the struggling settlement, wrote in 1665, 'unlesse His Majesty doeth absolutly enorder the Company Presidency and factorys removeall to this place [Bombay], and force the trade hither by keepeing some frigats heere in India, a trade will scarce bee settled as it should bee'.<sup>20</sup> Although the crown's inability to maintain Bombay effectively led Charles II to cede that colony to the East India Company, ideological considerations underlined both this apparently pragmatic decision and the controversy provoked by the patenting of the Morocco Company.

The officials and merchants who wrote against the Morocco Company feared it would compete with Tangier for Moroccan trade, forestalling expectations that England's new possession would become an entrepôt for the commerce of North Africa and the Mediterranean. Nathaniel Luke, secretary to Tangier's first governor, the earl of Peterborough, warned in late 1661 that a company in the 'hands of particular men' who had no interest in the success of a city lying outside the limits of their monopoly, would rather aim 'to carry the trade to the Moores then to give his Majesties & their nation the advantage thereof'.<sup>21</sup> As Thomas Povey, the treasurer for Tangier and member of the English Council of Trade, similarly reminded his readers, English expectations for the city's future depended on its transformation into 'a free port, & the Scale of the English

<sup>18</sup> Routh, *Tangier*, p. 20.

<sup>19</sup> Quoted in William Foster, *The English factories in India, 1665-1667* (Oxford, 1927), pp. 287-8.

<sup>20</sup> Quoted in *ibid.*, p. 70.

<sup>21</sup> 'Mr. Luke's reasons against the erection of a Morocco Company', BL, Harleian (Harl.) MSS 1595, fos. 13v-14r. This memorial is undated, but a copy in Nathaniel Luke's copybook appears following a document dated 12 Sept. 1661, BL, Sloane MSS 1956, fo. 45r-v. It is not entirely certain if this piece was written by Nathaniel Luke or his brother, John Luke. However, Nathaniel Luke is the probable author, since he had been appointed consul to the ports of Morocco by Cromwell in 1657 and was serving as Peterborough's secretary when the memorial was written. On Nathaniel and John Luke, see Helen Andrews Kaufman, ed., *Tangier at high tide: the journal of John Luke, 1670-1673* (Geneva, 1958), pp. 13-14.

trade' that would attract foreign trade, undersell neighbouring ports, and draw the Moroccans into a mutually beneficial commercial relationship. If the Morocco Company sought to trade directly with Moroccan ports, it would convince the Moroccans that 'Tanger shall onely remaine as an enemy's Garrison', and encourage them to oppose violently an English settlement lacking the trade that alone could 'drawe them into any kind of amity'.<sup>22</sup>

Critically, neither the memorials of Tangier's officials nor those offered by two separate groups of merchants trading to Morocco made a blanket argument against corporations. Thomas Povey had himself been deeply engaged in schemes to create a company trading to the Caribbean in the late 1650s and joined the patentees of the Morocco Company as a shareholder in the Company of the Royal Adventurers.<sup>23</sup> Instead, opponents of the Morocco Company more narrowly questioned whether that corporation was necessary or appropriate for Morocco's political conditions. In this sense, Povey's earlier vocal support for a joint-stock West India Company suggests why he viewed the Morocco Company with scepticism. Disgusted by the unwillingness and inability of the English Council of State to support its conquest of Jamaica adequately, Povey advocated the creation of a company to carry on Cromwell's war against Spain on private funds, marshalling private capital towards purportedly public ends.<sup>24</sup> As the pamphleteer 'Philopatris' later explained, joint-stock companies were political bodies designed to govern trade where the state could not: 'there is a necessity of a Joynt Stock in all Foreign Trade, where the Trade must be maintained by Force and Forts on the Land, and where his Majesty cannot conveniently maintain an Amity and Correspondence by Ambassadors, and not elsewhere'.<sup>25</sup> According to Philopatris, while companies were vital for the protection of trade in the Indian Ocean, where political conditions were unstable and beyond the reach of the English state, they were unnecessary wherever the state itself could safeguard trade.

Philopatris's explanation of the relationship between corporate trade and state authority responded to an ideological debate that differed in key respects from that which grew up around the Morocco Company, but it is nevertheless

<sup>22</sup> Thomas Povey, 'Reasons against the same [Morocco Company]', BL, Harl. MSS 1595, fo. 14v. Povey's undated memorial appears between documents dated 21 Sept. and 30 Sept. 1661 in Luke's copybook, BL, Sloane MSS 1956, fos. 50v–51v.

<sup>23</sup> Povey's subscription for stock among the Royal Adventurers is recorded in the company's minute book, TNA, Treasury, 70/75, fo. 13r.

<sup>24</sup> Povey to Edward D'Oyley, BL, Additional MSS 11411, fo. 21r–v. The letter is undated but probably from the fall of 1659. The papers surrounding the proposal for a West India Company are found in BL, Egerton (Eg.) MSS 2395.

<sup>25</sup> Philopatris, *A treatise wherein is demonstrated, I. that the East-India trade is the most national of all foreign trades* (London, 1681), p. 5. In 1667, the opponents of the short-lived Canary Company claimed that it was unnecessary and contrasted it to the East India Company, which, they argued, required a joint-stock in order to maintain forts and garrisons, Caroline A.J. Skeel, 'The Canary Company', *English Historical Review*, 31 (1916), pp. 529–44, at p. 542. See also, Stern, "A politie of civill & military power", pp. 270–4.



significant for understanding why Povey and others opposed that company. Philopatris wrote to defend the East India Company against accusations launched by the Levant Company that it had inappropriately monopolized England's trade to the Indian Ocean, a dispute which called into question whether joint-stock or regulated companies were the more effective means to organize England's overseas trade.<sup>26</sup> This later contest between regulated and joint-stock companies did not factor into debates over the Morocco Company. Although the Morocco Company was probably conceived as a joint stock, opponents of the company did not make an issue of its institutional organization and instead warned that any form of corporate monopoly would prove to be incompatible with the creation of a free port at Tangier.<sup>27</sup> Even so, Philopatris's attack on the Levant Company showed how the crown's diplomatic and military presence in the Mediterranean negated the need for corporate trade in that sea. Philopatris denied that the Levant Company served any useful purpose precisely because the king's warships could sail from Tangier to obtain justice for injuries suffered by English merchants in the Ottoman empire.<sup>28</sup> In this respect, the opponents of the Morocco Company anticipated Philopatris's later arguments. Corporate trade was unnecessary on the Moroccan coast, since the crown intended to make Tangier the cornerstone of the expansion of its power and prestige into the Mediterranean. Moreover, it was also a threat to the king's authority. As Povey pointed out, if the Morocco Company were to have 'power to erect forts & command them, & to manage trade by their owne authority', it would be in contradiction to the patents already granted by the king to his governor-general at Tangier and would prevent him from fulfilling his commission.<sup>29</sup>

While corporate trade threatened royal authority, its opponents argued that it also appeared inappropriate for the political environment of Morocco. As Povey succinctly advised, Tangier was 'to be secured to His Majesty either by force or trade'. The crown had consequently sought to make Tangier a trading city that could draw Moroccans into amicable commercial relations; the competition of company trading posts would leave Tangier a 'constant settled charge to his

<sup>26</sup> Joint-stock companies operated as unified, centrally directed corporate bodies, while the members of regulated companies traded individually, within guidelines stipulated by the company. The best discussion of the ideological ramifications of the rivalry between the Levant and East India Companies may be found in Stern, "One body corporate and politick": the growth of the English East India Company-State in the later seventeenth century' (Ph.D. thesis, Columbia, 2004), pp. 189–90, 195–7, 210–25.

<sup>27</sup> Although there is no mention of the form of the company, its membership suggests that it would have been a joint-stock, as does a letter from Nicolas de Clerville to Colbert, in which he records that 'une compagnie de marchands anglosi faict presentement un fond de cinq cens mil livres pour faire un port à Tanager', H. de Castries, P. de Cenival, and P. Cossé Brissac, eds., *Les sources inédites de l'histoire du Maroc: deuxième série—dynastie Filalienne: archives et bibliothèques de France* (6 vols., Paris, 1922–60), I, p. 30.

<sup>28</sup> Philopatris, *A treatise wherein is demonstrated*, p. 36.

<sup>29</sup> BL, Harl. MSS 1595, fos. 15v–16r.

Majesty' and convince its neighbours that hostile designs underlay its occupation.<sup>30</sup> Like Philopatris, the opponents of the Morocco Company also assumed that joint-stock companies were designed to deploy force to protect and advance their trade, but they advised that if the Company used its allowance of military supplies and customs revenue to establish coastal forts, it would only further provoke Moroccan hostility. In this vein, the memorial of one of two groups of merchants writing against the Morocco Company argued that if the English could take advantage of Tangier's location to limit trade along the Moroccan coast to their new port, they would make Tangier into the 'the head & fountaine of trade, & the safety & protection of the English marchants [sic]'. The merchants warned, however, that, 'to erect & build new forts & castles in other places (if it were possible) is the only way to create & stir up jealousies & provoke the people of that Country to believe, that the English nation intends to enslave them & make a conquest of their country'.<sup>31</sup> Moreover, the 'antient traders to Barbary without the straights' warned that the creation of forts was 'not feaſable, without a national engagement, the Country being populous, that people warlyke, & plentifully furnished with all manner of offensive Arms, horses & ammunition', and would merely convince the Moroccans that the English aimed at territorial conquest.<sup>32</sup>

It would be overly simplistic to argue that debate over the Morocco Company reflected fundamentally different approaches to political economy based on the explicit opposition of pacific trade and the aggressive commerce of trading companies. The nearly simultaneous rejection of crown rule in the Indian Ocean and of corporate trade along the Moroccan coast instead points to widespread ideas that trade had to be organized differently in response to diverse political and economic environments.<sup>33</sup> Underlying the issue of whether trade to Morocco should be governed by a company were questions about whether the crown could effectively regulate trade, safeguard English merchants, and maintain diplomatic relations with powers outside of Europe. Contrasting recommendations for Tangier's development overwhelmingly depended, however, on a generally unified conception of England's empire as maritime and commercial. Starr's proposal offered a vision for the development of trade to Morocco that was not substantially different from that of Tangier's

<sup>30</sup> Ibid. fos. 14v–15r.

<sup>31</sup> 'The marchant's reasons against the Moroco Company', BL, Harl. MSS 1595, fo. 17r. For the political significance of forts for the East India Company, see Ian Bruce Watson, 'Fortifications and the "idea" of force in early English East India Company relations with India', *Past and Present*, 88 (1980), pp. 70–87.

<sup>32</sup> 'The humble reasons of all the marchants that have beene the antient traders to Barbary without the straights', BL, Harl. MSS 1595, fos. 18v–19r.

<sup>33</sup> Compare Steven Pincus's recent arguments regarding later seventeenth-century political economy in *1688: the first modern revolution* (New Haven, CT, 2010), ch. 12, passim, with Thomas Leng's characterization of mercantilist thought, 'Commercial conflict and regulation in the discourse of trade in seventeenth-century England', *Historical Journal*, 48 (2005), pp. 933–56.

proponents, as both imagined fortified ports linking England's global networks of trade to Morocco and the Mediterranean. Similarly, although the East India Company jealously guarded its monopoly on trade to and from England, it approached the trading world of the Indian Ocean differently and established its ports as cities open to indigenous merchants and to the private trade of its own factors.<sup>34</sup> Upon the East India Company's accession to Bombay, its factors suggested that the city be turned into a free port to attract Indian merchants, citing the success of the Italian ports of Livorno and Genoa to illustrate the value of low duties and commercial openness for the development of port cities.<sup>35</sup> As seen in the next section, the example of Livorno equally inspired English thinking with regard to Tangier.

Povey's sharp dichotomy between 'force' and 'trade' echoed a broader distinction regularly drawn by seventeenth-century English writers between empires based on conquest and those based on trade.<sup>36</sup> As James Howell affirmed when he lauded Charles II's new foreign possessions:

Though the Acquestes aforesayd be a considerable addition to the Honor, grandeur, & interests of his Majestie, yet it is not that, or further Extent of Territories which He ayms at, as much, as at Enlargement of Trade with the security thereof & consequently the Common Good of his marchants & Sea-adventuring.<sup>37</sup>

Defending the sale of Dunkirk to France in 1662, the ever flexible Howell identified two kinds of 'Forren Possessions', those 'got by the discovery of the Marchant' which would become centres of trade and commodity production and those without commercial benefit but 'meerely maintained by Praesidial Forces or Garison'. While Dunkirk seemed of the latter variety and promised only expenses and political jealousies, the American colonies were examples of the former and 'ther are great hopes that in Afric *Tanger* will prove so, with other extraordinary advantages besides'.<sup>38</sup>

The use of force was implicit even in a self-consciously maritime empire: at issue was how it was to be used and in whom lay the authority to wield it. Tangier's governors repeatedly emphasized their efforts to induce the Moroccans to peace by establishing mutually beneficial trading relationships and just as frequently affirmed that their territorial aspirations extended no

<sup>34</sup> Philopatris, *A treatise wherein is demonstrated*, pp. 17–18; Stern, "One body corporate and politick", pp. 246–9.

<sup>35</sup> Foster, *The English factories in India, 1668–1669*, p. 211, quoted in Louis Dermigny, 'Ecales, échelles et ports francs au Moyen Âge et aux temps modernes', in *Les grandes escales, 3<sup>e</sup> partie, période contemporaine et synthèses générales* (Recueils de la société Jean Bodin, vol. 34, Brussels, 1974), p. 567 n. 976. See also Ruby Maloni, 'Surat to Bombay: transfer of commercial power', *Itinerario*, 26 (2002), pp. 61–73, at p. 65.

<sup>36</sup> See especially Armitage, *The ideological origins of the British empire*, pp. 138–45, and Istvan Hont, *The jealousy of trade, international competition and the nation-state in historical perspective* (Cambridge, MA, 2005), ch. 2, passim.

<sup>37</sup> TNA, SP 29/52, fo. 272r.

<sup>38</sup> James Howell, *A discourse of Dunkirk* (London, 1664), pp. 4–5.

farther than the surrounding fields to provide sustenance for the garrison and room for outworks to safeguard it.<sup>39</sup> They were equally convinced that only naval power and frigates cruising before Moroccan ports would restrain Muslim corsairs and induce Moroccans to come to Tangier to trade.<sup>40</sup> On the other hand, suggestions that Tangier would be a foundation for conquests in North Africa were rejected in favour of commercial and maritime aspirations for the city. During the summer of 1661, the lords commissioners for Tangier accordingly denied Peterborough's request for a large body of cavalry, on the basis that they intended 'not to make a warr with the Moores', but to cement peace with them through trade.<sup>41</sup> The reaction of the earl of Sandwich to the merchant James Wilson's plans for a territorial empire expanding outward from Tangier highlights the maritime vision that dominated English expectation for the city. Writing in late 1661, Wilson emphasized Tangier's strategic and commercial importance before adding that he did not 'thinke his majestie will content him selfe with one Port but rather endeavor to people all the coast to the East as far as Tripoly to the south as far as Saphy'.<sup>42</sup> Commanding the expedition that took possession of Tangier, Sandwich cautioned in response to Wilson's projections:

the designes proposed, mee thinks are Ill considered, for, to propose the possessing Africa from Gamboa to Tripoly is a vast thing, and one that sees what charge & trouble a Towne is possesst that is given and delivered up, will Conceive a great deale

<sup>39</sup> For instance, see earl of Peterborough, Tangier, 2 Apr. 1662, TNA, Colonial Office (CO) 279/1, fo. 127v; earl of Middleton to Arlington, Tangier, 12 Oct. 1673, Longleat House, Coventry papers, vol. 70, fo. 52r (microfilm read at the Institute of Historical Research, University of London); earl of Inchiquin, 'Narrative of the state of Tangier from April 1678 to April 1680', BL, Sloane MSS 1952, fo. 23v.

<sup>40</sup> See 'Description of Tangier', TNA, CO 279/33, fo. 136r (anonymous and undated, this document is probably the report on Tangier that Peterborough was ordered to draw up when he was replaced by the earl of Teviot, in 1663, see 'Instructions for the earl of Tiviott', TNA, CO 279/2, fos. 24r-v); Lord Belaysse to the lords commissioners for Tangier, undated, BL, Sloane MSS 3509, fo. 104r; journal entry of the earl of Sandwich, 4 Sept. 1668, Mapperton House, journal of the first earl of Sandwich, vol. 8, pp. 520, 526; Sir Henry Sheeres to Colonel Palmes Faireborne, Tangier, 5 Dec. 1678, Bodleian Library, Rawlinson MSS A 342, p. 379 (microfilm read at the Institute of Historical Research, University of London).

<sup>41</sup> This is recounted in 'Mr. Luke's reasons against the erection of a Morocco Company', BL, Harl. MSS 1595, fo. 13r. Peterborough's negotiations over the size of Tangier's garrison may be followed in 'Propositions humbly offered to the Lords committees appointed out of his majesties most honorable privy councill to consider upon the affaires of Tangier in Affrica' and 'The necessity of horse', BL, Sloane MSS 1956, fos. 30v-33v and 38r-v. All of these writings are undated, but 'The Necessity of horse' follows an order from the king in council of 26 July 1661.

<sup>42</sup> Wilson, Lisbon, 5 Oct. 1661, BL, Sloane MSS 3509, fo. 11r. It is unclear what point Wilson had in mind as the southern limit of his proposed empire. He described 'Saphy' as being 'on our Plantations now in gamboa', but it seems likely he was referring to the Moroccan city of Safi, *ibid.*, fo. 12r. See also Alison Games's discussion of Wilson's proposal in *The web of empire*, pp. 295-6.

more difficulty to posses Townes we must fight for, and not vary certain to prevaile neither.<sup>43</sup>

Sandwich by no means rejected the use of force to increase and project English power; instead, he distinguished sharply between England's interest to develop its maritime power and dreams of territorial empire. Sandwich thus intended to concentrate upon the improvement of Tangier itself which would 'keepe all europe in Awe', and to accomplish the goal of creating a magazine and free port that could attract the trade not only of other cities of North Africa, but also of established ports like Livorno.<sup>44</sup> Sandwich further urged that after securing Tangier, the English should aim to conquer Ceuta from the Spanish in order to gain complete control of the Strait, such that once 'the Kings Sovereignty maintaynes the Seas', he would be able to 'put what Conditions [he] Pleased upon all the World, that passe through the Straights'. From these opening steps, the English could then seek 'to gaine both ways, upon the Coast of Barbary, the places that are seated upon the Rivers, and are places of traffique, still preserving peace with the Main Land, soe necessary for Tanger'.<sup>45</sup>

Sandwich's hope that Tangier would serve as the foundation of a maritime empire commanding the Strait of Gibraltar reflected widespread expectations that control of the city might be only the first step towards English domination of the Mediterranean. Admiral John Lawson warned that Tangier was of such importance that, if the Dutch should get hold of the city, they would be able to 'keep the place against all the World, and give the law to all the trade of the Mediterranean', a verdict that, according to Clarendon, left Charles II 'very much affected'.<sup>46</sup> Shortly thereafter, Giovanni Luca Durazzo, Genoa's ambassador to the newly restored monarchy, reported that England's commitment to Tangier echoed Henry VIII's ambition to develop his naval power in order to 'open and close the ocean at the strait of Calais', a goal Charles II now aimed at 'with more reason' through control of the Strait of Gibraltar.<sup>47</sup> The French engineer, Nicolas de Clerville, was particularly worried that the English would seek further possessions within the Mediterranean that would allow them to sustain and justify their 'pretended monarchy of the sea'. Writing to Colbert in early 1662, he warned that, if the English gained control of additional footholds in the Mediterranean, 'they would not only by this means establish a new right to their pretensions of empire in the Mediterranean as well as in the Ocean', but would also be able to establish a toll at Tangier by virtue of

<sup>43</sup> 'A coppie of a discourse of Barbary sent his royal highness by my Lord sandwich', 1662, BL, Sloane MSS 3509, fo. 25r.

<sup>44</sup> *Ibid.*, fo. 25v.

<sup>45</sup> *Ibid.*, fo. 27r.

<sup>46</sup> Clarendon, *The life of Edward, earl of Clarendon*, II, p. 151.

<sup>47</sup> 'Relazione Dell'Ambasciata Straordinaria in Inghilterra al Rè Gran Bretagna Carlo Secondo, per congratulazione del ritorno al suo Regno', Jan. 1662, Archivio di Stato di Genova, Archivio Segreto, Relazioni dei Ministri 1/2717, p. 348. A copy of the 'Relazione' of Durazzo is in the British Library, Additional MSS 38884.

controlling both sides of the Strait.<sup>48</sup> This toll might fall on traffic passing Tangier or on trade to the Levant but, in either case, it posed a threat to France, first putting the French king to the shame of being tributary to the English ('la honte de se voir tributaire des Anglois') and secondly threatening his subjects' commerce in the Levant, already outpaced by English competitors.<sup>49</sup>

The prospect that possession of Tangier would allow England to exercise sovereignty over the mouth of the Mediterranean proved misplaced. As Henry Rumbold, the former English consul at Cadiz, later pointed out, it was naive to think that England could control access to the Mediterranean when Spain, at its military height, had failed to obtain that same objective.<sup>50</sup> Tangier's engineer, Sir Hugh Cholmley, similarly recalled that more cautious voices had warned, 'exacting tribute upon trading vessels was a thing of so universal a consequence as not to be maintained by the power of a single nation'.<sup>51</sup> In a sea where competing empires and states collided, domination over the Strait of Gibraltar represented an unsustainable extension of English sovereignty. In the final section, we will return to the limitations imposed on the expansion of English empire into the Mediterranean by the sovereignty of Mediterranean polities.

At a time when the conception of England's empire as a transatlantic political community was still in its infancy, descriptions of that overseas empire evoked not an emergent imperial polity, but a maritime empire marked by its commercial and naval power.<sup>52</sup> The only English port near the Mediterranean, Tangier appeared essential to protect English navigation in that sea, as naval wars against the North African regencies established the near-permanent presence of royal fleets there.<sup>53</sup> Tangier's advocates, however, also linked the city's naval role to its wider place in a trading empire. As the engineer, Sir Henry Sheeres, was later to ask, regarding Tangier and its role in English commercial and maritime strategy, 'What is it has rendered *England* so formidable, so rich, and so renown'd a Kingdom; but the strength of our Navyes, and Universality of our Commerce?' Continuing to describe the '*Machin*' of commerce upon which England's power rested, Sheeres further asked his readers, 'because there are many various Wheels and Motions therein, why should not *Tanger* be esteem'd among the principal of those movements, which keep this vast Engin going?'<sup>54</sup>

<sup>48</sup> *Les sources inédites de l'histoire du Maroc*, 1, pp. 29–30.

<sup>49</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 30.

<sup>50</sup> Bodleian Library, Carte MSS 69, fo. 388r. This anonymous and undated memorial was written in response to a letter from a 'Wm. S' of Hamburg, dated 2 Aug. 1680. Internal evidence makes clear that the author is Horace Rumbold. For more information on this figure, see 'Notes on the history of the family of Rumbold in the seventeenth century', *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, 6 (1892), p. 162 n. 2.

<sup>51</sup> Cholmley, 'Several discourses concerning the interest of Tangier', BL, Lansdowne MSS 192, fo. 85r.

<sup>52</sup> See Armitage, *The ideological origins of the British empire*, passim.

<sup>53</sup> BL, Lansdowne MSS 192, fo. 85r–v; TNA, SP 29/52, fos. 268r, 269r–v.

<sup>54</sup> Sir Henry Sheeres, *A discourse touching Tanger: in a letter to a person of quality* (London, 1680), pp. 10–11.

## II

How Tangier was to fit within the 'vast Engin' described by Sheeres proved a contentious question. Clearly, the city's development depended on its ability to attract trade and a trading community; as the secretary of state, Sir Edward Nicholas, wrote to the earl of Peterborough, 'it must be trade & Commerce that must improve the interest of that important Place'.<sup>55</sup> While recent research has examined the links between Tangier and England's North American empire, the crown's efforts to transform the city into an entrepôt for trade passing through the Strait of Gibraltar oriented it towards the trading world of the Mediterranean.<sup>56</sup> Particularly, English plans for the colony emphasized its development as a free port and open city that would attract Mediterranean merchants and their trade. The instructions issued to the earl of Middleton upon his appointment as governor of the colony thus emphasized that the king had incorporated the city in 1668, 'as the most likely Meanes to advance our Free-Port, diminishe our Charge, and invite Inhabitants and Commerce thither: Which were the Only Ends aimed at by us, in possessing that Place, and making a mould there'.<sup>57</sup> The charter granted to Tangier similarly affirmed that it would be a 'free-city', whose corporation included all the city's Christian residents; foreigners were admitted to Tangier's common council and to official positions.<sup>58</sup> The substantial Catholic contingent within both Tangier's garrison and civilian population, as well as its Jewish residents, ensured a measure of religious toleration within the city.<sup>59</sup> Uniquely, Tangier was also granted a court merchant comparable to French and Italian tribunals that operated according to the law merchant. As an anonymous Spanish account of the city emphasized, 'neither the city of London, with its great emporium of merchandise, nor any other city in the British dominions' possessed such an institution.<sup>60</sup> Since courts merchant had disappeared in an England dominated by the common law, the creation of the court at Tangier testified not only to the crown's commercial

<sup>55</sup> Nicholas to the earl of Peterborough, Whitehall, 17 May 1662, TNA, SP 44/1, p. 51.

<sup>56</sup> Cf. Games, *The web of empire*, pp. 294–7.

<sup>57</sup> 'Additional instructions which may be given to the earle of Middleton', Aug. 1669, TNA, CO 279/12.

<sup>58</sup> A copy of the charter granted to the city of Tangier is contained in the entry book of the city's Court of Records and Sessions, TNA, CO 279/45. For the nomination of the Genoese merchant Carlo Antonio Soltrani to the common council, opposition to that nomination, and resolution of the resulting debate, see the Register of the Proceedings of the Corporation, 21 Aug. 1668, TNA, CO 279/39, fo. 2r, and the 28 Aug. 1668 journal entry of the earl of Sandwich, Mapperton House, journal of the first earl of Sandwich, vol. 8, pp. 476–7.

<sup>59</sup> William Bullman, 'Constantine's Enlightenment: culture and religious politics in the early British empire, c. 1648–1710' (Ph.D. thesis, Princeton, 2009), pp. 96–112.

<sup>60</sup> Chantal de la Vérone, *Tanger sous l'occupation anglaise: d'après une description anonyme de 1674* (Paris, 1972), pp. 16, 74. A copy of the charter for the court merchant appears in TNA, CO 279/10, 1668. See also José Ingacio Martínez Ruiz, 'De Tángar a Gibraltar: el estrecho en la praxis comercial e imperial británica (1661–1776)', *Hispania*, 221 (2005), pp. 1043–62, at p. 1046.

aspirations for the city, but also to the extent of the colony's integration into the culture and political economy of the Mediterranean.<sup>61</sup>

Occupying an important place in seventeenth-century economic thinking, free ports were central to the political economy of the early modern Mediterranean as rulers responded to the sea's fiercely competitive commercial environment by aiming to attract foreign merchants and shipping through a combination of low duties and favourable trading conditions.<sup>62</sup> The instructions issued to the earl of Peterborough when he took command of Tangier thus emphasized that the transformation of the city into a trading hub and free port lay at the centre of the crown's wider aspirations for its new possession. After explaining that he had put himself 'to this great charge for making this addition to our Dominions' in order 'to gaine to our subjects the trade of Barbary & enlarge our Dominions in that sea & advance thereby the Honor of our Crowne & the Generall comerce & weale of our subjects', Charles II ordered Peterborough to announce that 'no dutys Customs, or other taxes whatever' would be laid on goods imported or exported from Tangier, the city remaining a free port for five years.<sup>63</sup>

Opening Tangier to foreign merchants and exempting goods bought and sold in the city from customs and most duties, the crown drew on the example of Mediterranean free ports. While free ports were by no means limited to that sea, it is indicative of the Mediterranean context within which the English viewed Tangier that they looked to the success of Livorno, which had become one of the chief trading ports of the Mediterranean under the patronage of the grand dukes of Tuscany, as a model for Tangier's development. In the seventeenth century, Livorno emerged as the focal point of English trade in the Mediterranean as it became a distribution centre where exports of manufactured and colonial products could be offloaded and reshipped and where return cargoes of Italian and Levantine goods could be procured.<sup>64</sup> Tangier's advocates appear to have imagined that the colony would fulfil this same role. Wilson and Sandwich both anticipated Tangier replacing Livorno as an

<sup>61</sup> Kelly de Luca, 'Beyond the sea: extraterritorial jurisdiction and English law, c. 1575–c. 1640' (Ph.D. thesis, Columbia, 2008), pp. 55–69.

<sup>62</sup> Paul Masson, *Les ports francs: d'autrefois et d'aujourd'hui* (Paris, 1904), and Dermigny, *Les grandes escales*, ch. 5, passim. For the free port of Livorno, see the work of Lucia Frattarelli Fischer, especially 'Livorno città nuova: 1574–1609', *Società e Storia*, 46 (1989), pp. 873–93, and 'Livorno, 1676' in Franco Angiolini, Vieri Becagli, and Marcello Verga, eds., *La Toscana nell'età di Cosimo III* (Florence, 1993), pp. 45–66. The only study to compare Tangier to other Mediterranean free ports is Thomas Allison Kirk's, *Genoa and the sea: policy and power in an early modern maritime republic, 1559–1684* (Baltimore, MD, 2005), pp. 193–6. For free ports in English economic thinking, see Leng's 'Commercial conflict and regulation', pp. 942, 946–7.

<sup>63</sup> 'Instructions for the earle of Peterburgh, generall of our army designed for Tanger in Africa', TNA, CO 279/1, fo. 29v–r.

<sup>64</sup> Gigliola Pagano de Divitiis, 'Il porto di Livorno fra Inghilterra e Oriente', *Nuovi studi livornesi*, 1 (1993), pp. 43–87, and idem, *English merchants in seventeenth-century Italy*, trans. Stephen Parkin (Cambridge, 1997), passim.



entrepôt for Mediterranean trade, while George Downing advised Clarendon that, if the king were to make Tangier 'as Legorn a place for all nations to lay up their goods in upon very little or no custome . . . it may grow a very wonderfull & considerable place'.<sup>65</sup> The example of Livorno was especially attractive to English officials since it illustrated that an open and inviting port could flourish even without a hinterland. In 1670, Cholmley advised William Coventry that, following his discussions with Tangier's merchants, he was increasingly optimistic that the city could be made 'a place of Trade', noting that 'it is not the Continent of Italie makes Ligorne flourish, by takeing off the Commodities that are brought thether, ten parts for one being transported unto other places'. Instead, the dukes of Tuscany had used offers of low rents and excellent port facilities to entice merchants and trade to their free port, knowing that 'it was a Conflux of people that much enrich the towne'.<sup>66</sup> For the length of its possession of Tangier, the crown similarly sought to create a regulatory and political environment that would attract foreign merchants and their accompanying trade.

While free ports had formed a central element of commercial proposals advanced by merchants and the commercially minded under the Commonwealth, they were also a departure from conceptions of the political economy of trade that increasingly dominated English mercantile thinking, resting on an open approach to trade even as England otherwise restricted and regulated its commerce along national lines.<sup>67</sup> Thus, although Tangier, as a port open to foreign trade, became a model for those in the American colonies who called for repeal of the Navigation Acts, its place in England's wider colonial empire proved problematic.<sup>68</sup> A report on proposals to re-establish the former

<sup>65</sup> Downing to Clarendon, The Hague, 6 Jan. 1662, Bodleian Library, Clarendon MSS 106, fo. 31r; BL, Sloane MSS 3509, fos. 11r, 25v. For the use of the example of Livorno, see also BL, Lansdowne MSS 192, fo. 12v; Sheeres, *A discourse touching Tanager* (London, 1680), p. 46.

<sup>66</sup> Cholmley to William Coventry, Tangier, 11 July 1670, North Yorkshire Record Office (NYRO), ZCG V 1/1/3, p. 99.

<sup>67</sup> Enthusiasm for free ports initially co-existed with proposals to restrict colonial trade to English ships; however, support for free ports faded following the passage of the Navigation Act of 1651. The Act of 1660 further required that the most valuable colonial products be brought first to English ports before they could be re-exported to European markets, creating a theoretically closed system of English colonial trade, see Robert Brenner, *Merchants and revolution: commercial change, political conflict, and London's overseas traders, 1550–1653* (London and New York, NY, 2003), pp. 613–20, and Leng, 'Commercial conflict and regulation', pp. 942, 948–52. Nuala Zahedieh provides an excellent introduction to England's colonial system and its legislative foundations in 'Economy', in David Armitage and Michael J. Braddick, eds., *The British Atlantic world, 1500–1800* (Houndmills and New York, NY, 2002), pp. 51–3. See also Beer, *The old colonial system*, especially ch. 2, and Lawrence A. Harper, *The English navigation laws: a seventeenth-century experiment in social engineering* (New York, NY, 1973).

<sup>68</sup> 'Petition of the deputy-governor, council, and assembly of Barbadoes to the king', 21 Oct. 1670, and 'The assembly of Barbadoes to Sir Peter Colleton and ten other gentlemen planters in London', 20 Apr. 1671, in W. N. Sainsbury, ed., *Calendar of state papers, colonial: North America and the West Indies* (45 vols., London, 1860–), VII: 1669–1674, pp. 116, 200. For the use of free trade rhetoric among colonial opponents of the navigation laws, see Christian J. Koot, "A

'composition port' at Dover from the commissioners of the customs pointed out that Mediterranean free ports responded to particular mercantile and political conditions that were starkly distinct from England's actual interest. Instead, the commissioners noted that England had no need of free ports 'according to such settlements as are in Ligorne & Genoa', for whereas they belonged 'to petty States that gaine Trade from one another to serve the Countries', England already enjoyed an abundance of commodities to fuel its commerce. Consequently, while the policies of the Italian free ports aimed at attracting foreign merchants and shipping, England had no need to 'decoy it hither upon other Terms his Majestie being the greatest King of Waters in Europe'.<sup>69</sup> The writer, Francis Brewster, later echoed this opinion, arguing that the success of Livorno had given free ports an excessively positive reputation for, although creating one might be 'a good Expedient' for states that 'hath neither Natural or Artificial Provision for Trade and Navigation, yet it may be prejudicial to a Nation that hath both'.<sup>70</sup> Indeed, the original establishment of the free port at Tangier specifically excluded ships coming from English colonies and from beyond the Cape of Good Hope, maintaining the distinct separation between European and colonial trade laid down by the navigation laws.<sup>71</sup>

Consequently, when reports circulated that ships were sailing directly to Tangier from the American plantations under passes from the governor of Jamaica, the privy council voiced its concern as to both the potential of this practice to deprive the crown of customs revenue and the larger impact it might have on English trade.<sup>72</sup> Called before the privy council's Committee of Trade in January 1669, the farmers of the customs argued that trade between Tangier and the colonies violated the Navigation Acts and, in the process, offered a cogent interpretation of the economic logic of England's navigation laws. The farmers emphasized that these laws explicitly aimed to tie the plantations more closely to England, employing English shipping, providing a vent for English manufactures, and, above all, 'making this kingdome a Staple not onely of the Comodities of those Plantations but of the Comodities of other Countries for Supplying them, it being the usage of other Nations to keep their Plantations trade to themselves'. Conversely, it would be easy for any person living in Tangier 'to colour the Shipps and Goods of Strangers and by that means and

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dangerous principle": free trade discourses in Barbados and the English Leeward Islands, 1650–1689', *Early American Studies*, 5 (2007), pp. 132–63.

<sup>69</sup> Commissioners of the customs, 5 Feb. 1661, Longleat House, Henry Coventry papers, vol. 103, fo. 30r (microfilm read at the Institute of Historical Research, University of London).

<sup>70</sup> Francis Brewster, *Essays on trade and navigation* (London, 1695), p. 29.

<sup>71</sup> *A proclamation declaring his majesties pleasure to settle and establish a free port at his city of Tangier in Africa* (London, 16 Nov. 1662).

<sup>72</sup> Journal entry of the earl of Sandwich, 26 Aug. 1668, Mapperton House, journal of the first earl of Sandwich, vol. 8, pp. 450, 453; W. L. Grant and James Munro, eds., *Acts of the privy council of England: colonial series* (6 vols., Hereford, 1908–12), I: 1613–1680, pp. 486–7. See also John Finch to Arlington, 14/24 Sept. 1667, TNA, SP 98/8, and CO 279/10, which includes a list of ten ships arriving at Tangier from the plantations between June 1666 and March 1668.

the easy and cheap access to the port as aforesaid draw the Trade from England and Englishmen'.<sup>73</sup>

In response to these arguments, Tangier's mayor, the merchant John Bland, emphasized how Tangier could fit in the framework of England's restrictive navigation laws. Although Bland owned plantations in Virginia and had earlier written in defence of free trade for the colonies, he appears to have viewed Tangier not merely as a legal loophole to send colonial goods directly to Mediterranean markets, but rather as an integrated component of England's wider commercial empire that bridged the trading worlds of the Atlantic and Mediterranean.<sup>74</sup> Bland thus argued that Tangier was 'a parte, & an oute Porte of England, Governed by the same lawes, & Councils, suplyed with the same treasure and wholly dependant upon, and subservient to the trade, navigation, and strength, of England'.<sup>75</sup> Customs on colonial goods could be collected at Tangier and the goods reshipped to their Mediterranean markets at lower cost, not only ensuring Tangier's success, but also promoting England's dominance of trade in the Mediterranean.<sup>76</sup> Carrying these arguments before the Council of Trade, to which the question of Tangier's participation in colonial trade had been referred by the privy council, Bland and his fellow advocates for permitting trade between Tangier and England's plantations affirmed that Tangier could be 'reputed no other but a Plantation of ours' and thus permitted to trade with the other, American colonies.<sup>77</sup> Stating that Tangier was 'a free port as well as an English Plantation', the authors further asked 'how shall its Neighbors bee invited to bring Aught to them if they can have nothing thence to carry back', and pointed out the town could hardly succeed as a free port unless it could use colonial goods to attract foreign merchants.<sup>78</sup> Moreover, the defenders of this trade responded to the customs farmers' accusations that it would harm English trade and revenues by emphasizing its national character, since it was 'a Trade att our own Nations, English with

<sup>73</sup> 'Reasons against the permitting of any goods or merchandize of the production of the English plantations to be brought to Tanger before they have been first unladen in England', 19 Jan. 1669, TNA, CO 279/12. For the navigation laws as a tool to turn England into a European entrepôt, see Zahedieh, 'Economy', p. 53.

<sup>74</sup> *The humble remonstrance of John Blande of London merchant, on behalfe of the inhabitants and planters in Virgina and Mariland* (n.p., 1661). On the use of Tangier as a loophole through the navigation laws, cf. Pagano de Divitiis, *English merchants in seventeenth-century Italy*, p. 180.

<sup>75</sup> John Bland, 'Reason and motives why his majesties cittie of Tanger should enjoy a free Trade with the other his majesties plantations', Mapperton House, journal of the first earl of Sandwich, vol. 9, p. 358.

<sup>76</sup> *Ibid.* p. 359.

<sup>77</sup> 'Reasons for the permitting the productions of the English plantations in America to be brought directly to Tanger before landed in England submitted to consideration if valluable to what been said in contra', BL, Eg. MSS 2395, fo. 652r. This memorial is undated but was written in response to the petition of the farmers of the customs, of 19 Jan. 1669; although unsigned, its argumentation and phrasing closely resembles Bland's memorial. Bland was in England in early 1669, further suggesting he wrote or contributed to this rebuttal of the farmers' arguments.

<sup>78</sup> *Ibid.* fo. 659v.

English, Plantation with Plantation'.<sup>79</sup> Would trade be improved or people encouraged to settle at Tangier if 'all Our English Plantations or Tanger should bee counted Aliens and forreigners'? Instead, on Tangier's maintenance depended the security of English merchants and shipping from North African corsairs and on Tangier thus hung the fate of English commerce, 'the chiefest Bulk of Our English Trade depending on the Traffick negotiated in the Mediteranian both in reference to the disposing of Our Europian and American goods and bringing Returnes thereof these so usefull for our own manufactorie'.<sup>80</sup>

Despite the case made by Bland and his associates, the Council of Trade 'utterly rejected' their proposal to open Tangier to the plantation trade.<sup>81</sup> A few years later, the Lords of Trade and Plantations would affirm that within the context of the Navigation Acts, Tangier was not to be 'deemed a Plantation of His Majesty in Asia, Africa, or America'.<sup>82</sup> As a matter of economic policy, the crown's divergent approaches to the development of Tangier and management of colonial trade were not contradictory. As the writer, Roger Coke, observed, 'Even the Act of Navigation with reason prohibits the Trade of our Plantations to Forreigners, because thereby, though it would enrich them by how much more their Trade would become great, yet this would be so much to the loss of the Nation: and permits a free Trade to *Tangier*, because it may enrich the place, and make it more frequented'.<sup>83</sup> The legal separation of Tangier from England's Atlantic empire does, however, reveal how different approaches to the organization of trade divided the trading world of the Mediterranean from the increasingly exclusive zones of colonial trade in the Atlantic Ocean. The effect of this separation was not only to deprive Tangier of its predicted role as a nexus of global trade, but also to accentuate a process whereby legal and commercial regulations defined the oceanic boundaries that marked England's imperial development. The division of Tangier from England's wider trading empire reflects the rise of the 'ocean regionalism' that Lauren Benton has recently dated to the end of the seventeenth century.<sup>84</sup> Whereas Benton concentrates on the emergence of distinct legal regimes in the Atlantic and Indian Oceans as the English state and East India Company confronted a global upsurge of piracy, the case of Tangier highlights how different trading regimes equally differentiated the Mediterranean and Atlantic.

<sup>79</sup> Ibid. fo. 658r.

<sup>80</sup> Ibid. fo. 658v.

<sup>81</sup> Journal entry of the earl of Sandwich, 20 Jan. 1669, Mapperton House, journal of the first earl of Sandwich, vol. 9, p. 96.

<sup>82</sup> This clarification comes in a summary of the Navigation Acts that follows an 'Answer of the commissioners of the customs about the Act of Trade & Navigation' to Lord Danby, 12 May 1675, London, TNA, CO 324/3, fo. 13v. Cf. Ruiz, 'De Tãnger a Gibraltar', pp. 1049–50.

<sup>83</sup> Roger Coke, *England's improvements* (London, 1675), p. 113.

<sup>84</sup> Lauren Benton, 'Legal spaces of empire: piracy and the origins of ocean regionalism', *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 47 (2005), pp. 700–24, and idem, *A search for sovereignty: law and geography in European empires, 1400–1900* (Cambridge, 2010), pp. 137–48.

Despite English efforts to encourage Tangier's development as a free port, the colony proved to be a disappointment as a commercial centre. As a small port cut off from the circuits of England's Atlantic trade and exposed equally to storms and Moroccan attacks, Tangier never attracted a sizeable merchant community. Instead, the colony's population consisted almost entirely of the soldiers stationed there and the merchants who supplied them; trade to Tangier, meanwhile, centred primarily on provisioning the garrison.<sup>85</sup> Under these conditions, Tangier had little chance of rivalling the more established entrepôts and port-cities of the Mediterranean. Yet even as Tangier proved ever more costly, unprofitable, and politically divisive, its supporters continued to praise the commercial and strategic potential of a city 'situated in the midst of the trading world'.<sup>86</sup> Tangier's location at the mouth of the Mediterranean appeared to give the colony an importance out of proportion with its economic value. The separation of Tangier from the trading world of the English Atlantic thus did not lead directly to the colony's failure and abandonment; however, the fact that Tangier was never even remotely self-sustaining made it highly vulnerable to the pressures of England's domestic politics and to external threats.

### III

Although Tangier's status as a free port marginalized it within England's burgeoning commercial empire, the colony's political and strategic situation nevertheless closely resembled that of other English fortresses and ports around both the Atlantic and Indian Oceans. With the declining power of the Saadi dynasty of Morocco from the early seventeenth century, Tangier's English garrison and inhabitants initially encountered a fluid political environment and the colony's promoters and governors well understood that its success depended on managing an array of competing dynasties and warlords to expand England's commercial and maritime foothold. Yet, even as English governors and company factors took advantage of emerging fractures in Asian, American, and African polities to establish and legitimize fortified ports, a different process dominated in Morocco. While the millions of pounds and thousands of lives poured into Tangier testify both to its prospective place within England's growing empire and to the growing willingness of the English crown to maintain such an imperial commitment outside the British Isles, Charles II's North African project was ultimately doomed by processes of Moroccan state-building. The rise of the new and assertive Alawi dynasty under Moulay al-Rashid and his successor, Moulay Ismail, fundamentally altered Tangier's position in Morocco. For these Moroccan empire-builders, holy war directed against Tangier and

<sup>85</sup> Cholmley to Mr Mico, Tangier, 6 July 1665, NYRO, ZCG V 1/1/1, pp. 172–3; Cholmley to William Coventry, Tangier, 2 Oct. 1670, NYRO, ZCG V 1/1/3, p. 156.

<sup>86</sup> BL, Lansdowne MSS 192, fo. 85v.

other Christian settlements on the North African coast legitimized their rule and helped them to unite the tribal groups that challenged efforts to centralize their growing empire.<sup>87</sup> In 1673, the earl of Middleton prophetically warned, 'if once the Country should be reduced under as absolute monarchy as Taffaletta [Moulay al-Rashid] was in prospect and pursuited, I am afraid this part of Barbary might prove very troublesome to other places of Christendome as well as to Tanger'.<sup>88</sup> The lengthy siege of Tangier by the forces of Moulay Ismaïl in 1680 demonstrated the new and serious threat posed to Tangier by Moroccan forces. Though Tangier was relieved and the siege lifted, the attacks revealed the city's vulnerability before the weight of Moulay Ismaïl's assurgent empire.

For both Alawi and Stuart dynasties, Tangier was a site of empire-building where they asserted their imperial sovereignty and defended it from foreign and domestic rivals. As seen, the colonization of Tangier exemplified the restored monarchy's commitment to take a leading role in England's commercial and colonial development. The acquisition of Tangier through Catherine de Braganza's dowry also brought the city into the personal possession of Charles II. Tellingly, when Tangier's merchants suggested to the earl of Sandwich that they would be more confident to invest in the city if it were annexed to the crown, and thus not able to be sold as easily as Dunkirk, Sandwich thought this, 'a greate point of state, How farr it is good in order to Preserve the Crown upon the Head of my Master & his family to part with Regalities; & whether emergencies may not happen wherin it may be of great use to his Majestie to have such a place in his owne personall power'.<sup>89</sup> The constitutional status of Tangier as described by Sandwich was not unique; Sir Matthew Hale noted that the king could acquire overseas possessions either in the 'capacity of king of England . . . or Charles Stewart'.<sup>90</sup> A bill passed by the House of Commons to unite Dunkirk and Jamaica to 'the imperial crown of this realm' died in the House of Lords since the formal annexation of the two Cromwellian conquests would have provoked the hostility of a Spanish government to which Charles II had promised the return of the colonies.<sup>91</sup> A similar effort was made in 1679 to annex Tangier to the English crown in order to ensure that the city was not sold to France.<sup>92</sup> Amidst the political crisis that grew up around the Popish Plot and Exclusion Bill, however, Tangier's expense and close association with the crown

<sup>87</sup> See Johan de Bakker, *Slaves, arms and holy war*, passim.

<sup>88</sup> Earl of Middleton to the lords commissioners for Tangier, Tangier, 5 Feb. 1673, TNA, CO 279/16, fo. 289v.

<sup>89</sup> Journal entry of the earl of Sandwich, 4 Sept. 1668, Mapperton House, journal of the first earl of Sandwich, vol. 8, p. 532.

<sup>90</sup> Matthew Hale, *The prerogatives of the king*, ed. D. E. C. Yale (London, 1976), p. 43 n. 1.

<sup>91</sup> Leo Francis Stock, ed., *Proceedings and debates of the British parliaments respecting North America, 1542-1688* (5 vols., Washington, DC, 1924-), 1, pp. 278, 281, 283-5, 288; Ian K. Steele, 'The British parliament and the Atlantic colonies to 1760: new approaches to enduring questions', *Parliamentary History*, 14 (1995), pp. 29-46, at p. 38 n. 44.

<sup>92</sup> Anchitell Grey, *Debates in the House of Commons, from 1667 to 1694* (10 vols., London, 1763), VII, pp. 96-101; Routh, *Tangier*, pp. 238-42.

focused parliamentary suspicions on the city. Although he still held Tangier to be a 'Jewell of such inestimable value', John Bland warned the earl of Shaftesbury in 1680 that Catholics dominated the garrison and the civilian government and that both the city's foreign residents and Irish soldiers were of dubious loyalty.<sup>93</sup> The inclusive and tolerant environment that integrated Tangier into the commercial and social patterns of the Mediterranean world also rendered it politically controversial in a Protestant empire. Containing a garrison that comprised a large number of Catholic soldiers and officers, Tangier seemed at best superfluous in a time of apparent national crisis and at worst appeared a foundation for future Catholic absolutism. When parliament made the allocation of additional funds for Tangier in the aftermath of the siege of Tangier in 1680 contingent upon the exclusion of the duke of York from the succession, the city's abandonment became all but inevitable.<sup>94</sup>

If the acquisition of Tangier pointed to the grand imperial ambitions held by the later Stuart monarchs, the colony's failure instead highlights the relative weakness of the seventeenth-century English state. As the Restoration monarchy poured money into the development of Tangier's harbour and fortifications, it anticipated the authoritarian empire of the later eighteenth century, but also engaged in a project that far exceeded the crown's actual capacity to project its power overseas. Although Charles II and his ministers did not intend Tangier to be a mere garrison, the city was never even remotely self-sustaining and left the state to bear the full burden of its costly defence. As early as 1667, during the financial crisis precipitated by the Dutch raid on the Medway, Hugh Cholmley warned Tangier's lieutenant governor, Henry Norwood, that sentiment was turning against the city in favour of retrenchments necessary 'to preserve our Antient Dominions in a flourishing Condition then by Exhausting our Treasure to impoverish our Selves in hopes to make our Posterity more glorious by a Remote accession to the Crowne'. For Tangier's sceptics, projects like the transformation of this exposed site into a naval and trading centre were works 'rather of noise and reputation than any solid benefitt & therefore sutable to plentifull & larger monarkys', not those struggling to reduce their expenses.<sup>95</sup>

Weakness alone does not, however, account for Tangier's failure: the East India Company found itself badly mauled after launching its war against the Mughal empire in 1686 and, seventy years later, it was the capture of Fort William by the forces of Nawab Siraj ud-Daulah that precipitated the Company's conquest of Bengal.<sup>96</sup> Moreover, the impetus to conquer European footholds

<sup>93</sup> Bland to the earl of Shaftesbury, Tangier, 1680, BL, Sloane MSS 3512, fo. 283r-v.

<sup>94</sup> Grey, *Debates in the House of Commons*, VIII, pp. 4-21.

<sup>95</sup> Cholmley to Henry Norwood, London, 2 Sept. 1667 and 1 Nov. 1667, NYRO, ZCG V 1/1/2, pp. 70, 111-12.

<sup>96</sup> P.J. Marshall, 'Western arms in maritime Asia in the early phases of expansion', *Modern Asian Studies*, 14 (1980), pp. 13-28; Om Prakash, *European commercial enterprise in pre-colonial India* (Cambridge, 1998), pp. 146-53; Colley, *Captives*, pp. 38, 255-6; Sanjay Subrahmanyam, *Explorations in connected history: Mughals and Franks* (New Delhi, 2005), p. 203.

on the African coast was not the only factor that shaped Moroccan relations with Tangier. For both the local rulers that the English first encountered upon occupying Tangier and the centralizing emperors of the Alawi dynasty, the English town and the remaining Spanish possessions on the Moroccan coast were equally valuable as targets for regimes legitimizing jihad and as sources of the gunpowder and arms on which their state-building depended.<sup>97</sup> This complicated relationship belies Nabil Matar's conclusion that by 1680 England's 'encounter with the Moors had become completely grounded in colonial desire and religious difference'.<sup>98</sup> In the fractured political environment of Morocco in the mid-seventeenth century, these two dimensions of Muslim-Christian relations were intertwined and had even encouraged an element of interdependence between Tangier and its sometime enemies.

The relationship between Tangier and its Moroccan neighbours parallels the vulnerability and mutual dependence that defined European forts and factories along the African coast and around the Indian Ocean. Ideological factors help to explain the divergent histories of Tangier and of the outposts that would become foundations of the British empire. Describing the brief French occupation of the eastern Indian city of São Tomé, English travel writer John Fryer asked, 'Why *Gulconda*, being a Potent Prince, should permit Garisons to be in the hands of Aliens?'<sup>99</sup> Fryer's explanation that Indian rulers were 'weak at sea' and thus preferred to leave their port cities to foreign allies to defend at their own cost appears increasingly problematic as the commercial and even maritime interests of these figures become more evident.<sup>100</sup> Nevertheless, Fryer's question remains pertinent, especially considering the fate of Tangier. Tribute payments and custom revenues encouraged African and Asian polities to permit European forts and factories to be situated on their lands. More broadly, these outposts also testified to the willingness and ability of companies to accept the sovereign authority of African and Asian rulers in order to develop their own political and commercial foundations. Although the construction of fortifications reflected a widespread belief that the safety of European communities depended on the threat of force, European strongholds generally rested on grants bestowed on their founders by neighbouring rulers and were often sustained through judicious acknowledgement of indigenous suzerainty.<sup>101</sup>

<sup>97</sup> For this point, see Bakker, *Slaves, arms, and holy war*, pp. 4–9.

<sup>98</sup> Matar, *Britain and Barbary*, p. 158.

<sup>99</sup> John Fryer, *A new account of East India and Persia* (London, 1698), quoted in Henry Davison Love, *Vestiges of old Madras, 1640–1800* (4 vols., Delhi, 1988), 1, p. 318.

<sup>100</sup> For the relationship between South Asian state-building and political economy in this period, see Sanjay Subrahmanyam, *Penumbra visions: making polities in early modern South India* (Ann Arbor, MI, 2001), ch. 4, pp. 104–14, 131–6, and idem, *Explorations in connected history: from the Tagus to the Ganges* (New Delhi, 2005), ch. 3, passim.

<sup>101</sup> Watson, 'Fortifications and the "idea" of force', pp. 71–81; Stern, "A politie of civill & military power", pp. 254–67.



A similar dynamic appears to have been at work in North Africa, where the Moroccans sought to establish the terms on which the English might be permitted to remain at Tangier. In 1683, the former Moroccan ambassador to England, Muhammad ben Haddu, wrote Charles II a letter in which he warned the English king that Moulay Ismaïl was preparing to attack Tangier, having used the promise of holy war to unite under his command those tribal groups that had originally resisted his rule.<sup>102</sup> Moreover, the Moroccan diplomat recounted an exchange between Moulay Ismaïl and the Ottoman sultan over disputed territory between Morocco and Algeria. According to ben Haddu, the Ottoman sultan responded to Moulay Ismaïl's initial communication regarding this territory by promising that the people of the land in question would serve the Moroccan emperor whenever he again engaged in war against the Christians, but also by asking how the Moroccans could 'have patience and endure in your countries four Christian Garrisons'.<sup>103</sup> Warning again of the coming assault on Tangier, ben Haddu proceeded to suggest how the English might avoid war and the expense it would entail, advising Charles 'to open your hands with gifts and to have pity on the city of Tanger' and to 'make it a Jewry (*mallah*) and storehouse for whatsoever my Master shall demand of powder and armes and whatsoever else he shall want and ask from your parts and do you write to him and beg of him his grace and Peace'. He went on to reiterate his suggestion that the English turn over Tangier, explaining that this would allow Moulay Ismaïl to justify the English presence in the city:

Do you therefore with all diligence behave your self well in my Masters service and give him whatever he demands of powder and armes and all other things to the end that he may have some excuse to make to the Ottoman Emperour that he does not make war on Tanger and may write him in the Letter that he now intends to send him that he keeps it as a place in obedience to him and that payes him taxes and customes and supplies him with whatsoever he commands.<sup>104</sup>

Significantly, ben Haddu specifically called on Tangier's residents to pay the *jizya*, or poll tax, which would have signified their incorporation into the Moroccan empire as non-Muslim subjects.<sup>105</sup> Thus, according to ben Haddu,

<sup>102</sup> For the full diplomatic context of this letter, see Bakker, *Slaves, arms, and holy war*, pp. 7–9, 72–85. Cf. Nabil Matar's treatment of this letter in *Britain and Barbary*, pp. 161–2.

<sup>103</sup> The letter here refers to the Spanish and Portuguese possessions on the Moroccan coast, in addition to Tangier.

<sup>104</sup> The translation here used is the original contained in TNA, CO 279/30, fos. 353r–36v, which largely parallels the modern translation by J. F. P. Hopkins in *Letters from Barbary, 1576–1774: Arabic documents in the Public Record Office* (Oxford, 1982), pp. 23–30, which is derived from the original Arabic letter in TNA, SP 104/4, #110. Hopkins provides the letter's date of 11 Sha'ban 1094, or 5 Aug. 1683. Hopkins also gives the original Arabic term for 'jewry' as *mallah*, which referred to the Jewish quarters of Moroccan cities.

<sup>105</sup> Hopkins specifies that ben Haddu cited the *jizya*, or poll tax, when he referred to Tangier paying taxes to Moulay Ismaïl, *Letters from Barbary*, p. 28. For background on the significance of this tax within Islamic law and its relationship to subject status, see Edhem Eldem,

while the Moroccans would no longer tolerate an independent garrison at Tangier, the English could remain there on condition that they acknowledged Moroccan sovereignty over the city.

While Muhammad ben Haddu's letter at least claimed to offer the English a way to maintain Tangier under the auspices of Moulay Ismaïl, the response of the city's governor, Colonel Percy Kirke, echoed the concern for the crown's authority and reputation that had marked both the initial development of the colony and Charles II's refusal to consider the Exclusion Bill in return for parliament's financial support of it.<sup>106</sup> Unlike the capitulatory agreements that Venice, France, England, and other states had established with the Ottoman empire, which allowed their merchants to live in Ottoman domains without being incorporated into that empire as subjects, ben Haddu's proposal would not only have integrated Tangier into Moulay Ismaïl's Moroccan empire, but would also have made Charles II tributary to the North African emperor.<sup>107</sup> Thus, when Kirke reported this letter to the secretary of state, Sir Leoline Jenkins, he recorded that he had expected to find 'some small and harmlesse artifice' in it, only to be 'amazed to find the highest peice of impudence that could have been imagined'.<sup>108</sup> Meanwhile, Kirke replied to ben Haddu to express, 'how much I have been surprised at so disrespectfull a manner of address to so great a Prince, and from whom you own to have received such heaps of favours', and continued, 'when I hear you advise my Master to make Tanger a tributary place and submit it as a Jewry to the Moors, I cannot consider you but as one of his greatest enemies or that some persons who wish you ill have made use of your name to affront my Master and ruine your credit with him'.<sup>109</sup>

Ultimately, Moulay Ismaïl was as unwilling to tolerate a fortified English settlement on his coast as Tangier's governors were to countenance its submission to Moroccan supremacy. As Muhammad ben Haddu's letter suggests, Christian settlements along the North African coast were particularly vulnerable within the culture and political tradition of religious war that had defined the Mediterranean for centuries. This particular ideological context that made jihad central to the creation of Moulay Ismaïl's empire differed from that which prevailed in South Asia, where state-building tended to be religiously and culturally syncretic.<sup>110</sup> However, ben Haddu's suggestion that the English could

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'Capitulations and Western trade', in Suraiya N. Faroqhi, ed., *The Cambridge history of Turkey: the later Ottoman empire, 1603–1839* (Cambridge, 2008), pp. 293–4.

<sup>106</sup> For the ideological basis of opposition to the exclusion bills and to parliamentary intrusion on royal authority, see Tim Harris, *Restoration: Charles II and his kingdoms, 1660–1685* (London, 2005), pp. 220–37, 252–8. See also Jonathan Scott, *England's troubles: seventeenth-century English political instability in European context* (Cambridge, 2000), pp. 435–6.

<sup>107</sup> Eldem, 'Capitulations and Western trade', pp. 293–6.

<sup>108</sup> Kirke to Jenkins, Tangier, 9 Aug. 1683, TNA, CO 279/32, fo. 74v.

<sup>109</sup> 'Copie of Colonel Kirke's second letter to the Morocco ambassador', Tangier, 9 Aug. 1683, TNA, CO 279/32, fo. 72r.

<sup>110</sup> C. A. Bayly, *Origins of nationality in South Asia: patriotism and ethical government in the making of modern India* (New Delhi, 1998), pp. 37–49, 214–19.

remain at Tangier if they would only acknowledge Moroccan sovereignty over the city also indicates that the political situation of Tangier was comparable to that of English outposts in India. Kirke's steadfast refusal to consider a proposal that he saw as demeaning to the honour of the English crown is thus all the more striking when we consider that the East India Company was simultaneously building its legitimacy in the political economy of the Indian Ocean through grants awarded it by Mughal emperors and other Asian sovereigns.<sup>111</sup> The politics of England's relations with Morocco offer a striking contrast to those which marked European interaction with local rulers around the Indian Ocean or on the west African coast. Opponents of the Morocco Company had warned that corporate trade was inappropriate for North Africa's political conditions since local inhabitants and their rulers would not tolerate the proliferation of fortified factories along their coast. Yet crown sovereignty over Tangier deprived its governors of the political flexibility East India Company factors skillfully deployed to expand company power and authority under the aegis of the Mughal empire and other Asian polities.

At a time when European military power still wielded limited influence on powerful Asian and African states, the ideological framework that guided the state-based relations between England and Morocco over Tangier provided one of the most subtle but critical distinctions between the histories of Tangier and Bombay. The conceptions of political economy and crown authority that underlay the colonization of Tangier both reflected and contributed to the wider process whereby even as the Atlantic and Indian Oceans and Mediterranean became more intertwined, other forces were at work favouring the evolution of very different systems. From this perspective, the failure of the colony at Tangier was not inevitable, but followed wider developments within both England's wider empire and Morocco. Ironically, the perception of the North African political and economic environment that underlay the crown's precocious effort to establish and administer a colony at the mouth of the Mediterranean also doomed the project. If royal government of Tangier had appeared appropriate precisely because the crown would be able to negotiate with Moroccan princes and rulers, the English state could not yet dominate conditions in a Mediterranean arena of more potent sovereigns.

<sup>111</sup> Stern, "A politie of civill & military power", pp. 264–7.