

but in varying directions. The Chinese state is giving away sovereignty with one hand while attempting to reign in other types of sovereign loss with the other.

The author's explanation for these complex policy shifts emerges from his accurate and intelligent critique of the new sovereignty literature in international relations theory. His empirical finding (Chinese policy shifts regarding sovereignty have not been uniform either over time or issue area) is used to extend the theoretical debate on the nature of sovereignty in the modern era. The power of each competing causal explanation in the literature (strongly held normative views, rational cost–benefit analysis, and external pressure from outside actors) also changes over time. He builds a dynamic argument that privileges leadership initiative in the early reform era (especially that of Deng Xiaoping), but then places far greater explanatory power in external pressure and norm diffusion for the substantial policy changes in economic sovereignty and Chinese engagement in the international human rights debate. Despite Carlson's identification with the constructivist school in international relations theory, he does not reject an interest-based argument. In fact, each explanation for the shifts in the four areas is built on the recognition that the Chinese state has shifted its stances on sovereignty in order to reap the benefits of globalization, economic integration, and greater mutual contact with the outside world. He argues that interests only, however, cannot explain why the Chinese government, for example, became much more willing to engage in the international human rights debate in the 1990s, almost immediately after the debacle of the suppression of the Tiananmen pro-democracy movement. He effectively uses the Chinese case to advance theoretical arguments that are significant for the ongoing explorations of how sovereignty is changing amid globalization in all its shapes and forms.

While the book is effective in its use of elite interviews and content analysis of an extensive number of documents to show that policy shifts have occurred, Carlson's argument does not delve deeply into the policymaking process. One wonders, then, what might have been missed given the importance that others have placed on the ways in which policy is made (and thwarted) by Chinese officialdom. For example, the broad changes in policy toward economic sovereignty may be at least partially explained by the actions of provincial and local leaders. Recent shifts in the human rights debate may have been advanced by domestic activists involved in the *weiquan yundong* (rights-protection movement). Given that the rights of sovereignty are as much about power over citizens as they are about power vis-à-vis other states, the author overemphasizes the role of elites, both domestic and international. As many studies of the Chinese reform era have now argued, radical policy change at the center is often prefaced by aggressive and daring actions of lower-level agents. Carlson tells us mainly about what those at the center have

said and written about the changes that have occurred; there is probably still even more to tell about what others *did* to advance policy change and to advance changing notions of sovereignty. Attention to this level of analysis does not contradict his general argument and is, in fact, entirely congruent with his findings that sovereignty has shifted more in the economic and social realms than in the territorial or jurisdictional ones.

*Unifying China, Integrating with the World* will be of interest to a broad array of scholars and policymakers. Its theoretical sophistication advances the general sovereignty debate in international relations theory, while the empirical arguments will be of great interest to policymakers who crave a more sophisticated picture of Chinese foreign policy than the engagement versus China threat debate. As China's role in the world becomes more important, this book should be effective in thwarting simplistic assumptions about how Chinese power, perhaps Chinese superpower, will be manifested.

**Globalization from Below: Transnational Activists and Protest Networks.**

By Donatella della Porta, Massimiliano Andretta, Lorenzo Mosca, and Herbert Reiter. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2006. 300p. \$75.00 cloth, \$25.00 paper.

**It Was Like a Fever: Storytelling in Protest and Politics.**

By Francesca Polletta. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006. 242p. \$45.00 cloth, \$19.00 paper.  
DOI: 10.1017/S153759270707065X

— Robert M. Press, *University of Southern Mississippi*

While different in scope and intent, both books offer a refreshing and uplifting sense of the capacity and willingness of people to protest conditions in society, or the world, which they deem unjust. The authors may not have set out to highlight idealism in political activism, but they ended up doing so.

The question of the impact of political protests is still a murky area. Such impact is difficult to show, and the authors of these two important books have not come up with a magic formula to convince us that public protests change public policy. But they do offer useful insights into how protestors operate and what seems to motivate them. The contribution of both works is that they add fresh insights and examples in support of two current trends in the study of social movements and political protest: 1) an increasing focus on cultural explanations of activism, and 2) growing evidence that activists are willing to forge ahead even in the face of major obstacles, including repression. The two trends are related.

*It Was Like a Fever* offers yet another challenge to the straitjacket of self-interest analysis, by examining passion, emotion, excitement—and just plain fun—as other motivating factors that can lead to political protest. The debate over whether culture or material conditions lead to change in society is an old one, going back at least as far as Max

Weber's cultural rebuttal to Karl Marx's materialistic arguments. But it has never been entirely an either/or debate. To her credit, Francesca Polletta makes it clear that her cultural argument is not to be taken as the only way to see things, declaring that she does not want to replace a "structural fundamentalism" with a "cultural fundamentalism" (p 5). Weber (1922) took more or less the same position in responding to Marx in *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*.

Polletta's particular contribution to the debate lies in her argument that analyzing narratives can help explain why some politically contentious issues get attention, why people take action, and why they choose particular tactics and strategies. There are cultural elements in the arguments of Donatella della Porta and her coauthors, but their main contribution lies with the second trend in social movement studies.

*Globalization from Below*, in describing new forms of political protest at the international level, also shows that these international activists forged ahead despite lack of what much of the literature on social movements refers to as political opportunities: "The movement for globalization from below . . . grew quickly at a time when political opportunities were diminishing" (p. 198). The authors include in the diminishing opportunities the lack of divisions within governments that might have made it easier to push those governments to make reforms.

Activists also faced forceful resistance from police at the international forums in Italy, on which della Porta and her colleagues focus. Yet it did not deter them from demanding a greater public voice in the making of international policies affecting world trade terms, the environment, and, in their view, the very nature of democratic government. Polletta similarly points out how activists overcame police and public resistance to carry out the sit-ins to integrate lunch counters in the 1960s.

Both books prod social movement theorists to pay more attention to the voices of the nonpowerful, the nonelite, and to examine their role in politics. Polletta makes a subtle and useful point regarding a process that may begin with stories and end with policy changes. Stories, she argues, can challenge the status quo by showing how some people are hurt by certain policies; and stories can "serve as a kind of check on values that are assumed to be universal and standards that are assumed to be neutral" (p 108). Della Porta et al. focus on activism by the victims of globalization as well as by their supporters over issues of perceived injustices of globalization.

*Globalization from Below* documents, through hundreds of interviews among protestors at two international summit meetings in Italy (2001 in Genoa, 2002 in Florence), the diversity of activists' backgrounds, affiliations, and choices of tactics. While emphasizing the importance of diverse individuals and not just organizations, the authors argue that the effectiveness of such protestors lies in how

successful they are in "recognizing the role of individuals but at the same time [being] able to sustain collective action" (p 247). One of the principal contributions of their book is the data it provides, which offer one of the first detailed portraits of activists and the networks they form. These activists share a general distrust of international institutions, such as the United Nations, the European Union, and the World Trade Organization. They constitute a diverse movement of international protestors who shun a collective identity but seek a collective process to make their voices heard more effectively (p. 247).

*It Was Like a Fever* has a much narrower scope and is a subtle work that builds on previous scholarship about the importance of storytelling and politics (e.g., see Charles Tilly, *Identities, and Political Change*, 2002; Joseph Davis, ed., *Stories of Change: Narrative and Social Movements*, 2002). Effective stories, Polletta argues, can motivate people to action, especially in the early stages of a protest movement before it is well organized. Her prime example is the lunch counter sit-ins of the 1960s that spread "like a fever" (p. 32) in the words of some students. Within 10 weeks, sit-ins grew from four college students in Greensboro, North Carolina, to some 50,000 participants in nine states with a sense of spontaneity, "fun," and a "giddy sense of excitement (p. 41).

Polletta, whose focus is intentionally not just on protest politics, also examines whether storytelling can help or hurt victims—especially women—of social injustice. She also discusses the apparent disconnect between annual storytelling in Congress to memorialize Dr. Martin Luther King and the failure of such rhetoric to generate legislation that would help the people Dr. King tried to help. She also challenges those who would classify narratives or stories as only personal and emotional phenomena, rather than political and authoritative (p. 28), insisting that narratives are a crucial kind of data for political science analysis.

What is missing in both works is convincing evidence that political protests change policy. Political scientist della Porta and colleagues focus on the actors and only slightly on the impact—not impact on policy but impact on police and how police respond to tactics of the protestors. They also note media coverage of the protests. Sociologist Polletta, whose explanations are not always easy to follow, does not explain why some people are motivated to action by stories but most are not. Nor do her examples provide strong empirical evidence of the link between storytelling and action, much less between action and policy outcomes.

To point this out, however, is not to detract from the value of the two works. Clear evidence of the impact on policy of protests or storytelling would be hard to come by. Social movement theorists as a whole have a hard time coming up with compelling linkages between protests and policy changes. Even scholars who address this issue directly struggle to do so (e.g., see Marco Giugni, Doug McAdam, Charles Tilly, eds., *How Social Movements Matter*, 1999).

But social movements can raise public awareness of an issue and that can lead to a variety of pressures for political change.

One reason that demonstrating clear causal links between social movements and policy is so difficult is because of the array of pressures or factors involved in any change of policy. There were, for example, massive protests against the U.S. involvement in Vietnam, yet the war continued for a number of years. There was no major protest movement against the U.S. involvement in Somalia in the early 1990s, yet the televised image of one American soldier being dragged naked through the streets of Mogadishu so shocked and revolted the American public that within a few days, President Bill Clinton initiated steps to withdraw all American troops.

As with any works, some questions remain unanswered, which is good because it leaves open a rich terrain for future researchers. Global activists are demanding a new type of politics. But are mass protests or mass concerts more effective in bringing about the changes they seek? (After a mass concert and a protest march organized by U2's Bono and Bob Geldof in 2005 to pressure leaders at the G8 summit, the G8 leaders agreed to double aid to Africa from \$25 million to \$50 million.) If narratives are important in protests and politics, then researchers should be able to come up with additional cases, and good stories, that support this claim. Those interested in such questions will find that these two books offer a good starting point for their research.

**Making War and Building Peace.** By Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006. 400p. \$24.95.

**Sustainable Peace: Power and Democracy after Civil Wars.** Edited by Philip G. Roeder and Donald Rothchild. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005. 392p. \$55.00 cloth, \$19.95 paper. DOI: 10.1017/S1537592707070661

— Michael J. Gilligan, *New York University*

The two books discussed in this review address the same substantive question: How does one establish sustainable peace after civil war? However, their approaches are quite different. The Roeder and Rothchild edited volume focuses on one aspect of establishing postwar peace—the post-civil war political institutions of the country. Doyle and Sambanis focus on the role of the United Nations in helping to establish sustainable postwar peace. I will first address the edited volume and then turn to the Doyle and Sambanis book before offering a few concluding remarks.

*Sustainable Peace: Power and Democracy after Civil Wars* is a terrific edited volume. I can think of no edited volume where the individual chapters fit more nicely together into a cohesive whole. As with the other volume discussed in this review, the primary purpose of the book is to offer

policy prescriptions regarding how to establish peace in post-civil-conflict settings. The focus of the book is on domestic political institutions—which postwar political institutions are most conducive to establishing a postwar sustainable peace. In addressing this topic, the book calls into question what might be called the conventional wisdom on this topic, namely that power-sharing arrangements are the best approach to establishing sustainable peace in postconflict countries and offers instead another prescription what the editors call “power-dividing institutions.”

Power-sharing arrangements have been employed by the international community recently in the peacebuilding efforts in the former Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, and other post-civil-conflict situations. The editors of this volume identify what might be called “the dilemma of power sharing”: “Power-sharing institutions frequently facilitate a transition from civil war but they thwart the consolidation of peace and democracy” (p. 12). Power-sharing arrangements can induce combatants to lay down arms by assuaging their fears that they will be locked out of power in the subsequent peace; however, these arrangements also ossify the political cleavages that lead to the war in the first place. The argument makes a great deal of sense, and contributions to this edited volume do a very good job of calling into question the empirical validity of any claims that power-sharing arrangements produce sustainable postwar peace and democratization.

The editor's policy recommendation is for post-civil-conflict planners to create power-dividing rather than power-sharing institutions. They argue power-dividing (i.e., separation-of-powers) institutions create cross-cutting cleavages that require actors to make political alliances across the divide of the old ethnolinguistic or religious cleavages along which the previous war was fought and in that way encourage political stability and sustainable peace. In their words, “one limits majorities not by empowering minority groups with parts of the government's power but by expanding individual liberties and rights at the expense of government and by empowering different majorities in independent organs of government” (p. 15).

To bolster its case against power-sharing institutions, the book offers chapters on some of the common power-sharing prescriptions for postwar stability (e.g., territorial decentralization, ethnofederalism, proportional electoral system, and fiscal power sharing) and shows that none of these institutions is significantly related to postwar sustainable peace. The book also offers case studies of Lebanon, India, Ethiopia, and South Africa that suggest that the instances of sustainable peace following civil conflict in deeply divided societies may be outliers. The book is convincing about the questionability of power-sharing arrangements as a means to sustainable postwar peace, but one obvious question concerns the issue of military force. It seems imprudent to apply the same prescription about