

behavioral norms, therefore, had to be punished. Transgressors had to be reprovved, disciplined, or even “defined out” of the community—though that raised awkward questions about the nature of “whiteness” and the distinctions of class and gender. Above all, prestige was the stuff and ground of argument, and its defense required demonstration. Identity is always performative, and Shadle shows how settlers developed codes of dress and address, rituals of sociality and mastery, to enact both belonging and difference and to project authority. As Shadle notes, however, performance necessarily implied an audience: settlers performed *to* Africans *for* whites. Officials did much the same and the stage could be contested.

Kenya settlers could not claim a providential history as part of their identity. What they did have, however, was English Common Law, which, they argued, guaranteed the “rights of all free-born Englishmen,” wherever they might be, for rights were portable. They used this claim to ground their identity, to denounce the tyranny of the colonial state, and sometimes—such was the compelling logic of rights—to defend Africans against officialdom, for rights implied obligations and the acceptance of obligation was a hallmark of prestige. As Shadle shows, official and “unofficial” views of law and order and the provision of justice, based on different interpretations of the role of law under colonial conditions, often clashed.

Souls of White Folk is not intended as a history of settlement in Kenya: it leaves out much of the formal political and economic infrastructure that supported the community and it ends, rather abruptly, in the late 1920s, before the shock of economic depression and war and before the final establishment of the White Highlands as a racially defined enclave. It does, however, dig deep, and it addresses two vital questions: who did settlers think they were? and why did they think and act as they did? Both these questions, especially when situated within the wider frame of ethnicity, have important comparative dimensions that a close reading of *Souls* reveals. Ironically, perhaps, for a book that deals with a community that emphasized difference, it encourages readers to explore similarities. Kenya settlers did not claim to be “white Africans,” but they did live in Kenya, and they necessarily interacted with, were influenced by, and in odd and unequal ways shared common concerns with Africans whom they otherwise excluded.

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Andrew Hussey. *The French Intifada: The Long War Between France and Its Arabs*. New York: Faber and Faber, 2014. xxiii + 441 pp. Introduction. Notes. Acknowledgments. Illustration Credits. Index. \$35.00. Paper. ISBN: 978-0865479210.

The “crisis of the *banlieues*”—the social and economic instability of (some) housing projects on the outskirts of large French cities—has preoccupied

the French state and public for decades. French anxieties have grown more acute since the outbreak of riots in 2005 and, more recently, since the Paris terrorist attacks of January and November 2015. Commentators cite various causes for the crisis: the failure to integrate immigrants, social and economic marginalization, and discrimination. Andrew Hussey's provocatively titled book suggests a different cause: colonial violence and the uneasy postcolonial relationship between France and "its" Arabs. He seeks to present an "analysis of current tensions of both sides of the Mediterranean, informed by an account of the historical circumstances which have brought us to where we are" (403). The first part of the book introduces some of the issues facing the suburbs of Paris and Lyon, interspersed with accounts of acts of terrorism or extreme violence committed by perpetrators of immigrant origin. The second, third, and fourth parts of the book examine the histories of Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia from the French conquest to decolonization and the challenges of the postcolonial period. The book concludes with a section on the disproportionate number of Muslims in French prisons and the role of incarceration in fueling radical Islam.

Hussey is hardly alone in analyzing what the French call the "social fracture" (*fracture sociale*), its relationship to immigration and integration policies, the debates over secularism, or France's colonial heritage. He dismisses explanations for this social fracture and resulting unrest that emphasize the economic and social marginalization of residents of the suburban housing estates, and of minority populations more generally. Instead, he argues that the disaffection of the residents stems directly from the inequalities and violence of the colonial era. Few would deny, of course, that the colonial legacy weighs heavily on contemporary French society. Yet Hussey's argument seems to oversimplify a complex issue.

Hussey contends that the long and frequently violent relationship between France and its North African colonies has shaped contemporary confrontations between French authorities and disaffected youth. He suggests that French citizens and immigrants of North African origin, even those born decades after decolonization, carry with them an intense resentment, if not outright hatred, of France that is rooted in the colonial experience. This is an intriguing claim. Unfortunately, however, Hussey offers little hard evidence that such resentment has been the defining factor in protests and outbursts of violence.

There are other limitations to Hussey's argument. If, as he posits, colonial violence and postcolonial instability engender violence in French residents with roots in the former colonies, then one might expect to see similar patterns among immigrant groups from other regions of the former empire; after all, the experience of colonialism and decolonization was equally violent in Indochina, Madagascar, and other areas. Hussey focuses almost exclusively on French citizens and immigrants of North African descent, but participants in demonstrations and riots (whether in the *banlieues* or not) have similarly varied backgrounds, as do those who have perpetrated acts of terror in recent decades. Moreover, he implies that all French citizens of

North African descent fall into the category of the disaffected and angry, when many are well integrated and successful. He argues further for the specificity of the French experience, excluding any real comparison with other European countries that are facing similar challenges of integrating marginalized minority groups, as well as the spread of Islamic radicalism. If French colonial violence is the cause of this instability and violence, how do we explain similar phenomena in other states? Belgium too was a colonial power, but one without a presence in North Africa or the Middle East; and yet it faces many of the same challenges as France.

In addition to such methodological problems, the organization of the book serves Hussey's argument poorly. Insufficient connections are made between the detailed histories of colonial violence, armed conflict, and postcolonial instability in the Maghreb, on the one hand, and social unrest and violence in contemporary France on the other. He describes both phenomena, but leaves it to the reader to conclude that the relationship between colonial violence and postcolonial social unrest is both direct and causal.

Readers are also confronted with a number of errors and misleading descriptions. For example, Hubert Lyautey's "oil spot" (*tâche d'huile*) method of conquest and pacification is erroneously described as a policy of "impressing the natives with French military power and technology, eventually winning them over to the benefits of European modernity" (280). While this was certainly an element of the French civilizing mission, the oil spot method itself was a policy of establishing French outposts as bases from which to spread control; eventually these disconnected French enclaves would merge much as drops of oil pool together. The apartment bombed by the OAS (*Organisation armée secrète*), which disfigured four-year-old Delphine Renard, was not Jean-Paul Sartre's (200) but André Malraux's. Henri Alleg, whose personal account of torture at the hands of French authorities during the Algerian War is well known, is somewhat oddly introduced as "a Jew suspected of Muslim sympathies" (188), instead of, more accurately, as a Communist suspected of collaborating with Algerian nationalists. Alleg was arrested and tortured first and foremost for his political sympathies and activism, not because of his religious affiliations or leanings.

The book is pitched to a broad rather than specifically academic audience, and Hussey's reliance on the journalistic style makes for a compelling read. The drawback, however, is that he seems to revel in lurid descriptions of violence. To describe violence is not in itself a fault (and is nearly unavoidable given the subject matter), but a fine line exists between necessary depiction and sensationalism. The book readily indulges in the latter, as when we are presented with the following narrative about the 1955 FLN massacre of Europeans in Philippeville: "Europeans were slashed with knives and razors, heads split by axes and sickles. There was a euphoric frenzy to all of this—Muslim women were ululating, giving a terrible, sinister soundtrack to an orgy of slaughter. As the blood flowed, the crowd grew ever more cruel" (171).

In short, Hussey is to be commended for tackling a difficult and important subject, but his book falls short of the nuanced analysis that such a complex issue requires.

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Mohammed Hassen. *The Oromo and the Christian Kingdom of Ethiopia, 1300–1700*. Woodbridge, U.K.: James Currey, 2015. xx + 379 pp. Oromo Glossary. Spelling of Ethiopian Names. Maps. Chronology. Notes. Bibliography. Index. \$80.00. Cloth. ISBN: 978–1847011176.

Prominent Ethiopianists such as C. Conti Rossini, Enrico Cerulli, and Tadesse Tamrat analyzed Christian and Muslim sources of Ethiopia—the sultanates of Shawa, Ifat, and Harar—without noticing the presence of the Oromo in the Christian kingdom of Ethiopia before the sixteenth century. With better knowledge of Oromo culture and language, Mekuria Bulcha, in *Contours of the Emergent and Ancient Oromo Nation* (CASAS, 2011), argued convincingly for the presence of the Oromo within the Christian kingdom and the Muslim states along the middle Awash Valley before the sixteenth century. Mohammed Hassen hinted at this thesis in his first book (*The Oromo of Ethiopia: A History, 1570–1860*, Red Sea Press, 1990), but provided no details. In his new book, *The Oromo and the Christian Kingdom of Ethiopia*, he offers a careful reevaluation and reinterpretation of the history of medieval Ethiopia that includes the Oromo.

The book is divided into eight chapters with narratives that shift between the sedentary and pastoral Oromo and the exploits of the Christian kings. The first two chapters focus on the sedentary Oromo and their contacts and interactions with the Christian and Muslim populations in medieval Shawa. Chapters 3 and 4 deal with the dramatic population movements of the pastoral Oromo into the Ethiopian highlands. Chapters 5–8 recount the struggle of the Christian kings and their unsuccessful efforts to stop the spread of the pastoral Oromo into the Ethiopian highlands. Reexamining available traditions and written sources, Hassen argues that the Barentu, one of the two Oromo moieties, were more numerous than the Borana during the sixteenth century. Although one could argue that the population size and distribution of the Borana and Barentu are less conclusive than Hassen asserts, and that the two groups were more dispersed than he suggests (as the distribution of the names of their sub-moieties indicates), the book nevertheless provides a valuable portrait of the two groups. Divided into seven full-fledged moieties and thirty sub-moieties, the Barentu spearheaded the northward