*Nationalities Papers*, 2017
Vol. 45, No. 5, 840–855, https://doi.org/10.1080/00905992.2017.1335297

Routledge
Taylor & Francis Group

Check for updates

# The rebirth of Chinggis Khaan: state appropriation of Chinggis Khaan in post-socialist Mongolia

Orhon Myadar*

*School of Geography and Development, University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ, USA*

*(Received 28 February 2016; accepted 17 October 2016)*

A massive monument of Chinggis Khaan (Chinggis Khaan's name is spelt differently depending on the language in which it was written and on conventions of transliteration. Among the most common are Chinggis, Genghis, Genghiz, or Jengiz. For the purpose of the paper, the Mongolian transliteration is used.) imposingly gazes down from the government palace in Ulaanbaatar, the capital city of Mongolia. The monument was erected in 2006 in commemoration of the 800-year anniversary of the establishment of "the Great Mongolian State." Occupying arguably the most prominent national space, the monument serves as an arresting emblem of the state. With its silent yet triumphant symbolization, the monument articulates the state's new ideology in the post-Soviet era. The monument is one of countless symbolic and material grand-scale state expressions appropriating Chinggis Khaan. In this article, I examine the state's appropriation of Chinggis Khaan as the marker of Mongolian post-socialist national identity. In doing so, I critically examine how the state appropriates history, remembering and forgetting certain parts, to cultivate a shared sense of belonging and pride. Unifying the public in shared glorification and celebration of Chinggis Khaan ultimately serves to instill devotion to the national political and ideological project.

**Keywords:** Mongolia; Chinggis Khaan; memory; ideology; nationalism

## Introduction

Few historical figures maintain as powerful a legacy as Chinggis Khaan. Though deceased for over 900 years, his infamy – including the brutality and destruction that he inflicted upon millions of people – has earned him a designation as one of the top 100 most influential people of the millennium (*Time* 1999). Yet, in contemporary Mongolia, a small Northeast Asian nation of three million, Chinggis Khaan is revered for a dramatically different legacy. Chinggis Khaan has become the predominant personification of the nation as the country transforms itself from a Soviet-backed regime of seven decades. The national obsession with Chinggis Khaan contrasts quite sharply to the Soviet era, when Chinggis Khaan's legacy was denigrated by Marxist narratives as the personification of a backward and oppressive class-based society.

This article critiques the state's appropriation of Chinggis Khaan in reconstructing Mongolia's post-socialist identity and in rewriting its new national ideology. Conceptually, the article argues that national identity is a social construct, produced and mediated to

*Email: orhon@email.arizona.edu

© 2017 Association for the Study of Nationalities

https://doi.org/10.1080/00905992.2017.1335297 Published online by Cambridge University Press

reflect shifting power arrangements and ideological commitments of the state (Myadar and Rae 2014). Following Foucault and others, the article argues that the state functions as an institutional machinery aimed at organizing social domains and disciplining the subjects of the state (Miller, Gordon, and Burchell 1991). While the state is not the sole source of power, its predominance lies in its ability to organize space and to regulate and produce disciplined political subjects through various mechanisms (Foucault 1977).

The state's glorification of Chinggis Khaan in today's Mongolia, and the devotion of vast material and human resources to this task can be understood within this conceptual framework. The Mongolian state has used Chinggis Khaan to reconfigure and invigorate Mongolia's national identity and uses his carefully appropriated persona to rally the public and galvanize a new national identity detached from the Soviet era. In other words, Chinggis Khaan has become an ideological trope of the state aimed at mobilizing the population toward a single goal of legitimizing the state and its power.

To demonstrate this case, the article explores various projects initiated, funded, and carried out by the state. In doing so, the article provides background information necessary to contextualize the differences between the Soviet and post-Soviet era. This background situates the appropriation of Chinggis Khaan in the post-Soviet era within a larger conversation about the shifting power arrangements and socio-economic conditions within which the cult-like exultation of Chinggis Khaan can be understood. Using primary sources, including legal and policy documents, the article examines how the state pushed forward with appropriating Chinggis Khaan as its embodiment despite the state's anemia due to "shock therapy" and the rapid transition from a centrally planned economy to a market-based one (Humphrey and Sneath 1999; Rossabi 2005; Myadar 2006). Though the transition may have slowed the Chinggis project, the state's ideological commitment to the glorification of Chinggis Khaan has not wavered.

The article examines specifically a prominent statue of Chinggis Khaan that was built in front of the government building in 2006. The statue stands as a testament to the state's glorification of Chinggis Khaan in the post-Soviet era and as a material and epistemological manifestation of the state's role in modeling the public psyche to embrace a sanitized version of this historical figure.

The statue, while prominent, is one of many similar projects of what this article dubs "Chiggisid Mongolia." Chiggisid Mongolia is an ultimate manifestation of the state's role in embracing, appropriating, and exploiting Chinggis Khaan as the representation of the nation. In conclusion, the article revisits the Foucauldian notion of the state as the central engine of social power and discipline. The Mongolian state's use of human and capital resources in appropriating Chinggis Khaan can be seen as an effort to inscribe a new (post-Soviet) ideology, to channel an ideal version of Mongolian national identity, and foremost, establish its own legitimacy as an extension of Chinggis Khaan.

## Background

Mongolia joined the so-called socialist camp in 1921 – becoming the second country to do so, preceded only by the Soviet Union. The national ideological project in the following seven decades largely mirrored the Soviet political blueprint, adopting and replicating various national policies directly from the USSR (Myadar and Rae 2014). Therefore, the collapse of the socialist regimes both in the USSR and Mongolia in the late 1980s and early 1990s undoubtedly marked Mongolia's drastic departure from Soviet ideological constraints. It also signaled a moment to redefine a state based on a radically new ideology. Reconstructing a new national identity and ideology was "a challenge to seventy years'

https://doi.org/10.1080/00905992.2017.1335297 Published online by Cambridge University Press

of production and reproduction of the Mongol identity and entire social order" (Bulag 1998, 254).

As the Soviets left Mongolia both physically and metaphorically, nationalist sentiment immediately began to erupt and has since been fanned by the state (Myadar 2006; Myadar and Rae 2014). This emerging nationalist sentiment served as a "*positive* discourse which [sought] to replace the structure of colonial power with a new order, that of national power" (Chatterjee 1986, 42, emphasis in original). The Soviet ideology and policies that were carried out in Mongolia mirrored colonial politics imposed by Europeans throughout the world. While Mongolia was not an official part of the Soviet Union, heavy-handed Soviet impositions on Mongolia were consistent with colonial politics elsewhere. Under Soviet direction and control, Mongolia was transformed from an impoverished pastoral society at the beginning of the twentieth century to a highly ordered and structured society after seven decades. This political, social, spatial, and administrative transformation was more vivid and radical than in many former Soviet sphere countries, especially compared to those countries that had long been settled and urbanized (Myadar and Rae 2014).

In the move from colonial to national, Mongolia began to unearth its mythical and antiquated past. Selective and nuanced memories of the past increasingly projected the "real" and glorious Mongolia, purposefully drifting away from the Soviet legacy. Given the ubiquitous ideological and material presence of the Soviets, the process of creating a new national identity has led to the erasure of various markers and symbols of the Soviet period. While there are still some lingering Soviet material expressions, the government of Mongolia has purged many of these sites. The physical and symbolic erasure of the Soviet era thus appears essential in salvaging Mongolia's fractured national identity (Myadar and Rae 2014). For instance, under the direction of the city's mayor Bat-Uul Erdene, the city council of Ulaanbaatar orchestrated the removal of this prominent and large statue of Lenin in 2013, which had been an integral part of the cityscape for nearly six decades (see Figure 1).

Simultaneously, authentic Mongolian symbols have emerged not only to reclaim the symbolic landscapes but also to articulate a newly reinvigorated Mongolia (Myadar and Rae 2014). The cultural markers of "real" Mongolia include (but are not limited to) Chinggis Khaan, nomadism, *lamaist* Buddhism, traditional food, costume, and writing – all of which have been resuscitated to some degree in the last few years (Myadar and Rae 2014). Diener and Hagen (2013) discuss the hybridity of cultural expressions in the cityscape of Ulaanbaatar. Within this seemingly hybrid city landscape, ranging from felt traditional dwellings known as *gers* to a growing number of glass skyscrapers, one image is triumphantly present in the country's effort to rearticulate the national ideology: Chinggis Khaan.

The image of Chinggis Khaan now dominates the landscape of Mongolia – in sharp contrast to the Soviet era when Chinggis Khaan's image was decidedly absent, and the state's ideological machine actively shunned Chinggis Khaan and his legacy. With the exception of a few Euranasianist scholars such as Nikolai Sergeevich Trubetzkoy, who credited Chinggis Khaan and the Mongol empire for creating a single unified Eurasian state system, Chinggis Khaan's legacy was denounced in both Soviet and Mongolia narratives (see, for instance, Trubetzkoy and Liberman 1997). He was thus nearly forgotten from Mongolian public memory for his infamy, the destruction he (and his empire) wrought upon different communities, his feudalistic attributes, and, perhaps most importantly, because his empire subjugated the Russian heartland under what was infamously known as the Tatar-Mongol yoke. Chinggis Khan represented national humiliation for the Russians (Bulag 2010, 46–48).

https://doi.org/10.1080/00905992.2017.1335297 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Figure 1. The front of the Mongolian government palace after the grand renovation of 2006. A ceremonial tribute to the Chinggis Khaan monument as shown here is not an unusual site. Photo by Michael Kohn with author's permission.

In the post-socialist years, however, Mongolia has collectively forgotten the sins of Chinggis Khaan. Chinggis Khaan has now become the primary marker of Mongolian national identity. As Urdyn Bulag notes, "after the long ban by the Soviet Union, Chinggis returned with a vengeance, reclaiming Mongolia as a Chinggis Khan's Mongolia" (2010, 32). The Mongolian state immediately began to use Chinggis Khaan as the rightful and desirable figure to nurture and solidify the nascent national identity. As a matter of state policy, the Mongolian state propagated the cult of Chinggis Khaan and underwent considerable efforts to channel the popular psyche to the glorified and romanticized version of this historic figure. One such effort was to concretize his image in the public mind by erecting a monument of him in Sukhbaatar Square, at the symbolic anchor of the country's capital, Ulaanbaatar.

## Appropriating Chinggis Khaan

To say that Chinggis Khaan's image is everywhere in today's Mongolia is hardly an exaggeration. Chinggis Khaan lives in every imaginable form in Mongolia, from billboards and rock bands to vodka bottles. He has become the preeminent symbol of national grandeur, culture, and identity (Bulag 1998, 2010; Kaplonski 2005; Lkhamsuren 2008; Ippei 2012; Myadar and Rae 2014).

Given this ubiquity, at a glance, the project of constructing a national identity does not appear to have been top-down – nor does it appear to have been carefully engineered and heavy-handedly executed by the state, as was the case during the socialist era. Instead, the nation appears to be reinventing itself rhizomatically, at least on the surface (Myadar and Rae 2014). The Deleuze and Guattarian "rhizome" metaphor represents a model that

https://doi.org/10.1080/00905992.2017.1335297 Published online by Cambridge University Press

extends in all directions with multiple non-hierarchical and disorderly entries and exits. The metaphor seems to capture the chaotic articulation and appropriation of Chinggis Khaan in post-socialist Mongolia (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 21). From entrepreneurs who commodify Chinggis Khaan[1] to historians who invent his birthday;[2] from rock singers who pay passionate tribute to Chinggis,[3] to neo-Nazi youngsters who swear to keep Chinggis' "holy" blood pure;[4] all appear to independently contribute to the project of Chinggis' glorification. Unlike rhizomes, however, these articulations are not necessarily independent discursive circuits detached from the core ideological generator: that is, the state. The state's role has been monumental in producing and inscribing the Chinggis-rooted national identity (Myadar and Rae 2014).

What are the state's roles in appropriating Chinggis Khaan in Mongolia? The Chinggis Khaan fascination did not come naturally. It needed to be re-produced, channeled, and cultivated. And that is precisely the role the state had to play. By the time the Soviets left Mongolia in the early 1990s, Soviet-dictated policies denouncing Chinggis Khaan largely shaped the epistemology of Chinggis Khaan among the general public. One such policy was to teach in schools that Chinggis Khaan was a ruthless feudal leader and thus an unpraiseworthy figure in Mongolian history (Boldbaatar 1999, 238; Bulag 2010, 48). Such teaching further removed each generation from the legacy of Chinggis Khaan, temporally and ideologically. As a result, Chinggis Khaan and his empire's legacy became rather "distant and vague memories" (Bulag 2010, 31).

The new Mongolian state thus assumed a central role in generating and propagating a new image of Chinggis Khaan and remolding the public psyche to be receptive to a reappropriated version of this highly contested historic figure (Myadar and Rae 2014). While the state is not the only source of Chinggis Khaan's glorification, the state has actively sanctioned and propagated a Chinggis Khaan-centered national identity.

This new epistemology is both a theory of knowledge on Chinggis Khaan scripted by the state as well as an image ideology in which Chinggis Khaan is central. As Duncan (1990) suggests, the state has the authority to write the national past and therefore controls both writing and interpretation of national identity. The Mongolian state has played an active and principal role in the rewriting of the national past and proliferating Chinggis Khaan not only for popular consumption, but also as an ideological and political tool. Chinggis Khaan has become "the template for the concept of the Mongolian nationality" and the symbol of national glory, pristine culture, and authentic identity (Sneath 2007, 172).

## Reading the Chinggis Khaan monument

The Chinggis Khaan monument at the government palace is one of many state-endorsed Khaan projects in Mongolia. The monument is also an example of memorialization of Chinggis Khaan by the state, which inscribes his image not only in public minds but in the physical urban space.

Though one of many, this Chinggis monument is particularly important to understanding the state's role in inscribing a Chinggis Khaan-centered national identity because of its location (Figure 2). The monument occupies a central and prominent location as a part of the government palace complex, which sits in the center of Ulaanbaatar, the capital city of Mongolia. As Diener and Hagen (2013) suggest, capital cities serve as important sites in constructing national identity. Ulaanbaatar is no exception in articulating the state-sponsored image for the nation.

Prior to the erection of the Chinggis Khaan monument, the mausoleum of Damdiny Sukhbaatar and Horloogiin Choibalsan decorated the government palace, consistent with

https://doi.org/10.1080/00905992.2017.1335297 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Figure 2. The Fallen Statue of Lenin. Photo by Michael Kohn with author's permission.

the ideological commitment of the state to socialism during that time. The mausoleum had opened in 1954, in an elaborate ceremony faithfully following the Soviet blueprint in reifying and preserving the cult of leaders. Both Sukhbaatar and Choibalsan were regarded as the foremost leaders and national heroes in socialist Mongolia. While the erection of the mausoleum necessarily reflected the state ideology at the time, its destruction also carried an equally persuasive message articulating the post-Soviet state ideology. The spatial reappropriation of the state's most prominent space undoubtedly signaled the radical ideological shift of the state and its ideology.

By visually and physically centering Chinggis Khaan, the monument is not to be seen as a mere architectural ornament but rather to be treated as the undeniable symbol of the state (Myadar and Rae 2014). Like the national monuments described by Mervyn Busteed, the Chinggis monument is "constructed of enduring materials [and is] designed not merely to withstand erosion by weather or traffic, but also to express the eternal character of the nation" (2009, 256).

Furthermore, the monument sits atop the steps to the building with a transcendent position over the viewer (Stewart 1984, 89). The spatial hierarchy between the monument (by extension, the state) and the viewer only highlights the inherent binary between the state and its citizens (Koch 2010). As in Koch's observation of the Kazakhstani monumentalist projects that are gigantic in scale, "only the state has access to the privileged panoptic view, while average citizens are conceptually diminished in scale and significance" (2010, 774–775). Aside from its location and spatiality, the size and design of the monument are also noteworthy. "Size and design are calculated to express the importance of [the monument] and to make [it] a visible center of attention not only to casual passersby but for the crowds during ceremonial occasions" (Busteed 2009, 257). The elevated position of the colossal monument forces the diminished viewer to look up literally, which in the process signals the subjectivity of the viewer to the symbolic representations of the monument (Koch

https://doi.org/10.1080/00905992.2017.1335297 Published online by Cambridge University Press

2010). While there are other prominent structures in the area including the Blue Sky Tower (see Figure 3), *because* the statue is a representation of a human figure, its size should be seen as a deliberate attempt at augmenting Chinggis Khaan's importance vis-à-vis an average passerby.

Furthermore, the way Chinggis Khaan is depicted in this monument signals the visual narrative the state produces. Here Chinggis Khaan sits authoritatively and dressed in traditional costume, without the usual décor of armors or weapons. This monument is in unequivocal contrast to Chinggis monuments elsewhere, including the Chinggis monuments in Ordos, China; a 40-meter stainless steel Chinggis monument on the eastern steppe of Mongolia; and the Chinggis monument in Marble Arch in Central London – all of which depict him as fierce and warrior like on horseback in full armor. By shying away from the theme of violence and destruction, this monument clearly narrates the allegorical focus of Chinggis' leadership of his people rather than conquering other lands.

The monument is also accompanied by two smaller monuments – of Ögödei Khaan and Khubilai Khaan (Chinggis Khaan's son and grandson, respectively). Chinggis Khaan produced numerous direct descendants.[5] The state's choice to limit the representation to only two of Chinggis' descendants considered the most successful suggests that the state is interested in *only* the selective legacy of Chinggis Khaan. Two smaller statues of soldiers also accompany the Chinggis statue. The soldiers are on horseback in full armor and have their hands on their weapons conveying the state's vigilance and power. Indeed the exclusively Chinggis Khaan-centered theme of the entire complex excludes other influential historic figures of Mongolia. Arguably, the absence of others serves only to amplify the presence of Chinggis Khaan and the particular articulation of history that the statute represents.

Figure 3. The Central Square of Ulaanbaatar. Photo by Michael Kohn with author's permission.

https://doi.org/10.1080/00905992.2017.1335297 Published online by Cambridge University Press

In order to understand the monument's symbolic importance, it is helpful to look to the monument's development. The monument's conception dates back to 1991, when the state ordered the monument of Great Master Chinggis Khaan (*Ih ezen Chinggis Khaany Höeshöö*) to be erected (presidential order #239 and the government order #348). These orders not only became the initial legal framework for this particular monument to develop into an arresting emblem of the state, but it also spearheaded a wider national ideological project to propagate the Chinggis Khaan cult. The state orders were issued amidst uncertainty following the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the inevitable drift of Mongolia from the Soviet-dictated ideological cage. The Mongolian state exploited the ideological vacuum, effectively shedding its socialist cast by reorienting itself in the glory of Chinggis Khaan.

The commitment to glorification of Chinggis Khaan was consistent throughout the otherwise tumultuous years. The president's decree of 2001 (N118) recommended to proliferate the glorification of Chinggis Khaan in Mongolia, including (but not limited to) supporting research on Chinggis Khan, enriching museums, organizing exhibitions, producing movies, and sponsoring art performances related to Chinggis Khaan. In spite of ideological differences between different political parties that have held power during this time, the commitment to Chinggis Khaan's glorification has never wavered. Otherwise rival political forces in Mongolia have largely been unified on one front: the promotion of a Chinggis Khaan-centered national identity.

In 2005, the government issued a decree #136,[6] to build the monument in front of the government palace and subsequently approved the budget for the construction of the complex. According to the National Audit Office, this initial budget was exceeded when the construction was completed in 2006. The artist L. Bold, who was the head of the National Art Council, led the project and completed the complex just in time for the 800-year anniversary (National Audit Office 2016).

Symbolic landscapes reflect power relations (Duncan 1990; Forest and Johnson 2002). They play a central role expressing the state ideology (Hook 2005). While symbolic landscapes are not the "audible part of policy talk," they silently, but effectively, inscribe political rhetoric onto the observer (Shapiro 1992, 88). Likewise, the monument of Chinggis Khaan signals to viewers "what to believe and how to behave" (Lowenthal 1985, 322). Following Lowenthal, Lkhamsuren argues that the Chinggis monument serves as a tool to illicit loyalty to the Mongolian state (2008, 40). Chinggis Khaan is widely credited as valuing the loyalty of his people (his subjects) above all (Weatherford 2005; Man 2007, 2010; May 2007). Lkhamsuren's interpretation, therefore, is a logical reading of the state narratives the monument produces among the contemporary Mongolian public.

Official state ceremonies are important spectacles that demand subjectivity and loyalty to the state. During various state-sponsored events, elite members of the state and other dignitaries offer ceremonial tribute to the Chinggis monument. They display utmost veneration to this beautifully crafted colossal bronze statue, amplifying its significance.[7] Hook argues that while monuments are "machines of ideology," only human actions power their affects (Hook 2005, 701). Therefore, spectacles such as the elite's tribute to the monument serve to empower otherwise ontologically powerless objects. "It is constituted not by something inherent to itself (a meaning, a concept, a value) but through the meanings and practices of others" (Rose 2002, 456). As Shapiro suggests, paying respect to the monument through these spectacles serves as a protoconversation. "It shapes the economies of the said and unsaid, as well as providing a structure of intelligibility for the said" (Shapiro 1992, 10). To follow David Harvey's critique of the corporate state as a mode of socio-

https://doi.org/10.1080/00905992.2017.1335297 Published online by Cambridge University Press

political organization, the state "transmits information downwards and 'instructs' individuals and groups down the hierarchy as to what behaviors are appropriate for the survival of society as a whole" (Harvey 1974, 20).

Foreign dignitaries also take part in this elaborate ritual. Official delegates to Mongolia join the heavily choreographed ceremony of paying respect to the Chinggis monument. Extending Ippei's (2012) assertion that Chinggis Khaan's name is used as a political and cultural resource in and out of Mongolia, this ritual is demonstrably used as a political narrative for post-socialist Mongolia's ideological undergirding, rooted in the fame and glory of Chinggis Khaan (Myadar and Rae 2014). The presence of the monument in the most prominent national space thus highlights both the departure from and arrival to the past. By embracing Chinggis as the preeminent marker of the idealized state image, Mongolia purposely departs from the Soviet legacy. In doing so, Mongolia arrives at a greater, more distant past. The Chinggis monument symbolically captures and articulates this dramatic ideological journey.

## Chinggisid Mongolia

The state accomplished several major projects before the 800-year anniversary. The renewed constitution of 1992 endorsed, among other things, "relish[ing] the traditions of the state, history and culture" (Constitution of Mongolia 1992). Subsequently, Mongolia's banknotes were redesigned in 1993 in such that any note above 100 *tögrögs* now features Chinggis Khaan (Myadar and Rae 2014). Prior to this change, an image of Damdiny Sukhbaatar adorned the banknotes. In general, banknotes are important "bearers and transmitters of the iconography of the nation-state" (Penrose 2011, 429). Banknotes serve as a means through which the state banally but clearly narrates its ideology to the public. After all, through the use of money, the state remains "deeply involved in the daily life of the public" (Gilbert 1999, 23). Redesigning banknotes, therefore, is a necessary state intervention for conveying its ideological shift even though "the national emblems and images that grace this money go largely unnoticed in commercial transactions and the ideological functions that they fulfill go often unnoticed" (Penrose 2011, 429–430). By making this thematic change, therefore, the government narrated its ideological shift – from Soviet-dictated socialism to Chinggisid Mongolia – an eventual arrival at the radically renewed nation.

Consistent with the aspiration of Chinggisid Mongolia, the Mongolian national airport changed its name (and, therefore, its identity) from Buyant-Uhaa to Chinggis Khaan Airport in 2005. The airport is the largest and only international airport in the country and is thus the primary gateway to Mongolia, framing what Mongolia is and how Mongolia is to be seen. The name signals to visitors to Mongolia the national ideological lineage. The airport is also a prelude to the endless Chinggis images in the country.

As such, Mongolia managed to fully assert its identity as Chinggisid Mongolia before the grand celebration of the 800-year anniversary. The year-long celebration started promptly on the first day of 2006 with the leaders of the state announcing the commencement of the great anniversary year. The year was filled with various elaborate celebrations and festivals, many of which were parts of the state's official anniversary program. Each event was dedicated and carefully choreographed to glorify Chinggis Khaan and his honorable deeds. Events included a production of a Chinggis Khaan opera and a horse relay carrying water and soil from Chinggis Khaan's birthplace to Khar Khorum, Mongolia's ancient capital. The anniversary ended on the last day of 2006 with the president's closing address of the nationwide celebration of the 800th Anniversary of the Mongolian State.

https://doi.org/10.1080/00905992.2017.1335297 Published online by Cambridge University Press

The state appropriation of Chinggis Khaan has accelerated since then. In 2007, then-President of Mongolia, Nambaryn Enkhbayar, issued a decree (N98) with comprehensive directives to continue propagating the Chinggis glorification. The list included, among others: directives for learning about and disseminating information on Chinggis Khaan's historic role; his deeds and his teachings; paying respect to his monument during state holidays; displaying the portrait of Chinggis Khaan in every organization, community, school, and cultural center; and, facilitating necessary mechanisms to respect and adopt Chinggis Khaan's orders and teachings. The solid and permanent structure suggests that "the possibility of anchoring a fleeting moment in time to an immovable place" (Dwyer and Alderman 2008, 168). Under the state directives, the nationwide propagation of Chinggis Khaan continued to prevail through various public expressions, including naming one of the main Ulaanbaatar avenues as Chinggis Avenue; adopting various symbols and icons from the Chinggis period as the state official symbols, including the black standard (Chinggis war symbol); and creation of a Chinggis medal as the highest symbol of honor.

While Enkhbayar fell from fame and was later imprisoned on corruption charges, his passionate call for the universal veneration of Chinggis Khaan lives on under his rival and successor Tsahia Elbegdorj. In the beginning of 2012, Elbegdorj issued a decree stating that Temuujin's (Chinggis Khaan's childhood name) birth date should be formally determined (presidential decree of 2012 N4). Under Elbegdorj's leadership, Mongolian scientists and historians worked together to determine Chinggis Khaan's birthday in preparation to celebrate his 850-year anniversary in 2012. While Chinggis Khaan's exact birth date is not known in any historical record, the state made a daring commitment to discover his day of birth and assumed the role of generating a new fictive knowledge to memorialize Chinggis Khaan. Based on the recommendations of the working group on formalizing Temuujin's birthdate, the president picked a date to make Temuujin's official birthday, which will follow the Mongolian lunar calendar to promote authenticity. This date, the president declared, would be celebrated nationwide as the "Mongolian pride day."

Yet again, in July 2013, the state took another bold move and changed the name of the main square in Ulaanbaatar from Sukhbaatar Square to Chinggis Khaan square per Decree 75 of the Ulaanbaatar City Representatives' Council of 15 July 2013. The square has been an important public space since it was constructed in honor of Sukhbaatar Damdin, whose prominent statue still stood in the middle. However, the politicians, including the city mayor Bat-Uul Erdene, who were the primary engineers of the change, highlighted the importance of reclaiming Mongolia's "truthful past" (Bat-Uul 2012).

Renaming the square was a state-imposed spatial articulation that took place in spite of public opposition. Within a month of the name change, a group of citizens filed a legal petition in protest, arguing that the square's name was changed in violation of the law and without following proper legislative procedures (Sonin 2013). A subsequent legal petition was filed by the descendants of Sukhbaatar. And a public opinion survey revealed that 97% of total of 1315 respondents did not support the name change. Only 3% or 39 people supported the name change (Undesten 2015). The public's opposition to the square's name change suggests growing public resistance to the top-down approach in articulating the nation's identity and the manifestations of it in symbolic landscapes.

The widespread sentiment was encapsulated in an interview with a 93-year-old woman days after the central square's name was changed to Chinggis Khaan square: Choijid Badamtseren was one of the first female teachers in the country and worked most of her adult life as a teacher. She spent her entire adult life in Ulaanbaatar. She had a vivid memory of the time the square was not a square. She remembered when it was first established, and she had just witnessed the name change when interviewed in her home in the

https://doi.org/10.1080/00905992.2017.1335297 Published online by Cambridge University Press

center of the city. In some ways she was a recorder of the city's history. When asked what she thought of the recent change of the square's name, she replied,

> My name is Choijid. I have been called Choijid all my life. Everyone knows me and calls me by that name. What if someone one day said that I can no longer be called Choijid? No matter how important and beautiful the new name is, I am still Choijid.

And she insisted that the square was still Sukhbaatar Square to her and would remain as such for the rest of her life.

Choijid's sentiments echoed others' interviewed on the date of the announcement. But, more importantly, her reaction articulates the complexity surrounding national symbols. While Choijid did not have any negative feelings toward Chinggis Khaan or his appropriation in post-Soviet Mongolia, she did not feel it was necessary to displace other national symbols. She was not alone in regarding Sukhbaatar as another important figure in Mongolia's history and in feeling that his legacy should not be erased from public memory, or from the cityscape. Indeed, bowing to public pressure, the state recently reversed course and changed Chinggis Khaan square back to Sukhbaatar Square in September 2016. It might have been a moment of vindication for Choichid, but she died a year too early, at the age of 97.

## Remembering and forgetting Chinggis Khaan

In order to understand the state's deliberate appropriation of Chinggis Khaan, it is necessary to examine the appeal of the past and the process of forgetting and remembering. It is equally important to question why Mongolia specifically has traveled back 800 years and seized upon Chinggis Khaan to represent the nation. Appropriating a complex historic figure as a national representation of grandeur necessarily requires the art of articulation so that the public is both proudly receptive and responsive to the representation. In the case of Chinggis Khaan, this task is complicated by the fact that he is someone who symbolizes pain and agony to many, depending on what their historical memory represents (Myadar 2011; Myadar and Rae 2014). As such Chinggis continues to be a radically polarizing, bifurcated emblem depending on where in the historic continuum he is appropriated and why such appropriation is deemed necessary.

Urdyn Bulag is one of the few scholars who have provided an engaging discussion on the appropriation of Chinggis Khan. He historically situates this appropriation by documenting the waves of Chinggis glorification (or lack thereof) not only in Mongolia but also in China, Japan, and Russia. He also highlights that Chinggis Khan, as an unequivocally prominent figure in world history, represents competing or even polarized feelings and meanings:

> The appropriation of Chinggis Khan cannot be done by keeping only the positive meaning and cleansing him of the opposite meaning. It requires embracing him in his entirety. The central problem afflicting [his appropriators] was Chinggis Khan's embodiment of both the most glorious and most atrocious. (Bulag 2010, 61)

Despite this apparent binary of his reputation, Chinggis Khaan's name is incontestably legitimized in post-socialist Mongolia. In understanding this puzzling legitimation process (and the reception of it by the public), it is useful to analyze the appropriation of history in constructing national identity.

Reproduction of the past is "a complex dialectic of remembering and forgetting" (Billig 1995, 37). "Tradition, history, and identity cannot be invented without displacement of something else" (Kaplonski 2005, 149). As national histories are generally haunted by

https://doi.org/10.1080/00905992.2017.1335297 Published online by Cambridge University Press

undesirable parts and unflattering moments (especially that of violence and cruelty that may have facilitated their very existence), there is a parallel process of both purposeful remembering and deliberate forgetting (Billig 1995, 38).

What we consider national past is in Lowenthal's words forever barred to us and that "we have only attenuated memories and fragmentary chronicles of prior experience and can only dream of escaping the confines of the present" (Lowenthal 1985, 4). This idea is similar to Ernest Renan's point of collective amnesia. According to Renan, for a nation to sustain itself, it needs collective amnesia to void the past, as national unity "is always effected by means of brutality" (1990, 11). It is the state's role, therefore, to administer this much needed amnesia and fill the collective memory with desired and tolerable versions of history. To revisit Foucault's dramatic imagery "the blood that has dried on the codes of the law" has to be erased from the collective memory of the public (Foucault 1980, 18).

The contrast between how Chinggis Khaan was denounced during the socialist period (serving the ideological purpose of the state at the time) and how he is rigorously revered in the post-socialist era (serving the ideological purpose of the state now) highlights the juxtaposition of such purposeful selection, highlights, or erasure of certain parts of so-called history by the state. The juxtaposition articulates "the signifying system through which necessarily (though among other means) a social order is communicated, reproduced, experienced and explored" (Williams 1982, 13).

To borrow Don Mitchell's problematization of culture, the evocation of the past in the present is another "means for representing relations of power" (1995, 108). "The top-down ideological structuring" works in the interest of the state precisely because it is used as a political tool to enlist the public for the wider state legitimization project (Mitchell 1995). The ways the state appropriates Chinggis Khaan as the symbol of national grandeur serve to produce a nostalgic tour back to an idealized past. One could argue that the state's attempts at manifesting a nostalgic past in Mongolia has succeeded at least to some degree in evoking nostalgic memory at both restorative and reflective levels. The restorative nostalgia serves to visit the idealized image of Mongolia as a land of glory and power to resist being overshadowed by its neighbors and existing in oblivion. Chinggis fascination, therefore, serves to create the imaginary "ideal" past. "The past provides the proof of right for the current sovereign state to exist" (Kaplonski 1993, 247). Reflective nostalgia, on the other hand, uses historical memory (*nuanced* and *selective*) to resist the present so as not to repeat the real or perceived assaults endured in the past. Thus, memories of the colonial past (most recently the Soviet leash on Mongolia) highlight the destructions brought upon otherwise pristine Mongolian identity.

As Kaplonski suggests, nationalism "not only argues *against* something (colonial rule) but argues *for* something (self-rule and independence)" (Kaplonski 2000, 333, emphasis in original). "The genealogist does not use history to lament the wandering away from a past ideal or the failure to move forward an ideal future, but to point to current dangers" (Shapiro 1992, 11). The rise of the Chinggis cult therefore serves not only as an anti-colonial tool but also as a plea for a renewed, reinvigorated glorious nation, as Mongolia once was.

> When we long for the past, we long for what might have been as well as what was: it is only by incorporating such longing into our narratives that we can suspend the past and ultimately change its meanings in the present. (McDermott 2002, 408)

Meanwhile, China's dazzling growth and bulging nationalistic muscles at its immediate frontier rekindle bitter historical memories (Myadar and Rae 2014). The specter of China silently occupying Mongolia has emerged as a prevalent concern and serves as an

https://doi.org/10.1080/00905992.2017.1335297 Published online by Cambridge University Press

impetus for Mongolia to reterritorialize its discursive boundaries (Myadar 2011; Billé 2016). Territorializing its distinctiveness has been an important nationalist endeavor for post-Soviet Mongolia, especially in opposition to the Chinese (Billé 2016). The anti-Chinese feelings were starkly evident in the survey conducted by the Sant Maral Foundation to identify public perceptions of the best partner country for Mongolia (Spadavecchia 2014). Without providing a list of possible countries as a suggestion, the survey simply asked the respondents what country they felt was the best partner country for Mongolia. While Russia was still favored by over half of the respondents, merely 1.2% felt that China was the best partner for Mongolia despite its geographic proximity (Spadavecchia 2014).

In an attempt to unify the public in service of a vision of an ideal Mongolian nation, the state's role therefore has been to produce the romanticized past and nurture the nostalgic feelings associated with it. In doing so, the state effectively narrates a collective desire for a sense of belonging, recognition, and, most of all, security – using Chinggis as the prime inspiration and source of pride. "Politics can go on once people have secured their holdings, and one can forget about the political process involved in establishing such holdings" (Shapiro 1992, 94).

As Chatterjee suggests, political-ideological discourses "have to be justified by appeal to logical, epistemological and above all ethical principles" (1986, 41). Given the historic vulnerability of its status as a separate and distinct entity, Mongolians are receptive to such nationalistic calls. Historical tides have time and again robbed Mongolia of its sovereignty and subjugated it to both neighbors, Russia and China. Perhaps these bitter historical memories help explain why Mongolia has resurrected a powerful icon to ward off similar peril in the future.

## Conclusion

In November 2012, Mongolia celebrated the 850th anniversary of the birth of Chinggis Khaan. This was the first official celebration of his birthday since the Mongolian president designated Chinggis Khaan's birth date. At the direction of the state, the day was regarded as "Mongolian pride day." Given that Chinggis Khaan's birthday was itself an epistemological creation of the state, this event highlighted the state's principal role in the propagation of Chinggis Khaan as the rightful symbol of national identity. In appropriating this long-gone historical figure as the national symbol for the post-socialist era, the Mongolian state uses memories of and nostalgia for the reign of Chinggis Khaan – *remembering* and *forgetting* parts where necessary – for instilling pride and devotion in the symbolic representation of the nation. Given that Chinggis Khaan's legacy is beset by competing and even polarizing historic memories and narratives worldwide, it is necessary for the Mongolian state to continue "flagging" for the public the newly rehabilitated image of Chinggis Khaan.[8] The monumental statue of Chinggis Khaan as benevolent ruler in the front of the government palace is one of countless such efforts of the state at flagging this reformed image and demanding subjectivity of the public to Chinggis Khaan, as the personification of the state it represents.[9]

The state's devotion of vast human and material resources to augment the legacy of Chinggis Khaan to near-cult status can be understood through the Foucauldian project of governmentality – or the art of governing through subtle uses of power by which the masses are made governable, and conditioned to self-governed and self-discipline.

The Mongolian state has managed to rally the public around a Chinggis-centered national identity. Thus ideologically unified, Mongolians as subjects are easier to govern

https://doi.org/10.1080/00905992.2017.1335297 Published online by Cambridge University Press

than if they remained divided, fighting for competing ideologies. The systems of meaning and intelligibility produced by the state work to create a unitary citizenry. A homogeneously united population in turn makes it easier to maintain social order than it would be without such a unified belief system. Therefore, the Mongolian state has rewritten and appropriated history to mold the popular psyche into its vision of a preferred society, united in the glorification of the Mongolian state through its new personification: Chinggis Khan. As in Duncan's (1990) critique of Kandyan "transmission of traditions," the narratives of a glorious past have been recorded and transmitted by the elite (just as by Sri Lankan kings in the case of Kandy). This process has in turn deepened and enriched the community identity and provided legitimization for the Mongolian government as "ruler" (Duncan 1990, 22).

Yet, in spite of the massive efforts of the state to foster and perpetuate a Chinggis-centered national ideology, there are moments of rupture and resistance. Choichid's and others' resistance to the state's decision to alter the central square's name was one of such moments. And the most recent reversal of the square's name from Chinggis Square to Sukhbaatar Square speaks to the power of such resistance and the limits of state hegemony.

## Notes

1. Entrepreneurs in Mongolia commodify Chinggis Khaan as the most reliable and dignified brand. As such, one can find a wide range of products and businesses named after him, including hotels, restaurants, pubs, carpets, beers, and vodkas, to name just a few (Bulag 2010, 32).
2. As shall be discussed later, Chinggis's birthday was picked by historians (under the directives by the state) in 2012. As the record of his birth is entirely unknown, it is a pure invention to serve the state's ideological need.
3. In 1991, Mongolian rock singer Jargalsaihan established his band Chinggis Khaan. He has several songs paying tributes to Chinggis Khaan, some of which won international awards.
4. They are several ultra-nationalist groups in Mongolia. They are inspired by the legacy of Chinggis Khaan and often publicly state their position to keep Chinggis's blood pure. They have been responsible for increased physical and verbal abuses against foreigners in Mongolia, as they consider foreigners taint otherwise pristine Mongolian culture and pure Mongolian blood.
5. According to a recent genetic study, 0.5% of the male population in the world might indeed be direct descendants of Chinggis Khaan. The study suggested that 8% of the men living in the region of the former Mongol empire carry y-chromosomes that are nearly identical. Therefore, roughly 16 million descendants living today could be linked to Chinggis Khaan (Zerjal et al. 2003).
6. These decrees were superseded by the president's decrees of 1997 (N59) and 2001 (N118) and the government decrees of 1993 (N27), 1997 (N115), 2001 (N112), and 2005 (N136).
7. The monument was designed by renowned artist L. Bold. He crafted the monument with artists from the Mongolian Artists' Association.
8. I borrowed here Michael Billig's (1995) term "flagging" for continual reminding.
9. For more detailed information on the various forms of "expressions" in Ulaanbaatar's cityscape, see Diener and Hagen (2013).

## References

Bat-Uul, Erdene. 2012. *В.И.Лениний хөшөөг буулгалаа* [V.I. Lenin Statue Is Removed], October 12. Accessed May 23, 2017. http://news.gogo.mn/r/112413.

Billé, Franck. 2016. *Sinophobia: Anxiety, Violence, and the Making of Mongolian Identity*. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press.

Billig, Michael. 1995. *Banal Nationalism*. London: Sage.

Boldbaatar, Jigjid. 1999. "The Eight-Hundredth Anniversary of Chinggis Khan: The Revival and Suppression of Mongolian National Consciousness." In *Mongolia in the Twentieth Century: Landlocked Cosmopolitan*, edited by Stephen Kotkin and Bruce A. Elleman, 237–246. Armonk, NY: ME Sharpe.

Bulag, Urdyn E. 1998. *Nationalism and Hybridity in Mongolia*. New York: Oxford University Press.

https://doi.org/10.1080/00905992.2017.1335297 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Bulag, Urdyn E. 2010. *Collaborative Nationalism: The Politics of Friendship on China's Mongolian Frontier*. New York: Rowman & Littlefield.
Busteed, Mervyn Austen. 2009. "Historical Geography of Nationalism." In *International Encyclopedia of Human Geography*, edited by Rob Kitchin and Nigel Thrift, 255–260. Oxford: Elsevier.
Chatterjee, Partha. 1986. *Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: A Derivative Discourse*. London: Zed Books.
Constitution of Mongolia. 1992. "Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia." Accessed May 23, 2017. http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/@ed_protect/@protrav/@ilo_aids/documents/legaldocument/wcms_117392.pdf.
Deleuze, Gilles, and Félix Guattari. 1987. *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*. Translated by Brian Massumi. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Diener, Alexander C., and Joshua Hagen. 2013. "City of Felt and Concrete: Negotiating Cultural Hybridity in Mongolia's Capital of Ulaanbaatar." *Nationalities Papers* 41 (4): 622–650.
Duncan, James S. 1990. *The City as Text: The Politics of Landscape Interpretation in the Kandyan Kingdom*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Dwyer, Owen J., and Derek H. Alderman. 2008. *Civil Rights Memorials and the Geography of Memory*. Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press.
Forest, Benjamin, and Juliet Johnson. 2002. "Unravelling the Threads of History: Soviet-Era Monuments and Post-Soviet National Identity in Moscow." *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 92: 524–547.
Foucault, Michel. 1977. *Discipline and Punish*. New York: Vintage.
Foucault, Michel. 1980. "War in the Filigree of Peace Course Summary." *Oxford Literary Review* 4 (2): 15–19.
Gilbert, Emily. 1999. "Forging a National Currency: Money, State-Making and Nationbuilding in Canada." In *Nation-States and Money: The Past, Present and Future of National Currencies*, edited by Emily Gilbert and Eric Helleiner, 25–46. New York: Routledge.
Government Decree. 1991. *Zasgiin gazryn zarlig* (N348), Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia.
Government Decree. 1993. *Zasgiin gazryn zarlig* (N27), Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia.
Government Decree. 1997. *Zasgiin gazryn zarlig* (N115), Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia.
Government Decree. 2001. *Zasgiin gazryn zarlig* (N112), Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia.
Government Decree. 2005. *Zasgiin gazryn zarlig* (N 136), Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia.
Harvey, David. 1974. "What Kind of Geography for What Kind of Public Policy?" *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers* 63: 18–24.
Hook, Derek. 2005. "Monumental Space and the Uncanny." *Geoforum* 36 (6): 688–704.
Humphrey, Caroline, and David Sneath. 1999. *The End of Nomadism? Society, State, and the Environment in Inner Asia*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
Ippei, Shimamura. 2012. *Chinggis Khaan henii baatar ve?* [Whose Hero Is Chinggis Khaan?]. Ulaanbaatar: Admon.
Kaplonski, Chris. 1993. "Collective Memory and Chingunjav's Rebellion." *History and Anthropology* 6 (2–3): 235–259.
Kaplonski, Chris. 2000. "The Role of the Mongols in Eurasian History: A Reassessment." In *Role of Migration in the History of the Eurasian Steppe: Sedentary Civilization vs. 'Barbarian' and Nomad*, edited by Andrew Villen Bell, 251–274. New York: St. Martin's Press.
Kaplonski, Chris. 2005. "The Case of the Disappearing Chinggis Khaan: Dismembering the Remembering." *Ab Imperio* 4: 147–173.
Koch, Natalie. 2010. "The Monumental and the Miniature: Imagining 'Modernity' in Astana." *Social and Cultural Geography* 11 (8): 769–787.
Lkhamsuren, Munkh-Erdene. 2008. "Selling of Good Father's Name: Legitimacy, Pride and Commodity, Commemoration of Chinggis Khaan." *Modern Mongolia Bulletin* 24: 35–46.
Lowenthal, David 1985. *The Past is a Foreign Country*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Man, John. 2007. *Genghis Khan: Life, Death, and Resurrection*. London: Bantam Press.
Man, John. 2010. *The Leadership Secrets of Genghis Khan*. London: Bantam Press.
May, Timothy. 2007. *The Mongol Art of War: Chinggis Khan and the Mongol Military System*. Yardley, PA: Westholme.
McDermott, Sinead. 2002. "Memory, Nostalgia, and Gender in a Thousand Acres." *Signs, Journal of Women in Culture and Society* 28 (1): 389–407.
Miller, Peter, Colin Gordon, and Graham Burchell, eds. 1991. *The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

https://doi.org/10.1080/00905992.2017.1335297 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Mitchell, Don. 1995. "There's No Such Thing as Culture: Towards a Reconceptualization of the Idea of Culture in Geography." *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers* 20: 102–116.
Myadar, Orhon. 2006. "Post-Soviet Transitions: Central Asia and Mongolia." In *Islam, Oil, and Geopolitics: Central Asia after September 11*, edited by Elizabeth Davis and Rouben Azizian, 257–269. New York: Rowman and Littlefield.
Myadar, Orhon. 2011. "Imaginary Nomads: Deconstructing the Representation of Mongolia as a Land of Nomads." *Inner Asia* 13 (2): 335–362.
Myadar, Orhon, and James Deshaw Rae. 2014. "Territorializing National Identity in Post-socialist Mongolia." *Eurasian Geography and Economics* 55 (5): 560–577.
National Audit Office. 2016. *Ih ezen Chingis Khaan hoshoo, turiin yoslol, hundetgeliin hoshoo tsogt-solboriig barij baiguulahad usliin tusvuus 2006ond olgoson horongiin guitsetgel* [Audit Report on the Expenditure of the 2006 State Budget Allocated to the Construction of the Chinggis Khaan Complex at the Government Palace]. Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia.
Penrose, Jan. 2011. "Designing the Nation. Banknotes, Banal Nationalism and Alternative Conceptions of the State." *Political Geography* 30 (8): 429–440.
Presidential Decree. 1991. *Yeroenhiiloegchiin zarlig* (N239), Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia.
Presidential Decree. 1997. *Yeroenhiiloegchiin zarlig* (N59), Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia.
Presidential Decree. 2001. *Yeroenhiiloegchiin zarlig* (N118), Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia.
Presidential Decree. 2007. *Yeroenhiiloegchiin zarlig* (N98), Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia.
Presidential Decree. 2012. *Yeroenhiiloegchiin zarlig* (N4), Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia.
Renan, Ernest. 1990. "What Is a Nation?" (1882). In Ernest Renan, *Qu'est-ce qu'une nation?* Paris: Presses-Pocket, 1992. (Translated by Ethan Rundell). Accessed May 23, 2017. http://ucparis.fr/files/9313/6549/9943/What_is_a_Nation.pdf.
Rose, Mitch. 2002. "Landscape and Labyrinths." *Geoforum* 33 (4): 455–467.
Rossabi, Morris. 2005. *Modern Mongolia: From Commissars to Capitalists*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Shapiro, Michael. 1992. *Reading the Postmodern Polity: Political Theory as Textual Practice*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Sneath, David. 2007. *The Headless State: Aristocratic Orders, Kinship Society, and Misrepresentations of Nomadic Inner Asia*. New York: Columbia University Press.
Sonin, 2013. Д. Сүхбаатарын хөшөө төв талбайд 90 гаруй жил болсны учир [Why Sukhbaatar's Statue Occupied the Central Square for over 90 Years?]. Accessed September 13, 2015. http://www.sonin.mn/news/politics-economy/20543.
Spadavecchia, Jamian Ronca. 2014. "Nationalism, Pastoral Nomadism, and Political Risk to Natural Resource Investments in Mongolia: Case Studies of the Aluminum Corporation of China Limited (Chalco) and Rio Tinto." *Journal of Political Risk* 2 (6).
Stewart, Susan. 1984. *On Longing: Narratives of the Miniature, the Gigantic, the Souvenir, the Collection*. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press.
*Time*. 1999. "Millennium Top Ten." December 31, 154 (27).
Trubetzkoy, Nikolai Sergeevich, and Anatoly Liberman. 1997. "The Legacy of Genghis Khan and Other Essays on Russia's Identity." *Studies in East European Thought* 49 (1): 70–79.
Undesten. 2015. Иргэдийн 97% нь Сүхбаатарын талбайн нэрийг хуучнаар нь үлдээхийг *дэмжлээ* [97% of Citizens Supported Keeping Sukhbaatar Square's Old Name]. http://undesten.mn/index.php?newsid=335.
Weatherford, Jack. 2005. *Genghis Khan and the Making of the Modern World*. New York: Crown.
Williams, Raymond. 1982. *The Sociology of Culture*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Zerjal, Tatiana, Yali Xue, Giorgio Bertorelle, R. Spencer Wells, Weidong Bao, Suling Zhu, Raheel Qamar, et al. 2003. "The Genetic Legacy of the Mongols." *The American Journal of Human Genetics* 72 (3): 717–721.

https://doi.org/10.1080/00905992.2017.1335297 Published online by Cambridge University Press